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‘Can’ and the Consequence Argument
Alex Grzankowski, University of Texas at Austin
 In the free will debate, the consequence argument is a powerful incompatibilist argument for the conclusion that, under the assumption that determinism is true, what one does is what one must do. A major point of controversy between classical compatibilists and incompatibilists has been over the use of ‘can’ in the argument. Many classical compatibilists have held that ‘can’ should be analyzed as a conditional. But the debate reached a dialectical impasse. The present paper offers a new dialectical point of entry. By making use of Kratzer’s (1977) influential semantic work on ‘can’ and ‘must’, it is argued that incompatibilists are in a position to offer a plausible, positive treatment of ‘can’ that, if adopted, validates the consequence argument.

…And Justice for All?: Rethinking the Reciprocity of the Virtues in the Republic
S. Seth Bordner, University of Alabama
 Most scholars think that Plato holds the view in Republic that one is just (or brave, or temperate) if and only if one is also wise. Call this the Reciprocity Thesis (RT). Because Plato holds that only philosophers can be wise, he would seem to be committed to the view that only philosophers can be just. But then the perfectly just city is composed mostly of unjust persons. For several reasons, I will argue, this is an undesirable interpretation, but one that can be avoided. In this paper I push back against this interpretation of justice in Republic and the RT that supports.

A Class on Philosophy and Food: Groping Towards Academic Service-Learning for Philosophy of Science
Dan Hicks, University of Notre Dame
 While service learning might seem best suited to applied ethics, I believe that it is also appropriate for such areas as philosophy of science. A philosophy and food class that I developed and have taught at the University of Notre Dame, "Are We Eating Good Food?,” is a first attempt to develop a model for service learning in philosophy of science. I explain the structure and content of my class and my students’ service projects. The class is not exclusively devoted to philosophy of science, and deals with complexity and the role of values in science rather than such "classical” issues as explanation or scientific realism. Reflecting on the gap that thus exists between "classical” philosophy of science and the content of my course, I conclude that I do not yet have a general model for service learning in philosophy of science, but I have made some progress.

A General Reply to the Arguments from Blur, Double Vision, Perspective, and Other Kinds of Perceptual Distortion Against Representationalism
David Bourget, University of London
 This paper offers a general reply to arguments from perceptual distortion (e.g., blur, perspective, double vision) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that distorted and undistorted experiences are counterexamples to this thesis because they can share contents without sharing phenomenal characters. In reply, I suggest that cases of perceptual distortion do not constitute counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This is can be shown by considering limit cases of perceptual distortion, for example, maximally blurry experiences, which manifestly lack detailed content. Since there is no reasonable way to draw the line between distorted experiences that have degraded content and distorted experiences that don’t, we should allow that an increase in distortion is always accompanied by a degradation in content.

A Kantian Argument for the Sovereignty Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Krista Thomason, Swarthmore College
 Some recent scholarship suggests that Kant’s critique of colonialism provides a prima facie argument in favor of self-government rights for indigenous peoples. Here, I argue for a stronger conclusion: Kantian political theory not only can but must include sovereignty for indigenous peoples. Normally these rights are considered redress for historic injustice. On a Kantian view, however, I argue that they are not remedial. Sovereignty rights are a necessary part of establishing perpetual peace. By failing to acknowledge the sovereignty of native groups, states once guilty of imperialism leave open the in principle possibility for future violence, even though no current conflict exists. Only in recognizing self-government rights can states truly commit to the cosmopolitan ideal.

A New Solution to the Surprise Test Paradox
Daniel Immerman, University of Notre Dame
 In this paper I offer a new solution to the Surprise Test Paradox. The paradox arises thanks to an ingenious argument that seems to show that surprise tests are impossible. I identify a flaw in the argument, namely a reliance on an instance of a false closure principle. I then show how my solution to the paradox is better than extant solutions. The reason it is better is that it can handle variants of the paradox that extant solutions cannot.

A Pluralist Objection to Aristotle’s Account of the Happiest Life: A Response
Matthew Walker, Rutgers University
 In Nicomachean Ethics X.7-8, Aristotle defends a striking view, which I call the supremacy thesis. This is the claim that the happiest way of life for human beings is a contemplative life. Contemporary philosophers are apt to find the supremacy thesis seriously blinkered, however. According to what I call the pluralist worry, it is implausible to think that a single determinate life—especially the contemplative life—could be happiest for all people. Aristotle’s view might seem to overlook, or fail to show proper appreciation for, the full range of talents, abilities, and inclinations that human beings possess. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle has resources for responding to the pluralist worry.

A Propositional Semantics for Substitutional Quantification
Geoff Georgi, West Virginia University
 The standard truth-conditional semantics for substitutional quantification, due to Saul Kripke, gets the modal profile of simple sentences containing substitutional quantifiers wrong. In this paper, I propose an alternative semantic theory for substitutional quantification that specifies what proposition is expressed by a sentence containing the particular substitutional quantifier, and show how it gets the modal profile of such sentences right. The key to this semantic theory is identifying the appropriate propositional function to serve as the content of an occurrence of a formula containing a free substitutional variable.

A Puzzle about Dialectic at Republic 533a1-5
Michelle Jenkins, Whitman College
 This paper is a close examination of Republic 533a1-5. Glaucon has asked Socrates to describe dialectic and Socrates appears to rebuff this request, telling Glaucon that he would not be able to follow the account that Socrates would offer. Scholars have traditionally taken this passage to refer to the method of dialectic—Socrates is telling Glaucon that he will not be able to understand the account of dialectic that Socrates were to give. I offer considerations against this interpretation and argue that Socrates is in fact talking of the Form of the Good in this passage. I end with some thoughts about why Socrates would warn Glaucon about the Form of the Good given Glaucon’s request for information about dialectic.

A Return to Neutral Relations: A Puzzle about Symmetry
Fatema Amijee, University of Texas at Austin
 In "Neutral Relations” Kit Fine argues against the standard view of relations on which a relation holds of its objects in a given order, in favor of a view on which a relation does not hold of its objects in any given order but is unbiased with respect to ordering, or neutral. On the standard view the ordering of the relata serves to distinguish the various exemplifications of a relation (i.e., it distinguishes aRb from bRa). This ability to explain differential application constitutes a criterion of adequacy on any theory of relations. A view on which relations are neutral must explain differential application without appeal to an ordering of the relata. My goal is to defend one such account—a view Fine calls ‘positionalism’. In §1, I briefly sketch Fine’s arguments against the standard view. In §2 I introduce Fine’s ‘symmetry objection’ to positionalism. I defend positionalism in §3.

