The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema (I-G)
Emil Badici (University of Florida)

In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to “sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes,” because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to sink virtually all orthodox solutions, and that the Inclosure Schema cannot be the structure that underlies the Liar paradox. Moreover, Ramsey was right in thinking that logical and semantic paradoxes are paradoxes of different kinds.

The Duhem-Quine Thesis (I-I)
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (Montana State University)

There are two versions of the Duhem-Quine thesis: (i) confirmation holism and (ii) evidence holism. After disentangling the notions of confirmation and belief from that of evidence, I propose two Bayesian accounts to address these two versions of the Duhem- Quine thesis. I further distinguish confirmation holism and evidence holism into two respective sub-varieties. I argue that none of the versions of the Duhem-Quine thesis is tenable.

Saving Strawson (I-K)
Peter Brian Barry (Saginaw Valley State University)

The discussion offered by Peter Strawson in his seminal “Freedom and Resentment” is typically taken to suggest that Strawson identifies being a morally responsible agent with being an apt candidate for the exercise of the reactive attitudes. So understood, an agent is exempt from moral responsibility if she is not an apt candidate. Even sympathetic commentators have observed that Strawson appears committed to allowing that being an evil person is an exempting condition and that evil persons are therefore not apt candidates for the reactive attitudes nor are morally responsible. After identifying just why exempting evil persons from moral responsibility is problematic for Strawson, I consider and reject a modification of Strawson’s account. I then suggest that the proper Strawsonian response is to reject an implausible account of evil personhood that underlies the objection that Strawson must exempt evil persons.

Kim on the Explanatory Argument for Physicalism (IV-J)
Jared G. Bates (Hanover College)

The explanatory argument for physicalism argues that physicalist type-identities give the best explanation of psychophysical correlations. Kim (2005) levels four major objections against the explanatory argument for physicalism, including that psychophysical identities cannot explain (let alone best explain) psychophysical correlations. I will reconstruct and assess all of Kim’s objections. The result is a defense of the explanatory argument for physicalism.
Courage, Fear of Death, and the Silencing of Competing Reasons (I-H)
Anne Margaret Baxley (Washington University in St. Louis)
Contemporary virtue theorists have fastened onto the fact that Aristotle and other classical virtue theorists accept a crucial difference between the person who merely acts rightly and the person who is wholehearted in what she does. But what accounts for the fact that both the continent and the virtuous person act in accordance with their best judgment, yet only one experiences conflict, temptation, and struggle? One promising answer, most closely associated with John McDowell, is that the requirements of virtue “silence” competing reasons for action. McDowell has argued that Aristotle’s contrast between virtue and continence requires the silencing thesis. But the silencing interpretation is not compelling. Aristotle does not think that virtue always silences concerns that are sacrificed by virtuous action, for he thinks that courage fails to silence the fear of death.

Globalist Attitudes and Special Relations (IV-H)
Macalester C. Bell (Columbia University)

Some attitudes take persons, or more specifically, a person’s moral character as their object. Shame, contempt, disdain, disgust and admiration all have this feature. But insofar as these attitudes are concerned with global assessments of character, they are seen as especially troubling. Objectors have complained that these attitudes associated with global assessments of character (henceforth “globalist attitudes”) can never fit their objects, and thus can never be warranted. In this paper, I will argue that those who dismiss all globalist attitudes in this way are misguided. Specifically, I will argue that this objection depends upon a mistaken view about how we ought to assess character traits. Once we recognize that our special relations can affect our character judgments, we ought to conclude that our globalist attitudes can, in many cases, fit their objects and thus should not be summarily dismissed as unfitting.

Kaplan on Quine’s Theorem (II-K)
Paolo Bonardi (University of Geneva and University of Sheffield)

The so-called Quine’s Theorem states that in a sentence, if a given position, occupied by a singular term, is not open to substitution, then that position cannot be occupied by a variable bound to an initially placed quantifier. A presumed counter-instance to this theorem has been put forward by David Kaplan in his article “Opacity.” The purpose of my paper is to illustrate Kaplan’s counter-instance to the theorem and to prove that it fails.

The Paradox of Resources: Global Inequalities and Resource Distribution (IV-I)
Idil Boran (York University)

Some cosmopolitans defend a system of global distributive justice, which prescribes an egalitarian redistribution of natural resource wealth between countries. Their argument relies on the claim that inequalities in natural resource distribution are responsible for inequalities in wealth between nations. This paper argues that this proposal is false and proposes to revise some of the standard assumptions about global justice accordingly. The analysis begins with the explanation of the resource thesis, the claim that resource endowment is an economic asset for a country, followed by the normative proposal to address inequalities through resource-based redistribution. An objection is then raised in light of recent studies in economics, which disclose economic problems associated with resource endowment in developing countries. The philosophical implications of these findings are discussed and lessons are derived for normative debates on global justice.

Visual Shape Perception and Bodily Action (III-J)
Robert E. Briscoe (Loyola University New Orleans)

In this paper, I examine the proposal—central to Alva Noë’s recent “enactive” account of visual perception—that in order to see an object’s 3D shape it is necessary to possess sensorimotor knowledge of the way the object’s 2D, perspectival-shape would vary with variation in one’s point of view. Noë’s proposal, I argue, mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception, i.e., our ability to see the orientation of an object’s visible surfaces in depth, to volumetric object recognition, i.e., our ability to identify the object’s volumetric shape from any of indefinitely many different possible perspectives on the object. I then try to show that this error is symptomatic of a much broader confusion about the role of bodily action in spatially contentful visual perception.

Understanding Meno’s Paradox in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I.1 (II-G)
David Bronstein (Oxford University/University of Toronto)

This paper presents a close reading of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I 1, focusing on the middle third of the chapter (71a17-30). Here Aristotle introduces a peculiar sort of learning, draws a distinction between two ways of knowing in order to explain it (“knowing universally” and “knowing without qualification”), and suggests that this distinction also solves a version of Meno’s paradox. Commentators have had difficulty understanding the connection between what Aristotle calls “the problem in the Meno” and Meno’s paradox as it appears in Plato’s dialogue. In addition, commentators have had difficulty connecting Aristotle’s distinction between knowing universally and knowing without qualification to his version of the paradox. This paper aims to solve these difficulties by presenting an interpretation of knowing universally and knowing without qualification, one that helps bring to light what exactly Aristotle means when he alludes to “the problem in the Meno.”

Moral Judgments: Etiologies and Credibility (IV-K)
Matthew Brophy (Minnesota State University–Mankato)

The interplay between moral intuitions and principles is a vital part of moral methodology. In fact, most ethical theorists exhibit deference to moral intuitions: Neo-Kantians are troubled by the Inquiring Murderer; utilitarianism by the Framed Innocent Man; virtue ethics by the Mafioso; and so forth. We seem to recognize that even if we have a map of moral principles, without the compass of moral intuitions, our ability to navigate the moral landscape would be lost. Principles without intuitions are empty, and intuitions without principles are blind. Our moral intuitions, however, are sometimes mistaken. Upon what basis can the credibility of a moral judgment be determined? In this paper, I examine how the credibility of an intuition can be determined by examining its “etiology.” The etiology of a moral intuition is its causal origin, which includes sociological, psychological, and biological factors, some of which might impugn its credibility.

Demonstratives and Indirect Perception (III-J)
Derek H. Brown (Brandon University)

I develop an account of demonstrative reference involving indirect perception and use that account to respond to A.D. Smith’s (The Problem of Perception, 2003) recent argument against indirect realism. The groundwork for my solution emerges from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role this indirectness plays in assertive utterances such as “That is an x.” I argue that in normal perception indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory role in such judgments, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to Smith’s criticism. The discussion is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.

