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A Case Against Doxastic Uniqueness
Jonathan Drake, University of Texas at Austin
 The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the Uniqueness thesis. According this thesis, “given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition.” Defenders of Uniqueness naturally commit to the principle that: when some agent A has equal reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the uniquely rational doxastic attitude for A to have with respect to p is suspension of judgment. In this paper I offer a case wherein an agent has equal reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, but the agent is not rationally required to suspend judgment. Furthermore, there seems to be in this case no uniquely rational doxastic attitude for the agent to adopt. Along the way, I consider possible replies from defenders of Uniqueness.

A Critique of Pure Reasons-based Virtue Individuation
Ryan West, Baylor University
 In Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (2009), Daniel Russell argues that each virtue is individuated on the basis of its “characteristic reasons”—i.e., the “sorts of considerations for which persons with that virtue characteristically take themselves to be called into action.” I demur. While Russell’s approach works well in some instances, some virtues lack characteristic reasons, and so cannot be individuated in this way. My argument has three steps. First, I summarize Russell’s account, and show that his reasons-based approach works well for one class of virtues—the “motivational virtues.” Second, I argue that the virtues in another class—the “structural virtues”—lack characteristic reasons. Third, I argue that humility, which is neither motivational nor structural, is like the structural virtues in lacking characteristic reasons. Given the diversity of ways in which the virtues relate to reasons, virtue individuation cannot be purely reasons-based.

A Defense of Modal Parts
Megan Wallace, University of Kentucky
 A modal parts theorist claims that ordinary objects are spread out across possible worlds in the way in which most of us think that tables are spread out across space. We are not wholly located in any one particular world, the modal parts theorist claims, just as we are not wholly spatially located where one’s hand is; we are modally spread out, a trans-world mereological sum of world-bound modal parts. And so are all other ordinary objects. In what follows, I explore a modal parts theory and investigate six arguments against it. These arguments may be the primary reasons why modal parts have not been accepted (or even relatively decently explored) until now. I argue that most of these reasons are unfounded or can be answered, and in so doing maintain that accepting modal parts has distinct advantages, making it a competitive view in its own right.

A Failure to Communicate? Speech Acts and the Response to Hate Crimes and Civil Disobedience
Samuel Huang, Rice University
 In this poster, I examine the legal response to two unique violations of criminal law: hate crimes and civil disobedience. I argue that the communicative function of criminal law makes a salient difference for why hate crimes are given harsher penalties, and why many think that civil disobedients should be given more lenient penalties. Because hate crimes and acts of civil disobedience are typically communicative acts themselves, I suggest viewing such violations through the lens of speech act theory. Examining the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts associated with these acts, I believe, can give us insight into the appropriate legal response to them. I additionally suggest that communicative theory may help us additional in two ways: to help delineate the categories of protected class in hate crime, and to provide potential distinctions amongst civil disobedients who are more (or less) deserving of leniency.

A Hard Problem for Schroeder’s Analysis of Perceptual Knowledge
Ryan Walsh, University of Southern California
 In some recent work Mark Schroeder defends a new analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively good enough. This view can be seen as an attempt to make good on a key insight had by some of the first authors responding to Gettier’s infamous paper, namely, that knowledge is true belief whose justification in some sense ‘stands up to’ the facts. In this paper I show that Schroeder’s own implementation of this insight is subject to Gettier-style counterexamples in the case of basic perceptual knowledge. I also suggest that the problem is likely to generalize to other kinds of knowledge, including memorial knowledge, a priori knowledge, and perhaps normative knowledge.

A Humble Defense for Caring about Our Own Well-being
Dana Howard, Ohio State University
 T. M. Scanlon makes some incisive objections to the view that a person’s well-being has a significant role to play in her first-person practical deliberations. In this paper, I argue that Scanlon overlooks one way in which the concept of well-being can play an important role in our practical deliberations: Knowing which actions forward our good as opposed to other values we care about is a useful heuristic in the way we manage and negotiate the amount of sacrifices we are making in our interpersonal relationships.

A New Challenge to Retributivism
Zac Cogley, Northern Michigan University
Matthew Taylor, Texas Tech University
 In this paper, we challenge retributivism: the claim that desert provides sufficient ground for punishment’s justification. We do this via careful consideration of John Martin Fischer’s recent defense of the retributivist position. We first show that Fischer’s nuanced retributivism can elude recent counter-examples offered by David Dolinko and David Boonin. Neither Dolinko’s nor Boonin’s examples preserve all features necessary for Fischer’s position to apply to them. However, by analyzing what their cases miss, we show what features a successful counterexample to Fischer would require. We then present such an example: a case where intuitively it would be wrong to punish, but where, according to Fischer, it should be permissible to do so. We then show that our case has features that generalize and present a framework that can be used to construct additional counterexamples. We conclude that retributivism has untenable commitments, which we draw out.

A Problem for Teleological Explanation in Aristotle’s Biology
Bryan Reece, University of Toronto
 Aristotle’s view that teleological explanations for organisms’ characteristics are primary differs starkly from contemporary mechanism, according to which function-independent specifications of processes are all that is needed for biological explanations. To expose best the distinctive features of Aristotle’s account, I consider a problem for Aristotle: He says repeatedly that organisms’ formal natures direct development for the good of the organism. Such optimization principles are crucial for his biology. However, as Aristotle mentions, sometimes organisms develop features that either make no contribution to their good or detract from it. This tension threatens to eviscerate the entire teleological explanatory scheme. I will show how for Aristotle, organisms’ formal natures can be understood as per se causes of beneficial parts and accidental causes of unbeneficial parts. As long as Aristotle’s optimization principles are understood (plausibly) as referring only to what formal natures cause per se, the problem posed by unbeneficial features is solved.

A Second Millian Argument for the Desirability of Pleasure
Andrew Sneddon, University of Ottawa
 John Stuart Mill famously offers an argument that pleasure is desirable, or intrinsically good, in the “proof” found in Chapter IV of Utilitarianism. Anthony Quinton ventures that this argument has been discussed as much as any other in the history of moral philosophy (1973, 58). It has certainly been much criticized, so it is reasonable to think that Mill failed to provide a persuasive case with this argument. My present purpose is to show that Mill implicitly provides a second argument for the desirability of pleasure in Chapter II ofUtilitarianism. Specifically, Utilitarianism contains an implicit and distinct version of what is now known as a “fitting-attitude” account of the intrinsic value of experiences. Ironically, this is a more persuasive argument than what Mill officially gives us in his “proof.”

A Simple Coincidence Puzzle
Bradley Rettler, University of Notre Dame
 Coincidence puzzles in metaphysics purport to expose a tension in our pre-theoretical views about ordinary objects. It is widely thought that mereological nihilism, if true, provides a solution to coincidence puzzles. Indeed, it is thought to be one of the more powerful solutions, since it is also a solution to a number of other metaphysical puzzles about material objects. In this paper, I argue that mereological nihilism is not a solution to coincidence puzzles. I do by proposing a coincidence puzzle to which mereological nihilism is not a solution. I then discuss the mereological nihilist’s most natural response to the puzzle and argue that she should not accept it.

A Solution for Buridan’s Ass
Eugene Chislenko, University of California, Berkeley
 Choices between apparently equally good alternatives, such as that of Buridan’s Ass, present central counterexamples to theories that treat action or intention as requiring evaluative preference. It seems clear that we manage to make such choices, and yet if they required evaluative preference, it seems we would be unable to choose. After characterizing the cases and criticizing initial responses to them, I argue that a wide range of these theories can account for intention in such cases by appealing to an intention to act unintentionally. It is a decision to “just pick” that allows us to handle such cases without their being a damaging theoretical counterexample.

A Valuation Theory of Practical Reasoning and Weakness of Will
Julia Haas, Emory University
 In my poster, I argue for the importance of value in decision-making and provide a valuation theory of practical reasoning and weakness of will. In Panel 1, I outline four basic capacities an agent needs in order to make decisions: possessing goals, self-regulation, value attribution, and value prediction. In Panel 2, I turn to evidence from cognitive and computational neuroscience to examine how these four capacities are operational in biological organisms and, in particular, in human beings. I outline how the brain represents, encodes, and predicts value, and I identify organisms’ estimations of future values as a baseline for understanding the nature of decision-making. Organisms likely rely on two complementary decision-making strategies to navigate their multifaceted environments, and the interface between these two strategies holds the key to explaining the perplexing phenomenon of weakness of will.

Actualism’s Ad Hoc Problem
Yishai Cohen, Syracuse University
Travis Timmerman, Syracuse University
 Do facts about what a subject S would freely do in certain circumstances at least partly determine any of S’s moral obligations? Actualists answer in the affirmative while possibilists answer in the negative. According to actualism, a subject S ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We propose a new objection to actualism by arguing that actualism makes an ad hoc distinction between the kinds of counterfactuals that at least partly determine a subject’s moral obligations and counterfactuals that do not even partly determine a subject’s moral obligations. We then offer a substantive amendment to actualism that rids it of its ad hoc problem, and which also avoids the further independent problem that actualism is not action-guiding.

After Psychiatric Kinds: Diagnosis Specificity and Progress in Psychiatric Research
Kathryn Tabb, University of Pittsburgh
 The failure of psychiatry to validate its diagnostic constructs is often attributed to the prioritizing of reliability of psychiatric constructs over validity, and the attendant use of operational rather than etiological criteria in psychiatric diagnostics. Recently, however, the National Institute of Mental Health has proposed a new diagnosis: psychiatry’s problem is its focus on the validation of psychiatric kinds rather than of the domains of functioning implicated in psychopathology. Advocates of the NIMH’s new initiative, the Research Domain Criteria framework, have defended their viewpoint through a critique of the reification of psychiatric kinds. I argue that in fact what is behind psychiatry’s failure to validate its nosology is not a metaphysical problem but an epistemological one, which I call diagnosis specificity: the assumption that when a clinician makes a diagnosis, they identify the patient’s condition as belonging to a homogeneous type and thus can make further inferences about the case.

Against an Account of Groundmaking
Noel Saenz, University of Colorado Boulder
 The fact that the ball is red grounds the fact that it is colored. But what grounds this fact? Generalizing, what grounds facts about grounding? A recent answer to this question has it that what grounds facts about grounding is the first relata of such facts (Bennett 20211; deRosset 2013). That is, if x grounds y, then x grounds that x grounds y. In this paper, I argue that such a view has some costs. In particular, such a view (i) entails that the grounding relation grounds itself (given certain assumptions that a defender of this is view explicitly commits to) and (ii) does not provide us with a fundamental layer rich enough in order to satisfy a very plausible constraint governing grounding.

Against Human Rights Minimalism
Alistair M. Macleod, Queen’s University
 The paper offers a critique of some versions of human rights “minimalism.” While the rights listed in international human rights documents shouldn’t be regarded as canonical, the fear that a moral defense cannot be mounted for a reasonably broad doctrine of human rights—one that approximates, even if it doesn’t mimic, the comprehensiveness of the lists of human rights in these documents—rests in part on a number of mistaken assumptions about what is involved in the provision of a compelling rationale for human rights. It’s a mistake, for example, to suppose human rights must be transformable into legal rights, or that the sole function of a doctrine of human rights is to provide a criterion of the moral legitimacy of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, or that the only duties generated by human rights are “perfect” duties, or that these must be “negative” duties.

Aiming to Shame?
Casey Hall, University of California, Irvine
 Shaming punishments are becoming more popular, and have been defended by legal scholars and some philosophers as attractive alternatives to incarceration. Part of the attraction, it is thought, is that these punishments teach the offender an important lesson about the social norms and values that her crime has violated. In this essay, I argue that most shaming sanctions are actually humiliating rather than shaming, and that there is a crucial difference between the two. Shame involves engagement with one’s values in a way that humiliation does not. Punishments that merely humiliate, as most of the so-called “shaming punishments” do, fail to live up to the justification for the alternative sanctions that anchor their use in the first place.

Alethic Functionalism and the Problem of Mixed Atomic Propositions
Jay Newhard, East Carolina University
 According to alethic functionalism, the truth manifesting property required for a proposition, P, to be true is determined solely by P’s subject matter properties. Call this principle “SMP.” Mixed atomic propositions—logically atomic propositions having multiple subject matter properties—pose a problem for SMP. Specifically, a mixed atomic proposition which has one but not all of the truth manifesting properties required for it to manifest truth meets sufficient conditions for manifesting truth, but fails to meet necessary conditions for manifesting truth, and is therefore both true and false. In this paper, a range of options for handling the problem of mixed atomic propositions is examined; each is found to be problematic. It is argued that the problem of mixed atomic propositions cannot be solved by alethic functionalism, and that SMP must be rejected. Further ramifications are discussed, including how this result bears on other forms of alethic pluralism.

An Argument for Naive Realism from Demonstrative Thought
Michael Barkasi, Rice University
 A number of philosophers (most prominently John Campbell) have given arguments against Representationalist views of perception (or for Naive Realist views) based on the well accepted premise that perceived objects can be selected for thought through attention. Here I give a new argument along these lines. I argue that Naive Realism follows from two well accepted premises about attention-based thought: that it’s demonstrative, and that the perceived object must be consciously presented in the experience. Although my argument is a positive argument for Naive Realism and not a negative argument against Representationalism, if successful, then philosophers (like Representationalists) who reject Naive Realism will face a dilemma. They must either give up the claim that attention-based thought is demonstrative, or the claim that phenomenally conscious experience is necessary for attentional selection.

An Aristotelian Argument for Philosophy’s Ease
Matthew Walker, Yale-NUS College
 In passages preserved in both Chapter 6 of Iamblichus’s Protrepticus (at 40.15-41.2/B55-56), and in verbatim parallel passages of Chapter 26 of Iamblichus’s De Communi Mathematica Scientia (82.17-83.2), Aristotle presents a series of three arguments respond to the worry that philosophy is somehow too difficult an activity to be pursued or enjoyed with profit. On the contrary, Aristotle argues, philosophy is easy. In this paper, I examine one of Aristotle’s arguments for the ease of philosophy, viz., the third argument. This argument, which I call the resource argument, holds that philosophy is easy because it does not require burdensome external resources. I contend that this resource argument is actually stronger and more interesting than it may initially appear.

Anti-anti-essentialism about Art
Daniel Wilson, University of Auckland
 The successful specification of the definition of art has so far proven elusive. Discouraged by repeated failed attempts at the definition of art, numerous anti-essentialist philosophers have suggested alternative accounts (for example, Dominic McIver Lopes, Kathleen Stock, and Berys Gaut). In this talk I defend the project of the definition of art by arguing that the strongest anti-essentialist arguments are unsuccessful in ruling out either the possibility or the value of a definition of art. Based on my observations regarding a blind spot in Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialist “look and see” approach, I conclude this talk by suggesting a new avenue of investigation for essentialism regarding art.

Aquinas on Testimony
Matthew Siebert, University of Toronto
 Human-to-human testimony is an important topic for Aquinas, and yet no one has studied his views on it, or compared his view to contemporary ones. I argue that Aquinas takes a unique pluralist approach to testimony, combining a Reductive approach to testimonial “opinion,” and an Assurance approach to testimonial “faith.” I briefly explain the difference between Reductive, Anti-Reductive and Assurance views, and explain why my interpretation is better than a Reductive or Anti-Reductive interpretation.

Are There Limits to Our Obligations to Seek and Engage Dissenters?
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin, Cornell University
Kristen Intemann, Montana State University
 Dissent is thought to play a valuable role in science, so that scientific communities ought to create opportunities for receiving critical feedback and take dissenting views seriously. There is concern, however, that some dissent does more harm than good. Dissent on climate change and evolutionary theory, for example, has confused the public, created doubt about existing consensus, derailed public policy, and forced scientists to devote resources to respond. Are there limits to the extent to which scientific communities have obligations to seek and engage dissenting views? We consider the two main criteria that have been offered for what constitutes “normatively appropriate dissent” or the sort of dissent that ought to have the opportunity to be heard and taken seriously. Many have argued that dissenters must 1) engage in uptake of criticism against their own views and 2) share some standards for theory appraisal. We argue these criteria ultimately are unsuccessful.

Are We Culpable for Implicit, Automatic, Consciously Unendorsed Stereotypes?
Chris Kramer, Marquette University
 Cultural implicit stereotypes and their effects have been widely studied among psychologists and social scientists, but there have been few philosophical accounts of the moral responsibility for such biases. In part one, I argue that stereotypes are errors in our heuristic or short-cut cognitive mechanisms, some of which might remain below conscious awareness yet still causally efficacious on our goals and behavior. In part two, I make the case that we are responsible for these stereotypes even if they are automatically triggered, implicit, and contrary to our consciously espoused values and beliefs. At some level, we do endorse, or at least fail to genuinely deny, the content of some negative cultural stereotypes insofar as they habitually sustain the status quo which benefits the stereotyper.

Attention and Agential Control of Bodily Action
Denis Buehler, University of California, Los Angeles
 Employments of attention are a way of controlling bodily action. Such employments of attention can be active, or passive. When they are active, they are exercises of the individual’s agency. Suppose an individual is actively controlling her bodily action in this way. She is then exercising agential control over the action. I contrast this type of agential control with forms of agential control that involve hierarchies of the kind introduced by Frankfurt, and Bratman. I argue that attentional control of action is more fundamental, than control involving such hierarchies.

Attention to Properties and Reference to Objects
Dominic Alford-Duguid, University of Toronto
 This paper focuses upon the relationship between perceptual attention to objects (“object-attention”) and perceptual attention to properties (“property-attention”). My target is Christopher Mole’s recent argument against the suggestion that object-attention is merely a complex kind of property-attention. It is an argument for a distinction in kind between the two types of attention. He uses this distinction as part of a challenge to those (such as John Campbell) who follow Russell and use perceptual attention to explain thought about objects. I argue that Mole’s argument fails, and with it his challenge.

Autonomy-in-community: The Double-edged Sword of Constraints to Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations
Pamela J. Lomelino, Loyola University Chicago
 Given that persons from vulnerable populations are more likely to encounter constraints to their autonomy, how can we attend to these constraints without further perpetuating their oppression? In order to better ensure their autonomy, it is first necessary to identify the additional constraints that plague members of vulnerable populations. Most notably, constraints that arise from social structures have gone unnoticed. To better ensure the autonomy of vulnerable populations, we must attend to these constraints. As a means of doing so, I propose a set of minimally sufficient ethical conditions. As I explain, implementing these conditions enables us to identify constraints to autonomy for vulnerable populations without further perpetuating their oppression. Although I use the medical context to illustrate my arguments, the constraints I identify represent a universal problem for the autonomy of vulnerable populations.

Backing into Self-ownership
John Thrasher, University of Arizona
 Recent work by David Sobel, Peter Railton, and Steven Wall has exposed a serious problem with traditional libertarian accounts of self-ownership and property. Either libertarian self-ownership is so strong that it cannot distinguish between serious and minor violations or it is not strong enough to justify strong libertarian property rights. If it cannot distinguish between the serious and the trivial, all violations from slavery to minor trespassing will be prohibited. These prohibitions will, however, undermine the libertarian’s commitment to the individual. If the libertarian cares about freedom, this argument goes, they will have to give up on self-ownership. I argue that the libertarian can solve this problem by rejecting a rationalistic “propertarian” commitment to self-ownership and should instead embrace a conventionalist defense of self-ownership. In so doing, the libertarian will be able to defend both self-ownership (albeit in a different form) and freedom.

Beauvoir and the Limits of Political Responsibility
Elisabeth Paquette, York University
 This paper will begin with the similarities between the structure of individual freedom and universal freedom, as drawn out in The Ethics of Ambiguity. Second, I will make evident that “present” freedom, as distinct from “future” freedom, is an insufficient form of freedom because it abstracts and withdraws from the world. As such, it fails to disclose the world, which is a necessary condition of freedom for Beauvoir. Third, freedom is only won when it is the end towards which our actions aim. For Beauvoir, there is a permanent tension between the means and the end of freedom, individual and universal freedom, and freedom as manifest in the present and the future. Beauvoir’s conception of freedom lays the foundation for the possibility of political action, i.e., the degree to which one can be politically responsible. The latter part of this essay will draw a connection between freedom and responsibility.

Belief and Imagination: A Common Misconception
Michael Ferreira, Ohio State University
 Scholars have recently begun to unravel puzzles surrounding the semantic and functional similarities between belief and imagination. Nevertheless, there remains a pervasive tendency to emphasize the sui generis status of the latter—i.e., to assume that belief and imagination are distinct propositional attitudes. I maintain that the distinct attitude assumption is unwarranted, and has moreover obscured deep conceptual ties belief bears to imagination. My aim here is to begin to sketch a clearer picture of these conceptual relations. The connections revealed are surprisingly strong. Being an imaginer, I argue, requires being a believer. Moreover, in some cases, having beliefs is sufficient for exercising imagination. I conclude that the distinct attitude assumption embodies an important misconception about belief and imagination.

Beyond Disagreement: Directional Reasoning and Other Forms of Higher-order Evidence
Jonathan Ellis, University of California, Santa Cruz
 A central question in the epistemology of disagreement concerns the extent to which an agent should alter the confidence she places in a particular belief, given evidence that an epistemic peer (someone she regards as equally informed, equally intelligent, and so on) disagrees with her on the matter. Among the many fruits of the recent surge in work on disagreement is that it prepares us, and encourages us, to investigate similar issues as they pertain to other forms of higher-order evidence. Here I look at parallel questions as they concern higher-order evidence about directional reasoning (sometimes called “motivated reasoning”), evidence that is both scientifically and philosophically informed. Precisely what that evidence is, and what its epistemic implications are, are difficult, largely unexplored issues. I explain why we cannot afford to dismiss them.