A Solution to the Problem of Access for Russellian Theories of Belief
Mihnea Capraru, Syracuse University
 Russellian theories of belief identify the contents of our beliefs with Russellian propositions. To address the ensuing Fregean puzzles, most contemporary Russellians maintain that two belief reports can attribute belief in one and the same Russellian proposition, yet concern different ways of believing it. If so, then the speakers of belief reports can talk about other people’s ways of believing. How they can do so is a problem: let us call this the problem of access. In this paper, I propose a simple solution to complement the ‘theory’ theory and the simulation theory: in the simplest cases, speakers can talk about other people’s ways of believing by talking about ways of believing that they themselves share with the others.

Abandonment, Mitigation, and the Principle of Underlying Censure
Craig Agule, University of California, San Diego
 In his Attempts, Gideon Yaffe provided a theory of sentencing mitigation in cases of criminal abandonment which turns on the disincentive effect of punishment. That theory properly grants mitigation in cases where a defendant abandons after realizing she was doing wrong, and it properly withholds mitigation in cases where a defendant abandons after realizing her prospects for criminal success are not as good as she had thought. However, Yaffe’s theory struggles with cases where the defendant abandons after realizing that her behavior is illegal. After examining two sorts of these cases of belated legal realization, I conclude that Yaffe’s theory falls short and that the true theory of abandonment-based mitigation should be more closely tied to the failure to properly recognize reasons that led to the original culpability.

Abductive Two-Dimensionalism: A New Route to the A Priori Identification of Necessary Truths
Stephen Biggs, Iowa State University
 Chalmers and Jackson (Chalmers 2006; Jackson 1998), among others, advocate epistemic two-dimensional semantics (E2D) as a way of reforging the necessity-a priority link seemingly broken by the identification of necessary a posteriori truths (Kripke 1972/1980). The E2D strategy requires that we can have a priori knowledge of semantic intensions constitutively connected to necessity, but many have argued that cannot have such knowledge. We argue that such access-based objections turn not on features of E2D per se, but rather on features of the conceiving-based epistemology of intensions (CEI) that extant versions of E2D uniformly presuppose. We introduce an alternative epistemology, based in abduction (i.e., inference to the best explanation, argue that the results of idealized abduction are reasonably taken to be a priori, and show that this epistemology of intensions blocks the access-based objections to E2D. We thereby provide a new route to the a priori identification of necessary truths.

Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence
Philip Swenson, University of California, Riverside
 Many philosophers wish to maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. One problem with this view is that the Fixity of the Past principle which underlies the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge as well. By developing an account of ability which appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of the Past with a new principle which does not generate this difficulty.

Acting for a Reason and Following a Principle: A Dilemma for Korsgaard’s Constitutivism
Andrew McAninch, Illinois Wesleyan University
 Christine M. Korsgaard argues that a person acts for a reason only if she recognizes some consideration to be a reason, where this recognition motivates her to act. Some contend that this requirement, which I call the guidance condition on acting for a reason, generates a vicious regress. Korsgaard herself is sensitive to this worry. Indeed, her appeal in recent work to the constitutive principles of rational activity can be seen, in part, as a response to this regress worry. I will argue, however, if she is to appeal to the constitutive principles of rational activity to resolve the regress, Korsgaard must determine whether acting on such principles is also subject to the guidance condition. If following constitutive principles is subject to the guidance condition, then the regress remains unresolved. But if not, then the rationale for applying it to acting for a reason vanishes as well.

Affective Qualities
Murat Aydede, University of British Columbia
Matthew Fulkerson, University of California, San Diego
 We distinguish between affect-presenting and affect-causing perceptual experiences and focus on the former. We note that we attribute positive or negative affective qualities (e.g., pleasantness and unpleasantness) both to perceptual experiences and to their objects. We offer a psychofunctionalist account of affective qualities when they are attributed to experiences and a dispositional (Lockean) account when they are attributed to their objects. We show how these two accounts are naturally united—indeed each almost follows from the other. Along the way we note some of the advantages of our approach.

Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, and the Bank Cases
Logan Gage, Baylor University
 Contextualism (the view that ‘knowledge’ and its variants are context-sensitive) has been supported in large part through appeal to intuitions about Keith DeRose’s Bank Cases. Recently, however, the contextualist construal of these cases has come under fire from Kent Bach and Jennifer Nagel who question whether the Bank Case subject’s confidence can remain constant in both low- and high-stakes cases. Having explained the Bank Cases and this challenge to them, I argue that DeRose has given a reasonable reply to this initial challenge. However, I proceed to argue that the current stalemate can be broken. Seeking to extend the Bach-Nagel critique, I offer a novel interpretation of the Bank Cases according to which the subject’s evidence changes between low- and high-stakes cases. If I am correct, then, given the amount of support the Bank Cases have been thought to lend contextualism, the case for contextualism is seriously weakened.

Against Radical Self-legislation
Tom O’Shea, University of Essex
 Radical constructivists claim that all normative authority in practical deliberation originates in self-legislation. Critics object that this position is beset by paradox: either self-legislation is governed by antecedent norms, and so is not the ultimate ground of normativity, or else it is not governed by such norms, and so legislation is too arbitrary to genuinely bind us or express our freedom. This paper outlines Onora O’Neill’s sophisticated defence of radical constructivism against these objections but argues that she ultimately succumbs to them. In particular, O’Neill transgresses her own necessarily strict requirement that self-legislation be independent of conditioned forms of reasoning. A possible reply—relying on the existence of practically necessary standards of reason to guide legislation—is considered but found wanting.

Against Some Group Readings of the Epistemic ‘Might’
Benjamin Lennertz, University of Southern California
 There is a debate over whether contextualists about the epistemic modal, ‘might’, can explain how hearers can disagree with utterances of ‘might’-sentences. Some contextualists have responded with what I call The Group Reading Strategy—that in uttering a ‘might’-sentence, speakers assert something about the information of the conversational group and that hearers appropriately respond by disagreeing with the proposition asserted. In this paper, I give two arguments to show that The Group Reading Strategy is unsuccessful. Each shows that ‘might’ does not get a group reading in all of the situations where we have disagreement. First, I amend von Fintel’s and Gillies’s (2011) argument from warrant in a way that gets around the objections of Dowell (2011). Second, I offer an independent argument based on conversational data in which it is clear that ‘might’ doesn’t get a group reading (though the disagreement phenomena persist).