Metaphysics and Ethics in Plato’s Republic (I-H)
Travis L. Butler (Iowa State University)

In Platonic Ethics: Old and New Julia Annas argues that the metaphysics of forms proper to the Republic does not serve as a foundation for the eudaimonist ethical theory presented therein. The ethics and metaphysics are parts of the same whole, but there is no hierarchy between them. Here I argue that Plato is ambivalent between the construal of eudaimonism that requires purification and separation, and the construal that requires harmony and cooperative functioning. My contention is that he settles on the latter in the Republic in part because of his commitment to the metaphysical claim that forms are powers productive of genuine value in the sensible world. Thus, metaphysics is foundational to ethics in the strong sense that Plato settles on one understanding of what his ethics means on the basis of the details of the theory of forms in the Republic.

Shared Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Restitution (IV-I)
Todd C. Calder (University of Victoria)

This paper explores the grounds of shared responsibility for injustices brought about by structural features of our society. The paper focuses on what the law of restitution can tell us about our shared responsibility for structural injustices.

Mill, Sentimentalism, and the Problem of Moral Authority (V-H)
Daniel J. Callcut (University of North Florida)

Mill’s aim in Chapter 3 of Utilitarianism is to show that his revisionary moral theory can preserve the kind of authority typically and traditionally associated with moral demands. One of his main targets is the idea that if people come to believe that morality is rooted in human sentiment then they will feel less bound by moral obligation on those occasions when moral demands clash with something they want. Chapter 3 emphasizes two main claims: 1) The main motivation to ethical action comes from feelings and not from beliefs, and 2) Ethical feelings are highly malleable. However, these two claims, intended to help form a significant rebuttal to the worry that a utilitarian conception of morality might undermine moral authority, can be combined to raise powerful skeptical concerns. I explain how Mill evades the skepticism, and why contemporary fellow travelers might be in worse shape to deal with the worry.

Denying Incomparability (IV-F)
David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)

My paper critiques the comparability requirement that practical reason is limited by the possibility of comparing alternatives. I describe methods of reasoning that are compatible with choice between incomparable options, and discuss a mistake about intention that supports the view that comparing alternatives is the only way to choose rationally. I then explain how a model of rational choice that prescribes the comparison of alternatives invents unacceptable concepts to make comparability possible. Finally, I criticize the assumption of the unity of practical reason that requires that prudential and moral choices are both made by comparing alternatives. It turns out that moral conflicts that are intractable for those who reason with a method of comparison may be resolvable by using moral reasoning that does not involve the comparison of alternatives in terms of a comprehensive value. Making room for such forms of reasoning is preferable to denying incomparability.

Kantian Rigorism and Defensive Deception (II-F)
Michael J. Cholbi (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

Tamar Schapiro has recently attempted to show that defensive deception (e.g., lying to prevent a murder) is allowable on Kantian grounds. Her attempt appeals to the notion that the murderer’s intentions indicate that he is not complying with the reciprocal standpoint characteristic of the Kingdom of Ends. The murderer’s non-compliance makes it impossible to be honest in the spirit required by the Kingdom of Ends, thus rendering deception excusable in such circumstances. I argue here that (a) Schapiro’s attempt fails because it also excuses other more morally dubious defensive actions, and (b) a satisfactory Kantian account of defensive deception must instead show that such deception is uniquely justified by appealing to the instrumental relation that such deception bears to a moral duty applicable in conditions of moral emergency.

Reliability and Warranted Assertion (IV-G)
E.J. Coffman (University of Tennessee)

Say that you “warrantedly assert” P iff your assertion that P meets whatever epistemic rules govern assertion. Accounts of “warranted assertability” tell us when you’re positioned to warrantedly assert P. ‘Lenient’ accounts of warranted assertability allow that you could warrantedly assert propositions you don’t know. Unlike much recent work, this paper focuses on lenient accounts of warranted assertability, arguing that one largely neglected such account—the Would-Be Knowledge Account (WKA)—seriously competes with its much more prominent rivals: the Rational Credibility Account (RCA) and the Justified Belief Account (JBA). After some preliminary remarks that help motivate my project, I lay out the three accounts, noting a way in which RCA and JBA are superior to WKA. I then revive WKA by highlighting an overlooked datum for theories of warranted assertability, and showing that only WKA accommodates it. I close by answering a pressing objection to my case for WKA.

Extending Charles Taylor’s Moral Psychology: Self-Interpretation, Desire and Rational Agency (II-H)
Marc A. Cohen (George Washington University)

My goal in this paper is to develop a moral psychology of desire taking Charles Taylor’s account of self-interpretation as a starting point. I argue that Timothy D. Wilson’s work on the “adaptive unconscious” provides empirical support for Taylor as I extend and develop his view. The result is a characterization of rational agency that does not depend on direct (meaning, non-inferential) first-person access to mental states. This point about rational agency is presented in response to criticisms advanced against Taylor by Richard Moran, who assumes that rational agency requires direct access to one’s mental states. Separate from Moran’s positive account, this requirement—this assumption—is un-motivated, and it conflicts with the empirical research on the subject.

Hume’s Causal Psychology and the Limits of Associationism (III-E)
Mark D. Collier (University of Minnesota–Morris)

One might think that Hume endorses the radical claim that causal psychology can be fully explained in terms of nothing but custom and habit. Associative learning does, of course, play a major role in the cognitive psychology of the Treatise. But Hume recognizes that associationism cannot provide a complete account of causal thought, since his own capacity to conduct an experimental science of human nature implies that human beings are more than creatures of habit. Hume’s official position is that human causal reasoning lies beyond the limits of associationism.

On An Alleged Refutation of Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism (II-K)
Christina Conroy (University of California–Irvine)

In Beyond Rigidity, Scott Soames defends Kripke’s modal argument against the rigidified-description theory of names by presenting a deductive argument meant to prove that since names and rigidified definite descriptions cannot be substituted in all belief contexts the two cannot have the same content. Soames’s argument relies on a Kaplanesque semantic theory which requires that the actual world figure as a constituent of any belief about an actual F. Given that there are beliefs that occur in non-modal contexts in which the actual world does not figure and given that Soames’s semantics cannot account for these beliefs, I propose an emendation of Kaplan’s semantic theory in which not only the naked extension of singular terms can figure directly in propositions, but the naked extension of predicates can do so as well thereby accounting for such beliefs and undermining Soames’s defense.

Teleofunctionalism and the Swampman (V-J)
Daniel L. Corbett (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Opponents of teleofunctionalism have used the Swampman objection in attempt to show that it is current dispositions rather than historical functions that determine whether a creature has beliefs and desires. I propose a response to this objection which is at odds with teleofunctionalism, but which nonetheless incorporates a key insight of that theory into its dispositional rival. Dispositional analysis of a system—determining what dispositions it has—requires that we compare the actual system with an idealized system. I propose that teleofunctional considerations provide the appropriate idealized system which we use when deciding if a person, or a Swampman, has dispositions requisite for beliefs and desires. Thus, while being an intentional agent requires having the right dispositions, having the right dispositions involves being sufficiently similar to an historical (biological) ideal. Swampman, on this proposal, has belief and desires because he approximates a creature which with the appropriate teleological functions.