Beyond Expressive Power: Cassirer’s Critique of Logic
Patrick Ryan, University of California, Riverside
 Frege reforms logic by expanding its expressive power. I’ll develop a suggestion made by Ernst Cassirer that Frege’s reformation required a further step: we also need a new theory of the concept, the lack of which creates circularity in Frege’s deduction of number: the relation “equinumerous to…” can only be used to construct an equivalence class if the members of the coordinated classes are already conceived of as ordinal numbers. By filling out the details of the objection, which Cassirer does not do, I’ll show that this problem arises because Frege relies on a particular conception of objectivity, according to which a concept’s objectivity is established if the concept corresponds to a feature of a given object (empirical or abstract objects) or a possible combination of objects. I’ll elaborate this conception and show that it creates problems within mathematical practice by considering the historical puzzles surrounding irrational numbers.

Biological Parenting as a Human Right
S. Matthew Liao, New York University
 Do biological parents have the right to parent their own biological children? It might seem obvious that the answer is yes, but the philosophical justification for this right is uncertain. In recent years, there has been a flurry of philosophical activity aimed at providing fresh justifications for this right by writers such as Harry Brighouse, Adam Swift and Anca Gheaus, among others. In this paper, I shall propose a new answer, namely, the right to parent one’s own biological children is a human right. I call this the human rights account of parental rights and I shall explain how this account is better than these other alternatives.

Brains Without Parts: Reframing the Debate Between Dynamicists and Mechanists
Daniel Pearlberg, Ohio State University
 Dynamicists argue that it is dynamical equations, not mechanisms, that are doing the explanatory work in cognitive science explanations. Moreover, Dynamicists claim that these dynamical systems explanations are explanatory in virtue of abstracting away from the underlying causal mechanisms, and that the explanatory role of abstraction cannot be captured by Mechanists. Mechanists have responded with the following Dilemma: Either dynamical systems explanations aren’t genuinely explanatory, or they are—but only by virtue of really being instances of mechanistic explanations. Mechanists can solve the Abstraction Problem by making use of the mutual manipulability [MM] account of constitutive relevance. However, this allows Dynamicists to address the Dilemma. For I argue that if the causal contributions of the parts of cognitive mechanisms are inseparable, dynamical systems explanations can still be genuinely explanatory, even by Mechanists’ standards, but given the constraints imposed by MM they are not instances of mechanistic explanations.

Business, Values, and Science in Biomedical Research
Aleta Quinn, University of Pittsburgh
 Business models for biomedical research prescribe decentralization due to market selection pressures. I argue that decentralized biomedical research does not match four normative models of the role of values in science. Nonepistemic values affect the internal stages of biomedical science, contra the externalist model. Decentralization precludes application of Douglas’s (2009) model because there is no person to whom responsibility for harm resulting from methodological choices could attach. Success in the marketplace is incompatible with Longino’s (1990) four criteria for enabling objectivity, and with Elliot’s (2011) prescription that values informing science must be those of the general public. The volume and integration in the publishing community of decentralized biomedical research imply that the entire community of biomedical research science cannot match the normative criteria of community-focused models of values in science. Several proposals for changing research funding structure (Brown 2008, Reiss 2010) might successfully relieve market pressures that drive decentralization.

Carnapian Conventionalism, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Biology
Joshua Filler, Ripon College
 Rudolf Carnap famously argued that there are objective answers to ontological questions. Yet Carnap argued that while the answers to ontological questions are objective, they are also, in a deep sense, conventional since we must first select a linguistic framework in which the ask the question. It is in the selection of a linguistic framework that conventionalism creeps in. In this paper, I argue that this Carnapian understanding of ontological questions is helpful in adjudicating the on-going debate over whether evolutionary causes are forces. I argue that there is an objective answer to the question of whether natural selection (and other evolutionary causes) is (are) forces. However, we cannot even provide answers to such ontological questions but until we decide upon certain conventions (in this case, what state-space one uses to represent evolutionary causes). So while this ontological debate can be decided objectively, this objectivity is a limited, Carnapian objectvity.

Cartesian Transubstantiation
Steven Dezort, Texas A&M University
 Descartes’s comments on transubstantiation to Arnauld and Mesland have been traditionally viewed as unrelated accounts of transubstantiation aimed only at placating Descartes’s critics in the Church. I argue that there is actually one theory of Cartesian Transubstantiation which Descartes refers to in his accounts to Arnauld and Mesland. Central to Cartesian Transubstantiation is the notion that a body is identified as the “body of Christ” because of its dispositions toward union with the mind of Christ. This notion of dispositions is important in how we understand the mind-body union because it allows us to identify a body as “the body of so-and-so” (e.g., the body of Christ) in virtue of its actual union with a particular mind.

Causation, Harm, and the Non-identity Problem
Thomas Bontly, University of Connecticut
 Can an action harm a person if he would not exist but for that action? Derek Parfit has argue that it cannot, which generates now-familiar non-identity problem. Parfit proposes to solve this problem by giving up the person-affecting conception of beneficence. Others propose giving up the comparative view of harm or even our very robust intuitions about non-identity cases. In this paper, I argue that no such sacrifices are necessary. Thinking about harm, causation, and counterfactual dependence from an interventionist (or manipulationist) perspective dispels the impression that there even is a problem about non-identity.

Coercion and Distributive Justice: A Defense
Douglas MacKay, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 The most promising defense of statism—the view that the scope of distributive justice is limited to the state’s relation to its citizens—is arguably Michael Blake’s coercion account. For Blake, states possess distinctive distributive obligations to their citizens because they coercively enforce systems of private law—contract, property, and torts. A number of commentators have recently argued that Blake’s account fails in its most basic aim of showing that the coercive enforcement of a system of private law is a sufficient condition for the existence of distributive obligations. Andrew Sangiovanni argues that Blake fails to show how the coercive imposition of norms explains why states possess distributive obligations to their citizens. Ryan Pevnick argues that state coercion “never requires justification via special concern with distributive justice.” In this paper, I argue that proponents of the coercion account can successfully respond to these objections.

Cognitive Penetration: What’s Under the Hood?
Kranti Saran, Ashoka University
 “Cognitive penetration” has no established usage: Pylyshyn (1999), Siegel (2012), Macpherson (2012), Deroy (2012) and Stokes (2012) offer sharply differing accounts of the range of permissible penetrators, what gets penetrated, and the necessary and sufficient conditions that must hold between them. I identify and critically assess two foundational theses, not thematised in the philosophical literature, on which these proposals differ: a thesis about the interaction between levels of explanation in cognitive psychology and a thesis about the nature of rational relations. I further identify prima facie reasons for rejecting both of these theses, thereby allowing a more expansive conception of cognitive penetration than has been defended till date.

Collective Wrongs and Moral Luck
Robert C. Hughes, University of California, Los Angeles
 Sometimes a group does something bad or wrong even though all of its members act as well as they can. No member of the group individually has the power to change what the group does. Because the group’s wrongdoing is committed in the course of pursuing an important end which individuals cannot pursue outside the group, group members should not withdraw. I reject both the view that no one is responsible for these collective harms or wrongs and the view that the group bears responsibility exclusively. I argue that these cases should be regarded as cases of moral luck. Participants in collective activities are open to moral assessment not only for the decision to participate, which they often do control, but also for the character of the activity in which they participate, which they typically do not control.

Commitments, Closure, Consequence
Colin Caret, Yonsei University
 The semantic paradoxes are a venerable source of data about logical consequence. Recent studies of Curry’s paradox, in particular, divide between non-transitive and non-contractive theories. Traditionally, part of the conceptual role of logical consequence was that it imposes a constraint on rational belief, viz. that one ought not to simultaneously accept X while rejecting any consequences of X. In this paper, I argue that the normativity of logic presupposes that consequences are “counterfactually complete,” i.e., that an agent ought not disbelieve any commitments she would have if she were to believe all of her actual commitments. Thus, transitivity is constitutive of the concept of logical consequence in a way that contraction is not. I conclude with the hypothesis that paradoxical sentences express multiple propositions as a philosophical interpretation of non-contractive theories of paradox.

Companions in Innocence: Defending a New Methodological Assumption for Theorizing about Moral Responsibility
Kelly McCormick, Washington and Jefferson College
 The contemporary philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility is rife with appeal to a variety of allegedly intuitive cases and principles. As a result, some have argued that many strands of this debate end in “dialectical stalemates,” boiling down to bedrock, seemingly intractable disagreements about intuition (Fischer 1994). Here I attempt to carve out a middle ground between conventional reliance on appeal to intuition and intuitional skepticism in regards to the philosophical discussion of moral responsibility in particular. The main goal of this paper is to propose and defend a qualified methodological assumption that I argue responsibility theorists can and should accept, one that serves to preserve a general skepticism about the proper role of intuition in our responsibility theorizing while marking a particular class of our responsibility judgments as having an uncontroversial epistemic status.

Conditionalization and Conceptual Change: Chalmers in Defense of a Dogma
Gary Ebbs, Indiana University Bloomington
 David Chalmers has recently argued that Baysian conditionalization is a constraint on conceptual constancy, and that this constraint, together with certain plausible assumptions about a rational subject’s conditional credences and “standard Baysian considerations about evidence and updating,” should lead a reasonable person to reject the Quinean claim that any belief is revisable without a change in content. I argue that Chalmers’s reasoning is unsuccessful because it overlooks the distinction between conceptual role content and translational content. Chalmers’s argument therefore leaves us where we began, with a seemingly irresolvable impasse between rationalists and Quineans about how to think about rational inquiry.

Confirmation and the Ordinal Equivalence Convention
Olav Vassend, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 According to a widespread convention in Bayesian confirmation theory, two confirmation measures are to be considered equivalent in the case that the two measures are ordinally equivalent—call this the “ordinal equivalence convention” (OEC). In this paper, I explore the costs that come with adopting OEC. In particular, I show that adopting OEC renders one incapable of determining whether a piece of evidence significantly favors one hypothesis over another. I also show that adopting OEC makes Bayesian confirmation just as contrastive and intrinsically relational as Likelihoodist confirmation. Finally, I briefly discuss whether there are good reasons why OEC has become a widespread convention, and I conclude that there are none.

Confirmation Holism and Meaning Holism Revisited
Timothy Fuller, Yonsei University
 Does confirmation holism imply meaning holism? In this paper I revisit a traditional argument for a connection between the two theses, associated especially with Quine. I also evaluate a contemporary argument for such a connection that utilizes the resources of inferential role semantics. I diagnose both arguments with an unappreciated weakness, one that illustrates a general difficulty with drawing insights about the nature of ordinary thought and language from claims about the nature of science. The diagnosis is intended to be instructive: It suggests more fruitful connections between theories of scientific inference and theories of everyday thought and language.

Consequentializing Inviolable Rights
Zi Lin, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 Individual rights usually appear to be best accounted for by deontology, but there have long been attempts amongst consequentialists to show that consequentialism can also accommodate our moral intuitions regarding rights. However, certain rights are thought to be inviolable under appropriate circumstances, and their inviolability is particularly difficult for consequentialism to capture. Following Frances Kamm’s insight that inviolability is a status (2007), I argue that the difficulty is rooted in the essential difference between a status and a state of affairs. While the targets of consequentialist evaluation typically are states of affairs, inviolability is a moral status, and various proposals for consequentialist evaluation of inviolability are problematic due to the special nature of moral status.

Construction and Schematism in Kant’s Opus Postumum
Jeffrey L. Wilson, Loyola Marymount University
 We find Kant reasserting the importance of schematization in the Opus postumum and connecting it to his new doctrine of self-positing. We also find a repeated insistence that transcendental philosophy itself must be schematic rather than constructive. In this paper, I use the terms construction and schematism as a lens through which to interpret theOpus postumum and to trace threads of the manuscript that would otherwise go unseen. The picture that emerges is one in which Kant offers a physical schematism of a system of moving forces. This schematism is equivalent to the doctrine of self-positing and plays the decisive role in the transition from the metaphysics of natural science to physics that constitutes the central problematic of these late texts.

Constructive Realism: Variations on a Theme by Nelson Goodman
Thomas Norton-Smith, Kent State University
 According to Nelson Goodman’s constructive nominalism, there is a plurality of internally consistent, equally privileged, well-made actual worlds constructed through the use of symbol systems he calls “true” or “right” world versions. Using evidence from an American Indian world version, I will argue for a constructive realism that understands Goodman’s world constructing processes—among them composition, decomposition, ordering, sorting and collecting—as kinds of mental acts that are antecedent to the actual worlds they construct.

Coordination, Understanding, and Semantic Requirement
Paolo Bonardi, Université de Genève
 My goal in this paper is to raise doubts about coordination among proper names. In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine proposes two characterizations of coordination (among names): one is an intuitive test; the other is a technical definition. Based on the intuitive characterization, I shall maintain that coordination is grounded in a notion of understanding distinct from the familiar notion of linguistic competence. While—as I will argue—a theoretical characterization of the notion of understanding is needed in order to fully illuminate Fine’s coordination, it is not clear how such a notion should be characterized. Not even Fine’s technical characterization of coordination, grounded in the notion of semantic requirement, will enable us to get out of the impasse. The problem of determining what exactly coordination among names is will finally remain open.

Counterfactuals for Newcombers
Landon Hedrick, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
 Some Newcombers think that the dispute between one-boxers and two-boxers is to be settled by determining whether it’s pragmatically appropriate to use a non-standard resolution of vagueness with respect to the counterfactual conditionals that we deliberate with. Terence Horgan, for instance, argues that the standard resolution of vagueness is inappropriate in a Newcomb scenario, and opts for a backtracking resolution instead. This allows him to defend the one-boxing strategy. In this paper I set aside Horgan’s meta-level argument for thinking that we should use the backtracking resolution. Nevertheless, I show that Horgan’s one-boxing argument is always unsound. We can see this by considering a minor variant on the Newcomb scenario which makes it clear that there is always a false counterfactual premise in the argument.

Defending an Expressivist Account of Reasons
DS Nelson, University of Missouri
 It is common for moral philosophers to analyze the actions, or potential actions, of agents in terms of reasons. The use of the language of reasons, however, seems to imply the existence of mind-independent normative facts. Simon Blackburn, however, denies such facts exist. However, he does not want to sacrifice the usefulness of reasons talk. So, Blackburn attempts to provide an expressivist account of the reasons talk employed by philosophers. R. Jay Wallace, however, thinks Blackburn’s account mistakenly removes the agent from the focus of the discussion. I will argue, however, that Wallace’s criticisms are misplaced. The supposed inadequacies that Wallace finds in Blackburn’s account are the result of interpreting Blackburn’s account as an alternative to our reasons talk instead of an explanation of it; and this is a mistake.

Deliberationally Useless Conditionals
Karolina Krzyżanowska, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
 It is a widely accepted assumption that a rational agent should not consider indicative conditionals in the process of decision making for they can constitute a bad or a conflicting advice. Following Keith DeRose, I will argue that indicatives can be conditionals of deliberation, but some of them are deliberationally useless. However, as DeRose failed to identify the reason why certain indicatives are better avoided in the context of deliberation, I will put forward an alternative explanation of this phenomenon.

Demonstratives and Modified Occam’s Razor
Dawn Starr, Ohio State University
 Nathan Salmon (2002) argues that David Kaplan’s account of demonstratives violates a version of Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor: do not multiply expressions beyond plausibility. On Kaplan’s account, demonstratives require something extra-linguistic to determine a referent on an occasion of use, a demonstration in “Demonstratives” and in his later work, “Afterthoughts,” a special type of speaker intention called a directing intention. Salmon argues that on Kaplan’s account a demonstrative is an incomplete expression that, when completed by a demonstration or directing intention, becomes a new expression—effectively, a new word—almost every time a demonstrative is used. I call this the proliferation problem for demonstratives. Salmon raises the objection by focusing on Kaplan’s “Demonstratives” view but maintains that the same objection applies equally to the “Afterthoughts” view. In this paper I show that, on the most plausible interpretation of “Afterthoughts,” demonstratives are not in fact proliferated.

Descartes’s Change of Heart about the Passions
Matthew J. Kisner, University of South Carolina
 It is sometimes thought that the passions, according to Descartes, provide us with a kind of moral guidance by informing us of what is good and evil. However, this reading is difficult to square with Descartes’s early letters to Elizabeth, where he claims, “all our passions represent to us the goods to whose pursuit they impel us as being much greater than they really are. (AT IV 294-5, CSMK 267; see also AT IV 285, CSMK 264). On this basis, recent scholarship has argued that, for Descartes, we should “never let the passions be our guide.” This paper argues that Descartes reversed his view and came to regard the passions as reliable insofar as they perform the function of representing the good of the soul. This commitment is important to Descartes’s ethics, I argue, since the virtue of generosity arises from following the guidance of the passion of generosity.

Desire and Virtue
Nomy Arpaly, Brown University
Timothy Schroeder, Ohio State University
 Many virtue theorists hold that the virtuous person is disposed to do the right things, feel the right things, and think the right things. But what is the ground of these dispositions? We argue that one or more intrinsic desires for the right or the good, correctly conceived, suffice to ground all of the dispositions characteristic of virtue, and thus that virtue just is the possession of such desires. It is perhaps no surprise that a desire would suffice to ground a disposition to act, but we show through a range of examples that intrinsic desires also ground numerous emotional and cognitive dispositions, including the dispositions to feel (reasonably and unreasonably, taking into account novelty and jadedness) and cognize (believe rationally and irrationally, be confident in one’s beliefs, attend, and learn) the way we expect of people who are kind, just, and otherwise virtuous.

Desire in Plato’s Phaedo
Travis Butler, Iowa State University
 Desire is central to the philosophical ethic defended in the Phaedo. On the one hand, the soul’s imprisonment is caused and exacerbated by bodily desires (82e5-6); on the other hand, the philosopher’s defining desire for truth guides him to his liberation. This paper sketches an account of the nature of desire as it is understood in the Phaedo, focusing on the functional role, content, and phenomenology of desire. Desires have the functional role of compelling acquisition of their target objects; they have descriptive content that asserts the reality of their objects; and they have varying degrees of phenomenological intensity. This framework applies to bodily and philosophical desires alike, and explains their imprisoning and liberating power.

Different Types of Names
Eric Snyder, Ohio State University
 Names are used in a variety of ways, namely referentially, predicatively, and adjectively. However, the predominant dialectic regarding names has it that names are exclusively referential-type or predicative-type expressions. The former view is known as Referentialism, the latter as Predicativism. I review the linguistic evidence in favor of these prominent views, their advocates, and their problems. Neither view can account for adjectival uses of names, and the increasingly popular Predicativism has several heretofore unmentioned, independent problems. I want to reintroduce an alternative to these two prominent positions. I call it “Type Polysemy.” According to it, names take on different semantic types in different syntactic environments thanks to a limited stock of independently needed type-shifting principles originally provided in a classic paper by Barbara Partee. The result is an empirically superior account of names which elegantly explains why they, like other nouns, have the various uses witnessed.

Difficulty and Degrees of Praise and Blame
Gwen Bradford, Rice University
 It is a curiously neglected observation that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness admit of degrees. In virtue of what do praise- and blameworthiness vary? This paper looks at one factor that appears to shape degree of praise- or blameworthiness: difficulty. It’s a natural thought that doing something that is praiseworthy is all the more praiseworthy if it was especially difficult, and there is a parallel idea that the difficulty of avoiding wrongdoing can mitigate blameworthiness—the more difficult it would be to do what morality requires, the less blameworthy you are for failing to do it. In this paper, I reject both the praise-augmenting and blame-mitigating theses about difficulty, on the grounds that difficulty per se does not have these effects on praise- and blameworthiness. Rather, the difficult-making features do.

Dilemmas for the Rarity Thesis in Virtue Ethics
Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby, Baylor College of Medicine and Rice University
 “Situationists” such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris have accused virtue ethicists as having an “empirically inadequate” theory, arguing that much of social science research suggests that people do not have robust character traits (e.g., virtues or vices) as traditionally thought. By far, the most common response to this challenge has been what I refer to as the “rarity response” or “rarity thesis.” Rarity responders (e.g., Ernest Sosa and Gopal Sreenivasan) deny that situationism poses a threat to virtue ethics since there is no reason to suppose that the moral virtues are typical or widespread. But, far from being its saving grace, I will argue, the rarity thesis forces virtue ethicists into positions that are incompatible with their theoretical foundations or render their theory normatively irrelevant. The more they modify their thesis to fit the empirical evidence and to be normatively relevant, the less they retain a virtue ethical theory.