An Institutionalized Concern with Promoting Egalitarianism? Defending Dworkin’s Proposal Against G.A. Cohen’s Incoherence Charge
Robert (R.J.) Leland, Stanford University
 I begin by presenting a proposal attributed by G.A. Cohen to Ronald Dworkin: the difference principle could require regulating the basic structure so as to promote an egalitarian ethos, without directly requiring individuals to take up that ethos. I present some cases to spell out what such a principle would require. Then I discuss Cohen’s argument that Dworkin’s proposal commits its proponents to an incoherent triad. I argue that the argument as stated by Cohen fails. Then I present an improved version of the argument (which may be what Cohen had in mind). I show that advocates of Dworkin’s proposal can escape the improved argument, via one of two plausible routes, which philosophers ought to explore more fully. The result of my argument is that Cohen fails to establish that Dworkin’s proposal leads to an incoherence.

Analyticity and Ontology
Louis H. deRosset, University of Vermont
 Analyticity theorists, as I will call them, endorse the doctrine of analyticity in ontology: if some truth P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist. Suppose, for instance, that the existence of a table in a certain location is analytically entailed by the existence and features of certain particles in that location. The doctrine implies that the table’s existence requires nothing more of the world than that those particles exist and bear the features in question. Here I argue that the doctrine faces counter-examples, and so analytic entailment does not have the significance for ontology that analyticity theorists have claimed.

Animal Consciousness, Non-propositional Thought, and Zen Buddhism
Sara Waller, Montana State University
 Mental states that are free of beliefs and desires are intrinsic to the illuminated trance prescribed by Zen Buddhist practice. Meditators strive to minimize thoughts, expectations and emotions, and attachment to them. Koans serve to end analytic thought by presenting unsolvable puzzles. Experimental evidence that (many) non-human animals experience beliefs and desires that are non-propositional. Are these animals technically closer to satori than humans because they are free of the tangles of language, or are their desires even more pressing? This paper explores the role of language in chaining us to, or freeing us from, attachment to beliefs and desires.

Archein and Archai (Rule and Offices) in Plato’s Statesman
Melissa Lane, Princeton University
 The Statesman has been powerfully characterized as an abstract analysis of architectonic political knowledge or expertise. Yet in its very abstraction, it has been described as impoverished, by comparison with the Republic and the Laws, in treating the concrete question of how a constitution should organize the distribution of offices. I contend that the dialogue is less absolutely impoverished on this point than this statement implies. I show that the Statesman addresses the most important political offices (archai) and political roles which characterized Greek constitutions, and that its account of the rule (archein) of the ideal statesman is developed in relation to a corresponding reconceptualization of these political roles and offices. The Statesman is an exercise in constitutional analysis as well as an abstract analysis of political expertise: to reconfigure the political authority of statesmanship, it must reconfigure the political authority of the subordinate offices.

Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?
Thomas Pogge, Yale University
 Human rights violations involve unfulfilled human rights and a specific active and intentional causal relation of human agents to such non-fulfillment. This causal relation may be interactional—or institutional, as when agents collaborate in designing and imposing institutional arrangements that foreseeably and avoidably cause human rights deficits. Readily available evidence suggests that the design of supranational institutional arrangements plays a major role in shrinking the already small (3%) share of global household income going to humanity’s poorer half, whose social and economic human rights consequently remain unfulfilled. A strong case can be made, then, that people like myself—affluent citizens of influential states—collaboratively violate the human rights of the global poor. Most of us find this judgment incredible—but only because they fail to investigate the institutional causes of the non-fulfillment of human rights or relevant institutional reform possibilities.

Artistic Beauty as Free Beauty
Emine Hande Tuna, University of Alberta
 The apparent inconsistency between the third moment of the Analytic in the Critique of Judgment (CJ) and the section on fine arts and genius creates problems that make the status of artistic beauty questionable. The already problematic distinction between adherent and free beauty, which makes commentators question whether or not adherent beauty is beauty, resurfaces in the issue of artistic beauty. In order to overcome this problem I suggest that even though we can judge artistic beauty as adherent beauty similar to the way in which we do for natural beauty, we also judge it as free beauty.

Assertibility in Context
Geoff Pynn, Northern Illinois University
 The knowledge account of assertibility says that a speaker is in an epistemic position to assert that p if and only if she knows that p. Keith DeRose has shown that the knowledge account is incompatible with purist invariantism about knowledge. So purist invariantists need an alternative account of assertibility. An adequate account should explain why assertibility varies with context, and should underwrite an explanation for the tight link between knowledge and assertibility that makes the knowledge account so attractive. I argue for such an account by starting with a suggestion from Robert Stalnaker about the "essential effect” of assertion. I show how the account predicts the context-sensitivity of assertibility, explains some common data, and implies that knowledge is typically required for warranted assertion.

Balancing Commitments: Herman on Own-happiness and Beneficence
Donald Wilson, Kansas State University
 In her most recent book, Barbara Herman offers a distinctive approach to an old problem related to the practical scope of moral requirements. Herman argues that we can avoid the kind of troubling balancing of commitments that seems to leave personal relationships and projects hostage to an open-ended and extensive commitment to helping others that threatens to reduce us to lives spent in the unrelenting service of others. I argue that the structural changes that Herman proposes and the room she makes for circumstance specific individual judgment do not obviate the need for this kind of balancing and that the basic problem cannot be solved without embracing it.

Belief, Ethics, and the Ethics of Belief
Guy Axtell, Radford University
 Several ongoing philosophical debates indicate a need to look closer at the relationship between ethical and intellectual virtues. One is the challenge coming from situationist psychology, a challenge that bears differently on different domains and conceptions of character traits. Another is the debate over a proper understanding of the ethics of belief, and of the differences between moral and epistemic versions of it. This paper will primarily address contrasting basic conceptions of the relationship between facts and values, and how that issue informs and constrains the kind of norms that a proposed ethics of belief can properly appeal to. It also tries to show that a "responsibilist” ethics of belief is superior, both philosophically and pragmatically, to the better-known "evidentialist” ethics of belief.

Believing qua Member
Mark Phelan, Lawrence University
 Casual reflection on the daily news reminds us that we often talk as though groups have intentional states, such as beliefs and desires. But what is the status of such verbal ascriptions? Are these to be given a realist interpretation and understood as attributions of mental states to groups, over and above the individuals that constitute them? Or should they be understood individualistically, as involving shorthand references to the mental states of the individual persons that comprise groups? As I will argue, neither approach conforms entirely to our practice of mental state attribution. Careful reflection on an array of mental state ascriptions favors a third approach. People generally interpret group mental state ascriptions distributively, as attributions of mental states to group members, whose mental states constitute a subset of the mental states of individual persons.