Neuroscience and Responsibility (III-G)
Felipe De Brigard (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Eric Mandelbaum (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

People think that the more we get to know about the unavoidable neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we will be to hold people responsible for their actions. Thus, some think that as neuroscience gains insight into the neurological causes of actions, people will cease to view others as morally responsible for their actions. In the following study we probe the folk to see how they reason about actions that are caused by an agent who suffers from a neurological or psychological illness. What we found was quite surprising: the folk are no more likely to view a neurological illness as a mitigating factor than they are to view a psychological illness as a mitigating factor. Additionally, we found that the folk seem to ignore the etiology of the behavior and will hold agent’s responsible even when the agent’s actions are determined by factors outside of their control.

Welfare and the Status-Quo Bias (IV-F)
Dale Dorsey (University of Alberta)

Preferences display a status-quo bias. This bias is particularly evident in cases of “sour grapes” or “adaptive preferences,” in which an agent, disappointed at being unable to achieve x rather than y, switches her preferences and comes to prefer y to x. In this paper, I argue that the status-quo bias is troubling for a wide spectrum of theories of welfare, including not simply familiar desiderative accounts, but also theories that have been deployed as solutions to phenomena like sour grapes (including so-called “objective” theories and theories that propose an “autonomy” constraint on an agent’s preferences). I then sketch an alternative theory of welfare that can accomplish two goals: first, to take seriously an agent’s preferences when it comes to well-being; second, to avoid the status-quo bias.

Counterfactual Dependence, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences (V-G)
Jeffrey Dunn (University of Massachusetts)

David Lewis (1986b) gives an attractive and familiar account of counterfactual dependence in the standard context. This account has recently been challenged by a counterexample from Adam Elga (2000). In this paper, I attempt to formulate a Lewisian response to Elga’s counterexample. The strategy is to add an extra criterion to Lewis’s similarity metric, which determines the comparative similarity of worlds. This extra criterion instructs us to take special science laws into consideration as well as fundamental laws. I argue that the Second Law of Thermodynamics should be seen as a special science law, and also give a brief account of what Lewisian special science laws should look like. If successful, this proposal blocks Elga’s counterexample.

Resolving Horgan’s Strengthened Two Envelope Paradox (IV-F)
Don T. Fallis (University of Arizona)

The two envelope paradox is not really all that paradoxical. The fact that (a) one envelope contains twice as much money as the other does not imply that (b) the other envelope is equally likely to contain twice or half as much money as your envelope. And (b) is what is behind the familiar reasoning that the other envelope has a greater expected utility than your envelope. But Terry Horgan (2000) has suggested a strengthened version that really is paradoxical: You are reliably told that, if you were to open either envelope, you would think that the other envelope is equally likely to contain twice or half as much money. The familiar reasoning now seems eminently reasonable, but it still does not make any sense to prefer the other envelope. I suggest a way to resolve this paradox that is inspired by Peter Vallentyne’s (2000) “correction” to standard decision theory.

Intrinsically/Extrinsically (I-J)
Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)

We regularly distinguish between the properties a thing has in and of itself and those it has at least partly depending on its environment. Unfortunately, this description of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction equivocates between two distinctions that require distinct explanations. I show that the intuitions used to motivate an account of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties—the I/E distinction—actually motivate an account of the distinction between ways in which things have properties—the I-ly/E-ly distinction. I then argue that standard ways of drawing the I/E distinction, based on logical independence, are inadequate to explain the I-ly/E-ly distinction. I offer a new account in which empirical knowledge and explanatory purposes play an essential role in determining the relevant notion of independence. I also propose a model of the relation between the distinctions that explains how intrinsic properties can be had extrinsically and extrinsic properties had intrinsically.

Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged (II-F)
Scott E. Forschler (Northland Community and Technical College)

Richard Hare argues that the fundamental assumptions of Kant’s ethical system should have led Kant to utilitarianism, and that Hare’s own work provides the derivation which Kant failed to discover because he was misled into adopting rigorist, deontological norms. Several authors, including Jens Timmermann, have argued contra Hare that the gap between Kantian and utilitarian/consequentialist ethics is fundamental and cannot be bridged. I show that Timmermann’s claims rely on a systematic failure to separate normative and meta-ethical aspects of each view, and that Hare’s attempt to bridge the gap between Kantian and consequentialist ethics is immune to Timmermann’s criticisms. I close by suggesting that the term “Kantian ethics” is often misleading, and should typically be qualified as “Kantian rationalism” or “Kantian deontology,” in order to avoid confusions of the sort Timmermann falls into.

On the Apodictic Proof of Kant’s Revolutionary Hypothesis (V-I)
Brett Fulkerson-Smith (University of Kentucky)

According to Kant in the new Preface to the Critique, the hypothesis that what can be known about objects as appearances is only what can be put into them by the knower or that objects as appearances conform to human cognition is “proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding” (Bxxii). But how does the constitution of our representations of space and time and the elementary concepts of the understanding apodictically prove Kant’s revolutionary hypothesis? Based upon Kant’s lectures on logic, this paper suggests that Kant’s hypothesis is apodictically proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic just in case the necessary requirements for the apodictic proof of a hypothesis expressed in his lectures on logic are satisfied therein.

History, Tradition, and the Normative Foundations of Civil Marriage (I-F)
Jeremy Garrett (Rice University)

On what has become known as the traditional account, marriage is a lifelong, multipurpose association between two, and only two, persons—one male and one female. According to many, the state has good reason to recognize, and exclusively to support, this form of union. In this paper, I will critically examine one familiar strand of defense for traditional civil marriage—namely, that strand which locates intrinsic value in the historical pedigree of tradition itself, rather than in the philosophical caliber of some inherent, ahistorical property of lifelong, monogamous, heterosexual unions. My criticism will take the form of a general tripartite argument that seriously weakens, if not incapacitates, any historical argument for an institution like traditional civil marriage. After developing the three layers of the argument, I will bring it to bear on two influential historical defenses of this type: Burke’s argument from accumulated wisdom and Hayek’s empiricist evolutionary argument.

Essentialism versus Essentialism: A Reply from a Naive Essentialist (I-J)
Allen Gehring (Indiana University–Bloomington)

In “Essentialism versus Essentialism” Michael Della Rocca argues that the grounds that justify accepting essentialism also undercut its justification. I argue that the essentialist has at least two lines of response. The first hinges on showing how his argument undercuts the purpose he is trying to accomplish in deploying it. The second fills in the details of a way to develop essentialism that draws on some recent research in cognitive science. With these lines of response I conclude by explaining how the essentialist has an edge in this debate.

Is Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Circular? (IV-H)
Luke Gelinas (University of Toronto)

One recent objection to Michael Slote’s agent-based virtue ethics, due to Ramon Das, is that agent-basing cannot non-circularly account for the value of interior states without assuming an agent-independent standard of act-evaluation. Since agent-basing denies any such standard, this is a problem. The objection, however, makes a tendentious assumption: that the value of a disposition to perform acts expressive of good inner states necessarily depends on the value of those acts. I point out that Das has given us no reason to accept this claim, and that there might be views of virtue on which we are warranted to reject it. Thus, even if the disposition to act in certain ways is constitutive of good inner states, it doesn’t follow that the value of those states is derivative on the value of those acts.

An Argument Against Plentitude (II-J)
Cody S. Gilmore (University of California–Davis)

Coincidentalism is the view that it is possible for distinct objects to coincide mereologically throughout their careers. Plenitude, roughly stated, is the view that necessarily, every matter-filled spacetime region contains a great many objects that coincide in this way. Recently, Karen Bennett and John Hawthorne have argued that the most plausible form of coincidentalism is one that affirms Plenitude. In this paper I argue that Plenitude is false, for it conflicts with some straightforward truths about simples and the behavior of the part-whole relation.