Discourse and Logical Form
Ernest LePore, Rutgers University
Una Stojnic, Rutgers University
Matthew Stone, Rutgers University
 We develop an account of reference resolution for demonstrative pronouns that precisifies interdependences between mechanisms structuring a discourse context and reference resolution. What a pronoun picks out is partly determined by what is at the center of attention in a coherent discourse (where ‘attention’ and ‘coherence’ are made precise). We argue these mechanisms, contrary to the received Kaplanean views, are grammaticized, and as such should be independently represented in logical form. Once these systematic linguistic contributions are recognized, we will be able to characterize the meaning of a demonstrative pronoun, like ‘he’, such that, much as with pure indexicals, like ‘I’, its reference is straightforwardly determined as a function of linguistic context. We will argue that the resulting view is superior to its competitors. It renders transparent linguistic mechanisms typically left implicit, or confused with pragmatic processes; and consequently, it avoids ascribing ambiguity to seemingly unambiguous expressions.

Do Negative Cultural Stereotypes Fall Within the Scope of a Theory of Social Justice?
Gerald D. Doppelt, University of California, San Diego
 Rawls limits issues of social justice to features of a society which embody its basic structure. Rawls characterizes the basic structure as (1) institutions defined by law and choices that are legally coerced, and (2) more broadly any institutions that have profound effects on the life chances of individuals. I argue that the harms created by negative cultural stereotypes are issues of social justice. They satisfy the second condition of the basic structure of society, even if they do not satisfy the first criterion. Even if it is impossible or undesirable to alter negative cultural stereotypes by law and public policy, nonetheless they do have profound effects on individuals’ life chances and their access to equality of opportunity, recognition, self-respect, and human well-being.

Does All Labor Have Dignity?
Andrea Veltman, James Madison University
 In this paper, I critically examine the claim—made by Martin Luther King, Jr. and others—that all labor has dignity. I argue that the claim is incorrect, even if it is motivated by a sound insight that many forms of work have dignity and value. The claim that all labor has dignity is not only open to counter-example but also betrays a complexity of issues surrounding work, esteem and human development. Not all labor or work is equal is eliciting social esteem, supporting self-respect, or in contributing to human flourishing. I suggest looking at the matter through the lens of a meta-ethical question concerning labor and social subordination, and I join other theorists of justice in maintaining that true social equality entails that all people have an opportunity to develop and contribute their talents in complex work that grounds self-respect.

Domesticated Platonism and the Pitfalls of Nominalism
Eric Rubenstein, Indiana University of Pennsylvania
 Armed with an ontology of only individuals, nominalists face the difficult task of explaining the general or common. For those whose nominalism is motivated by a fear of abstracta which can’t exist in causal relations, including being objects of knowledge, a theory of concrete universals can serve to be a viable alternative. I sketch such an account, taking seriously the idea from Plato’s middle dialogues that generality is explained by the sharing of something common, but adding the twist that we think of predicables as modeled on stuffs or masses. Thinking of universals as concrete, stuff-like entities allows us to make generality a basic feature of reality, in a way that alleviates at least some of the concerns that drive philosophers towards nominalism. Ultimately the nominalist’s reliance on a primitive relation of resemblance is replaced by that of whole/part.

Durand of St.-Pourçain and Prosper de Reggio Emilia on Cognitive Habits
Peter Hartman, Loyola University Chicago
 Cognitive habits explain our ability to think about things when they are absent and the relative ease with which we do this. According to most medieval philosophers in the High Middle Ages (1250-1350), such habits exist in the intellect as in a subject. However, towards the beginning of the 14th century two philosophers—Durand of St.-Pourçain and Prosper de Reggio Emilia—rejected this view, arguing that cognitive habits ought rather to be located in the sensitive part of the soul. In this talk, I want to examine what motivated Durand and Prosper. I will first look at an argument Durand and Prosper put forward, and then I will present some objections to it raised by an anonymous author. In the second section, I will speculate about what might be at stake.

Embodied, Embedded, Extended Problem-Solving: Toward a Unified Account of Ordinary and Scientific Cognition
Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira, Universidade de São Paulo
 The emergence of the embodied cognition research program has shed new light onto cognitive processes, now increasingly seen as essentially or at least significantly embodied, environmentally and socially embedded (or situated), and physically extended (or distributed). In this poster I explore the prospect of applying these ideas of Embodied, Embedded, and Extended cognition (“E-Cog” for short) to a unified account of scientific and ordinary understanding, thus bridging the gap between cognitive science and philosophy of science. Recent studies suggest a strong influence of embodied and socially embedded cognitive processing in tool manipulation and visual learning. Although these studies were conducted with a focus on ordinary cognitive activity, following the “continuum hypothesis” I interpret the evidence as revealing important aspects of science that contradict standard cognitive science, and help to make sense of the role played by extraempirical and non-epistemic values in scientific practice.

Epistemological Pluralism and the Doxastification Strategy
Ian Harmon, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
 Most epistemology operates within a framework that assumes all knowledge is propositional. Call this assumption epistemological monism. The aim of this paper is to make a case for epistemological pluralism, which is the thesis that there are many types of knowledge, many of which are non-propositional. Due to the general assumption of epistemological monism, there has been little work in developing a compelling case for the thesis. In order to establish epistemological monism is implausible, I present what I take to be the strongest argument for endorsing monism, and show that this argument has the consequence of turning knowledge, justification, and evidence into hollow concepts. I label this argument the doxastification strategy. For these reasons, epistemologists should give the implications of epistemological pluralism serious attention.

Eternalist Recurrence
Sam Cowling, Denison University
 In a world of eternal recurrence, history repeats itself infinitely many times over, without beginning or end and without any variation between epochs. In a world of eternal replication, history merely replicates itself through the existence of infinitely many qualitatively indiscernible epochs. Intuitively, eternal recurrence and eternal replication are distinct possibilities: recurrence requires the persistence of individuals across epochs, while replication requires that numerically distinct individuals occupy each epoch. For example, while you survive across infinitely many epochs in a world of eternal recurrence, you inhabit only a single epoch in a world of eternal replication. In this paper, I argue that familiar forms of four-dimensionalism cannot accommodate the distinction between eternal recurrence and eternal replication. I then argue that, in order to distinguish these possibilities, four-dimensionalists ought to be dynamic four-dimensionalists and, in keeping with the “moving spotlight” version of eternalism, posit fundamental non-qualitative tense properties.

Evaluating the Epistemic Status of the Testimony of Converts
Jason Kawall, Colgate University
 How should we treat the testimony of individuals who have once held a certain view or belief, but have converted to a new, conflicting belief? Those who present such conversion stories seem to think that the testimony of a convert should carry added epistemic weight—perhaps as the convert understands both sides of the story, and upon reflection has come to see some side as correct. In this paper I attempt to more carefully distinguish various reasons that might be given for granting added epistemic weight to the testimony of converts. I argue that these reasons are not generally compelling, and that, ceteris paribus, we should not treat the testimony of a convert as any more powerful than that of a similar non-convert. However, there is one range of important cases where I argue that such added weight is warranted.

Evaluative Perception and Moral Epistemology
Michael Lacewing, Heythrop College
 A number of recent discussions of the idea of evaluative perception have taken up the suggestion of perceptual expertise. The model is typically filled out by invoking a central role for the emotions in our evaluative ‘sensitivity’ and a response-dependence theory of value. I argue that such models come under pressure from general epistemological considerations, to do with the specification of correctness conditions. When we evaluate whether a response is appropriate, we find forms of enquiry that have no parallel in perception. We also find that achieving appropriate emotional responses involves a development of the self that has no parallel in achieving accurate perceptions or new forms of perceptual expertise, and that the specification of what it is for an emotion to be appropriate must make mention of these structures of the self. These disanalogies render the idea of evaluative perception epistemologically useless.

Excluding the Forces of Ruin: A Defense of Analogue Attitudes
Per-Erik Milam, University of California, San Diego
 Derk Pereboom (2001) and Tamler Sommers (2007) have argued that, because we are not responsible, we ought to either abandon reactive attitudes or, where possible, replace them with non-reactive analogues that do not presuppose responsibility. Call this position Abolitionism. Unsurprisingly, this position has many detractors. Shaun Nichols (2007) argues that the reactive attitudes—particularly moral anger-based attitudes like resentment and indignation—play a crucial role in maintaining social harmony and that the analogues proposed to replace them cannot perform the relevant functions as effectively. This paper defends abolitionism against Nichols’s objection. However, unlike other abolitionists, I do not attack his empirical claims. I argue that even if Nichols is right that abolitionists’ proposed replacements cannot adequately perform the functions of the anger-based reactive attitudes, it does not follow that the gains of retaining them outweigh the losses of divestment.

Exemplars and Saints: A Virtue Ethical Response to Moral Saints Problems
James Taplin, San Francisco State University
 Moral saints problems, as expressed by Susan Wolf in her “Moral Saints” article, present a serious concern for ideal-ethical theories. Wolf highlights the fact that the ideal moral agents of traditional ethical systems will, unless such accounts allow room for non-moral norms, turn out to be less than ideal people. In this essay I look to an account of supererogatory acts as a potential solution to this problem. After showing the inefficacy of such an account in responding to moral saints problems, I turn to a virtue-ethical account of moral exemplarism inspired by Linda Zagzebski’s “Exemplarist Virtue Theory,” which I argue is capable of responding to such concerns. By understanding the moral exemplar as conceptually prior to moral virtues, we are able to dispel Wolf’s concerns. Finally I highlight the value of an account of supererogatory action as playing a tertiary role within such an account.

Exhaustified Counterfactuals
Paolo Santorio, University of Leeds
 Lewis argued that counterfactuals are nonmonotonic: some standard inferences that hold for other conditionals, like antecedent strengthening, fail for counterfactuals. He captured this by building a notion of comparative closeness into the semantics of counterfactuals. All modern theories of counterfactuals have followed suit. But Lewis was wrong. First, comparative closeness just can’t do the explanatory job he wanted. There are cases that exemplify the striking logical features of counterfactuals and that can’t be explained via comparative closeness. Second, there is a large body of linguistic data for which inferences like antecedent strengthening seems to hold. These latter cases give us a real insight into the logic of counterfactuals: counterfactuals are monotonic. Lewis’s original data are better explained as a kind of scalar implicature. I show how a monotonic analysis, supplemented with an account of scalar implicatures, can both explain the facts that motivated Lewis and explain the new data.

Existence and the Cognitive Event Type Theory of Propositions
Justin Dallmann, University of Southern California
 This paper takes up and responds to a series of charges that Jeff Speaks has leveled against the most recent version of Scott Soames’s cognitive event type theory of propositions. Speaks argues that these central theses commit the cognitive event type theorist to the invalidity of certain, intuitively valid, argument patterns concerning belief. It is argued that no way of making the argument precise presents a problem for the cognitive event type theory of propositions fleshed out in terms of Soames’s ontological views. The paper then takes up Speak’s claim that the ontological commitments of the theory as spelled out by Soames are incompatible with “serious actualism”—a prominent theory of what there is. A novel and plausible serious actualist view that is compatible with the core insight of the cognitive event type theory of propositions is then presented, undercutting any bite that the objection might have had.

Experiential Pluralism and the Power of Perception
Mark Kalderon, University College London
 Sight is a capacity, and seeing is its exercise. Reflection on the sense in which sight is for the sake of seeing reveals distinct relations of dependence between sight and seeing, the capacity and its exercise. Moreover, these relations of dependence in turn reveal the nature of our perceptual capacities and their exercise. Specifically, if sight is for the sake of seeing, then sight will depend, in a certain sense, upon seeing, in a manner inconsistent with experiential monism. Thus reflection on the power of perception forms the basis of an argument for experiential pluralism.

Fairness and Liability to Defensive Harm
Kerah Gordon-Solmon, Queen’s University
 If a person is liable to some measure of defensive harm, it means that she has forfeited her right against being harmed in that way, in that circumstance. She is not wronged by, and has no right to defend herself against that harm. The predominant account of liability is Jeff McMahan’s “responsibility” account; but it’s been increasingly challenged by powerful rivals. The task of this paper is to defend McMahan’s account against one such rival, namely, Jonathan Quong’s “moral status” account of liability. Section I explicates the distinguishing normative commitment of the responsibility account, which Quong opposes, namely, the commitment to distributive fairness. Section II explicates and critiques Quong’s “moral status” account; it argues that a commitment to distributive fairness is a requisite feature of any plausible account of liability to defensive harm.

Feeling and Function: Conscious vs. Unconscious Emotions
Katherine Tullmann, The Graduate Center, CUNY
 This poster examines the distinctive functional roles of conscious and unconscious emotions. One complication is that feeling theories of emotions—such as that held by the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux—hold that emotions are necessarily conscious. Similarly, many theorists who are influenced by Bernard Baars’s and Stanislas Dehaene’s work on the global workspace theory, as well as Ned Block’s notion of access consciousness, equate an emotion’s being conscious with its availability for executive control, from which the state’s functionality arises. I argue that such theories are rely on an ambiguity in the term ‘feeling’. Furthermore, such theories cannot distinguish between the functional role that is due to an emotion’s being conscious and that which is due to some other (unconscious) property of the emotion. In the last section of the poster, I discuss the implications of my arguments for different theories of consciousness.

Felicity and Fidelity
Nellie Wieland, California State University, Long Beach
 When speaker A reports what speaker B said, sometimes she does so with high propositional and locutionary fidelity. And sometimes she doesn’t. But this distinction doesn’t track whether the report is felicitous. Many felicitous reports barely look like the original utterances. I describe this phenomenon as low-fidelity same-saying. Given the felicity of lo-fi same-saying I argue that same-saying is not just complicated by reflexivity and by Fregean identity statements, but also by the fact that language users are willing to accept lo-fi reports of original utterances as instances of same-saying. From this I sketch several directions forward: (i) that this extends to direct quotation (lo-fi quotation), (ii) that this is relevant to the nature of content (lo-fi content), and (iii) that this provides evidence for a speaker- and token-based metaphysics of language (a deflationary take on the semantic/pragmatic divide).

Fifteen Years Later: Making Sense of Emergence (Again)
Olivier Sartenaer, Columbia University
 Fifteen years after Kim’s seminal paper offering a welcome analysis of the concept of emergence, I propose an extension of Kim’s work that does greater justice to the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than defining emergence as a monolithic middle path between reductive physicalism and substance pluralism through a conjunction of supervenience and (functional) irreducibility, I develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the possible varieties of emergence in which each taxon is properly identified and defined. This taxonomy has two advantages. First, it is unificatory in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from a common unity principle, which consequently constitutes the very hallmark of emergentism. Second, it can be shown that the emergence taxa it contains are able to meet the challenges that are commonly considered as being the hot topics on the emergentists’ agenda, namely the positivity, the consistency and the triviality/liberality challenges.

Finding Normativity in Subjective Construal
Denise Vigani, The Graduate Center, CUNY
 Recent attention by virtue ethicists to Mischel and Shoda’s model of personality as a cognitive-affective processing system has placed increasing emphasis on the way individuals subjectively construe situations. If virtue ethics is to avoid subjectivism, however, we need some account of what it is to construe situations in accordance with virtue. I suggest two components to such an account. First, virtue requires that certain features of situations be taken as salient. I argue that Daniel Russell’s notions of reasons-responsiveness and of reasons ‘clustering’ can allow us to indicate the kinds of features virtue makes salient. Furthermore, I suggest that Jonathan Haidt’s work on moral foundations supports the idea that reasons do, in fact, cluster. Second, one must read the situation correctly. This, I argue, commits virtue ethicists to external reasons. I suggest that virtue ethicists follow McDowell in denying that such external reasons be graspable by reason alone.

Food Deserts, Justice, and the Distributive Paradigm
Jennifer Szende, Université de Montréal
 Iris Marion Young and others have forcefully argued that there are a variety of reasons to mistrust the distributive paradigm as defining justice. The distributive paradigm, Young tells us, is not sufficient to define injustice, given the variety of forms that justice might take. In particular, it obscures the institutional power structures that cause unjust distributions. Yet, food deserts are, I argue, often defined and readily visible as a distributive problem. Like food deserts, a variety of justice problems are identifiable most readily in their distributive formulation, and en examination of the correlation between oppression and distribution can therefore be a useful demonstration of the urgency of justice claims. This paper uses the example of food deserts to argue in favor of salvaging the distributive paradigm, albeit with modifications inspired by Young.

Forensic Science as a Popperian Coding System
Liz Stillwaggon Swan, Mercyhurst University
 This paper utilizes the framework of Karl Popper’s 3-world ontology to make the case that forensic science is a specialized coding system that establishes meaningful connections between the world of biology (world 1) and the world of human society (world 3). Forensic science is a cross-disciplinary endeavor that uses scientific methods to determine what transpired in a crime so the legal system can determine how to prosecute the offenders. On a Popperian analysis of forensic science, world 1 consists of trace evidence gathered at the crime scene, which enables investigators to develop a detailed reconstruction of the incident for consideration under the legal and ethical codes of society, which are products of world 3. Understanding forensic science in this way situates forensic science within the larger context of debates in contemporary philosophy of science.

Fossil Evidence and Darwin’s Origin of Species
Richard Gawne, Duke University
 At the time of its initial publication in 1859, one of the most serious impediments to the ascendancy of the evolutionary account Darwin developed in the Origin of Species was the failure of the geological record to testify to the existence of the many transitional and intermediate forms predicted by his theory. Prior to the initial printing of the Origin, a number of transitional form candidates had been described, and in the intervening years between the first and sixth editions, several celebrated specimens were unearthed. Curiously, these creatures receive little or no mention in the Origin. This peculiar and largely unexplored historical fact will be the focal point of this essay. My primary aim will be to demonstrate that Darwin’s anti-realism about the species category likely played a significant role in his decision to downplay the importance of the relevant paleontological specimens.

Foucault and the Possibility of Anti-foundationalist Critique
George W. Shea, IV, Duquesne University
 The place of normative principles as a basis for critique in anti-foundationalist critical social theory has been intensely debated since the rise of post-structuralism and is still currently contested amongst thinkers such as Charles Taylor (1984), Thomas McCarthy (1990), Amy Allen (2003), and Paul Rekret (2013). While detractors criticize anti-foundationalism as an absurd relativism and as generating a political impasse, they fail to examine anti-foundationalism from the perspective of the set of problematics with which it is engaged, which ultimately obscures the very objectives and advantages of anti-foundationalism. Particularly, such critics fail to take seriously Foucault’s insistence on employing a genealogical, as opposed to metaphysical, approach to history. So as to highlight its advantages, this paper situates Foucault’s anti-foundationalist conception of critique, “the art of voluntary insubordination,” within the context of his claim that the “politics of truth” is the locus of political activity.

Friendship and the Ethics of Social Technology
Michael Goerger, Central Washington University
 Recent research indicates that the use of social technologies such as Facebook, Twitter, text messaging, and Skype may have an adverse effect on certain components of a well-lived life, namely the formation and maintenance of friendships. In this essay I argue that social technologies have the potential to interfere with valuable friendships if they are not used wisely. Further, because friendship and sociality is a component of a flourishing life this interference constitutes an ethical problem. These problems are particularly salient in three key areas: the creation of common space, the intimacy of friendship, and character development. I conclude this essay by arguing that an approach rooted in the Greco-Roman tradition with an emphasis on the virtues of friendship and moderation is best able to provide a framework in which these concerns can be discussed.

Getting Ockham’s Priority Straight
Joshua Blander, King’s College
 In this paper, I discuss a text of William Ockham in which he critiques (his version of) Burley’s realism about universals in order to see how his discussion illuminates his account of natural priority and real distinction. I claim that one of the premises in his argument suggests a powerful and controversial principle that ranges far beyond what our initial intuitive grasp of the premise might suggest. Ockham intends to make the modal claim that, for example, an object can exist without the color that it has; but he further claims that an object can exist without any color whatsoever. Thus Ockham provides a unique account of the relationship between things said to be “prior” (such as substances) and those things said to be “posterior” (such as accidents), at least when such things are really distinct.

Global Expressivism’s Motivation Problem
Andrew Forcehimes, Vanderbilt University
 This essay argues that Huw Price’s global expressivism faces a motivation problem. I first argue that it seems that Price cannot sustain the distinction between the truth-norm and the Rortyian norm of warranted assertibility. However, even if unsuccessful, the rejoinder that Price most plausibly would offer puts global expressivism in conflict with his assertion that the account actively encourages speakers to participate. So, the argument Price offers that disagreements presuppose a truth-norm might “get the cogs in cognition,” but his global expressivism leaves us either (i) with nothing to make them turn or (ii) unmotivated to get them turning. Ultimately, I hold that for Price to make good on (i) he has to give up (ii).

God’s Awful Majesty Before Our Eyes: Kant on Moral Worth and Divine Hiddenness
Tyler Paytas, Washington University in St. Louis
 The problem of divine hiddenness arises from the lack of an explanation for why an omni-benevolent God would choose not to make his existence obvious to us, given the benefits that would result from our knowledge of him (e.g. emotional consolation, reduced violence, etc.). Near the end of the second Critique, Kant argues that theoretical knowledge of God would preclude any conflict between inclinations and the moral law. Without the need to overcome inclinations through respect for the moral law there could be no moral worth, and the world would be devoid of unconditioned value. I argue that insofar as we accept some of the basic tenets of Kantian ethical theory we should accept Kant’s argument as a conclusive solution to the problem of divine hiddenness. Further, even those who are not sold on Kantian ethics should find God’s hiddenness significantly less troubling in light of his discussion.