Blues, Trauma, and the Finitude of Human Existence
Ben Stolorow, Independent Scholar
Robert Stolorow, University of California, Los Angeles
 Emotional trauma brings us face-to-face with our vulnerability to suffering, death, and loss—possibilities that are constitutive of finite human existing. We elucidate the vital role played by the process of bringing the bodily aspect of emotional experience into language in the working through of painful emotional states. Such visceral-linguistic unities are achieved in a dialogue of emotional understanding, and it is in such dialogue that experiences of emotional trauma can be transformed into endurable and namable painful feelings. The blues is a wonderful example of such dialogue. The lyrics provide the words that name the particular experience of trauma, while the more formal aspects of the music evoke the visceral dimension of emotional pain. In the unifying experience of the blues, songwriter, performers, and listeners are joined in a visceral-linguistic conversation in which universally traumatizing aspects of finite human existing can be communally held and borne.

Can Cost-effectiveness Analysis Accommodate the Equal Value of Life?
Paul Menzel, Pacific Lutheran University
 Cost-effectiveness analysis of health care (CEA) has been criticized for unfair discrimination against the disabled and chronically ill because it attributes less value to extending their lives than to the lives of those who would be in full health. One prominent response has been to modify CEA by distinguishing different roles in its structure for individual utility and social value. On this view, the equal value of life is a claim about social value, not individual utility, and CEA can therefore accommodate it. I argue that this defense of CEA fails because the claim of the equal value of life is compelling as a claim about individual utility as well as social value. As a result, the equal value of life continues to pose a severe challenge to CEA’s structural integrity, and CEA has not yet successfully rebuffed the charge of unfair discrimination.

Can We Really See a Million Colors?
David Papineau, King’s College London
 It is widely assumed that humans are capable of over a million different conscious visual responses to coloured surfaces. This paper argues that the empirical data are better explained by positing far fewer such responses, alongside a gestalt ability to register directly that adjacently presented surfaces are different-in-colour.

Causation: Ontology and A Priority
Nathanael Stein, Florida State University
 Philosophers discussing causation must specify an ontology of causation. The standard account of that ontology is that causation is a relation between events, though some alternative candidates have been proposed. All of these accounts make two assumptions: that the ontological category of causal relata admits of a unique specification [Uniqueness], and that cause and effect are of the same ontological type [Uniformity]. There are good reasons for rejecting both assumptions, derived from considerations of plausible cases, standard usage, and theoretical motivations. Reasons which might be or have been given in favor of Uniqueness and Uniformity are unconvincing. Thus, the standard ontologies of causation, including those framed in terms of events should be rejected in favor of an ontological pluralism. That pluralism is only provisional, however, since giving a non-provisional account of the relata of causation is far more complex than normally supposed.

Collective Intentionality: A Human—Not a Monkey—Business
Angelica Kaufmann, Universiteit Antwerpen
 In Making the Social World Searle makes the same claim he made in 1995: that "Human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for collective intentionality” (Searle, 2010, p. 43). In this paper I aim to show that Searle’s ‘overattribution’ of collective intentionality to non-human animals is unjustified. Firstly, I briefly reconstruct and augment Tomasello and Rakoczy’s (2007) criticism that Searle overemphasises the primitiveness of the notion of collective intentionality. Secondly, I will outline a cross-species analysis for the emergence of cooperative behaviour. Such an approach suggests that we resist Searle’s overattribution. Thirdly, I argue that Searle’s six conditions of adequacy for any account of collective intentionality are incompatible with his attribution of collective intentionality to non-human animals. Finally, I conclude by noting that Searle’s overattribution has important consequences for his system, as it implicates that human uniqueness begins with institutional reality rather than with collective intentionality and social ontology.

Common Sense Ontology
Mark Moyer, University of Vermont
 A radical view of what exists bears a burden of explaining away the contrary views of common sense. But what does common sense say exists? According to most philosophers, common sense holds that chairs and countries exist but not arbitrary quantities of matter or arbitrary sums of objects. I argue otherwise. Although people would deny that anything exactly occupies the combined space of the Eiffel Tower and my nose, they would also say that there is a quantity of matter constituting the two of them and that the collection of the tower and my nose weighs more than the tower itself. This shows such things are accepted by the common folk. Common sense thinking, it turns out, countenances much that is quite uncommon.

Composition and Facts
Noel Saenz, University of Colorado Boulder
 Facts, when taken to have particulars and parts, are thought to succumb to a number of mereological objections. For example, facts so understood are thought to violate the following very plausible principle: If y is a proper part of x, then there’s something, z, such that (1) z is a proper part of x, and (2) z is not identical with y. In this paper (which is a proper part of a much larger paper) I argue that, for example, facts do violate this principles but that the proper response to make is to deny the principle and not the facts. Though this may, at first, strike us as philosophically revisionary, I will show that rejecting it is not as revisionary as it may at first seem.

Compositionality and Conceptual Role
Eric Saidel, George Washington University
 Fodor and Lepore (among others) argue that Conceptual Role Semantics (CRS) cannot handle an important cognitive phenomenon: compositionality. As a consequence, CRS is not a viable theory of mental semantics. This paper argues that Fodor and Lepore’s challenge is based on taking compositionality to be stronger than the evidence warrants. A weaker compositionality that is consistent with CRS is a better fit for the phenomena it is supposed to explain (the productivity and systematicity of language and thought), and it coheres better with ordinary usage. Thus compositionality does not present a challenge to CRS.

Compositionality and Structured Propositions
Lorraine Juliano Keller, University of Notre Dame and Niagara University
 In this paper, I evaluate one of the central arguments for a popular thesis in the philosophy of language that I call "Structured Propositionalism,” according to which propositions are complex entities composed of the semantic values of the meaningful parts of the sentences that express them. According to what I call the "Compositionality Argument,” semantic compositionality entails complexity in semantic values: if the assignment of semantic values to sentences obeys the widely accepted principle of compositionality, then sentential semantic values (viz., propositions) must be complex. This paper subjects this hitherto inadequately explored argument to scrutiny. I present an objection to the Compositionality Argument that is potentially devastating for Russellians, but to which Fregeans have a satisfactory response. Since Russellianism is by far the most popular version of Structured Propositionalism, this challenge to one of the central arguments supporting the view is not to be taken lightly.