What Is the Problem of Intentional Identity? (I-G)
Ephraim Glick (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

I discuss a puzzle due to Peter Geach that is based on the following sentence: Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob’s mare, and Nob thinks she (the same witch) killed Cob’s sow. In clarifying the problem and the possible approaches to it, I reject the standard treatment of the puzzle as one to be dealt with by formal machinery.

A Dilemma for Kant’s Theory of Substance (V-I)
Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast)

This paper poses a dilemma for applying the category of substance given Kant’s different conceptions of substance in the Critique of Pure Reason. Briefly stated, if the category of substance applies to an omnipresent and sempiternal substance, then although this would ensure that all experiences of empirical objects take place in a common spatiotemporal framework, one could not individuate these empirical objects and experience their alterations. If the category of substance applies to ordinary empirical objects, however, then although one could individuate these substances and experience their alterations, the category would not pick out a common spatiotemporal framework for these experiences. I will argue that this dilemma can be overcome by examining the development of Kant’s conception of substance in his final work, the Opus postumum.

Explaining Past Scientific Successes Realistically (and without being Whiggish) (II-I)
David W. Harker (East Tennessee State University)

The most popular argument for scientific realism remains the inference to best explanation from a theory’s success to its approximate truth. Recently however, and in response to the antirealist’s objection from the history of science, realists have refined the argument. Rather than target entire theories, it is suggested we argue instead for the approximate truth of only certain parts of theories. Despite an initial and apparent plausibility, the selective realist strategy faces compelling and important objections. In this paper I argue that by adopting a comparative sense of success, the strategy has at least a chance of working.

Omissions as Causes (III-G)
Michael Dean Hartsock (University of Missouri–Columbia)

Imagine a man who happens upon a drowning child he could easily save. He does nothing and the child dies. Intuitively, his negligence is a cause of her death. But his is a sin of omission, and traditional accounts of causation consider causation by omission incoherent. Against tradition, I will argue for genuinism, the view that omissions are genuinely causal. I reconstruct and rebut two recent arguments against genuinism offered by Phil Dowe. Each argument assumes that there is a robust distinction between positive events (things that do happen) and negative events (things that don’t happen). I argue that this distinction cannot be maintained, at least on certain accounts of causation. The moral is that only descriptions of states of affairs, not states of affairs themselves, are positive or negative. As such, so-called negative events are just as genuinely causal as straightforwardly positive events.

Two New Cartesian Circles (III-E)
Glenn A. Hartz (Ohio State University)

Patrick K. Lewtas (American University of Beirut)
Like the Traditional Circle first noted by Arnauld, the ones envisioned here affect arguments for God’s existence in Descartes’s Meditations. But that circle raises a problem internal to the Meditations itself. These new ones—the “Global Circle” and the “Euthyphro Circle”—are difficulties for those arguments which emanate from other metaphysical beliefs Descartes held at the same time. Descartes’s “divine voluntarism” makes his Meditations project circular in ways that have not been noticed. The new circles are virulent and pervasive. Every argument that falls afoul of the Traditional Circle falls afoul of these new circles, and every argument that escapes the Traditional Circle is nevertheless caught by the new ones. With divine voluntarism already in place, the Meditations project had no chance because the demon who takes over for God is a “voluntarist demon.”

Finks, Masks, Mimics, and Freedom (V-E)
Charles M. Hermes (University of Texas–Arlington)

Many theorists used to believe that agents’ abilities and dispositional properties could both be explicated in terms of a single counterfactual conditional. Counterexamples to these approaches have led most theorists to abandon both of these projects. Nevertheless, it might appear that both failures are intimately connected. If they are, then a dispositional account of agents’ abilities seems promising. Recently, Michael Smith, Kadri Vihvelin, and Michael Fara have developed dispositional compatibilism, which grounds free will and agents’ abilities in terms of dispositional properties. Their position, however, only seems attractive when theorists ignore problems that have developed for Lewis’s account of dispositions. By exploring how agents’ abilities operate in masking and mimicking scenarios, I demonstrate that dispositional compatibilism fails. Nevertheless, the key insight of dispositional compatibilism is that discovering how the dispositional literature dovetails with the free will and action literature is an extraordinarily fruitful project.

Valuing from Life’s Perspective (V-H)
Charles Huenemann (Utah State University)

Nietzsche launches powerful critiques of traditional moral values on the basis of “life’s perspectives and objectives.” But what does this mean? Several recent commentators have tried to provide an explanation by ascribing to Nietzsche a will-to-power metaphysic, but there are solid reasons for thinking that Nietzsche did not intend to provide any comprehensive metaphysical system. This paper explains “life’s perspectives” by showing how to construct a theoretical entity (“Life”) that has a perspective and can do the philosophical work Nietzsche requires. Moreover, it shows why employing such a construct, as a heuristic, does not lead to ascribing a robust metaphysical system to Nietzsche.

Warranted Assertability Maneuvers and the Rules of Assertion (I-I)
Leo Iacono (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes use a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM), according to which our intuitions about the truth-values of the assertions involved in the cases are sensitive to the conditions under which the assertions are conversationally proper rather than to their literal truth-conditions. I argue that an invariantist WAM against one contextualist case, Stewart Cohen’s airport case, cannot succeed. Such a WAM is inconsistent with the knowledge account of assertion, according to which assertion is governed by the rule: Assert that p only if you know that p. Although the knowledge account of assertion is well supported by diverse linguistic evidence, it has recently been argued that other, weaker rules suffice to account for the supporting evidence. The rules that have been proposed, however, are also inconsistent with an invariantist WAM against the airport case.

Can Group Agents Be Autonomous? (III-H)
Mark N. Jensen (Hope College)

Philip Pettit has recently argued that we are justified in holding group agents responsible for some action even when we are not justified in holding any individual member responsible. As a condition for responsibility, Pettit argues that group agents must be autonomous. The argument of this paper is that no group satisfies this condition because no group agent is autonomous. At issue are the implications of the discursive dilemma and associated impossibility theorems which show that group agents make judgments which cannot be an aggregating function of individual member’s judgments. Pettit is mistaken in thinking that autonomy emerges here; a better reading shows that group agency fails with respect to this class of judgments. This result has implications for social and political theory, not the least of which is the surprising importance of individual members who act qua individual rather than qua member in sustaining their group’s activities.

Thau On Qualia and Representational Content (V-J)
James John (University of Toronto)

Thau (2002) presents an intriguing argument against the qualia theory (QT). According to QT, conscious perceptual experiences owe their “phenomenal characters”—what it’s like to have them—to their possession of non-representational “qualia.” Thau’s argument fails. One problem is that it equivocates on the expression “the way things seem.” Another problem is that it begs the question against QT. A third, more serious problem is that there are two forms QT can take, and Thau’s argument, even if cogent and sound, only applies to one of them. But there is another form of QT that is immune to Thau’s criticisms. One upshot is that QT is much more plausible than representationalist critics like Thau have recognized.

Making Co-instantiation Primitive: Consequences for the Bundle Theory’s Commitment to the Identity of Indiscernibles (V-G)
Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)

The most significant objection to the bundle theory of particulars is the argument from the falsity of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII). I offer a defense of bundle theory from the PII objection, a defense which turns on an analysis of the relation of “co-instantiation.” I argue that co-instantiation should be regarded as a necessary condition for the formation of a bundle and, furthermore, that it should be regarded as primitive (ontologically unanalyzable). I then clarify what is involved in making an entity primitive and argue that, as a direct consequence of making co-instantiation primitive, the bundle theory avoids the PII objection. I conclude by discussing the implications for what bundle theorists say about the structure of particulars.