Guard Jealously: A Defense of Exclusivity in Love
Ingrid Albrecht, Lawrence University
 Against the widespread understanding of jealousy as a negative emotion to be avoided, I argue that a susceptibility to jealousy is a sign of a healthy loving relationship. I contend that it is a structural feature of the healthiest form of love that it be exclusive—that it regard other intimacies as potential threats to one’s own intimacy. I first consider accounts that defend our demand for exclusivity by appeal to the limited amount of time and attention we have to give. But these inadequately explain the substantive value of attending to each other in love: when in a loving relationship, we give the other the power to interpret us in a constitutive manner, and we share a perspective. As such, love requires significant vulnerability, and the trust that one’s claims have authority among those made on the beloved. This creates an inherent demand for exclusivity and susceptibility to jealousy.

Gustav Shpet on the Existence of a Collective Subject of Consciousness
Anna Moltchanova, Carleton College
 Many philosophers agree that we can identify a special mode of functioning of human agents associated with their membership in a group. This requires explaining how the collective and individual modes of functioning co-exist for the individual, especially if they include conflicting preferences (e.g. she dislikes her group’s project but endorses it as a member of the group). One can reconcile the opposing modes by defending that there exist two subjects of conscious experience at different times, the individual one, indifferent to the choice, and the collective one, endorsing it, the latter being non-reducible to the former; both experienced from the first-person viewpoint. Gustav Shpet defends this view in “Consciousness and Its Owner” (1916). I present his position and then formulate a view concerning the persistence of collective subjects of consciousness through time that explains how the remembrance of their past by collective subjects can happen from the first-person perspective.

Hard Facts Made Easy
Blake McAllister, Baylor University
 Some past truths seem fixed, locked-in, settled, etc., in a way that present or future truths are not. The special fixity of these past facts (read “facts” as “true propositions”) is called accidental necessity. Accidentally necessary truths are hard facts; all others are soft. The hard fact/soft fact distinction is intuitive, but attempts to formalize this distinction are fraught with difficulties. Existent formalizations seem excessively complex and artificial and achieve only limited success. Here I develop a new characterization of accidental necessity and the hard fact/soft fact distinction—one that is relatively simple and utilizes familiar notions. My account arises from reflection on the key insight that accidentally necessary truths are those that are free from present or future influence. The result is a fresh account of accidental necessity that promises insight into discussions of logical and theological fatalism and the principle of alternate possibilities.

Holistic Motivational Internalism Defended
Jonathan A. Tresan, University of Rochester
 Holistic (or “communal”) motivational internalism is the idea that moral judgments must play a role in attitude-involving practices. HI is plausible: intuitively, in a world entirely lacking moral pro/con-attitudes, no one could count as judging anything morally right or wrong. Recently, this intuitive case for HI has been challenged by Strandberg (2011, 2012) and Björnsson and Olinder (2012). Strandberg argues that internalist intuitions are confused reactions to the fact that moral utterances exhibit a generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the relevant attitudes are present. Björnsson and Olinder argue that internalist intuitions tacitly rely on empirical assumptions. Contra Strandberg, I argue that the posited implicature is too weak to explain internalist intuitions. Contra Björnsson and Olinder, I argue that they show at most that the case for HI relies on empirical assumptions which are obviously true and universally accepted. The case for HI remains strong.

How Are Models and Explanations Related?
Collin Rice, Lycoming College
Yasha Rohwer, Oregon Institute of Technology
 Within the modeling literature there is often an implicit assumption about the relationship between a given model and a scientific explanation. Unfortunately, an adequate analysis of these relationships has yet to be provided. In this paper, we distinguish two fundamental kinds of relationships between scientific models and explanations. The first is metaphysical, where the model is identified as an explanation or as a partial explanation. The second is epistemological, where the relationship between the model and the explanation is of great importance to the modeler’s discovery of an explanation. Our analysis reveals that there are several importantly different ways that a model might instantiate these relationships. Understanding these relationships is key to analyzing the use of models to provide explanations and the roles models play in scientific theorizing. Furthermore, our analysis casts light on the nature of idealization and its role in scientific modeling.

How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming
Par Sundstrom, Umeå Universitet
 According to physicalism, consciousness reduces to some physical phenomenon just like water reduces to H2O and liquidity to loose molecular connection. However, the reduction of consciousness seems less satisfactory than other reductions. According to many—even many physicalists—the reduction even seems “absurd” (Papineau 2002). A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct reduction hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason to accept it why does it seem “absurd”? One possibility is that this is explained (solely) by our having an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This “error explanation” is a minority view among physicalists. It is rejected by, among others, proponents of the “phenomenal concept strategy,” which has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. I argue that the “error explanation,” despite its relative unpopularity, is the only plausible explanation that is available to physicalists.

How to (Maybe) Quantify Over (Merely) Apparent Objects
Ben Sheredos, University of California, San Diego
 Phenomena realism is the thesis that there exist mental objects of experience. Quine raised a fundamental challenge to phenomena realism: to say that phenomena exist is to commit to quantifying over them, and this requires an account of phenomena’s individuation conditions. I articulate a novel, structural realist form of phenomena realism which provides such an account. While radical forms of structuralism are controversial, I pursue only a moderate structuralism according to which mental objects of experience are co-individuated with the experiential structures in which they are embedded: phenomena exist, but are nothing beyond positions in the apparent structure of experience. My goal is not to argue in favor of adopting this view, but rather to re-center the debate over phenomena realism, bringing individuation to the fore. Objections against traditional variants of phenomena realism (sense-datum and subsistence theories) are either inapplicable to this structuralist version, or admit of an in-principle answer.

Hugh of St. Victor on Scientific Knowledge
Rafael Nájera, Brown University
 My poster describes the views of the twelfth century theologian, philosopher and educator Hugh of St. Victor on scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge, or ‘scientia’ in Latin, is seen to mean something like the Augustinian view, in which scientia is a necessary step in the path towards the intellectual contemplation of God. Hugh is shown to have a Neoplatonic theory of knowledge that is not without problems but that he manages to integrate into his vast theological system, into a categorization of the sciences following Aristotle’s main tripartite division (physics, mathematics, and theology) plus logic and into a curriculum of study in which disciplines such as math and logic are not seen as mere preparation for the study of the Scriptures.

Hume’s Qualitative Hedonism
Dale Dorsey, University of Kansas
 In this paper, I investigate David Hume’s account of welfare, self-interest, or prudential value. In essence, my reading is this: Hume was a hedonist. He believed that pleasure and pain are the only things that influence the prudential value of a life. But Hume was a hedonist of extraordinary sophistication. His hedonism intriguingly blends traditional hedonism with a perfectionist value theory leaving a version of qualitative hedonism with—in something of a coup for qualitative hedonists—a clear and compelling rationale for the relative value of higher and lower pleasures.

Images and Kant’s Theory of Perception
Samantha Matherne, University of British Columbia
 Recent discussions about Kant’s theory of perception have focused primarily on the topic of conceptualism, i.e., whether Kant requires concepts or conceptual capacities for perception. One of the issues in this debate concerns his analysis of how we perceptually represent an object with multiple properties. It is often assumed that in order to decide this issue, we must look to Kant’s analysis of intuitions. In this paper, however, I show that it is not intuitions, but rather images that Kant identifies as the relevant representations. I argue, moreover, that when we shift our attention to whether Kant is a conceptualist about images, we will find an additional, though often neglected resource for resolving this issue: the Schematism. I claim that the Schematism indicates that Kant is a conceptualist with respect to images; however, I suggest this leaves room for Kant to still be a non-conceptualist about intuitions.

In Defense of (a Formulation of) Physicalism
Andreas Elpidorou, University of Louisville
 There are at least two theoretical obligations that are incumbent upon a proponent of a particular definition of physicalism: first, the proponent should defend her definition against various objections; and second, the proponent should motivate her definition. In this essay, I deal only with the first task. I present and critically evaluate Stoljar’s (2010) contention that one cannot define physicalism by appealing to a physical theory that is true in the actual world. I argue that none of the arguments that Stoljar advances against such a definition of physicalism are successful.

In Favor of the (Possible) Reality of Race
Matthew H. Slater, Bucknell University
 Disputes over the reality of race—in particular, whether there are races are natural kinds—have often foundered on an inability to make clear sense of the sense in which race can be biologically real and yet (also) socially constructed. I sketch an account of natural kinds that gives specific content to this possibility and argue for the tenability of treating races as genuine kinds on this account, even if they fail to be “biologically real.”

Indeterminism and Non-reductionism in Libertarian Theories of Freedom
Leigh Vicens, Augustana College
 In this paper I argue that on a substance-monist and event-causal libertarian view, the reduction of mental-to-physical causation to physical-to-physical causation is as great a threat to our freedom as is the causal determination of our actions by events of the distant past; and the insertion of indeterminism into a picture of our brain processes does nothing to secure the irreducibility of our mental life. After laying out what physicalist assumptions lead to the reduction of mental-to-physical causation, I argue that such reductionism is incompatible with the ultimate responsibility condition that many libertarians are committed to, and that underlies their rejection of causal determinism as well. I then present a promising model of mental causation that avoids the problem of reduction, which involves the notion of emergent properties. Finally, I suggest how such a model might be incorporated into a one popular substance-monist and event-causal libertarian account of freedom.

Indexical Logic and Linguistic Meaning, or Why the Humpty-Dumpty Problem Won’t Go Away
Geoff Georgi, West Virginia University
 Philosophers of language who want to apply David Kaplan’s formal logic and semantics of indexicals to natural language face a philosophical problem concerning the relationship between the formal contexts of Kaplan’s theory and individual acts of linguistic communication. The problem arises from a tension between Kaplan’s goals of constructing a logic for indexicals and of giving a semantic theory for these expressions in English. Several recent attempts to solve this problem while retaining key features of Kaplan’s view fail: they bridge the gap between formal contexts and linguistic communication, but at the cost of any insight into the meaning of indexicals like ‘I’. This failure is related to what is known in the recent literature on Kaplan’s semantic theory as the Humpty-Dumpty problem.

Inequality and Democracy
Danielle Wenner, Carnegie Mellon University
 While not all inequality is inherently bad, there are some forms of inequality which are morally objectionable. This paper is an examination of those forms of inequality the moral objection to which may lie in resulting inequalities in democratic citizenship. I begin with an analysis of deliberative democracy, and argue that deliberative accounts of democratic legitimacy require an ex ante equality of opportunity to influence the outcomes of deliberative procedures—an equality which is threatened by socio-economic inequality. I go on to consider a sophisticated form of procedural democracy, and argue that it is similarly undermined by deep inequality. I ultimately suggest that absent an account of democratic legitimacy that is not substantially undermined by large inequalities in wealth and knowledge, then insofar as we are morally committed to the ideal of democracy, we are also committed to alleviating those inequalities to the extent that we can.

Inherited Duties and Reparations: Reconsidering the Chain-harm Argument
Jonathan Winterbottom, University of California, Santa Barbara
 A recent strategy to defend reparations for historical injustices against the non-identity problem posits an intergenerational chain connecting harms suffered by original victims of historical injustices with harms to their descendents. Unfortunately, defenses of the strategy fail to show that harms to original victims’ children are wrongful and hence do not ground the children’s rights to compensation. To avoid this problem I appeal to the idea that under certain circumstances wrongdoers inherit duties toward third parties. I argue that a wrongdoer’s failure to compensate the original victim likely prevents the victim from fulfilling her parental duty and that the wrongdoer thus inherits that duty; the wrongdoer’s failure to compensate the original victim then constitutes a harmful breach of an inherited duty that the wrongdoer owes the victim’s child, and hence it constitutes a wrongful harm to the child. My account also avoids a distinct objection originally raised by George Sher.

Injustice, Ignorance, and Intellectual Courage
Kathryn Pogin, University of Notre Dame
 Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing is persuasive, interesting, and has important implications for the intersection of ethics and epistemology. Though Fricker, at times, gestures at the psychological literature, much of her argument relies on fictional literature and film to illustrate her conception of epistemic injustice. In this paper, I explore Fricker’s notion of intellectual courage as an epistemic virtue, its relationship to epistemic injustice, and the problem this poses for her account when we consider the epistemic consequences of certain well-demonstrated cognitive biases. I argue that, as she construes it, intellectual courage will perpetuate epistemic injustice rather mitigate its effects.

Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Loyalty
Stephen Galoob, University of Tulsa
 Many construe fiduciary obligations as a species of promissory obligations. However, the fiduciary’s obligation of loyalty has intentional requirements that promise-keeping does not necessarily have. Loyalty shapes deliberation in particular ways. A fiduciary whose deliberation is not shaped in these ways does not act loyally. Fiduciary loyalty does not admit of “accidental compliance”—it is not satisfied by actions done for inappropriate or illicit reasons. By contrast, promissory obligations do not have the same intentional success conditions. Therefore, intentions matter to the satisfaction of fiduciary obligations in a way that they don’t matter to promissory obligations. Part I identifies an asymmetry: promissory obligations can be satisfied by accidental compliance, but obligations of loyalty cannot. You can accidentally keep a promise, but you can’t accidentally act loyally. Part II elaborates the “shaping” account of fiduciary loyalty. The shaping account explains this asymmetry and is superior to two alternatives.

Intuitions about Disagreement Do Not Support the Normativity of Meaning
Derek Baker, Lingnan University
 In his recent (2012) book, Alan Gibbard argues that “meaning” is a normative term and that philosopher’s meta-semantic theories should be understood as prescriptive theories. His primary argument rests on our intuition that two philosophers can know all the non-meaning facts surrounding the use of a term but still disagree about its meaning, and that the disagreement is genuine. This is effectively an Open Question Argument. But the Open Question Argument is a bad test of the normativity of a given term: it generates false positives. Normative terms do sometimes generate strange intuitions about disagreement, but there are better thought experiments for eliciting them—Hare’s (1952) Missionary and Cannibals case and Horgan and Timmons’s (1991) case of Moral Twin Earth. When analogous thought experiments are constructed for the term “meaning,” there are no intuitions of genuine disagreement, undermining Gibbard’s case that “meaning” is a normative term.

Irreducible Teleology and Deviant Causal Chains
Scott Sehon, Bowdoin College
 There is a fundamental distinction between things we do on purpose, or for reasons, and those things that merely happen to us. Actions done for reasons are goal directed, and they can be explained teleologically, as in, “Kate went to the kitchen in order to get a beer.” While this much is relatively uncontroversial, according to the dominant causal theory of action, reasons explanation of human action are a species of causal explanation. Accordingly, any teleological explanation of action must “really” be a causal explanation in disguise; i.e., teleological explanation must be reducible to causal explanation. However, as noted by Davidson early on, causal accounts of goal direction run into the problem of deviant causal chains. I look at recent work by Jesùs Aguilar on this problem, and I argue that it is of no help to the causalist who wishes to reduce teleological explanation to causal explanation.

Irrelevant Explanations of the Social Contract
Ashton Sperry, University of Missouri
 Social contract theorists have traditionally concerned themselves with the normative issue of which political and moral agreements ought to be included in the ideal social contract. But there is also the descriptive issue of explaining the origins of current social contracts. Evolutionary game theorists, such as Brian Skyrms, have concerned themselves with this latter issue, by explaining the origins of prosocial behavior (e.g., cooperation) foundational to well-functioning societies. Said equilibrium explanations use models consisting of a range of initial conditions and dynamic processes that greatly affect a population’s equilibrium state. Contrary to the notion that equilibrium explanations are not causal explanations, this paper argues that explanations of the social contract are causal explanations, because of the exacting nature of the initial conditions and processes. Change the initial conditions or dynamic processes and different behavior results. Interestingly, equilibrium explanations of the social contract become irrelevant due to their causal nature.

Is Moderate Luck Egalitarianism an Oxymoron?
Stewart Braun, Australian Catholic University
 Luck egalitarianism faces the persistent criticism that it treats harshly those who are responsible for making poor or risky choices. In response, luck egalitarians such as Kok-Chor Tan and Shlomi Segall have developed moderate accounts of luck egalitarianism that respectively restrain the scope and strength of the responsibility principle on which luck egalitarianism relies. I argue that these moderate versions of luck egalitarianism fail to overcome a variant of the harshness objection in which the imprudent person is not reduced to dire straits, but from an egalitarian standpoint we still have reason to assist. Consequently, moderate luck egalitarianism faces a dilemma. Either it must accept harsh treatment of the imprudent, or it must severely weaken the responsibility principle that distinguishes it from other accounts. Given this dilemma, it can be concluded that moderate luck egalitarianism is oxymoronic since it cannot be successfully moderated.

Is the Gendered Division of Labor a Problem of Distribution?
Gina Schouten, Illinois State University
 The Gendered Division of Labor (GDL) has demonstrably harmful consequences, and there are promising political interventions—including family leave initiatives, work time regulation, and substitute childcare provisions—that could remedy the GDL by inducing domestic partners to share paid and unpaid work more equally. These interventions, however, face a formidable justificatory burden in liberal societies: The interventions undertake to amend the personal behavior of individuals within their homes, and they appear to rely for their justification on controversial value judgments about the good of equal domestic partnerships. One recently popular strategy for overcoming the liberal presumptions against such political interventions invokes unfair distributions of goods either caused by or inherent in the GDL and contends that these mal-distributions justify gender egalitarian political interventions. I argue that the strategy is ultimately unpromising, because the harms of the GDL are not distributional.

Is the Problem of Luck the Compatibilist’s Problem Too?
Seth Shabo, University of Delaware
 The leading challenge to libertarian accounts of free will has come to be known as “the Problem of Luck.” Recently, some compatibilists about determinism and responsibility have taken up this challenge on the libertarian’s behalf. Their aim in doing so is to show our self-conception as morally responsible agents is safe for the world we inhabit, whether or not that world is subject to deterministic laws. I argue that these compatibilists’ efforts have an unintended consequence: instead of helping libertarians out of their predicament, these efforts have led compatibilists into a strikingly similar predicament of their own. The problem is that these compatibilists’ responsibility conditions can be satisfied by truly random outcomes, and compatibilists are no better positioned to deny that the relevant outcomes are random than libertarians are.

Justification and Composite Normative Concepts
Paul Silva, Monash University
 Some epistemologists think epistemic justification is an epistemic permission, others think it’s epistemic goodness, and yet others take it to be connected to praiseworthiness or blamelessness. All such views of justification encounter problems. After drawing attention to these problems a new view is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of epistemic justification that offers hope of solving some long standing epistemological problems.

Kant and Cogito
Nicholas Riggle, New York University
 I discuss a widely accepted principle in the recent literature on self-verifying knowledge, which holds that thinking ‘I think’, or a thought of the form ‘I think that p’, makes it true. I show that in the case of ‘I think’ this principle can be understood in three ways: it is either the self-referential act, the predicative act, or the composite referential and predicative act that makes it true. I argue that Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, holds the unusual first kind of view, according to which ‘I think’ is fundamentally made true by the tokening of ‘I’. As a result, the justification of ‘I think’, unlike that of more complex thoughts, need not appeal to second-order thought. If Kant is right, then the self-verifying status of ‘I think’, is, in a sense, more basic than that of other kinds of self-verifying knowledge.

Kant on Intuition and Hallucination
Colin McLear, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
 A number of contemporary interpretations of Kant presume that he endorses a form of perceptual direct realism. However, though Kant does repeatedly define intuition in terms of an immediate relation to an object, it is not obvious which if any position in the philosophy of perception Kant takes to be entailed by this. Most problematically for the proponents of a direct realist interpretation of Kant, there seems to be significant textual evidence suggesting that Kant considers perceptual and hallucinatory states to be mentally identical, differing only with regard to their causal provenance. I argue that the texts do not preclude ascribing to Kant the view that perceptual and hallucinatory states are mentally and not merely causally distinct kinds of states. This may not be sufficient to secure the claim that Kant is a perceptual direct realist, but it does show that opposition to this claim will require further argument.

Kant’s Demonstration of Freedom in Its Legislative Aspect
Benjamin Yost, Providence College
 One of the tasks Kant faces in establishing the authority of morality is to show that the moral law normatively governs the wills of finite rational beings like ourselves. And this requires Kant to show that robustly free, autonomous wills, exist. I argue that the famously daunting challenges associated with such a demonstration are best met when the demonstration is construed as a practical, rather than theoretical, one. In brief, an agent practically demonstrates the existence of a will governed by the moral law by governing her will in accordance with the law. After explaining the differences between theoretical and practical demonstrations, I show that only a practical demonstration is compatible with Kant’s conception of agency. Since practical laws govern, or determine, a will only when they are (to borrow Engstrom’s apt phrase) “efficaciously represented” by that will, free will’s existence can only be exhibited in a practical demonstration.

Kant’s Transcendental Definition of Pleasure and Its Role
Alex Rueger, University of Alberta
 In the Critique of Judgment Kant seems to subscribe to a general principle connecting the achievement of an aim with the feeling of pleasure. Commentators have mostly agreed that this cannot be a general principle since the pleasure of taste is disinterested and therefore cannot result from the achievement of an aim. Furthermore, the status of the principle has seemed obscure: is it merely an empirical claim or can it really be a non-empirical principle? I argue that the controversial principle is indeed general and non-empirical by showing how it is related to the “transcendental definition” of pleasure Kant gives in § 10. I briefly sketch the significance of the achievement principle for Kant’s repeated claim that only the pleasure of taste reveals to us the need for a third critique.