Conditions of Cognitive Sanity and the Internalist Credo
Andrew D. Spear, Grand Valley State University
 Laurence BonJour has proposed background conditions on internalist justification. Hilary Kornblith argues that such conditions are inconsistent with a core internalist commitment, that subjects internally alike are justificationally alike, resulting in a position indistinguishable from standard externalisms and so signaling the "death” of internalism. I think the funeral arrangements are premature, though a more systematic consideration of background conditions is needed. I explain how BonJour-style internalism is consistent with certain kinds of background conditions: conditions the failure of which either affect what a subject has access to or undermine the subject’s epistemic agency. Four of BonJour’s five conditions are of this type and so not susceptible to Kornblith’s objections, while a fifth should be rejected in its current form. The result is that certain background conditions are motivated by commitments of internalism, are consistent with internalism, and result in a view distinct from standard externalisms.

Confucianism before Confucius: The Rectification of Names in the Yijing
Halla Kim, University of Nebraska at Omaha
 The Yijing is full of names and symbols, broadly conceived, and they stand in semantic/semiotic relations to the world, sometimes in the natural way and sometimes in the normative way. I argue that this is part of the underlying implications of the well-known Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names. In the end, I conclude, though, that, in the actual presentation of his doctrine, Confucius not only played the role of a mere ‘transmitter’ of the Xianjin ideals, as he famously claimed, but also developed them in a new, creative way, in particular, with a strong implication for political reforms in the human society.

Consciousness, Control, and Zombie Action
Joshua Shepherd, Florida State University
 According to a strong intuition, persistent in both philosophy and cognitive science, consciousness is intimately involved in control’s exercise. Recently, however, some have suggested that consciousness is functionally unimportant for the control of at least some overt action—that these overt actions are controlled by ‘the zombie within’ (Koch and Crick 2001). In this paper I examine arguments in favor of zombie action. I note that these arguments suffer from an attenuated view of control, and I highlight important but thus far overlooked empirical possibilities concerning the role of consciousness for action control.

Consequentialism, Eudaimonism, and Alienation
Aaron Flaster, Lewis & Clark College
 Eudaimonism shows how consequentialism can avoid the problem of alienation. The problem of alienation reduces to three objections: consequentialists cannot act for the sake of others, consequentialists cannot accommodate the loyalty that exists between friends, and consequentialists cannot develop the intimacy between friends. Each objection tries to show that consequentialism cannot accommodate friendship. This threatens consequentialism because people need friends, and not just acquaintances, to live well. Unlike acquaintances, friends have an intimate relationship—they spend time together, share similar interests, and discuss how to live well. This intimacy allows friends to improve each other’s characters more effectively than acquaintances could. Consequentialism can assuage these objections by appealing to eudaimonism. Eudaimonism faces three similar critiques and the eudaimonist responses serve as useful parallels for consequentialism.

Consilient Generalizations as Laws of Nature
Reuben Stern, University of WisconsinñMadison
 In this paper, I propose a novel way for Humeans to explain scientists’ search for laws of nature. Though Humeans are often sympathetic to David Lewis’s Best System Account of lawhood, problems arise from its reference to our standards of simplicity and strength. I argue that Humeans can avoid these problems by regarding laws as the maximally consilient generalizations. A generalization is consilient if and only if it necessitates the agreement of independent measurements in two or more generalizations. A set of generalizations is maximally consilient at some world if and only if it consiliates all of the generalizations that can be consiliated at that world. My proposal is inspired by William Whewell’s account of confirmation.

Constructing the Null Hypothesis: Epistemic and Non-epistemic Values in Statistical Methods
Irina Meketa, Boston University
 Philosophical treatments of bias in comparative psychology’s statistical models have left out a crucial feature: the choice of null hypothesis (H0). Earlier accounts of bias largely focus on error-rate asymmetry in the Neyman-Pearson Method (NPM). I argue that the asymmetry is less important than the value assigned to the H0. I propose a reformulation of the NPM that controls for bias by (a) replacing problematic metaphysical assumptions about parsimony with relevant empirical and theoretical considerations in determining the H0 and (b), establishing a role for appropriate value judgments in the determination of the error rate asymmetry.

Contextualism and the Content of Vague Assertions
Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska, Uniwersytet Warszawski
 The problem with contextualism concerning vague assertions is that it seems that while content-contextualism makes impossible any genuine disagreement concerning ascriptions of vague properties to objects, truth-contextualism either precludes permissible disagreement concerning borderline cases or else it leads to content-contextualism. I suggest a way out for contextualists. I offer a new account of the usage of personal taste predicates and suggest that we model the usage of all vague predicates on it. The idea is that in clear cases "a is F” means "a is F simpliciter,” whereas in borderline cases it means "a is F-to-me.” Since the boundary between borderline and non-borderline cases depends on context, my solution weds content-contextualism with truth-contextualism.

Conventions, Precedents, and Beliefs: A Lesson from Lewis and Millikan
Megan Stotts, University of California, Riverside
 David Lewis and Ruth Millikan provide strikingly different analyses of convention. Lewis requires mutual knowledge of regular conformity that relies on a process of reasoning about others’ beliefs, whereas Millikan champions a simpler view of conventions as behavior reproduced due to weight of precedent, with no requirement of mutual knowledge. I argue that despite these major differences, their accounts suffer from complementary tensions. Lewis overemphasizes beliefs and tries to exclude the causal power of precedents from his account, but he runs into trouble when precedents sneak back in. Millikan tries to exclude beliefs in favor of causal connections to precedents, but beliefs eventually make a problematic appearance. These complementary tensions reveal that the correct account of convention will have to include both beliefs and causal connections to precedents, but perhaps as sufficient rather than necessary conditions.

Convergence on Divergence: How to Be a Relativistic Moral Realist
William A. Rottschaefer, Lewis & Clark College
 Urging the scientifically minded moral realist to meet her own methodological standards, Doris and Plakias have challenged her to address the long-standing problem of moral disagreement. I use a gene-culture co-evolutionary account of one of their showcase problem cases, the difference between honor and non-honor cultures, to argue not only that significant moral disagreement—and the moral relativism it seems to imply—pose no awkwardness for moral realism, but also that a properly scientifically based naturalistic moral realism explains it, indeed, provides tools for justifying it. In doing so, I show how to be a relativistic moral realist.

Cookies and Surprise Exams
Dylan Dodd, Pacific University
 I introduce a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox. I compare it to the more familiar Surprise Exam Paradox, and argue that the two paradoxes have analogous solutions.