Belief Revision and Coherence without Foundations (V-F)
Nicholaos Jones (The Ohio State University)

Sven Ove Hansson and Erik Olsson argue that, because AGM theory represents belief states as logically closed, it is inconsistent with what they call Classical Coherentism. They conclude that any theory of belief revision that is compatible with Classical Coherentism should use only a subset of the elements of a belief state in representing that state. But there is an alternative, namely, restricting the support relations with respect to which the representation of belief states are logically closed, in a way that does not require giving epistemic priority to a subset of elements in belief states.

Bivalence and Contradictory Pairs in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 9 (II-G)
Russell Jones (University of Oklahoma)

According to the most traditional view of De Interpretatione 9, Aristotle denies the fatalist conclusion that the future is fixed by denying bivalence. The argument structure of the chapter is a reductio: Bivalence is assumed, and the absurd fatalist conclusion follows. Whitaker argues that Aristotle accepts bivalence, but rejects: [RCP] Of every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false. I argue that both of these interpretations are flawed, but that important insights from each should be preserved. I then offer a fresh interpretation of the chapter that shows that RCP is the refutand of the argument, and that Aristotle explains the failure of RCP with respect to future contingents by the failure of bivalence for future contingents. Unlike other interpretations, my interpretation is consistent with the text of chapter 9, with the larger context of De Interpretatione, and with central principles of Aristotelian philosophy.

And Never the Twain Shall Meet: A Critique of Carl Gillett’s Dimensioned Realization (IV-J)
Douglas Keaton (University of Cincinnati)

Carl Gillett’s “dimensioned realization” is an attempt to reconcile disparate accounts of the realization relation: those used by metaphysicians of mind and those used by philosophers of science. I show that the attempt fails because the resulting defined relation is a disjunction of two wholly disparate relations. I use this as an example to point to a larger issue: failures in the discipline to agree on the meanings of terms such as “order” and resulting attempts to assimilate inassimilable fields of philosophical inquiry. Metaphysics of mind and philosophy of science are not the same thing.

General Circulation Models and Severe Tests (II-I)
Sarah Kenehan (University of Tennessee/Bern University)

In this paper, I address two concerns commonly cited as reasons for not using GCM-generated predictions as a basis for policy decisions: first, since the models are based on an incomplete representation of the climate system, then model-generated predictions are necessarily unreliable; and second, since the tests of GCMs fail to adhere to the criterion of use-novelty, then the corroboration of model-generated projections carries very little weight. In employing Mayo’s conception of severe tests, I show that these supposed problems are misplaced. As such, these concerns are not conclusive objections against the use of these models in policymaking.

The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus and the Moral Enforceability of Human Rights (III-F)
Eunjung Kim (University of Washington)

The idea of an overlapping consensus has assumed an important role in defending universalism about human rights. The common understanding of an overlapping consensus on human rights norms is that it establishes the acceptability of the norms from diverse cultural and religious perspectives. This paper argues that an overlapping consensus on human rights norms fails to establish acceptability, and further, acceptability is not necessary to defend the universal application of human rights norms. An overlapping consensus on human rights norms, however, demonstrates that the universal application of the norms is not motivated by a biased interest in promoting parochial set of values. This paper argues that the moral enforceability of human rights norms depends on the impartiality of the enforcer rather than the acceptability by the individuals against whom the norms are enforced.

Ordinary Objects without Overdetermination (II-J)
Daniel Korman (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Trenton Merricks takes the causal-exclusion arguments in the philosophy of mind and puts them to work in eliminating baseballs and other medium-sized dry goods. The dominant response has been that the overdetermination of an event by a thing and its parts is unobjectionable. I show that the argument can be resisted without incurring a commitment to systematic overdetermination, by postulating a division of causal labor: events at the macroscopic level are typically caused by macroscopic objects while events at the microscopic level are typically caused by microscopic items. I supply independent motivation for postulating such a division of causal labor and answer Merricks’s objections to this sort of response.

McKeever and Ridge on Practical Reasoning (III-H)
Mark LeBar (Ohio University)

In Principled Ethics, Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge argue for the mistakenness of a variety of “particularist” challenges to the deployment of principles in morality and moral philosophy. They argue instead that our best conception of morality is as essentially involving principles, that philosophical attempts to understand morality are right to invoke principles. Here I argue that their view cannot make sense of the idea that we act in light of our moral reasoning. If McKeever and Ridge are right, a certain very deep and strong skepticism about the motivating power of moral reasoning must follow. If we have reason to reject such skepticism, then we have reason to think McKeever and Ridge have not fully captured the story of moral reasoning.

Why the Responsibility Objection to Thomson’s Abortion Argument Must Fail (I-F)
Kurt Liebegott (Purdue University)

This paper examines one of the most prominent objections to Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion.” The Responsibility Objection holds that Thomson’s arguments do not apply to most pregnancies because the pregnant woman has a moral responsibility for the fetus’s need for her body if it resulted from consensual intercourse. Abortion violates this moral responsibility, and is thereby an unjust killing and a violation of the fetus’s right to life, so abortion is immoral in most cases contrary to Thomson’s arguments. The abortion literature argues over whether or not a pregnant woman does in fact have such a moral responsibility. This paper gives a new and different argument that, even if we assume that a pregnant woman does have such a moral responsibility, it does not follow that abortion is immoral. Rather, the Responsibility Objection is found to beg the question and thus fails to challenge Thomson’s arguments.

On the Coherence of Inversion (V-J)
Clayton Littlejohn (Dedman College)

In this paper, I shall examine a recent attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves far too much, I shall locate where the demonstration goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion.

The Experience of Authorship and Automatic Action (III-G)
Tracie Mahaffey (Florida State University)

My goal is to show that there is a category of actions, not preceded by report-level conscious proximal intentions, but for which individuals still feel a sense of authorship. I argue that automatic actions are a problem for Daniel Wegner’s view that conscious will is an illusion because Wegner does not make a distinction between automatic and automatistic actions. If Wegner is willing to admit there is a sense of authorship with regards to automatic actions, no matter how diminished, then he must revise his view to accommodate these cases. If report-level proximal intentions are required for the experience of the conscious will, then there cannot be an experience of conscious will in these cases. If the experience of conscious will is not required for the experience of authorship, then the close connection between these two phenomena—the experience of conscious will and the feeling of authorship—is severed.

Kierkegaard on the Problem of Abraham (III-I)
R. Zachary Manis (Southwest Baptist University)

A significant challenge faces any ethic that endorses the view that divine commands are sufficient to impose moral obligations; in this paper, I focus on Kierkegaard’s ethic, in particular. The challenge to be addressed is the “modernized” problem of Abraham, popularized especially by Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: the dilemma that an agent faces when a being claiming to be God issues a command to the agent that, by the agent’s own lights, seems not to be the kind of command that a loving God would issue. I argue that Kierkegaard regards this scenario as never resulting (in the actual world) in an agent’s falling into dire moral error solely on account of her non- culpable misinterpreting of God’s will and/or failure to discern correctly whether a perceived moral imperative truly is divine in origin. I then try to show why this view is not as implausible as it may initially seem.

Affective Evaluative Inconsistency and the Fragmented Self (II-H)
Patricia A. Marino (University of Waterloo)

Is there anything irrational, or self-undermining, about having “inconsistent” attitudes of endorsement? In this paper, I argue that, contra the claims of Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor, the answer is “No.” The proper characterization of what I call “affective evaluative inconsistency,” involves not logical form (endorsing A and not-A), but rather the co-possibility of what is endorsed; attitudes of endorsement are inconsistent when there is no possible world in which what is endorsed can co-exist. Essentially conflicting endorsements, I show, are no worse for an agent than contingently conflicting ones, which are common and no threat to rationality or well-being. Partly based on reflections about a conflicted mother, who endorses staying at home and having a career, I argue that affective evaluative inconsistency does not render a person unable to act, does not make a person’s actions ineffective because of vacillation, and does not undermine a person’s autonomy.