Kantian Space, Supersubstantivalism, and the Spirit of Spinoza
James Messina, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 I do two things. First, I evaluate Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s claim that Kant’s theory of space is “wholly in the spirit of Spinoza.” I argue that, in fact, Kant and Spinoza do share a number of substantive assumptions regarding the nature of the whole of space and its relation to its parts. Second, I examine in light of these shared assumptions Kant’s oft-repeated claim that if space were transcendentally real, Spinozism (understood as a kind of supersubstantivalism) would follow, along with Kant’s reasons for thinking that transcendental idealism avoids this nefarious result. Regarding the latter, I argue that the salvific power of transcendental idealism lies not, as one might have thought, in the restriction of space to appearances, but rather in the claim that space is something merely formal and indeterminate with respect to forces and dynamical laws.

Knowledge and Epistemic Certainty
Leo Iacono, Southeast Community College
 Subjective certainty is feeling certain that p is true. Epistemic certainty is being in such a strong epistemic position with respect to p that one can be entirely justified in feeling certain that p is true. This paper is a defense of the entailment thesis, the claim that knowledge requires epistemic certainty. One compelling reason to accept the entailment thesis is that it can easily explain the impropriety of sentences like “I know that it is raining, but I cannot be certain that it is.” In “Knowledge and Certainty,” Jason Stanley attempts to explain this impropriety without appealing to the entailment thesis, and also offers new arguments against the entailment thesis. In response, I will produce sentences whose impropriety Stanley’s explanation cannot account for, show why Stanley’s arguments against the entailment thesis do not succeed, and present new arguments in support of the entailment thesis.

Knowledge in Action: Less Like Pain, More Like Perception
Eylem Özaltun, Harvard University
 I will argue for the claim that practical knowledge by itself is a way of knowing how things are outside of mind and body. In other words, the object of the non-evidential, practical knowledge in action is what happens. I will first show that our ordinary conversational practice already presupposes the view I favor: namely, that practical knowledge is, in its own right, a way of knowing how things are. Then I will examine the so-called two-factor theories that are at odds with this presupposition. I will uncover the source of their appeal to show that it is illusory. I will argue that knowledge of our perceptual states, not of our inner states, provides the right model for the knowledge-in-action, and a better way of capturing the insights that motivate two-factor theories.

Knowledge, Belief, and Pragmatic Sensitivity
Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College
 Knowledge attributions appear to be pragmatically sensitive: their acceptability depends in part on what is at stake in the subject’s choice situation. Some philosophers have attempted to explain pragmatic sensitivity in terms of what knowledge attributions conversationally implicate. In contrast to the conversational implicature view, a pragmatic encroachment view assumes that the knowledge relation is itself pragmatically sensitive. Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder have recently developed a pragmatic encroachment view of pragmatic sensitivity, offering an explanation of pragmatic encroachment in terms of an alleged constitutive relationship between belief and a disposition to treat a proposition as true in practical deliberation. Unfortunately, the specific relation they postulate is implausible. This paper takes up a more plausible view of the relationship between belief and treating as true in practical deliberation, and uses that view to develop and defend a novel conversational implicature account of the pragmatic sensitivity of knowledge attributions.

Language and Freedom in Merleau-Ponty
Dimitris Apostolopoulos, University of Notre Dame
 This paper argues that Merleau-Ponty’s account of language in Phenomenology of Perception suggests that language establishes the conditions for freedom, and that human freedom can be realized through language use. I begin with a look at Merleau-Ponty’s view of freedom in the Phenomenology, and show that freedom depends on a historical situation, and that free action consists in its modification. This kind of “situated” freedom depends, I argue, on a cyclical account of time. I then argue that language can establish a situation for subjects. The linguistic situation bids subjects to modify the sedimented meanings contained in their situation, by meeting with the same cycle of time developed in Merleau-Ponty’s account of freedom. “Authentic” language use, in which subjects contribute new meanings to their linguistic situation, has the result that the subject “exceeds” herself in speech, thus realizing the self-transcending act that Merleau-Ponty thinks human freedom consists in.

Language Use in Defective Contexts
Daniel Harris, The Graduate Center, CUNY
Rachel McKinney, The Graduate Center, CUNY
 In this presentation we question the widespread view that semantics and pragmatics are (or ought to be) only concerned with language use that is communicative and cooperative. We argue that some speech is native to non-cooperative contexts, in the sense of being made possible by the contexts’ very defectiveness. We demonstrate the existence of a class of speech where the status of a conversational move comes to be fixed by factors other than the mutual presuppositions of the conversational participants. We argue that such defective speech offers significant challenges to both Stalnakerian and Gricean theories of communication. We argue that both theories fail to explain and predict various features of defective speech, which we take to constitute data that must be accounted for by a viable theory of human communication. We thus maintain that both the context-determinist and Gricean views of defective speech are inadequate.

Libertarian Paternalism and the Authority of the Autonomous Person
Cami Koepke, University of California, San Diego
 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009) argue that the government is justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their well-being. In this paper, I argue that those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call autonomy as authority, have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument for libertarian paternalism. I draw from Joseph Raz’s (1990) idea of exclusionary reasons and Daniel Groll’s (2012) conception of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism fails to respect autonomy. Though the S/T argument holds that libertarian paternalism respects autonomy because it is non-coercive, I argue that a paternalistic act does not have to be coercive for it to be problematic. What is ultimately worrisome about Sunstein and Thaler’s defense is that they think that considerations of well-being have priority over considerations of autonomy in the government’s reasoning about policy.

Locke and the Laws of Nature
Patrick Connolly, Iowa State University
 Many commentators (McCann, Stuart, Langton) have argued that Locke understood laws of nature as causally efficacious. On this view the laws are causally responsible for the production of natural phenomena. This paper argues that this interpretation faces serious difficulties. First, I argue that it will be very difficult to specify the ontological status of these laws. Proponents of the view suggest that these laws are divine volitions. But I argue that this will be difficult or impossible to square with Locke’s nominalism. I also argue that this view runs the risk of collapsing into occasionalism and Locke has measured critiques of the occasionalist position. The only way to maintain that laws are causally efficacious divine volitions while avoiding occasionalism is to have God engage in what I call “brute fact-making.” But I offer some reasons to think that Locke would have been uncomfortable with this.

Logical Validity and Expressive Words
Gregory Ackerman, University of Southern California
 In contemporary theorizing about semantics we sometimes come across the claim that a particular argument is intuitively logically valid. The alleged logical validity of the argument is treated as a piece of data that a semantic theory must account for. In the first part of this paper I argue that there are circumstances where we should not rely on our intuitions about logical validity. The second part of the paper focuses on David Kaplan’s “The Meaning of Oops and Ouch” as a specific instance where intuitions about logical validity are, but should not be, relied upon. I argue that Kaplan’s semantic analysis of so-called expressive words like ‘damn’ and ‘ouch’ is not supported by the alleged data he presents concerning logical validity. In the third part, I offer and partially defend an alternative explanation for some of the intuitions we have about arguments with expressive words.

Love and Attachment: The Value of Self-interestedness in Loving Relationships
Monique Wonderly, University of California, Riverside
 It is not uncommon for philosophers to name disinterestedness, or some like feature, as an essential characteristic of love. Such theorists claim that in genuine love, one’s concern for her beloved must be non-instrumental, non-egocentric, or even selfless. These views prompt the question, “What, if any, positive role might self-interestedness play in genuine love?” In this paper, I argue that attachment, an attitude marked primarily by self-focused emotions and emotional predispositions, helps constitute the meaning and import of at least some kinds of adult reciprocal love. In this way, attachment represents a type of self-interestedness that not only contributes positively to such relationships but is also essential to them.

Mean and Nasty Talk: On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Slurs.
Kent Bach, San Francisco State University
 Based on stereotyping and built on prejudice, the use of slurring words imputes some abhorrent property to and expresses contempt for members of a group (ethnic, religious, etc.). Their use is offensive, and not just to their targets. Such facts suggest that slurring words are semantically distinctive somehow, just how depending on answers to questions like these: Does a slur portray a class of people as contemptible because using it shows contempt, or does using it show contempt because it portrays them as contemptible? Do slurring words express contempt because they are taboo, or are they taboo because they express contempt? Why are even non-assertive uses of slurring words offensive and hard to disown directly? Although it is tempting to answer such questions with the help of a partly expressivist semantics, I will argue for an enhanced descriptivist semantics of slurs, combined with some observations about their pragmatics.

Mental Qualities Without Consciousness
David Rosenthal, The Graduate Center, CUNY
 It’s widely assumed that the qualitative character of sensations and perceptions cannot occur without being conscious—that conscious subjectivity is essential to qualitative character. I’ll show how this assumption blocks any informative account of the nature of mental qualities. That in turn makes qualitative character appear problematic; we can’t expect to explain how qualitative character connects with anything else if we can’t even say in an informative way what it is. But it’s misconceived to see qualitative character as having an essential tie to conscious subjectivity. What’s essential to mental qualities is just their role in perceptual discrimination. An account in those terms explains the nature of mental qualities comparatively, by appeal to their relative locations in a quality space that reflects the perceptual discriminations the mental qualities make possible. Since perceptual discrimination need not be conscious, the mental qualities that enable such discriminations must themselves be independent of conscious subjectivity.

Moral and Mathematical Realism: Partners in Epistemological Guilt?
Christopher Gibilisco, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
 Moral realism claims spatiotemporally unlocated and causally inert moral facts determine the truth-value of moral claims. Critics argue moral realism faces the following epistemological challenge: if moral facts cannot cause moral beliefs, then how could moral beliefs be reliable? Some defenders of moral realism attempt to deflect the epistemological challenge by claiming mathematical realism faces the same epistemological challenge mutatis mutandis; so, unless mathematical realism can answer the challenge in a way the moral realist cannot emulate, moral realism is no more epistemologically problematic than mathematical realism. I argue mathematical realism can explain how mathematical beliefs could be reliable by positing a plenitude of mathematical facts such that proof method is a reliable guide to mathematical reality. I then argue moral realism cannot emulate this strategy. I conclude that the defender of moral realism has yet to establish that moral realism is no more epistemologically problematic than mathematical realism.

Moral Authority after Darwin: A Response to Joyce
Daniel Diederich Farmer, Marquette University
 The critical target of my paper is Richard Joyce’s argument for moral skepticism in The Evolution of Morality. I contend that Joyce’s understanding of moral authority is erroneous. I develop an alternative, social conception of moral authority. Like Joyce’s objectivist view, it is consonant with the data from psychology on the moral/conventional distinction. Unlike Joyce’s view, it does not pave the way to global skepticism. The result is not that all of morality is vindicated in every respect, but that vindication of particular norms and ideals is shown to be possible.

Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness
Miriam Schoenfield, University of Texas at Austin
 The aim of this paper is to argue that if moral realism is true, then, if there is moral vagueness, it is ontic vagueness. I begin by explaining why it is plausible that there is moral vagueness. I then show why neither semantic nor epistemicist approaches can satisfactorily explain it. Thus, if moral vagueness exists, it must be ontic vagueness.

Multiple B-series and the Passage of Time
Katherine Fazekas, University of Connecticut
 B-theorists frequently use the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) to challenge opposing views on the nature of time, such as presentism and the A-theory. However, there is a way in which the standard characterization of the B-theory is incompatible with STR. I argue that it follows from STR that instead of there being one universal B-series, there are multiple B-series, each relative to an inertial reference frame (IRF). Furthermore, I argue that those B-theorists who believe that temporal relations constitute the passage of time must modify their view in light of STR and Minkowski spacetime. Whereas space-like separated events can be ordered by temporal relations relative to IRFs, and hence can form B-series, time does not pass between such events. Time only passes between time-like separated events—those events that can be causally related to each other.

Naming, Saying, and Structure
Bryan Pickel, University of Edinburgh
 It is commonplace for philosophers to distinguish mere truths from truths that perspicuously represent the world’s structure. According to a popular view, the perspicuous truths are supposed to be metaphysically revelatory and to play an important role in the accounts of law-hood, confirmation, and linguistic interpretation. Yet, there is no consensus about how to characterize this distinction. I examine strategies such as the one developed in Sider’s Writing the Book of the World which purport to explain this distinction in terms of vocabulary: the truths that represent the world perspicuously have better, joint-carving vocabulary. I argue that the distinction between a perspicuous and mere truth concerns both the vocabulary of the sentence and its grammar.

Nietzsche’s Conception of Power: Freedom, Selfhood, and the Overcoming of Resistance
Jacob Krch, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 In this article, I defend an interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of power which was first proposed by Bernard Reginster, according to which power is the activity of overcoming resistance. While Reginster’s defense of this reading relies entirely on a few of Nietzsche’s unpublished notes, I turn primarily to his published works for textual support, focusing, first, on two key passages in which Nietzsche presents the will to power as a living thing’s disposition to discharge its strength, and, second, on his discussions of human freedom. I then address a serious objection to this interpretation, recently put forth by Ivan Soll, who doubts that Nietzsche would choose to equate power with an activity when power is conventionally understood as a type of capacity. In response, I argue that a basis for this admittedly unusual choice can be found in what I refer to as Nietzsche’s Heraclitean account of the self.

Non-negotiable: Why Moral Naturalism Cannot Do Away with Categorical Reasons
Andres Luco, Nanyang Technological University
 Moral naturalism is often faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations, prescriptions, and values entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons are normative reasons for action that apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that some recent defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do it, regardless of what s/he wants to do. Versions of moral naturalism that deny this claim would, if widely believed, disable some crucial practical uses of moral concepts. Following Richard Joyce, I take this to be an indication that the concept of a categorical reason is a “non-negotiable” part of moral concepts.

Non-unified Objects as Proper Individuals in Stoicism
Pavle Stojanovic, Johns Hopkins University
 The Stoics distinguished between objects that are unified in virtue of possessing a ‘holding’ (hexis), and non-unified objects, those that exist by contact (e.g., a ship) or by separation (e.g., an army) and do not possess a hexis. Although our sources are not explicit about the Stoic position on this, it has been argued recently that the Stoics thought that non-unified objects cannot be proper individuals, i.e., that they cannot be peculiarly qualified. In my essay, I argue that accepting that things without hexis can be peculiarly qualified is not contradictory for the Stoics, and that some evidence found in Simplicius suggests that they indeed might have held such a view. I will also suggest a possible explanation of how non-unified objects might nevertheless be peculiarly qualified for the Stoics.

Of Dogs, Daycare, and Discipline: A ‘Genetic Guide to Parenting’?
James Tabery, University of Utah
 Consider the following three questions: Should parents buy their child a dog? Should parents send their infant to daycare? Should parents, when their toddler has a temper tantrum, respond with empathy directed at the child’s frustration or with punishment directed at the child’s misbehavior? Decisions about the family pet, childcare, and discipline are subjects of friendly debate and involve both personal and familial evaluations of finances, schedules, and parenting philosophies. Might genetic information about the child figure into such decisions? I believe it could and in the near future. My goal in this paper is to say why I think a “genetic guide to parenting” is a very real possibility and to then evaluate whether or not this would be a good thing.

On Caring Whether There Are Immanent Universals: An Invitation to Non-specialists
Daniel Giberman, Göteborgs Universitet
 I argue that much as we care about numerical identity with respect to artifacts and persons without having to be invested in the specialized ontology literature, so we care about numerical identity with respect to properties. It follows that non-specialists have reason to care about the ontological debate over immanent universals and tropes, which debate concerns whether the numerically same entity is directly responsible for like qualitative facts in distinct spatiotemporal locations. The argument works by analogy: much as I prefer ceteris paribus not to drink from a cup that Hitler once drank from, so I prefer not to be in the direct vicinity of some universal that is in the direct vicinity of Hitler. This latter preference cannot be satisfied if immanent universal realism is true.

On God and the Malin Génie: Descartes’ First Meditation
Samuel Murray, Saint Louis University
 The standard interpretation of Descartes’s First Meditation includes what I refer to as the “Equivalence Thesis.” The Equivalence Thesis states that the power of the Evil Genius, introduced near the end of Meditation One is equivalent to the power of God, i.e., that the Genius can render dubitable all that God is thought to render dubitable at the end of Meditation One. This essay will show that ET lacks textual support and raises systemic problems for the project of the Meditations. This will be accomplished in three sections. Section one will demonstrate that God’s ability to render mathematical judgments dubitable entails the dubiety of the cogito, which dubiety undermines the persuasiveness of the cogito and upends the project of the Meditations. Section two will provide textual evidence against ET. Section three will outline a new interpretation of the Genius.

On Hegel, Women, and the Foundation of Ethical Life: Why Gender Doesn’t Belong in the Family
Laura Kane, The Graduate Center, CUNY
 In many of his works, Hegel reduces women to their physiology to explain why they occupy a subordinate role in nature and in society. Such treatment seems arbitrary at best, for the gendering of roles disrupts Hegel’s dialectical approach to spirit without any meaningful gain. Despite these harmful elements in Hegel’s work, it is important not to overlook the positive contributions that Hegel has made to social and political philosophy. I argue that the sexist claims that Hegel makes about women are irrelevant to his theory of the family in the Philosophy of Right. Therein, Hegel outlines three components that are necessary for the completion of the family (marriage, property and assets, and the raising of children) and divides familial roles along gender lines. Given the three components that are essential to the family, I argue that there is no necessary basis for familial roles to be divided by gender.

On Household Names and Ordinary Names
David Schwarz, Independent Scholar
 This paper develops a distinction that Kripke and others note between names of the famous and names of the non-famous, and argues that the distinction is reflected in how names’ semantic references are determined. On Kripke’s and related accounts, names’ references generally do not depend on how individual speakers think of the referents; they are rather determined socially: passed to names in a speaker’s idiolect from references with the names by other speakers. The paper argues that such social mechanisms cannot generally explain names’ semantic references, except for names of the famous that count as what are sometimes called household names. A conclusion, then, is that for ordinary names in a speaker’s idiolect, semantic references are determined at least in part by how she thinks of the referents—and that all the favored counter-examples to this are special household name cases.

On Jeshion’s Account of Singular Thought
Katie Monk, University of Bristol
 In a recent article Robin Jeshion provides a series of compelling counterexamples to the acquaintance account of singular thought. She then goes on to propose a new account based on significance. In this article, I show that Jeshion’s theory fails on two grounds; firstly that it cannot properly define the notion of significance and secondly that it faces its own set of counterexamples.

On Whether B-theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death
Natalja Deng, University of Notre Dame
 This paper is an evaluation of Mikel Burley’s “Should A B-theoretic Atheist Fear Death?” (Ratio), in which he criticises Robin Le Poidevin’s claim that a commitment to the B-theory of time provides atheists with a reason to relinquish the fear of death. I argue that Burley’s rejection of Le Poidevin’s thesis is based on a mistake: the prevalent B-theoretic account of our differential emotional attitudes towards the past and the future does not, contra Burley, conflict with Le Poidevin’s thesis. I close with some remarks on Le Poidevin’s assumption that on the B-theory, our lives are ‘eternally real’ in a sense relevant to the topic at hand.

Ordinary Virtue
Susan Stark, Bates College
 An impressive body of psychological data casts doubt on our ordinary conception of the human agent as responsible for her actions and subject to praise and blame. Numerous psychological studies have examined human moral behavior. On the basis of these studies, many psychologists conclude that it is the situation and its unique set of psychological pressures that determine the individual’s action. This view, called situationism, offers a way to make sense of how ordinary individuals commit horrific acts of cruelty: these individuals are not cruel people. They are ordinary individuals who are overcome by their situations. On the basis of this data, some philosophers have concluded that there are no enduring character traits that determine an individual’s actions. Thus, virtue theory ought to be rejected. I argue, however, that this conclusion is mistaken and that virtue theory is well-placed to account for these psychological data and answer the situationist’s critique.

Peirce, Grounding, Regress, and Circularity
Andrew Howat, California State University, Fullerton
 This paper is a contribution to the long-standing debate over the coherence of Charles Sanders Peirce’s overall system of philosophy. It approaches that issue through the lens of a contemporary debate over the notion of metaphysical grounding. The central question concerns how we can take seriously what we shall call Peirce’s Rule—that nothing can be admitted to be absolutely inexplicable—without being vulnerable to a vicious regress or equally vicious circularity. It argues that in Peirce’s early work he offers a quietist conception of grounding that provides a persuasive and ground-breaking answer to this central question. It then argues that in Peirce’s later work we find a metaphysical conception of grounding that fails to answer that question, and is thus inconsistent with his earlier work.

Phenomenal Qualities and Neutral Monism
Emmett L. Holman, George Mason University
 In view of what many see as a standoff between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism, some philosophers have lately been turning to Russellian theories of mind as an alternative. Different Russellian theories can be distinguished in terms of how they understand the intrinsic properties that, as Russellians see it, undergird the causal and functional relations to which physical theory confines itself. The goal is to give an account of such properties that can explain the emergence of consciousness in a non-gappy way. Panpsychism is the most popular form of Russellianism, but physicalist and neutral monist versions have also been mooted. In this paper I examine an especially interesting form of neutral monism that has recently been proposed by Sam Coleman (2012, 2013). Coleman’s theory rests on a controversial thesis, but I offer an argument for this thesis that I think can stand up to criticism.