Corrective Justice Supplemented
Aness Webster, University of Southern California
 Jules Coleman, in The Practice of Principle, defends a theory of tort law based on the principle of corrective justice which posits a duty to repair when a right has been breached. In the course of this defense, he considers an objection that the principle of corrective justice is inadequate because a complete theory of tort law ought to provide an adequate account of the first-order rights/duties as well as the second-order right to redress or duty to repair. I argue that Coleman’s responses are inadequate and that we should supplement the principle of corrective justice with an adequate account of first-order rights that tort law protects. I also argue that an account of first-order rights is not sufficient for a complete theory of tort law; it must be supplemented by the principle of corrective justice. Tort law, I suggest, is an institution which protects particular sorts of first-order rights in a particular way, namely, by forcing those who have violated these rights to compensate for the breach of these rights (and the resulting harm). This view has the virtue of being able to distinguish tort law from both criminal law and a publicly funded compensation scheme.

Cosmopolitanism and Reproductive Choices
Louis-Philippe Hodgson, York University
 I articulate a problem that cosmopolitans face regarding reproductive choices, and I argue that it can only be solved by leaving cosmopolitanism behind. I start with the obvious observation that children are born as a result of somebody’s choices. Since cosmopolitans hold that justice demands that the prospects of children everywhere be equalized, this seems to commit them to the claim that a person in one country can unilaterally create an enforceable duty for those in another country just by choosing to have a child. I maintain that this is problematic. I then argue that the problem requires political institutions for its solution. This creates serious trouble for cosmopolitanism, since a central tenet of the view is that the content of our duties of justice doesn’t depend on what institutions are present (except insofar as that influences what is feasible).

Death and Disability: Two Problems for the Event-based Account of Harm
Duncan Purves, University of Colorado Boulder
 State-based and event-based accounts of harm offer competing answers to the question, what is it to suffer a harm? According to state-based accounts someone suffers a harm just in case she is worse off (either in a respect or all things considered) than she otherwise would have been. On event-based accounts, someone suffers a harm just in case she undergoes an event of losing a basic good. I suggest that the event-based account is undermined by two overlooked but troubling aspects of the view. First (and surprisingly) the event-based account offers a much less adequate treatment of the harmfulness of death than a properly amended version of the state-based account. Second, the event-based account has troubling implications for the harmfulness of what I call "non-regrettable disabilities,” conditions that would normally be considered debilitating but that, due to peculiar circumstances, make no difference to the quality of one’s life.

Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects
Daniel Z. Korman, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
 Debunking arguments purport to undermine some range of beliefs by showing that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between those beliefs and the facts that they purport to be about. Such arguments have been wielded against beliefs about morality, mathematics, logic, colors, and the existence of God. Perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects, however, are widely thought to be invulnerable to such arguments. I will show that this is a mistake. I articulate a debunking argument that purports to undermine our most basic perceptual beliefs. I challenge two natural responses to the argument: (i) that there is a causal explanation of the accuracy of such beliefs, and (ii) that there are a plenitude of objects before us, virtually guaranteeing the accuracy of such beliefs. I then defend a rationalist response, according to which our beliefs are accurate on account of our apprehension of facts about composition and kind membership.

Deflationism Deflated
Jeremy Wyatt, University of Connecticut
 The substantiveness of properties is a central notion in many deflationist theories. I investigate what it is for a property to be substantive, arguing that every existing view of substantiveness is problematic and that a deflationist view of substantiveness is more promising. But, as it happens, deflationism about substantiveness ushers in the deflation of deflationism itself.

Degrees of Incoherence and Dutch Books
Julia Staffel, University of Southern California
 Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute the norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view is widely known as subjective Bayesianism. While this view is the foundation of a broad research program, it is also widely criticized for being too idealized. My goal in this paper is to extend the framework of subjective Bayesianism in such a way that we can capture differences between incoherent credence functions. Being able to measure to what degree a credence function is incoherent will help us model the degrees of belief of non-ideal agents. This will give us the resources to explain how the ideal norms of Bayesianism can be approximated by non-ideal agents, and thus exert normative force over their credence functions.

Discontent with Rich Contents
Matthew Frise, University of Rochester
 There is recent debate about whether the rich content view—the view that properties about kinds, natural kinds, causal relations, dispositions, or moral statuses can be represented in the contents of visual experience—is true. Participants in this debate have claimed that its outcome informs various important issues in philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, psychology, and neuroscience, and such claims have gone unchallenged. I argue that, other than its intrinsic interest, the outcome of the rich contents debate doesn’t matter. I consider four claims in the recent literature, each of which purportedly suffices to show that the outcome matters, and I show that each claim is either false or insufficient. If correct, I have undermined key motivations for an entire debate.

Dispositional Essentialism and Contingency
Amy Karofsky, Hofstra University
 Many recent metaphysicians have successfully shown that any theory on which natural laws are anything less than absolutely necessary will ultimately collapse into Humeanism. However, a world that operates according to metaphysically necessary natural laws seems to be one where everything happens as a matter of absolute necessity. Since most philosophers reject Humeanism, at one extreme, and strong necessitarianism at the other, the challenge is to secure a position somewhere in between the two positions by positing an ultimate basis for nature’s metaphysics that can ground the absolute necessity of natural laws while still allowing for some genuine contingency. Dispositional essentialists maintain that fundamental, dispositional properties constitute basis and can ground both necessity and contingency. The necessary natural laws are ultimately rooted in the essential nature of the dispositions, while contingent manifestations of properties are rooted in the dispositional character of dispositions. In this paper, I argue that dispositional essentialism fails to provide for genuine contingency and cannot avoid collapsing into strong necessitarianism. I then suggest that there is nothing wrong with that.

Does Structural Realism Provide the Best Explanation of the Predictive Success of Science: Or Is Any Version of Scientific Realism Defensible?
Gerald D. Doppelt, University of California, San Diego
 I examine Carrier’s and Ladyman’s structural realist (‘SR’) explanation of the predictive success of phlogiston chemistry. On their account, it succeeds because phlogiston chemists grasped that there is some common unobservable structure of relations underlying combustion, calcification, and respiration. I argue that this SR account depends on assuming the truth of current chemical theory of oxidation and reduction, which provides a better explanation of the success of phlogiston theory than SR provides. I defend an alternative version of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realism which I call ‘Best Current Theory Realism’ (BCTR) and argue that it can answer the pessimistic meta-induction.