Moral Responsibility, Coercion, and Guidance Control (I-K)
Justin P. McBrayer (University of Missouri)

Semi-compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with causal determinism. I argue that John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s semi-compatibilist account of moral responsibility is false because it has false implications in cases in which an agent acts under a coercive threat. Fischer and Ravizza argue that as long as an agent exercises what they call guidance control over an action, then the agent is morally responsible for the action. However, since guidance control is consistent with very strong cases of coercion, this poses a problem for their account. Either we give up the intuitive claim that coercive threats can affect moral responsibility or we deny that guidance control is sufficient for moral responsibility.

Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error (V-F)
Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto)

When skeptical possibilities are raised, it is common to feel some temptation to retract mundane knowledge ascriptions. Non-skeptical invariantists argue that it would be a mistake to give in to this temptation, but they do not deny that we feel it, and need to explain why. The standard explanation—advanced by Williamson and Hawthorne, for example—appeals to the availability heuristic: after overexposure to epistemological horror stories involving brains in vats and tricky lighting we come to overestimate the risk of failing to know, just as overexposure to violent television programming can lead one to overestimate the frequency of homicide. I argue that there are both empirical and philosophical problems with this explanation, and offer a rival account of what happens to us psychologically when possibilities of error are raised, an account involving a switch from associative to deliberate reasoning.

Circularity in Ordinary Language Arguments for Epistemic Contextualism (V-F)
Jay M. Newhard (John Carroll University)

During the past three decades or so, a number of philosophers have argued that the knowledge predicate is a context-sensitive expression and have suggested various accounts of the contextual features to which it is sensitive. Context-sensitive accounts of the knowledge predicate were originally motivated by the response they provide to skeptical paradox and other important epistemic puzzles; more recently they have been motivated by ordinary language considerations. While the principal version of the skepticism-based argument for contextualism is a fully abductive argument, the ordinary language arguments are partly abductive arguments which rely implicitly on further deductive reasoning to support the contextualist thesis. In this paper I examine the ordinary language arguments for the contextualist thesis, and argue that these arguments are circular.

What Should Egalitarians Believe?—Beyond Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism (IV-I)
Martin O’Neill (University of Manchester)

This paper is concerned to clear up a number of possible confusions in egalitarian thought. I begin by showing that the most plausible forms of egalitarianism do not fit straightforwardly on either side of the distinction between Telic and Deontic egalitarianism. I then argue that the question of the scope of egalitarian principles cannot be answered in the abstract, but instead depends on giving a prior account of the different ways in which inequality can be bad. In doing so, I defend a version of Non-Intrinsic egalitarianism which manages to secure the distinctiveness of equality as a political value. This political conception of equality may nevertheless have a very broad scope, extending beyond the bounds of any particular society.

Moral Realism and Ways of Life (IV-K)
Matthew Pianalto (University of Arkansas)

This paper examines Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim that a person’s commitment to a way of life is a relevant factor in deciding what it is true that the agent ought to do in a moral dilemma. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that his view shows that extreme universal moral realism, which claims that facts about the agent make no contribution to the truth of what an agent ought to do, is false. I use Sinnott-Armstrong’s as a starting point to consider how a different kind of moral realism can account for the relevance of ways of life, and argue that they can be regarded as “realistic factors” in moral deliberation because they are grounded in morally permissible commitments which serve to shape the agent’s perspective on his or her situation, rather then serving as additional reasons the agent weighs in his or her decision.

Hursthouse’s Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics, the Slide into Consequentialism, and the Problem of Instrumentally Successful Vice (IV-H)
Mark Piper (Saint Louis University)

In this paper I present criticism of Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian naturalistic virtue ethics as elaborated in her book On Virtue Ethics. I argue that her theory is vulnerable to the charge of partially collapsing into a form of consequentialism that falls prey to a powerful objection to that theory: the problem of instrumentally successful action (or, in the present case, the problem of instrumentally successful vice). I consider several possible responses from Hursthouse and argue that they are inadequate. As a result, Hursthouse must either accept the likelihood that highly morally counterintuitive traits can, for some persons or circumstances, be virtues; or, she must defend the implausible notions that human nature and flourishing are more or less invariable. As both of these options are undesirable, it may be best to reject Hursthouse’s form of neo-Aristotelianism altogether.

Know How to Be Gettiered? (IV-G)
Ted L. Poston (University of South Alabama)

Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s influential article “Knowing How” argues that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. One objection to their view is that knowledge-how is significantly different from knowledge-that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their reasons, however, are not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge-how is not susceptible to Gettier cases. This suggests a significant distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how.

Descriptions, Understanding, and Anaphoric Chains: Russell’s New Challenge (II-K)
Frank Pupa (The Graduate School and University Center–City University of New York)

Almost without exception, opponents to Russell’s theory of descriptions challenge the theory on truth-theoretic grounds. In this paper, I issue a challenge on a different ground: understandability. Russell’s theory of descriptions, when coupled with Russell’s theory of understanding, generates what I label the ‘anaphoric chain problem’. This problem, I argue, forces the thoughtful theorist to reject Russell’s theory of descriptions in favor of a non-Russellian rival. The paper begins, in §1, with a brief presentation of Russell’s theories of descriptions and understanding. In §2, I introduce anaphoric chains; I also provide a Russellian account of anaphoric chains containing descriptions. Finally, in §3, I introduce the anaphoric chain problem. After this introduction, I demonstrate that Russell’s theory of descriptions fails on understanding-theoretic grounds. I close with a non-Russellian account of the problem at hand.

Moral Realism and Autonomy in Discourse Ethics (IV-K)
William Rehg (Saint Louis University)

Is Kantian constructivism compatible with a robust moral realism in which moral facts are independent of rational consent? Although some Kantians accept a weak “procedural realism,” Habermas understands his discourse-ethical constructivism as an antirealist view, incompatible with robust moral realism. In this paper I examine Cristina Lafont’s objection that discourse ethics must be interpreted in robust realist terms. This objection gets a foothold partly because of ambiguities in Habermas’s discourse ethics. To clarify the debate, I propose a clearly antirealist reformulation of the discourse-ethical moral principle. Realists must therefore show how their position differs from the proposed reformulation. I conclude that one can adopt Lafont’s realist discourse ethics only if one regards autonomy as one first-order value among others. Although autonomy thereby loses its metaethical significance for moral ontology, the realist strategy has some advantages.

The Dialectical Regress of Justifications (IV-G)
Michael A. Rescorla (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Dialectical egalitarianism holds that every asserted proposition requires defense when challenged by an interlocutor. This view apparently generates a vicious “regress of justifications,” since an interlocutor can challenge the premises through which a speaker defends her original assertion, and so on ad infinitum. To halt the regress, dialectical foundationalists such as Adler, Brandom, Leite, and Williams propose that some propositions require no defense in light of mere requests for justification. I argue that the putative regress is not worrisome and that egalitarianism can handle it quite satisfactorily. I also defend a positive view that combines an anti-foundationalist conception of dialectical interaction with a foundationalist conception of epistemic justification.