Phenomenalism, Intentionality, and Kant’s Difference from Berkeley
Tim Jankowiak, Southern Utah University
 There is a long tradition of interpreting Kant’s transcendental idealism as a form of phenomenalism. There is just as long of a tradition of arguing that Kant couldn’t have been a phenomenalist, because if he were, his idealism would reduce to Berkeleyan idealism and this would undermine Kant’s empirical realism. I argue that this argument is unsound. I show that the general phenomenalist thesis (the objects of experience are representations) could be construed in at least five different ways. While three of these phenomenalisms would undermine empirical realism, two do not. Thus one could read Kant as a certain kind of phenomenalist without undermining his empirical realism. My argument hinges on Kant’s theory of intentionality, and the way this theory differs radically from Berkeley’s account of intentionality (and that of the early moderns generally).

Philosophical Success
Nathan Hanna, Drexel University
 In this paper, I offer a rough criterion of success for philosophical arguments. Such criteria can be useful. And they have significant implications for the value of philosophy. I develop my criterion by examining and revising a criterion defended and applied by Peter van Inwagen. On the basis of his criterion, he thinks that all philosophical arguments for substantive conclusions fail, in particular the argument from evil. I’m more optimistic, both about philosophy generally and about the argument from evil specifically. I identify problems with van Inwagen’s criterion and try to improve on it. Our criteria have significantly different implications. On my criterion, philosophical arguments have hope for success and the argument from evil isn’t obviously a failure.

Physics Does Not Entail Causal Closure
Justin Tiehen, University of Puget Sound
 Consider the class of all physical truths; that is, all truths expressible using terms taken from an idealized, completed science of physics, along with logical and mathematical terms. The class includes truths describing all particular physical matters of fact and also all physical laws. I argue that this class of physical truths—in other words, physics, broadly construed—fails to entail that the physical realm is causally closed.

Praise-blame Asymmetry and the Intend/foresee Distinction
Sherri Lynn Conklin, University of California, Santa Barbara
 In this poster, I discuss the empirically-based folk concept of Praise-Blame Asymmetry. I note that when laypeople make assessments of moral responsibility, they sometimes appeal to the agent’s motivations for acting, and they sometimes do not. In order to figure out why they make these judgments and how these judgments are justified, I explore an empirically-based folk theory of moral worth. While examining the folk theory of moral worth, I realize that laypeople inconsistently apply the criteria for an agent’s being morally responsible and that it is these inconsistently applied criteria that are fueling asymmetrical judgments about praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. I try to resolve the inconsistencies in the folk theory of moral worth by appealing to the intend/foresee distinction. Ultimately, appealing to the intend/foresee distinction cannot resolve the inconsistencies in PBA because it results in problematic claims about the praiseworthiness of morally indifferent agents who perform right acts.

Pride, Identity, and Moral Responsibility
Jeremy Fischer, University of Calgary
 Having the emotion of pride requires viewing oneself as standing in some special relation to the object of pride. The first aim of this article is to critically assess the leading philosophical account of this relation (which I call the ‘pride relation’), and to sketch a novel account. According to agency accounts of the pride relation (the proponents of which include Robert Solomon, Norvin Richards, Kristján Kristjánsson, and Richard Taylor), the self and the object of pride are suitably related just in case one is morally responsible for the existence, or excellence, of the object of one’s pride. I argue in this paper that agency accounts fail. The second aim of this article is to suggest that the pride relation, though distinct from the relation of moral responsibility, is nonetheless a relation of philosophical interest which merits further attention.

Problematizing Prohibitionism
Juan J. Colomina, University of Texas at Austin
 Prohibitionism claims that no matter how slurs function, or are conceived: because of their contemptible content, they are prohibited words. Thus, many argue that the only possible approach to slurs is a silencing strategy. Though I agree that prohibitionism can prevent racism, this paper claims that, as a linguistic theory, prohibitionism is based on a mistaken presumption: if we conceive slurs as (illocutionary) acts of subordination, then the solution cannot be silence because these two requirements are in tension with one another. An alternative is required to explain both the way that the speaker expresses derogatory attitudes at the target and the illocutionary potential of the target to appropriate the word.

Problems for an Evolutionary Response to the Darwinian Dilemma
Alexander Grossman, University of Texas at Austin
 Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma for normative realism has received much attention recently. David Enoch takes the Dilemma to be a special case of a more general worry: that of explaining the correlation between our normative beliefs and the normative truths. He thinks that evolutionary considerations, ironically enough, can be leveraged in reply. He proposes that the normative realist can hold that the aim of evolution is good, even though evolution does not so aim because it is good. This supposition, he holds, does considerable work in explaining this correlation. I argue that Enoch’s reply fails: his proposal still involves a problematically miraculous correlation, and this correlation suggests that the resulting view, while vindicating the reliability of our normative judgments, does not allow our normative beliefs to constitute knowledge. I then explore a general lesson, namely that the best understanding of the challenge involves an important modal component.

Promises, Practices, and Persuasion
Terrence Kelly, University of Alaska Anchorage
 Scanlon’s expectationalist account of promising offers a powerful alternative to conventionalist accounts, but has been criticized for various circularity and boot-strapping problems. Another such criticism is developed in this paper. It is argued that promises are essentially requests for trust, but are offered when trust conditions are quite thin. Even if we accept Scanlon’s account of the duties generated by promising, it is unrealistic to think that the recognition of such duty alone is typically sufficient to fill the “trust gap” that makes promising necessary in the first place. This boot-strapping problem can be resolved by reconstructing promises as acts of persuasion in which latent grounds for trust are utilized in justifying the promise-offer. An important implication of this is an expansion of Scanlon’s principle of fidelity to include a duty of ongoing trustworthy behavior on the part of the promisor.

Public Equality and Democratic Legitimacy
Amanda Greene, Stanford University
 In The Constitution of Equality, Thomas Christiano claims that the necessary and sufficient conditions for justifying democracy are: (1) the correct conception of the fundamental interests of persons in society, and (2) the correct principle of “public equality.” In this paper I critique Christiano’s principle of public equality, both as an ingredient of social justice and as a sufficient condition for justifying democracy. I analyze his notion of “universal governance interests” and argue that he equivocates on whether or not these interests constitutively involve publicity. Moreover, public equality’s normative bearing on the equal advancement of interests is reducible to non-normative facts about cognitive bias. Though public equality is theoretically superfluous, I explain how publicity-related notions such as transparency may have pragmatic value in democratic justification. I close by proposing a way for Christiano to defend democracy in terms of equal advancement of interests without a principle of public equality.

Rationalizations and Causal Explanations: Reply to Mele
Giuseppina D’Oro, Keele University
 This paper considers Mele’s claim that causalism has an advantage over anti-causalism because the latter is unable to account for the distinction between confabulations or retrospective rationalizations and genuine explanations. I argue that the distinction between reasons which are genuinely explanatory and mere rationalizations cannot be drawn along the contours of real psychological process vs idealized rationalizations and that the causalist is in no better position than the anti-causalist to draw the Davidsonian distinction between genuine reasons and mere rationalizations. The paper takes the form of an imaginary dialogue between a causalist (Mele) and an anti-causalist (the author).

Rawls’s Accommodation of Desert
Philip Smolenski, Queen’s University
 This paper seeks to examine how Rawls can accommodate a brand of desert-based judgments, by replacing the notion of desert with legitimate entailments. I begin by assessing what it means for natural endowments to be underserved and how this only commits Rawls to the position that one’s superior natural endowments offer no antecedent claim to the social product. I will conclude that Rawls makes room for achievement-based desert judgments by replacing the notion of desert with legitimate entitlements. In such cases, Rawls is able to capture the colloquial usages of desert, except here, desert has no foundational role in our account of distributive justice and all such judgments are reducible to other kinds of judgments (e.g., justice-based judgments). Finally, I respond to a concern that Rawls’s account of legitimate entitlements may be insufficiently because it does lacks desert’s critical force, by drawing on fairness and equality to assess institutional structures.

Rawlsian Stability
Jon Garthoff, University of Tennessee
 Despite great advances in recent scholarship on the political philosophy of John Rawls, Rawls’s conception of stability is not fully appreciated. This essay aims to help remedy this by articulating a more complete understanding of stability and its role in Rawls’s theory of justice. I argue that even in A Theory of Justice Rawls (i) maintains that within liberal democratic constitutionalism judgments of relative stability often adjudicate decisively among conceptions of justice and (ii) is committed to (i) more deeply than to the substantive content of justice as fairness. This essay thus emphasizes the continuity of Rawls’s thought over time and motivates the position that Rawlsian stability is as philosophically significant and distinctively Rawlsian as justice as fairness itself.

Rawslian Reflective Equilibrium
Thomas V. Cunningham, University of Arkansas
 This paper proposes a Rawlsian conception of moral justification as a social activity. Through a close reading, Rawls’s view of ethical justification is shown to be significantly more dialogical and deliberative than is commonly appreciated. The result is a view that emphasizes the social nature of ethical justification and identifies information sharing between persons as the crux of justification in metaethics, in contrast to normative ethics. I call it Rawlsian reflective equilibrium to distinguish it from other varieties.

Reason and the Unity of Virtue
Daniel Farnham, Independent Scholar
 Through careful examination of the role of reason in virtuous action, we can better see the meaning of and the need for the thesis that the virtues are unified. The very short version of the story I will tell is that to act on a reason is to act from a principle, and to act virtuously is to act on a principle that best represents the human concern for acting for the sake of the good, and brings all the relevant sorts of considerations to bear on one’s action. That principle must have a certain kind of form: the form of universality. I will argue that the demands Aristotle thinks practical reason must meet lead naturally to the Stoic idea that the standard of virtuous action is that our actions must meet a test of universal agreement.

Reason-responsiveness and Voluntary Influence
Lindsay Rettler, Ohio State University
 I examine a prominent view of doxastic control and argue that it doesn’t explain attributions of doxastic blame. According to Reason-Responsiveness Views of doxastic control, we have control over our beliefs because we have the ability to respond to reasons when forming and maintaining them. Advocates of Reason-Responsiveness Views are often unclear about what is meant by reason-responsiveness, and how this ability could amount to control. I distinguish three potential meanings of responsiveness to reasons: (i) mere sensitivity to reasons, (ii) passive critical reflection, and (iii) active critical reflection. I argue that the first two capacities are not the kind of control necessary to explain doxastic blame, while the third capacity is. However, I argue that active critical reflection is in fact a kind of practical control, so it is not merely responsiveness to reasons that explains doxastic blame.

Reasonable Expectations and Blame
Matthew Talbert, West Virginia University
 It is often claimed that if a wrongdoer reasonably judges that her behavior is permissible—perhaps because this view is endorsed in her culture—then she is excused from moral blame. Typically, those who endorse this claim assume that it is unreasonable to expect people to omit behavior that they regard as permissible, and that if a person can’t be expected to omit a piece of behavior, then it is wrong to blame her for not omitting it. I reject this perspective and argue that what matters for blame is not the moral perspective of the target of blame, but rather our moral perspective as issuers of blame, particularly our views about whether an agent’s behavior evinces objectionable and unjustified ill will, contempt, or disregard for others. When behavior expresses these qualities of will, blame can be appropriate regardless of whether its target reasonably took her behavior to be unobjectionable.

Reasons and Deontic Modals
Justin Snedegar, University of St. Andrews
 This paper illustrates an interesting upshot of studying normative language for substantive normative philosophy. I argue that consideration of the deontic modals, ‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘may’, which are used to ascribe the normative notions of oughts, requirements, and permissions, motivates a particular picture of the structural relationships between these normative notions. I then argue that this causes problems for some recent attempts to ground requirement and permission in normative reasons, because these accounts do not have any obvious way to capture the structural relationships made clear by thinking about deontic modals. This is of particular importance for the recently popular reasons first program in philosophy, according to which all normative notions can be grounded in reasons.

Recklessness and the Ignorance Excuse
Stephen Bero, University of Southern California
 Gideon Rosen has argued that confident judgments of moral culpability are virtually never justified. A crucial premise in his argument is the Ignorance Thesis, according to which an agent is not culpable for an act of whose wrongness she is ignorant (unless she was culpable for the ignorance itself). Rosen’s critics have raised a number of objections to the Ignorance Thesis; I focus on one of these, according to which an ignorant agent can be culpable for her act when she knowingly takes a substantial risk that the act is wrong. I argue, first, that the significance of the objection has been overstated—it is not as damaging to the Ignorance Thesis as it may appear. Second, I propose a revision to the Ignorance Thesis that defuses the objection while clearing the way for the Ignorance Thesis to play its assigned role in Rosen’s case for skepticism about moral culpability.

Reconciling Irony and Sincerity: Why Irony Doesn’t Need Pretense
Robert Willison, University of Pennsylvania
 In this paper I argue that, contrary to many of the leading accounts of verbal irony, irony needn’t be insincere. Verbal irony does not necessarily involve either pretense or strict dissociation with respect to the propositional content encoded in sentences uttered ironically. I argue, instead, that verbal irony is characterized by dynamic reversal, in which the medium and object of interpretation interact disharmoniously. This account, in addition to capturing a larger class of cases of verbal irony, makes clear the continuity between verbal and situational irony.

Reconciling the Hypocrite: Hegel on Schiller, the Beautiful Soul, and the Body in the Conscience Section of the Phenomenology of Spirit
Shae Chang, The New School
 This paper criticizes the common assumption that Hegel’s conscience in the Phenomenology of Spirit is a peculiar fusion between Fichte’s conscience and Goethe’s beautiful soul. It argues instead that the conscience section of the Phenomenology is to be understood in light of Schiller. It is part of a larger work in which I argue that when we read it in this way, we see that Hegel is doing something else here: namely, talking about the body (which he is often criticized as neglecting), and bringing the body and aesthetics into morality.

Rehabilitating the Regulative Use of Reason: Kant on Empirical and Chemical Laws
M. Bennett McNulty, University of California, Irvine
 In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant asserts that empirical laws “carry with them an expression of necessity” (A159/B198). Yet there is widespread interpretive disagreement about the nature and source of this necessity in empirical laws of natural sciences. It is especially unclear how non-physical sciences—those without a clear connection to the a priori principles of the understanding—could have such genuine, empirical laws. I explain that the regulative use of reason makes possible such laws in non-physical sciences, especially chemistry. According to Kant, through experimentation we unify the chemical powers of substances under ideas of reason (specifically, ideas of elements). Though ideas are beyond the possibility of experience, their postulation is necessary for the achievement of reason’s theoretical ends: the unification of the cognitions of science. Furthermore, the nature of the elements necessitates the judgments and regularities of chemistry, making possible genuine chemical laws.

Reliablism and Suspended Judgment
Peter Murphy, University of Indianapolis
 What conditions should a process reliablist impose on justified suspended judgments? Using a series of cases, this paper argues that they should not impose their characteristic etiological condition on basic justified suspensions. Instead, they should go with a view which requires that there be no reliable process that produced, or could have produced, an undefeated belief or credence about the issue on which one is suspending.

Resolving Fodor’s Puzzle about Concept Learning
Derek Anderson, University of Texas at Austin
 In his landmark essay “The Language of Thought,” Jerry Fodor poses a challenge for proponents of computational theories of learning: explain how concept learning is possible. In this essay I critique Susan Carey’s recent attempt to answer Fodor’s challenge, arguing that her bootstrapping account fails to posit the appearance of genuinely new conceptual resources as a result of learning. I go on to develop an original response to Fodor’s argument which concedes that new concepts are never acquired through learning, but which nevertheless allows that people can learn new concepts. This is achieved by treating concept acquisition as distinct from concept learning-the former notion is to be understood in terms familiar from discussions of semantic externalism, while the latter notion is to be understood in terms of one’s learning how to apply a concept veridically.

Resolving the Responsibility Dilemma
Richard Arneson, University of California, San Diego
 ABSTRACT Resolving the Responsibility Dilemma The responsibility dilemma arises for those who maintain that soldiers fighting in a war are morally permitted intentionally to kill only those who have made themselves liable to be killed by contributing to an unjust threat of sufficient magnitude to render it the case that they have forfeited their right not to be intentionally killed. The dilemma is: either the requirements of liability are set high, in which case very few combatants fighting for an unjust cause are liable to be killed, and so may not be attacked, or the requirements of liability are set lower, in which case combatants fighting for the unjust cause are generally liable to be killed, but then many noncombatants on the side of the unjust cause are equally liable to be killed. This essay argues that for resolving the dilemma by accepting the latter horn.

Responsibilist Evidentialism: Overcoming the Insufficiency Objection to Evidentialism
Christopher Cloos, University of California, Santa Barbara
 Evidentialism holds that a subject is justified in believing a proposition just in case the subject’s evidence on balance supports the proposition. Evidential support is sufficient for propositional justification. The ‘insufficiency objection’ to evidentialism argues that this is false. This is done by way of counterexamples involving epistemic irresponsibility (i.e., defective evaluation, investigation, and handling of evidence). In this essay, I present such a counterexample, and I argue that a standard evidentialist reply to the counterexample fails. To overcome the insufficiency objection, by neutralizing the counterexample, I articulate a new version of evidentialism. What I call “Responsibilist Evidentialism” is comprised of two conditions that are independently necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional justification: evidential support and epistemic responsibility. As a result, Responsibilist Evidentialism effectively handles a reoccurring objection to evidentialism.

Rethinking Spinoza’s Moral Philosophy
Peter Zuk, Rice University
 This paper offers a novel interpretation of a difficult passage (IVP18, scholium) in Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics in the hope that doing so can help us to arrive at a new understanding of his moral philosophy. I first lay out some key aspects of that moral philosophy and the metaphysical and psychological views that underlie it in order to put the passage in its proper context (§I). Next, I examine the passage in question and suggest several possible readings, settling on what may well be a new interpretation (§II). I then take up the question of how best to classify the resulting formulation of Spinoza’s view and close with a brief treatment of its significance (§III). My primary contention will be that we can justifiably interpret Spinoza as proposing a novel type of metaethical constructivism that enjoys at least one important advantage over other types of the doctrine.

Rowe’s Friendly Atheism and the Epistemology of Religious Disagreement
Chad Bogosian, Grand Canyon University
 Prior to the recent explosion of literature on the epistemology of disagreement, philosophers of religion were discussing the significance of religious disagreement to the rationality of belief in God. In his noteworthy paper, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” William Rowe articulates one type of response to religious disagreement he calls “Friendly Atheism.” With respect to the recent disagreement literature, I think Rowe’s view falls under what I call the Steadfastness view. I will argue that Rowe’s Steadfastness is interesting but runs into problems. Proponents of Steadfastness need not worry, because there are numerous remedies available. When applied, these remedies transform Rowe’s Steadfastness view into a handful of more promising versions of Steadfastness that apply differently across cases of religious disagreement. The upshot is that reasonable disagreement is preserved, for known religious disagreement with a peer need not provide one with a defeater for her belief.

Science Isn’t after the Truth
Angela Potochnik, University of Cincinnati
 The important role of models in science is increasingly appreciated, and this has been accompanied by the recognition of the centrality of idealizations. One common view is that idealized models are important to science, but that they fall short in one or more ways. On this view, there must be an intermediary step between idealized models and the traditional aims of science, including truth, accurate representation, explanation, and prediction. Here I develop an alternative interpretation of the role of rampant idealization in science. Attention to scientific practice shows that idealizations are not going away, and focusing on what is accomplished with the use of idealized models leads to a reconsideration of the very aims of science. Science does not, in general, aim for the truth. The role of truth or accuracy in representational, explanatory, and predictive aims must thus be reconsidered.

Scientific Fictionalism and the Problem of Inconsistency in Nietzsche
Justin Remhof, Santa Clara University
 This essay begins to develop Nietzsche’s scientific fictionalism in order to make headway towards resolving a central interpretive issue in his epistemology. Nietzsche states that knowledge claims are falsifications. Presumably, this is a result of his view that truths are somehow false. I call this the Problem of Inconsistency. Without a solution to this problem, there would be strong reason to discard many of Nietzsche’s thoughts on epistemological matters. I argue that Nietzsche thinks knowledge claims falsify because he embraces a scientific fictionalist view according to which inexact representations, which are false, can also be accurate, or true, and that this position is not inconsistent.

Self-determination, Self-transformation, and the Case of Jean Valjean: A Problem for Velleman
Christopher Franklin, Marymount University
 According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events (such as desires and beliefs) involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry (which I call ‘identification reductionism’) contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s causing the decision. In this paper I discuss J. David Velleman’s identification reductionist theory, according to which an agent is identified with his desire to make most sense of himself. I develop two constraints that an adequate identification reductionist theory must satisfy and show that Velleman’s theory cannot satisfy both. In particular, I argue that Velleman’s account founders on cases of self-determined self-transformation.

Self-respect, Responsibility, and the Unenlightened Sex
Erica Holberg, Utah State University
 I examine Kant’s conception of the vice of lack of self-respect in light of the feminist assumption that sexist oppression structures everyday life. I argue that because Kant’s moral psychology depends crucially on our direct relation to the moral law, too much responsibility is put on the individual for her condition of low self-respect. Because moral freedom and responsibility belongs to me solely in virtue of my intelligible self, failure to show respect for any agent, whether for other agents or for myself, is a failure in what I will and so a moral failure I am responsible for. By locating the moral solely within the intelligible self, Kantian moral psychology denies the power of socially constructed and shared fantasies to constrain what one can imagine as one’s own.

Sensory Pleasure and Desire
David Bordeaux, University of California, Los Angeles
 There is something good about sensory pleasures. It is tempting to say that a pleasant sensory experience is good because of what it is like to have such an experience. However, the theory that sensory pleasures are good because of their phenomenology is subject to counter-examples that show that a sensory experience is a pleasure only if the individual having it has some desire for it. Theories of sensory pleasure that require that pleasures be desired have so far not drawn on the intuitive idea that sensory pleasures are good because of their phenomenology. Rather than thinking that the phenomenology of a pleasant experience makes the experience good, I propose that the phenomenology of a pleasant experience makes it good for a desire for that experience to be satisfied.

Sex, Procreation, and the Conjugal View of Marriage: A Critique
Christopher Arroyo, Providence College
 The most comprehensive critique of same-sex marriage and defense of “traditional” marriage comes from Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson, and Robert George. Central to their argument is the claim that marriage is essentially tied to procreation and the rearing of children. In this paper I argue that their reliance on procreative purpose gets things wrong. First, I give an overview of the way procreative purpose functions in their defense of the conjugal view of marriage. I then argue that their position entails a reductive view of sexual relations. On the one hand, they over-emphasize the role of procreative sex in the good life, elevating the moral status of procreative sex at the expense of other genuinely good purposes of human sexual activity. On the other hand, their over-emphasis of procreative sex commits them to a mistaken view of sexual pleasure.

Shaping Up Location: Against the Humean Argument for Extrinsicality of Shape
Shieva Kleinschmidt, University of Southern California
 Recently, we have been presented with an argument against the intrinsicality of shape that appeals to a plausible Humean principle. According to the argument, if shape is intrinsic and the location relation is fundamental, then we cannot explain the necessary correlation between an object’s shape and the shape of its location. And, it is claimed, the Humean principle tells us that an unexplained necessary correlation like this one is unacceptable. In this paper I respond to this argument by rejecting the favored interpretation of the Humean principle. Sometimes there are truths about what it means to stand in a given relation, even when that relation has no analysis. And these truths entail that certain features are had by the relata of the relation. Lacking an explanation for these sorts of truths is not problematic. I argue that it is plausible to take is located at to be such a relation.

Shared Intention and Reasons for Action
Caroline Arruda, University of Texas at El Paso
 Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for cases of shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary and sufficient conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny that some of the features that make individual actions intentional also serve as necessary conditions for shared intentional action. Namely, these accounts entail that shared intention is possible only if the participating agents form their intentions on the grounds of genuinely rational considerations. In this sense, they “overrationalize,” as I call it, shared intention. These views are internally inconsistent, given that they grant that shared intention has a family resemblance with individually-held intentions.

Shunning Sexual Harassers
Richard Dean, California State University, Los Angeles
 The problem of sexual harassment in the profession of philosophy has received dramatically increased attention recently. One proposal for dealing with serial sexual harassers is to shun them professionally, by, for example, refusing to invite them to participate in conferences or contribute to anthologies, and refusing to engage in conversations with them. I think that given some apparent facts about human moral psychology, this proposal is problematic. Promoting a policy of deliberately shaming or shunning sexual harassers is likely to lead to moral complacency on the part of non-harassers, and so is unlikely to decrease sexual harassment in philosophy departments overall. But this is compatible with maintaining that there may nevertheless be many occasions when it is appropriate and effective for individuals to act in ways that have effects of isolating and even shaming serial sexual harassers.

Skeptical Theism Is Self-defeating
Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini, Rutgers University
 Skeptical theists (e.g. Bergmann (2001, 2009)) attempt to meet the challenge to theism posed by evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the limitations of human cognition. I argue that skeptical theism is self-defeating in the sense that the rational skeptical theist must, as a consequence of her self-proclaimed lack of evidence concerning the overall balances of the morally relevant properties of possible future states of affairs, regard the occurrence of predictable everyday events as evidence against theism. For any prior credence in theism not equal to 1, there is some small finite number of predictable events such that an agent’s learning of their occurrence must constrain her credence in theism to a value below 0.5. I discuss and reject one attempt to circumvent this problem, concluding that the self-defeating nature of skeptical theism constitutes a significant new problem for the skeptical theist.

Smith’s Practicality Requirement: A Friendly Amendment, Then a Problem
Robert Myers, York University
 According to Michael Smith’s practicality requirement, if an agent judges that there is reason for her to φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to φ in C or she is practically irrational. As a number of critics have noted, however, it is far from clear that this is correct, for if an agent’s normative judgements have often proven unreliable before, or seem otherwise suspect now, it is not always clear what practical rationality demands of her. I therefore begin by proposing a friendly amendment to Smith’s requirement, one that makes it much easier to defend. I then go on to argue that this requirement is actually much harder to satisfy than Smith thinks it is, and in fact that there is good reason to doubt that it could be satisfied if desires were nothing more than the purely functional states that Smith claims they are.

Some Problems and Possibilities for Theism in Peirce’s ‘Neglected Argument’
Gregory Wolcott, Metropolitan State University of Denver
 I argue that Peirce’s “Neglected Argument” has resources for understanding theistic belief, but these resources need additional support. Firstly, Peirce’s argument doesn’t establish everything a theist would desire, but it does lay at least some of the groundwork for establishing the rationality of theism and the possibility of the moral transformation of humans toward God’s “Holy Will.” Peirce arrives at something closer to deism than theism (with some caveats) in the “Neglected Argument,” but by describing the structure of coming into belief in God, he leaves open the space for a more robustly theistic account of belief. Secondly, this argument for the rationality of theistic belief could be enhanced further only insofar as other ontological conditions are laid out, conditions he does not supply sufficiently. Once these are offered, however, belief in God becomes a more plausible proposal.

Spinoza on Akrasia and Dominant Non-beliefs
Justin Steinberg, Brooklyn College
 While Spinoza’s account of akrasia has been the subject of much recent scholarship, this work has evinced little recognition of a tension within Spinoza’s own philosophy concerning the possibility of strict akrasia. This tension arises because of Spinoza’s endorsement of two apparently mutually incompatible theses: (1) If, at time t, A judges that, between two (incompatible) courses of action, x and y, x is better than y, then if, at time t, A chooses either x or y, A will choose x; and, (2) Akratic actions can (and do) occur. After motivating Spinoza’s commitment to each of these theses, I argue—contrary to the prevailing scholarly view—that he never intended to make the case for strict akrasia. I conclude by proposing one way in which he might have reconciled (1) with action contrary to one’s dominant judgment.

Spinoza’s Realist Analysis of Substances Having Attributes
Michael Istvan, Texas A&M University
 Spinoza has gained a reputation, more common at certain periods of scholarship than others, for endorsing an ontology where nothing can have the intrinsic capacity to be wholly present in multiple entities at one and the same time. I argue, on the contrary, that Spinoza is a realist concerning universals and thus that he allows for the possibility of entities that—to give the most general definition of a universal—are in some sense repeatable, in some sense wholly present in each repetition. In section one, I outline the two basic nominalist analyses possible to give of an entity being charactered. In section two, I argue that Spinoza can endorse neither of the two nominalist analyses of a substance having attributes, and that he must in fact endorse a realist analysis.

Structure and the Grounding Problem
Eric Yang, Claremont McKenna College
 Kathrin Koslicki has offered a novel argument for the claim that every mereologically complex material object has a formal proper part, which is construed as the structure of the object. She argues that one of the virtues of her theory is that it resolves the Grounding Problem. However, there is a version of the Grounding Problem that is unique to her account, and she suggests various resolutions. Beginning with a presentation of Koslicki’s resolution to the Grounding Problem and the modified version of the problem, I argue that Koslicki’s response to the modified version is unsatisfactory, thereby threatening the plausibility of her account.

Subject and World
Michael Bowler, Michigan Technological University
 One of the more vexing issues facing philosophy is the relation between subject and world. More concretely, philosophers worry that an unbridgeable chasm might separate the subject from the world. Hubert Dreyfus has given a well-known and influential analysis of this issue. He maintains that our being and that of the world is grounded in the intelligibility embodied in a shared background of social practices. According to Dreyfus, this is sufficient to overcome the subject-object or subject-world dichotomy. In this paper I argue that Dreyfus’s position does not fundamentally alter the relation between subject and world and in fact remains subjectivist. I will also argue that Heidegger’s analysis of world and Dasein provides a radically different way of understanding the relation between ourselves and the world that truly does overcome the dichotomy between subject and world.

Teleologies and the Methodology of Epistemology
Georgi Gardiner, Rutgers University
 A teleological approach to a concept investigates it by asking questions such as ‘What is the purpose of the concept?’, ‘What role has it played in the past?’, or ‘If we imagine a society without the concept, why would they feel the need to invent it?’ The idea behind a teleological approach is that examining the function of the concept illuminates the contours of the concept itself. This approach is a relatively new development in epistemology, as yet there are few works examining the method. I aim to fill this gap and engender greater understanding of the method. I first contrast the teleological method with more orthodox approaches in epistemology. I then draw a three-way taxonomy of different kinds of teleological approaches, and provide an example of each kind. Finally I suggest specific ways the teleological approach can be incorporated alongside orthodox methods in a general methodological reflective equilibrium.

The Acquired Virtues Are Real Virtues: A Response to Stump
Brandon Dahm, Baylor University
 In a recent paper, Eleonore Stump argues that Aquinas’s account of the moral life is not Aristotelian. Specifically, she argues that, according to Aquinas, the acquired virtues are “not real at all” because they do not contribute to true moral life. Stump persuasively argues that Aquinas thinks the highest moral life is the life joined to God by the infused virtues and the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit. I do not take issue with the constructive account. Instead, I offer a two-stage argument that Aquinas thinks the acquired virtues are real virtues. First, I respond to four arguments Stump offers against the reality of the acquired virtues. Second, I show three ways in which the acquired virtues contribute to the moral life for Aquinas: as perfections of the human good, as practical models of how to increase infused virtues, and as aids to the infused virtues.

The Anchor Puzzle for Deontic Necessity Modals
Nathan Robert Howard, University of Southern California
 This paper presents a new puzzle for deontic semantics, called the anchor puzzle. The puzzle challenges the view that must(φ) entails should(φ) by challenging that claim that all instances of must(φ) can be replaced with should(φ) without loss of truth. If must(φ) entails should(φ), then “the ship must dock before it may drop anchor” entails “the ship should dock before it may drop anchor.” But the latter sentence doesn’t seem truth evaluable, regardless of the truth of the former. Hence the puzzle: what about the semantics of should and must explains this strange failure of entailment? The puzzle is solved by taking sides in a recent debate between Schroeder (2011) and e.g., Wedgwood (2006) and Broome (2007) on whether weak deontic necessity modals are always propositional operators. Schroeder contends that they sometimes express relations between agents and actions.

The Basic Structure and Ethical Life
Chris Melenovsky, University of Pennsylvania
 John Rawls’s two principles of justice apply specifically to the basic structure of society, but what can justify distinguishing principles for such a subject? The most prominent justifications have been from Thomas Nagel and Samuel Scheffler, who argue for a “moral division of labor” between principles that apply to institutions and principles that apply to individuals. I argue that Rawls himself would offer a stronger argument based on a distinction between principles that apply within the structure of ethical life and principles that apply to the structure of ethical life. As particular persons, most of our moral principles will need take our social context into account, but those that apply to the basic structure ought not do so. For this reason, we ought distinguish those principles that apply specifically to the basic structure from principles that apply to everyday decisions. We need not appeal to any moral division of labor.

The Best Results Argument
Nanhee Byrnes, University of California, San Diego
 The best results argument for democracy asserts that political egalitarianism is more conducive to the production of best outcomes than any form of political non-egalitarianism, and thus we ought to institute democracy. The argument is based on two premises: the consequentialism thesis of legitimacy, proposed by Arneson, and democracy instrumentalism, proposed by Aristotle and Mill. The soundness of the argument has been questioned. Some reject the instrumental value of democracy, claiming that non-egalitarianism could be better in producing best outcomes. To many democracy theorists, the problem is with the consequentialism thesis. They maintain democracy’s legitimacy must be founded on such intrinsic values as autonomy, fairness, or public reason justifiability. I show these criticisms are misplaced, and thus defend the soundness of the best results argument. I conclude once soundness is established, the best results argument is the most persuasive argument for democracy.

The Breakdown of Political Liberalism and Some Pragmatist Responses
Alan Reynolds, University of Oregon
 First, I develop a critique of political liberalism. Political liberals assume that our disagreements about justice are constrained by a shared set of political values, but I argue that our disagreements about justice are often much deeper, and political philosophy must be responsive to this fact. Second, I explore whether Deweyan democracy offers an adequate response to deep pluralism. I argue that John Dewey’s account fails, since “growth” is a controversial standard that excludes moral non-naturalists from democratic deliberation, and because his faith in deliberation to bring about consensus is unfounded in the context of deep pluralism. Third, I propose that William James offers a better response. I develop three Jamesian insights: (1) the political philosopher must be a committed non-partisan; (2) the political philosopher must accept actual demands as prima facie legitimate; and (3) the presumption of the political philosopher must be to accommodate existing demands, not transform them.

The Butterfly Effect Argument Against Constraints on Harming
Howard Nye, University of Alberta
 In this paper I argue that all plausible theories of agent-centered constraints against causing harm are undermined by the likelihood that our actions will make the world drastically different than it would have been. Theories that impose constraints against intended harming but none against foreseen harming have unacceptable implications for choices between more and less harmful ways of securing greater goods. Theories that impose constraints against “proximally” caused harm but none against “distally” caused harm have similarly unacceptable implications. This leaves as plausible only theories that impose constraints against some distally caused harm. I argue that, given the dramatic distal effects our actions are likely to have, these theories entail that any way we could live our lives involves unjustified killing, and that any version of them that is strong enough to be plausible entails that we are morally required either to allow ourselves to waste away or kill ourselves.

The Concept of Substance as Amphibolous: A New Reading of Kant’s First Paralogism
Courtney Morris, University of California, Riverside
 In the “Paralogisms,” Kant critiques the doctrine of rational psychology, which concludes that the soul is a simple substance identical over time and hence immortal, imperishable, and indestructible. Although commentators generally applaud Kant’s critique of rational psychology, they disagree over how to interpret the rational psychologist’s mistake. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of the argument that the soul is a substance. Specifically, I argue that the rational psychologist thinks they are entitled to conclude that a thinker is a substance tout court because they do not recognize that the concept of substance is “amphibolous,” or ambiguous. Indeed, the ambiguity in the concept of substance is rooted in the inherent ambiguity in what Kant calls the “concepts of reflection.” Recognizing this greatly illuminates the first paralogism.

The Difference Principle and Fraternity
David O’Brien, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 John Rawls has argued that the difference principle is one of the principles that govern the basic structure of a just society. Rawls also claims a further merit for the difference principle. It “provides an interpretation of the principle of fraternity”; indeed, it “expresses [fraternity’s] fundamental meaning from the standpoint of … justice.” G. A. Cohen has charged that the difference principle does not express fraternity because it licenses inequalities that vitiate fraternity. In this paper, I examine Rawls’s and Cohen’s dispute about the fraternal interpretation of the difference principle. I aim to clarify the nature of the dispute—what the dispute is about and how we can resolve it—and defend a version of Cohen’s criticism.

The Friendship Model of Virtue
Mark Alfano, University of Oregon
 This paper develops the friendship model of virtue. I begin by identifying some important features of friendship. Friendship is relational in various ways. You can’t be my friend if I’m not also your friend. You can’t be my friend unless you harbor particular de re attitudes towards me, which I reciprocate; for instance, you have to think of me as your friend, to wish me well for my own sake, to wish me well in virtue of my good character, and so on. Furthermore, the existence of these attitudes must be mutual knowledge, and perhaps even common knowledge, between us. Next, I argue that other virtues may be relational in the same way, concentrating on the trustworthiness and trustingness. Drawing on discussions of trust by Philip Pettit and Victoria McGeer, I show how one person’s being trustworthy may be partially constituted by another person’s being trusting, and vice versa.

The Hedonic Coincidence Problem for Desire Satisfactionism
Eden Lin, Rutgers University
 I raise a novel problem for desire satisfactionism, the view that you are well off to the extent that your intrinsic desires are satisfied. Whether or not pleasures are themselves intrinsically good for us, every pleasure—or at least every pleasure of the ordinary, unobjectionable sort—coincides temporally with a pro tanto increase in welfare for the person feeling it: other things equal, the person’s welfare rises when the pleasure starts, remains high during the pleasure, and comes back down when the pleasure ends. I argue that desire satisfactionism cannot accommodate this fact, even if pleasure can be analyzed in terms of desire. This is because you can feel an attitudinal pleasure—a pleasure taken in the thought, or apparent fact, that p—at a time when none of your intrinsic desires is satisfied.

The Idea of a Constitutional Consensus Revisited
Katharine Schweitzer, University of Nevada, Reno
 John Rawls’s readers have not had much to say about the idea of a constitutional consensus, perhaps because he rejected this form of agreement as inadequate. I revisit the idea of a constitutional consensus, including its original articulation by Kurt Baier. Although neither Baier nor Rawls understood a constitutional consensus as a compromise, I maintain that scholars should interpret this kind of agreement as such. Neither Rawls nor Baier appreciated how difficult it is to achieve a constitutional consensus among citizens of pluralist democracies. In explaining why a constitutional consensus is difficult to achieve, I focus on the epistemic costs of agreeing to the principle of equitability, which Baier claimed that democratic citizens share. As against Baier, I argue that citizens do not agree on this “highly unspecific” understanding of justice. Many religious citizens consider accepting this principle to be a compromise.

The Imagination in Malebranche’s Metaphysics and Method
Julie Walsh, Université du Québec � Montréal
 Those who dismiss Malebranche’s system as a failure tend to focus on the incompatibility of two central commitments: freedom and occasionalism. If God is the only true cause of all things, we cannot assert that humans are the cause of anything. So, the system fails. Typically, once the focus is on this contradiction, it seems neither necessary nor helpful to explore other details of Malebranche’s explanation of freedom. In this paper, I discuss one such set of details from Book II of the Search after Truth, where Malebranche discusses the imagination. The additional details about freedom that are gleaned from the treatment of the imagination do not defuse the straightforward contradiction between a traditional conception of human freedom and occasionalism. I argue, however, that they highlight the kind of freedom that Malebranche takes humans to enjoy—a freedom that may not be incompatible with occasionalism after all.

The Insufficiency of Explanationism
T. Ryan Byerly, Regent University
 This paper develops a unique attack on explanationist accounts of epistemic goods, focusing on a recent explanationist account of epistemic justification defended by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Their view implies that when a claim p is part of the best available good explanation of a person S’s evidence, S is justified in believing p. But, I show that there is a class of cases where a proposition p is part of the best available good explanation of a person S’s evidence and yet S is not justified in believing p. These cases are ones where S has good reason to think that the correct explanation for her evidence may well not be currently available.

The Limits of Moral Dumbfounding
Danielle Wylie, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 In moral psychology, “Psychological Rationalism” is understood as the view that moral judgments are caused by a process of reasoning. Jonathan Haidt has claimed provide evidence against such a view by showing that people succumb to “moral dumbfounding,” a phenomenon in which people cannot adequately provide their reasoning after forming a moral judgment. I show that this evidence serves as a strike against the view only if Psychological Rationalism is committed to the “Consciousness Claim,” the claim that moral reasoning is conscious reasoning (and indeed, Haidt assumes that it is). I also suggest that a number of plausible variants of the view reject the Consciousness Claim, thus limiting the efficacy of the objection. Ultimately, although some have taken dumbfounding to be a strike against Psychological Rationalism, its real impact is limited to only variants that embrace the Consciousness Claim.

The Myths of Cronus in Plato’s Statesman and Laws
George Harvey, Indiana University Southeast
 In book IV of the Laws, the Athenian and his interlocutors consider what constitution would be best for the new Cretan colony (712b). The Athenian here refers to the mythical age of Cronus, a time when gods directly governed human affairs, and as a result, the people enjoyed wonderously happy lives (713c). Mention of the Cronian age brings to mind the more detailed exposition found in the Statesman, where the Eleatic stranger identifies the age of Cronus with one of the periods of alternating cosmic motion (Pol., 270c-274e). I will show that there are a number of problems with the specific suggestion that we think about the Athenian’s appeal to the myth of Cronus in light of the Statesman. In this paper, I will discuss some of the problems with the interpretive strategy and then discuss the Athenian’s earlier account in book III of the origins of political constitutions.

The Neo-Stoic Epistemic Virtues of Groups
Sarah A. Wright, University of Georgia
 How do epistemic virtues apply to groups? Here, I focus on the Stoic account of epistemic virtues and demonstrate why those virtues are well-poised to be smoothly extended to cover groups. I start with the Stoic distinction between the telos of our lives and the skopos of our actions. I argue that a natural extension of the individual epistemic skopos to the group epistemic skopos allows for a focus either on the epistemic states of its members or the epistemic states of the group as a whole. In response to the objection that groups cannot have beliefs so they cannot aim at true group belief, I demonstrate that the Stoic view of epistemic agency clearly allows groups beliefs. Further, this view can illustrate a sense in which the control we have over our beliefs is equivalent to the control we have over our actions, both for individuals and for groups.