Is There an Intermediate Position between Knowing and Not Knowing? The Wax Block in Plato’s Theaetetus (II-G)
Naomi Reshotko (University of Denver)

Plato has trouble accounting for false belief at Theaetetus 187d-200c because he treats knowledge as all or nothing. Plato succeeds only with the wax block model (191a-195b), wherein he considers learning and forgetting (191c-e). This modest success might lead us to conclude that learning and forgetting constitute something in between knowing and not knowing. While Plato’s one successful account of false belief does hinge on the notion of a third epistemological relationship, it does not hinge upon one that is between knowing and not knowing. Plato develops a new epistemological position that occupies the ignorance horn of the knowing and not-knowing dilemma. Plato finds belief compatible with ignorance by identifying a positive relationship that we can have with an object concerning which we are ignorant.

In Defense of the Wide-scope Instrumental Principle (III-H)
Simon Rippon (Harvard University)

If people always have reason to take the known, necessary means to the ends that they intend, then it appears that intending even an irrational end must give a person a perfectly good reason to take the means to it. I argue that this is not so, utilizing a wide-scope interpretation of the instrumental principle of the kind suggested by Broome and Wallace. Raz argues in “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality” that even the wide-scope interpretation of the instrumental principle entails that when people intend an end, they have reason to take the means to it. I refute Raz’s argument by arguing against a flawed logical principle it uses, and explain why wide-scope instrumental reasons entail narrow- scope reasons only in conjunction with additional normative premises. I conclude by explaining some advantages of understanding instrumental reasons as wide-scope reasons.

Worthy Lives (V-H)
Lisa S. Rivera (University of Massachusetts–Boston)

Susan Wolf’s paper “Meaning and Morality” draws our attention to the fact that Williams’s objection to Kantian morality is primarily a concern about a possible conflict between morality and that which gives our life meaning. I argue that the force of Williams’s objection requires a more precise understanding of meaning as dependent on our intention to make our lives themselves worthwhile. It is not meaning simpliciter that makes Williams’s objective persuasive but rather meaning as arising out of our positive evaluation of the value of our lives as a whole. This type of meaning has a normative element: it involves a person’s deep-seated commitment to make her actions consistent with ends that confer worth on her life itself. The more significant conflict with morality lies in the conflict between the normative force of moral requirements and the normative force of the need to have a life that is itself worthwhile.

Coherentism and Truth (I-I)
William Roche (Texas Christian University)

It has recently been argued that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive and that coherentism thus is false. Erik Olsson argues in this fashion. So too does Tomoji Shogenji. I join Olsson and Shogenji in arguing that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive. I also argue, though, that neither Olsson’s argument nor Shogenji’s argument succeeds in showing this, and that, moreover, the fact that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive might not be at all detrimental to coherentism.

Speaking of the Unspeakable (I-G)
Paul Saka (University of Houston)

Paradoxes of self-reference include the Berry (“the smallest number not nameable in under nineteen syllables”) and the Non-denoter (the phrase N: “N, which does not denote”). The Non-denoter, which is analogous to the Liar, goes straight to the heart of the matter. The Berry, at root the same problem, arguably reveals that paradox arises without pathological self-reference. Available proposals for treating paradoxes of reference include denying that the Berry is meaningful, distinguishing between canonical number coding and colloquial descriptions of numbers, and regarding “denote” as a covert indexical. I argue that these approaches are inadequate, and that we need to internalize the reference relation in the manner of cognitive linguistics.

Coincidence and Cardinality (II-J)
Thomas Sattig (Tulane University)

Coincidentalism is the view that distinct material things can be composed of the same microphysical simples at the same time. The existence of distinct coincidents is incompatible with any microphysical criterion of identity over time of material composites. This incompatibility constitutes a problem for the coincidentalist only if the coincidentalist needs a microphysical criterion of identity over time. What does the coincidentalist need such a criterion for? I will show that the coincidentalist needs such a criterion for an explanation of cardinal supervenience, of the thesis that facts concerning how many composite material things exist supervene on facts about microphysical simples.

Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s Theory of Meaning (III-I)
Joseph K. Schear (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo)

In his Logical Investigations, Husserl endorsed a form of platonism about propositional meanings, against the various forms of psychologism circulating at the turn of the 20th century. A platonist about meaning holds that propositions exist prior to and independently of the acts and processes of thinking subjects. By contrast, a theory of meaning is psychologistic if it claims, or entails, that meanings are products of, or somehow essentially dependent on, the particular acts and processes of thinking subjects. In his Being and Time period, Heidegger attacked Husserl’s platonism about meaning. The aim of the paper is to assess one key prong of this attack. I argue that Husserl’s theory of meaning emerges from Heidegger’s criticism unscathed. However, I conclude by offering an interpretive hypothesis about how one might read the failed objection in a more charitable light; that is, as marking Heidegger’s existential phenomenology as an extension of, rather than a departure from, the anti-psychologistic agenda of the original “Husserlian” breakthrough.

Kant and Newton on Forces and the Nature of Matter (III-E)
Bradley L. Sickler (Ouachita Baptist University)

So important was Newton’s influence on Kant that Ernan McMullin labels Kant “the greatest Newtonian philosopher of them all.” McMullin claims, “The Principia evidently played a fundamental role in the shaping not only of Kant’s philosophy of science, but of his entire philosophical system. Without it to serve as a paradigm... it seems doubtful whether Kant’s transcendental turn would ever have taken place...” Gravity and inertia are the forces most often associated with Newton, and Kant’s concept of force (especially gravity) is often treated as merely a regurgitation of Newton. Despite superficial appearances, however, those two forces will serve well as examples of Kant’s departure from Newtonian doctrine, for the two men conceived of force quite differently. We will see that their deep differences about force can be traced to a more fundamental disagreement—one about the nature of matter itself.

Liberalism, Multiculturalism and the Hardening of Religious Identity (III-F)
Sonia Sikka (University of Ottawa)

Liberalism, as a political paradigm, is committed to maintaining a stance of neutrality towards religion(s), along with other comprehensive systems of belief. Multiculturalism is premised on the view that the political policies of internally diverse nations should respect the beliefs and practices of the various cultural, ethnic and religious groups of which those nations are composed. Sometimes synthesized, sometimes standing in tension, these two political frameworks share the common goal of preventing religious and communal conflict while respecting diversity. Although this goal is, in principle, laudable, I argue that liberal and multiculturalist forms of public reasoning also encourage religious and cultural communities to regard their “identities” as consisting of fixed bundles of beliefs and practices. This conception diminishes critical reflection and movement, with potentially dangerous consequences both for the health of religion and for social stability.

Whose Aristotle? Which Stagirite? (I-H)
May Sim (College of the Holy Cross)

I examine MacIntyre’s analysis of phronêsis in his “Rival Aristotles: Aristotle Against Some Modern Aristotelians.” MacIntyre is right to recognize the relevance of knowledge of both universals and particulars in Aristotle’s phronêsis, and also right that a theoretical knowledge of the ultimate good for human beings (UGHB hereafter) alone cannot make one practically wise. But I question his claim that theoretical knowledge of UGHB need only be used in the phronimos’ justification of actions and not in his practical deliberations about actions. I also question his view that Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics can correct a politician’s theory and practice outside of, but contemporaneous with Aristotle’s polis if he had been given a good upbringing. I show that MacIntyre is mistaken in these two uses of the knowledge of UGHB for Aristotle. His view not only contradicts Aristotle’s but also his own account of Aristotelian phronêsis.

Necessarily, Everything Necessarily Exists (I-J)
Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)

This paper presents and defends a brief version of the well-known argument for the conclusion that necessarily, everything necessarily exists, along with analogous arguments for similar temporal and spatial conclusions. The paper argues that the conclusions should be accepted; when properly interpreted, they do not require that anything that exists is a member of the domain of every world/time/place. Rather, the modal conclusion, properly understood, amounts to the claim that anything is one of (absolutely) everything (on the assumption that absolutely everything is actual). The final section of the paper applies the interpretation to resolve a related problem for Lewisian modal realism discussed by Divers and Parsons.