The Objects of Stoic Eupatheiai
Douglass Reed, University of Virginia
 Scholars know that the Stoics claim that the sage is free from emotions, instead experiencing εὐπάθειαι, or ‘good feelings.’ Our Stoics sources, however, are unfortunately silent about the objects of these feelings. That is, we do not know whether the sage experiences εὐπάθειαι about virtue/vice only, indifferents only, or both. Although many commentators broach it in passing, we lack a focused treatment of the issue, leaving us with a blind spot in our understanding of Stoic philosophy. Here I provide such a treatment and argue in favor of the view that εὐπάθειαι are exclusively about virtue/vice. In particular, I argue that since this reading alone can accommodate the Stoic claim that there is not a εὐπάθεια corresponding to emotional pain, we should accept it. I close the paper by proposing a new puzzle for Stoic philosophy if my view is correct.

The Paradox of Truth-aptness and the Meaning of ‘True’
Jeremy Wyatt, University of Connecticut
 In this paper, I offer a way to substantiate a neglected response to a certain paradox involving truth-aptness. The strategy makes use of a novel, non-indexical contextualist semantics for ‘true’. I motivate this semantics using data generated by a case due to Max Kolbel. In addition, I leverage these data in offering difficulties for Kolbel’s competing semantics, which takes ‘true’ to be polysemous.

The Pragmatic Pyramid: John Dewey on Gardening and Food Security
Shane Ralston, Pennsylvania State University
 Despite the minimal attention paid by philosophers to gardening, the activity has a myriad of philosophical implications—aesthetic, ethical, political, and even edible. The same could be said of community food security and struggles for food justice. It is surprising that pragmatist philosophers, who typically work at the nexus of theory and practice, have remained relatively silent about the relationship between gardening and food security. In this paper, I propose a tentative pragmatist model for understanding how gardens make our food system more secure—a model inspired by John Dewey’s writings on school gardening, which I call the pragmatic pyramid.

The Public Form of the Law: the Second-personal Constitution of Freedom
Ariel Zylberman, McGill University
 My aim in this paper is to begin to articulate and defend a Kantian account of the normative basis of positive or statutory law. On the proposed account, statutory law is justified formally and second-personally as constitutive of freedom, that is, in virtue of the law’s public form. The public form of the law is the immanent ideal that the law must be understood as stemming from the will of everyone subject to it. Following statutory laws is constitutive of your freedom, then, because in following such law you follow a norm internal to your will. And the normativity of the law is second-personal in the sense that you are bound by the lawgiver’s contingent address. The formal and second-personal character of this account promises to offer an alternative to the familiar naturalist and positivist accounts of the law and of reading Kant on this topic.

The Vagueness of Theistic Interpretations of William James’ Pluralism
Nate Jackson, Baylor University
 Is William James’s pluralism compatible with both polytheism and monotheism? In A Pluralistic Universe, James argues that the existence of superhuman consciousness is probable, but that the number of divine persons must remain vague. The necessity of this vagueness entails that both polytheism and monotheism are compatible with his metaphysical commitments. After considering the polytheistic interpretation, however, it seems that monotheism is incompatible with pluralism. Monotheism requires that disparate experiences of the divine be reconciled into one entity. And, James’s understanding of the nature of experience in the works comprising Essays in Radical Empiricismcannot accommodate monotheism; this conception of experience is subject to a theistic application of the Miller-Bode objections. These objections show that, theistically interpreted, James’s metaphysics entails polytheism. I argue that James’s view of reality as active in A Pluralistic Universe is necessary to render his metaphysics compatible with monotheism, which affords the vagueness he affirms.

The Value of Sex and the Wrongness of Rape
Ryan Fanselow, Wayne State University
 Standard explanations of the wrongness of rape appeal to the fact that rape is a coercive use of someone else’s body. This feature of rape is something that it shares with forcing someone to eat a tomato and other instances of non-sexual battery. However, we ordinarily take rape to be much more wrong than ordinary instances of non-sexual battery. What is it, then, about rape, that makes it distinctively wrong? I argue, in this paper, that it is the fact that rape assaults central parts of what Korsgaard calls our practical identities. I defend this explanation by noting that it can explain an important intra-feminist dispute about whether rape’s sexual nature is essential to its wrongness and that it harmonizes with the experience of victims.

The Variadic Functions Approach to Tense: Temporalism in an Extensional Framework
Dan Zeman, Institut Jean Nicod
 In this paper I introduce and develop an approach to tenses and temporal expressions that strikes a middle ground between eternalism and temporalism consisting in appeal to “variadic operators” (Recanati, 2002). Appeal to such operators has proven useful in giving the semantics of several types of expressions: adverbs (McConnell-Ginet (1982)), prepositional phrases (Keenan and Faltz (1985)), relational terms (Barwise (1988)), etc. The focus of this paper is on tenses and temporal expressions, with the aim of showing how these are treated by appeal to temporal variadic operators. First I define the temporal variadic operator and then show how it can be used to account for simple tensed sentences (such as “Socrates sits,” “Socrates was sitting,” and “Socrates will sit”). I also give a rough sketch of how it can accommodate more complex phenomena like sequence of time, interaction between tenses and temporal adverbials, temporal anaphora, later-than-matrix and double-access readings, etc.

Theodicy’s Limited Prospects
Aaron Rizzieri, LaGuardia Community College
 I distinguish between knowledge of what God’s reasons for allowing gross suffering could plausibly be, and knowledge of what God’s reasons actually are, and defend an attendant principle of ‘Distrust’ in order to demonstrate that even a successful theodicy would not fully undermine the evidential argument from evil against theism. My purpose is to establish some plausible limitations on how successful a theodicy can be.

Thoughts You Don’t Think
Maarten Steenhagen, University College London
 Our imagination can play tricks on us. Can we exploit this truism to cover cases of severe pathology? In this paper I argue that the experience of thought insertion—a symptom typical of schizophrenia, but perhaps not limited to it -could be so covered. I will first bring out how our ordinary psychology seems well equipped to handle thoughts that aren’t thought by the subject who is aware of them. I will then show how we equally seem quite familiar with cases where thoughts we become aware of and that aren’t thought by us, are thought by someone else. If I am right, subjects could indeed come to have before their minds thoughts that are thought by someone else.

Three Problematic Paths to Well-being Policy
Gil Hertshten, University of California, San Diego
 Policy-makers who treat measures from the social sciences as measures of well-being in order to decide which policies aimed at promoting individual well-being to adopt, face at least three possibilities, each problematic in its own way. First, policy-makers might appeal to a specific, normatively loaded theory of well-being, but the candidate philosophical theories are controversial and contested. Second, policy-makers might rely on platitudes in order to only adopt policies that uncontroversially promote well-being, whatever one’s specific view of well-being is. Such a conservative approach would be too restrictive. Third, policy-makers might rely on measures as proxies for well-being. They can do so, moreover, without appealing to any specific theory of well-being. However, since there are several reasonable proxies, when the measures diverge policy-makers have no reason to choose one over another. In this paper I argue that none of these possibilities is particularly appealing.

Tracing and Recklessness: Lucky Drunk Drivers
Craig Agule, University of California, San Diego
 To explain cases of culpable incapacity, like drunk driving, reasons-responsiveness theorists augment the account of responsibility with a tracing element: the drunk driver is responsible for her incapacitated drunk driving because she is responsible for becoming incapacitated. But this complicates the account. Some appeal to the drunk driver’s recklessness to explain why she is blameworthy without needing the theoretical commitments of tracing, and, indeed, recklessness can explain many of our intuitions about culpable incapacity cases. However, the recklessness account struggles to explain the Lucky Drunk Driver intuition—that an incapacitated agent who drives but fortunately harms no one is nonetheless more blameworthy than another incapacitated agent who, merely by luck, fails to drive at all. Is it enough to consider the driving as just another consequence? Or is there something distinctively blameworthy about the driving as an action? Deciding between tracing and recklessness will require answering this further question.

Transcendental Idealism, Freedom, and Teleology: Grounding Kant’s Theory of Moral Obligation
James P. Messina, University of California, San Diego
 This paper argues that, to the extent that Kant’s theory of moral obligation is grounded on his arguments for transcendental idealism, his moral philosophy relies on substantive use of the teleological principle that everything in nature has a purpose. Based on a close reading of relevant passages in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and The Critique of Pure Reason, I show, against Guyer, that Kant did, in fact, rely on this teleological assumption. I conclude that, unless we can provide grounds for Kant’s theory of moral obligation that do not rely on transcendental idealism, contemporary defenders of Kant’s theory of moral obligation must (a) argue in favor of the use of this teleological principle, (b) engage with skeptics regarding the costs and benefits of assuming ourselves to be free, or (c) formulate a new conceptual argument that shows that we are entitled to assume ourselves to be free.

Transvaluation in Deleuze’s Selective Interpretation of the Eternal Return
James Mollison, Loyola Marymount University
 This essay provides a comparative exposition of the cosmological, ethical, and metaphysical dimensions of Deleuze’s selective interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return. Primary passages where the eternal return appears shows an evolution in Nietzsche’s formulation of the idea, with each development being integrated by Deleuze. Cosmologically, Deleuze’s interpretation is contrasted with Kaufman and Vattimo’s cyclical interpretations of identical repetition. Ethically, we refute counterarguments made by Valadier and Schrift that the selection of Deleuze’s interpretation falls short of amor fati, of affirmation beyond good and evil. After comparing Deleuze’s transformation of the subject and value with Klossowski and Blanchot, the metaphysical dimension of Deleuze’s interpretation is contrasted with Heidegger’s. Lastly, arguments from Malabou and Badiou to the effect that Deleuze succumbs to a metaphysical unity are addressed. In the end, selection in Deleuze’s interpretation cannot be understood apart from an affirmative transvaluation that is generative of notions of identity and opposition alike.

True for Lack of Falsemakers?
Jonathan Payton, University of Toronto
 According to Truthmaker Maximalism, every true proposition has a truthmaker, some entity in the world which makes it true. In recent years, some leading truthmaker theorists have attempted to avoid positing truthmakers for negative existential truths—like `Fido doesn’t exist’—by claiming that these propositions are true in virtue of lacking falsemakers. I argue that this weaker view—according to which all propositions are true either because they have truthmakers or because they lack falsemakers—faces two serious difficulties. First, it is difficult to give it sufficient motivation while retaining a general commitment to truthmakers. Second, the weaker view actually ends up being equivalent to Truthmaker Maximalism. Truthmaker theorists are thus stuck with the demand for truthmakers for negative existential truths.

Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Moral Consequence of Consistency
Jason D’Cruz, University at Albany
 How must we think of others in order for us to have the confidence to trust them? What sort of capacity must we take ourselves to have to consider ourselves worthy of the trust of others? This paper examines the relationship between the capacity for consistent dispositions and the conditions necessary for trust and trustworthiness.

Truth-conditional Pragmatics and Semantic Presupposition
Lenny Clapp, Northern Illinois University
 This paper argues that, in contrast the view of Carston (2002), advocates of truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) ought to accept the broadly Stawsonian view that definite NPs trigger referential presuppositions as a matter of their semantics. This reconciliation of TCP and semantic presupposition focuses on the problem of presupposition denials. The paper begins by explaining that though the felicity of presupposition denials is widely recognized as problematic for the Stawsonian, it is also problematic for Carston’s TCP-inspired alternative to the Strawsonian view. Carston attempts to solve this problem with her ingenious “double-pass” analysis of proposition denials, but the double-pass analysis is shown to generate false predictions, and moreover to be inapplicable to felicitous presupposition denials involving definite NPs with procedural meanings. The paper concludes by presenting a TCP-inspired approach to presupposition denials which preserves Strawson’s core idea that definite NPs trigger referential presuppositions as a matter of their semantics.

Two Forms of Autonomy: Rousseau and Kant
Rafeeq Hasan, University of Chicago
 Rousseau famously writes, “the impulsion of appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself is freedom” (SC, 1.8.3). Kant just as famously grounds the normative bindingness of moral obligation in the necessary commitments of free, rational agency, and so also in a type of self-legislative act. Based on the surface similarities between their mutual concern for autonomy, numerous readings of Rousseau have sought to turn him into a Kantian avant la lettre. In this paper I argue against these broad tendencies to assimilate Rousseau to Kant. I suggest that Rousseau is much more centrally preoccupied than Kant with the question of whether the ideal of living freely can actually account for the forms of feeling, doing, and acting in common without which our lives seem emotionally and spiritually empty, devoid of meaningful connection to others

Varieties of Moral Intuitionism
Elizabeth Tropman, Colorado State University
 Moral intuitionism is the view that we can know or justifiably believe some moral facts directly, without inferring them from evidence. While intuitionism is frequently dismissed as implausible, the theory has been the subject of renewed interest. Contemporary reformulations of moral intuitionism are being developed along multiple lines. These different varieties of intuitionism call for critical classification and comparison. I take up this task in this paper. After isolating three classes of moral intuitionism (rationalist intuitionism, response intuitionism, and appearance intuitionism), I pay special attention to the recent suggestion that intuitive moral knowledge is based on how things appear to the judging subject. One conclusion of this paper is that appeals to moral appearances may not be as helpful to intuitionists as commentators suppose. Getting clear on these issues will move key intramural debates within intuitionism forward and help us assess the prospects for a renewed moral intuitionism generally.

Vote Weighting and Consent Expression: A Modest Proposal
Thomas Metcalf, University of Colorado Boulder
 I take as a premise that whether one consents to some option varies, ceteris paribus, with how much information one has about that option. I argue that the less knowledge one has about some candidate, the less one has consented to one’s vote. This gives us reason to consider a system of “consent expression,” according to which the results of elections are made to match not the actual votes of the electorate, but instead, the actual consent of the electorate. I show that this proposal enjoys considerable advantages over previous “vote weighting” proposals, and I defend it from objections.

What Is the Well-foundedness of Grounding?
Scott Dixon, University of California, Davis
 Some philosophers think that grounding is in some sense well-founded. They typically motivate this by appealing to a certain intuition, which I will discuss. In the grounding literature, the thesis that grounding is well-founded is rarely characterized precisely, and, when it is, it is not the thesis that is actually backed by the intuition. I provide an axiom for grounding which adequately captures this intuition. Afterward, I show why some attractive alternative characterizations of the well-foundedness of grounding do not.

Why—If Russell Is Right—Open Futurists Needn’t Deny Bivalence
Patrick Todd, University of Edinburgh
 There is a familiar debate between Russell and Strawson concerning bivalence and ‘the present King of France’. According to the Strawsonian view, “The present King of France is bald” is neither true nor false, whereas, on the Russellian view, that proposition is simply false. In this paper, I develop what I take to be a crucial (and unnoticed) connection between this debate and a different domain where bivalence has been at stake: future contingents. On the familiar Aristotelian view, future contingent propositions are neither true nor false. However, I argue that, just as there is a Russellian alternative to the Strawsonian view concerning ‘the present King of France’, so there is a Russellian alternative to the Aristotelian view, according to which future contingents all turn out false, not neither true nor false. The result: contrary to millennia of philosophical tradition, we can be open futurists without denying bivalence.

Why Frankfurt-style Cases Fail to Undermine PAP
Jiajun Hu, University of Tennessee
 Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) allegedly challenge the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). Debate over Frankfurt’s challenge has largely focused on whether FSCs constitute a direct counterexample to PAP by satisfying two conditions simultaneously: a person is responsible for an action and this person could not have done otherwise. Surprising to many, Frankfurt (2003) claims that the debate misses his essential point because FSCs effectively undermine the appeal of PAP even if they fail to directly disprove PAP. Unfortunately, such a claim has been largely ignored. In this paper, I first reconstruct Frankfurt’s argument to explicate his essential point: FSCs indirectly undermine PAP because FSCs motivates actual-sequence views of responsibility. Then, I disclose a neglected feature of FSCs. Lastly, I argue that Frankfurt’s argument fails to undermine PAP, because in light of the disclosed feature, what FSCs motivate is not actual-sequence views of responsibility at all.

Why Identity Is Not a Relation
Fatema Amijee, University of Texas at Austin
 Metaphysical orthodoxy demands ontological commitment to a relation of identity. My target is this orthodox stance. Kai Wehmeier recently (and in my view, successfully) defended the view that identity is not a relation from serious objections. But Wehmeier’s defense leaves us at a crossroads: while he has shown that some of the best arguments for treating identity as a dyadic relation do not work, we still require a positive argument for the view that identity is not a relation. Absent a positive argument, we have no reason to prefer a non-relational view of identity over one that upholds the orthodox stance (indeed, the weight of orthodoxy might tip things in favor of a relational view). My goal in this paper is to fill this lacuna.

Why the Law of Likelihood Applies Only to Mutually Exclusive Hypotheses
Greg Gandenberger, University of Pittsburgh
 The Law of Likelihood is the central thesis of likelihoodism, one of three major schools of thought about the notion of evidence in science (Sober 2008, Ch. 1). It says that datum E favors hypothesis H1 over H2 if and only if the likelihood function k=P(E|H1)/Pr(E|H_2)>1, in which case k measures the degree of that favoring. I propose to restrict the Law of Likelihood to mutually exclusive hypotheses. This proposal seems natural and suffices to block a counterexample due to Fiteslon (2007, 476-7), but it faces at least three significant objections: (1) it conflicts with plausible constraints on the notion of evidential favoring, (2) it fails to address the tacking paradox, and (3) it seems to exclude cases involving competing causal claims and cases involving nested models. I respond to each of those objections.

Why the Presumptive Right Is Actually on the Side of Immigrants (Even Undocumented Immigrants)
José Jorge Mendoza, Worcester State College
 Christopher Heath Wellman has argued from a traditionally liberal perspective that a legitimate state (i.e., a state that respects human rights) is entitled to self-determination and that part of being self-determined means having the presumptive right to control immigration. In this essay, I argue that even if Wellman’s conclusion is correct the presumptive right his argument generates is, at best, limited to issues of admission and exclusion (i.e., to questions concerning who may be let in and who may be kept out). Wellman’s conclusion, however, does not hold with respect to border and interior enforcement (i.e., to questions concerning how immigration law may be enforced and what sort of deportation procedures a legitimate state is justified in deploying). When border and interior enforcement are considered, a commitment to universal equality actually entails that that presumptive right is on the side of immigrants, including undocumented immigrants.

Wolf’s Dilemma
William Beals, University of San Francisco
 In her paper “Moral Saints,” Susan Wolf argues that moral sainthood is unattractive because the life of a moral saint does not appear to be good in any non-moral sense. However, Wolf’s own recent work on meaning in life is incompatible with her conclusion about moral saints. This paper aims to show that if we assume Wolf’s account of moral saints is accurate and her remarks on meaning in life true, then at least a subset of moral saints lead meaningful lives, and thus have some claim to leading lives with significant non-moral value as well. If what I argue here is true, then any resolution to the problem is going to have deep ramifications for practical philosophy: either living morally and living well are more consistent than Wolf’s earlier paper concludes, or her very plausible and promising theory of meaning in life does not work.

Words on Psycholinguistics
Wade Munroe, Indiana University Bloomington
 I argue that David Kaplan’s analysis of the factors that determine what words (if any) someone has used in a given utterance is inconsistent with models of speech planning in psycholinguistics as informed by data on slips-of-the-tongue. Kaplan explicitly aims to formulate a theory of words that elides the details of the process responsible for speech planning and production and, thus, ignores the relevant, psycholinguistic literature. Kaplan’s reliance on the intentions of speakers in his account leads to two specific problems: (1) his theory will deliver incorrect answers about what words have been said in word intrusion errors (slips in which a different word than the one intended enters the speech planning process), and (2) in certain errors involving sub-word units (e.g., morphemes, phonemes, etc.).

You Should Know You Won’t Make a Difference: The Inefficacy Objection to Act Consequentialism and the Problem with the Singer/Norcross/Kagan Response
Mark Bryant Budolfson, Stanford University
 Many core examples in ethics and social philosophy involve collective action problems—for example, whether an individual is required to vote, whether it is wrong to consume products that are produced in morally objectionable ways, etc. In these cases, it matters greatly what we together do, but yet a single individual’s ‘non-cooperative’ choice seems to make no difference to the outcome, and also seems to involve no violation of anyone’s rights. Here it is argued that contrary to influential arguments by Peter Singer, Alastair Norcross, and Shelly Kagan, traditional act consequentialist appeals to expected consequences cannot deliver plausible verdicts on all of these cases, because in large collective action situations individuals often have a probability of making a difference that is sufficiently small to ensure that ‘non-cooperation’ is the option with the greatest expected value, even when consequentialists themselves agree that ‘cooperation’ is required.

You’ve Got to Be Joking! Socrates’s Comedic Self-portrayal to Crito in the Euthydemus
Nicholas Oschman, Marquette University
 The collaboration of the elements of the frame of the Euthydemus—notably, the closed frame, the self-reported dialogue by Socrates, and the named interlocutor, Crito—dramatically affects how readers should approach the inner dialogue of the text. Socrates, as an unreliable narrator, gives a comedic self-portrayal in order to performatively insist that Crito follow Socrates’s suggestion in his closing lines—Crito should pay no heed to the practitioners of philosophy, but should rather heed philosophy itself. By introducing comic elements, both to the brothers and to Socrates himself, Socrates is able to distance the value of philosophy from the particular wisdom of its practitioners. The Euthydemusis unique insofar as the interior portion of the dialogue is not immediately intended to be for the sake of the audience, but for the sake of Crito in the frame.

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