Agency and Enervation (II-H)
Kevin Toh (Indiana University–Bloomington)

Harry Frankfurt has proposed that we conceive an agent as identifying with a first-order conative attitude when there is a reflectively-maintained absence of conflict among his higher-order attitudes that pick out that first-order attitude as the motivationally efficacious attitude. Michael Bratman has objected to this conception of identification by arguing that an agent can be in such a psychological state as the result of enervation, exhaustion, or depression. I argue that this objection is based on a failure to distinguish two problems about human agency. Bratman has actually recognized the distinction between the two problems in a recent article, but has reiterated his objection against Frankfurt’s proposal. I argue that a clear understanding of the two problems shows not only that Frankfurt’s proposal is not vulnerable to Bratman’s arguments, but also that Bratman’s own conception of identification based on what he calls “self-governing policies” is problematic.

Physicalism and Sparse Ontology (IV-J)
Kelly Trogdon (University of Massachusetts)

A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Jaegwon Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses Jonathan Schaffer calls priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that Kim’s preferred response to his objection, local reductionism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to physicalism than one may have thought.

Autonomy and History (I-K)
Mikhail Valdman (Virginia Commonwealth University)

A popular view among autonomy theorists is that facts about the history of a person’s desires—how they were formed or acquired—matter crucially to her autonomy. I argue that while one’s personal history matters to one’s autonomy, how one’s desires were formed or acquired does not. I argue that a desire’s autonomy lies not in how it was formed or acquired, but rather in whether its bearer actively engaged with it in a way that made it his own.

Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy (V-I)
Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

One of the great appeals of voluntarism is that it presents itself as the only possible alternative to an absolutist conception of political legitimacy. Many Kant interpreters accept this dichotomy and consequently argue that a fundamental problem with Kant’s non-voluntarist theory of political obligations is its complementary absolutist conception of political legitimacy. I argue that this construal of Kant’s texts is mistaken since Kant’s non-voluntarist conception of political obligations is complemented not by an absolutist, but by a liberal republican conception of political legitimacy. By putting forward this liberal republican alternative to absolutism or voluntarism, Kant shows that the dichotomy is false, that there are institutional conditions on political legitimacy, and that the rights of the state are not reducible to the rights of individuals. Appreciating these features of Kant’s position, I propose, is especially important in order to capture his account of economic justice.

The Biological Species Concept and Evolutionary History (II-I)
Joel Velasco (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Many phylogenetic systematists have criticized the Biological Species Concept (BSC) because it distorts evolutionary history. While defenses against this particular charge have been attempted, I argue that they are unsuccessful. In addition, the criticism of the BSC discussed in this literature pinpoints only one way in which the BSC distorts history. The underlying problem can be used to generate additional cases that present more serious objections. These objections to the BSC also straightforwardly apply to other species concepts that are not explicitly concerned with evolutionary history. What is missing from much of the discussion in the literature is the fact that the Tree of Life, which represents phylogenetic history, is independent of our choice of species concept. Since representing evolutionary history is of primary importance to taxonomy, these problems lead to the conclusion that the BSC, along with these other species concepts, are unacceptable.

On a Recent Husserlian Criticism of Gadamer’s Account of the Subject (III-I)
David T. Vessey (University of Chicago)

Rudolf Bernet recently criticized Gadamer’s account of the subject at play as a model case of the flawed legacy of Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity. According to Bernet, “the stakes are nothing less than Gadamer’s entire philosophical.” We have then—twenty years after Derrida’s criticisms of Gadamer and forty years after Habermas’s criticisms—the third systematic criticism of philosophical hermeneutics, this time from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. Bernet argues that Gadamer’s account of a “minimal subject” misses the extent to which an individual can use his or her judgment to actively shape the world. I respond to Bernet’s reading of Gadamer highlighting how, for Gadamer, the subject is active and reflective, even in the play of dialogue, as well as how Gadamer’s general account of play as an alternative to subjective accounts of constitution differs from his specific account of the play in the experience of a work of art.

Aristotle on the Signification of Natural Kind Terms: Narrow or Wide Content? (V-G)
Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)

Do natural kind terms denote natural kinds solely because of the narrow content of the thoughts they conventionally signify, according to Aristotle, or is wide content involved? Since wide content may be generated in many ways, given the full range of Aristotle’s semantic theory, this is a complicated question. I will limit myself here to arguing that, for Aristotle, a natural kind term denotes a natural kind independently of the efficient causal history of the thought with which the term is conventionally associated.

How Do You Like Your Eggs? The Morality of an Internet Market in Human Ova (I-F)
Amy E. White (Ohio University–Zanesville)

The Internet market in ova has come about because of advances in fertility treatments and increased demand for human eggs. For many women, especially older women, using an egg from another woman significantly increases the changes of pregnancy. On the Internet, it is clear that a market exists in the sale, as opposed to the donation, of human gametes. However, it remains common practice to refer to the procurement of human ova as egg donation even if the donors are handsomely compensated for their so-called donation. On the Internet, eggs can be shopped for much like other merchandise. At the extreme, Internet sites such as Ron’s Angels allow models to auction their eggs to the highest bidder. Potential parents hoping to have a beautiful child may pay up to $150,000 for eggs from one of Ron’s Angels’ vendors. Many arguments have been made that selling and purchasing eggs from Internet vendors is immoral.

Attention and Its Phenomenology (III-J)
Wayne W. Wu (Ohio State University)

At a party, you are involved in conversation when suddenly your name is voiced elsewhere: that conversation captures your attention while yours recedes. This cocktail party effect has an analog in vision where shifts of attention lead to shifts of salience. In both cases, the attended object seems more prominent, standing out against others. This contribution of attention to consciousness, what I call phenomenal salience, is captured by the spotlight and zoom lens metaphors deployed in psychology. What is its basis? Focusing on vision, I examine whether salience amounts to how the attended object is represented. By posing a counterexample to representationalism, I show that it cannot account for phenomenal salience solely by visual content. Focusing on attention as an action, I argue that salience is not a purely perceptual phenomenon but derives also from non-perceptual representational capacities enabled by agency. The common metaphors are misleading as to attention’s phenomenology.

Respecting Religious Citizens as Reasoners (III-F)
Melissa Yates (Northwestern University)

My aim in this paper is to advance an argument against the politically liberal account of public deliberation. I begin with a discussion of the absence of the concept of ‘respect’ from John Rawls’s Political Liberalism in order to underscore problems this poses for his response to objections from religious theorists. Rawls and other political liberals claim that the best way to protect religious freedom in to exclude religious matters from the public sphere; I contend that this approach fails to respect religious citizens as reasoners, since religious claims like all cognitive commitments are improved when they are subjected to public scrutiny. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of the concept of respect for reasoners for theories of public deliberation and I argue that including religious reasons in political debates is not only permitted but recommended.

Kant’s Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered (II-F)
Benjamin S. Yost (Harvard University)

Critics claim that Kant’s enthusiastic embrace of the death penalty is incompatible with, or at least not required by, the principles of his practical philosophy. I will argue that Kant has a strong justification of capital punishment. To do so, I will sketch an interpretation of Kant’s view that meets the three most common objections to it. The first objection charges Kant with inconsistency, stating that he has no reason to apply a flexible version of the ius talionis to rape while applying a strict version to murder. The second claims that the death penalty is impermissible because it infringes on a person’s inviolable right to life. The third holds that execution violates human dignity. To address the third—and most important—concern, I wlil argue that motives of honor, as Kant describes it, would drive a rational person to endorse her own execution, were she to commit murder.