Does the Judgment Internalist’s Claim Depend on a Particular View of Motivation?
Gregory Nirshberg, University of Texas at El Paso
 The debate between judgment internalists and judgment externalists is fought over whether moral judgments are necessarily motivating, or only contingently so. I argue that formulations of the judgment internalist position have never clearly defined what it means to be motivated. As a result of this, the "practically irrational” defeater (and others like it) included in conditional forms of judgment internalism do too much work for the judgment internalist’s claim. Using a partial working definition of motivation, I explore a few unusual cases for the judgment internalist, and examine what kind of impact this definition has on their claim. I argue that the judgment internalist should accept this view of motivation, and, once this is done, also defend judgment internalism in its strong form sans conditionals. I then examine one particular critique of the strong form on empirical, rather than a priori, grounds, and determine the consequences for the judgment internalist.

Educating Jouy: A Case Study of Ableism in Feminist Philosophy
Shelley Tremain, Independent Scholar
 The feminist charge that Michel Foucault’s theoretical approach in general and his history of sexuality in particular are masculinist, sexist, and reflect male biases vexes feminist philosophers who believe his claims imbue their analyses of disability and ableism with complexity and richness. No aspect of Foucault’s corpus has been more consistently subjected to the charge of masculinism and male bias than his example of the nineteenth-century farmhand Charles Jouy who, at about forty years old, engaged in sexual activity with a young girl, Sophie Adam, was apprehended by authorities, and subsequently incarcerated for the rest of his days. In this paper, my central aim is to interrupt the momentum of the accepted feminist interpretation of the incidents involving Jouy and Adam by advancing a perspective on Jouy’s identity and the incidents that takes seriously insights derived from philosophy of disability and critical disability theory and history.

Evaluating Wars with Just and Unjust Aims
Saba Bazargan, University of California, San Diego
 How we do we evaluate a war which has both just and unjust ultimate aims? The assumption that it’s possible to reach a verdict on whether such a war satisfies jus ad bellum is basic to the just war tradition. But this assumption, I will argue, is deeply problematic. There is no satisfactory way to aggregate the individual, morally heterogeneous evaluations of war’s disparate ultimate aims into an all-things-considered evaluation of the war en toto. Attempts to do so either rob just war theory of its action-guiding character, or unnecessarily obfuscate the moral status of a war’s constituent aims. Instead, I argue, we ought to limit the object of evaluation to the ultimate aims composing that war.

Evil and Its Opposite
Todd Calder, Saint Mary’s University
 Several theorists writing about the nature of evil believe that the best way to begin is to think about evil’s opposite. According to this approach, evil just is the opposite of some familiar moral concept such as virtue, supererogation, or goodness. The first part of this paper questions the wisdom of this approach. The second part develops a plausible theory of evil that does not begin with the thought that evil is the opposite of some familiar moral concept. At the end of the paper, once a plausible theory of evil has been established, I return to the question of evil’s opposite.

Exclusion, Still Not Tracted
Douglas Keaton, Flagler College
Thomas W. Polger, University of Cincinnati
 Karen Bennett has recently articulated and defended a "compatibilist” solution to the causal exclusion problem. Bennett’s solution works by rejecting the Exclusion principle on the grounds that even though physical realizers are distinct from the mental states or properties that they realize, they necessarily co-occur such that they fail to satisfy standard accounts of causal over-determination. This is the case, Bennett argues, because the causal background conditions for core realizers being sufficient causes of their effects are identical to the "surround” conditions with which the core realizers are metaphysically sufficient for the states or properties that they realize. Here we demonstrate that the background conditions for the causal sufficiency of core realizers for their effects are not identical to the core realizer’s surrounds, nor do backgrounds necessitate such surround conditions. If compatibilist solutions to exclusion can be defended, a different argument will be needed.

Experiential Learning in the Feminist Philosophy Classroom
Julinna Oxley, Coastal Carolina University
 This presentation will describe how I adapted the methodology, goals, and activities used in Women’s Studies Service Learning courses into my Philosophical Issues in Feminism course. First, I articulate the pedagogy used called "Experiential Learning” (EL), which is a type of Service Learning. EL is distinctive in that it emphasizes personal transformation along with service to the community; the student’s beliefs or mental models should change as a result of the service experience. Next, I describe the various Experiential Learning elements of the course: (1) Student dialogue with guest speakers from the community; (2) Student reflection on how class discussion affects the student and contributes to their learning process; and (3) An "Activism Project” where students collectively research, design, and implement a project that addresses a course-related social problem in the University or community. These activities enable students to see the relevance of Philosophy to the world around them.

Exploring Metanormative Constitutivism
Mary Clayton Coleman, Illinois Wesleyan University and Tulane University
 Constitutivism faces two kinds of serious challenges. First, the constitutivist strategy may seem incoherent. How could truths about what it is to act possibly entail anything about which actions we ought to perform? Second, even if the constitutivist strategy is coherent, it may not look at all promising. It may seem as if there are no normative truths about action that follow from whatever minimal premises we can squeeze out of the nature of action. In this paper I focus on the second challenge. I begin by offering an account of what it is for a principle to be constitutive of action, and I use this account to make what I call the basic constitutivist argument. Next, I make a proposal about the nature of action, and I use this proposal to argue that anyone who acts ought to comply with both an instrumental principle and a prudential principle.

Externalist Accounts of Racial Epithets
Leo Yan, Brown University
 Christopher Hom has recently argued that his account of racial epithets, Combinatorial Externalism, is superior to alternative accounts precisely because only his account can satisfy a series of adequacy conditions, most of which describe various characteristics of racial epithets. In particular, Hom’s account explains the unique derogatory nature of racial epithets as due to the epithet’s semantic content, which is determined externally from the speaker. I here analyze Hom’s account and argue that while it indeed satisfies his adequacy conditions, it does so by virtue of its externalist nature rather than its particular semantic conception of racial epithets. I also argue that an alternative externalist account of racial epithets can likewise satisfy Hom’s adequacy conditions. If this is correct, then Hom has not shown that his account is the best explanation of racial epithets simply because it is able to satisfy his adequacy conditions.

Foucault’s Aesthetics: Place, Space and Ecology
Dan Williamson, San Jose State University
 The question of the environment is a paramount social and political concern. These concerns are addressed here by using Foucault’s later ideas of ethics, aesthetics, and bio-politics applied to an aesthetics of place and space that coincide with long-standing American environmental/ecological discourses. The approach here is not limited to the natural environment alone but to the possibilities of urban "heterotopias” that might be constructed. Arendt’s ideas are deployed to further articulate the idea of a space for power to be structured to embody not only an aesthetics but also a public space for speech and action, a place for parrhesia. What emerges from this is a concept of an environmentally centered community that is aesthetically realized within a political, social, and public space committed to plurality and diversity, an ecologically centered bio politics.

Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-constitution
Roman Altshuler, Stony Brook University and Marymount Manhattan College
 John Fischer has recently argued that the value of acting freely is the value of self-expression. Fischer holds that the value of a life is a narrative value. Free will is valuable insofar as it allows us to shape the narrative structure of our lives. This account rests on Fischer’s distinction between regulative control and guidance control. While we lack the former kind of control, on Fischer’s view, the latter is all that is needed for self-expression. I first develop Fischer’s narrative account, focusing on his reliance on temporal loops as giving us control over the value of our lives. Second, I argue that the narrative account grants us greater power over the past than Fischer would allow—it allows for a kind of retroactive self-constitution. Finally, I suggest that this modification of the narrative view opens the possibility of a conception of freedom far stronger than guidance control.

Frege’s Puzzle Left Unsolved: A Reply to Sainsbury and Tye
Joseph A. Hedger, Syracuse University
 In Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them, Sainsbury and Tye argue for their Originalist theory of concepts on the basis that it solves seven well-known puzzles. These puzzles are traditionally seen as puzzles about language, and in particular puzzles concerning semantic content. Sainsbury and Tye argue that they have analogues as applied to the content of thoughts. In this paper I argue that their solution of Frege’s Identity Puzzle (from "On Sense and Reference”) is implausible, because Originalism fails to explain the difference in cognitive significance which Frege took to be the puzzling explanandum.

G.E. Moore, Analysis, and the Rejection of Idealism
Garrett Bredeson, Vanderbilt University
 In this paper I seek to clarify the stakes of Moore’s encounter with idealism by drawing out the methodological commitments implicit in his program of philosophical analysis, a program which in his mature thought is rooted in his defense of common sense. The sharp wedge he drives between ordinary understanding and philosophical analysis in the course of his defense of common sense leads to difficulties in his own view of analysis, but these very difficulties, I will argue, are ones he should embrace as faithful reflections of the starkness of his rejection of idealism. While the idealists have allowed philosophical considerations to infect their understanding of everyday life, Moore argues that everyday life can serve as a proper object of philosophical analysis only if it is granted its own, distinctive kind of integrity and secured against the inroads of philosophical investigation.

Global Justice and the State System
Daniel Pilchman, University of California, Irvine
 This essay answers the question "Are there binding principles of global justice?” in the affirmative. According to this interpretive theory, principles of global justice have binding moral authority when they correct for the evident internal pathologies of a global practice. The state system is a global practice for which we can identify a number of internal pathologies. In light of these harms, I propose a number of corrective norms. Unless and until alternative principles are proposed that better correct for the systematic harms caused by the state system, these principles have binding moral authority. Even if my proposed principles are replaced by more effective alternatives, it remains the case that there are binding principles of global justice.

Good People with Bad Principles
Howard J. Curzer, Texas Tech University
 Right now the USA seems quite divided about justice. Since the two sides hold incompatible principles, at least one side must be holding the wrong principles. To have bad principles, and to feel and act upon them reliably without regret or reconsideration, is vice. Yet we all know people on both sides of the political divide whom we consider virtuous. This poses a challenge for virtue ethics. How can people with bad principles of justice seem virtuous? In this paper, I reject several potential solutions. Although some people don’t really believe what they say, others are confused about the facts of economics, yet others misapply the correct general principles, and some virtuous-seeming people are actually unjust, these explanations do not account for all of the seemingly virtuous, but wrongheaded people. I propose a different solution based upon the distinction between personal and role virtue.

Haji on the Direct Argument
P. Roger Turner, University of Tennessee
 In his "On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility,” Ishtiyaque Haji challenges the so-called Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. His challenge comes in the form of a counterexample to Rule B, a principle about the transfer of non-responsibility over the material conditional whose truth no one is responsible for. What is important about Haji’s alleged counterexample is that, if it is successful, then it’ll follow, not only that Rule B is false, but also that the Direct Argument—which rests upon Rule B—fails. But I don’t think Rule B is false, and neither do I think that the Direct Argument fails. So, in the paper, I defend Rule B from Haji’s alleged counterexample. I conclude that my defense of Rule B is successful; from which it follows that Haji’s alleged counterexample fails to undermine the Direct Argument more generally.

Hegel’s Estates Reconsidered: The Mediation and Reconciliation of Group Interests
Todd Hedrick, Michigan State University
 This paper argues that Hegel’s political thought has not been properly appreciated as a version of liberalism that incorporates agonisitic group differences, which critics often contend liberal politics is unable to do. This is because Hegel makes this point in the context of his account of the estates and corporations, which are usually seen as dated and paternalistic institutions that Hegel was unwise to retain in his account of ethical life. However, I argue that although many criticisms of Hegel’s estates are valid, it is worth attending to his reasons for including institutions of their type: they follow from Hegel’s critique of ‘abstract’ citizenship in Rousseau and Kant, and the need for persons a) to see how their particular activities contribute to broad types of social labor essential for the reproduction of society, and b) how their group interests are represented in the state and related to others groups.

Heidegger’s Transcendental Idealism
James Hebbeler, St. Joseph’s University
 In this paper I pursue a deeper comparison than has been offered so far in the literature between parallel features that can be found in Heidegger’s theory of Dasein in Being and Time and Kant’s theory of human reason in the Critique of Pure Reason. Given the strikingly similar structural features of the two accounts, I argue against other broadly Kantian readings of Heidegger’s position that Heidegger is best read as a transcendental idealist. While Heidegger certainly rejects Kant’s transcendental idealism, his ultimate departure from Kant is to be found in a subtle reversal of priorities within a shared general transcendental framework.

How Can a Skeptic Have a Standard of Taste?
Susan Hahn, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Why wasn’t Hume a skeptic about matters of taste? He was a thoroughgoing skeptic about fundamental matters in traditional metaphysics, such as cause, causal necessitation, inductive inferences, the self, even external objects. Yet, without exception, Hume’s aesthetics is read as abruptly reversing his skeptical position and promoting a timeless and objective standard for judging beauty. I reject the dominant approach for displacing the gains of his skepticism. To impute to Hume knowledge of a standard that depends essentially on a relation to certain persons makes him sound more like an idealist than an empiricist philosopher with naturalistic leanings. Instead, I read his aesthetic naturalism against the background of his skeptical commitments, by reconstructing his dilemma of taste along the lines of his general skepticism about cause. I argue that he deduces "that” an unknown standard is operative, but in a qualified sense not ruled out by his skepticism.

How to Distinguish a Quasi-realist from a Realist
Melis Erdur, New York University
 The debate between moral realism and anti-realism suffered a peculiar setback recently: expressivists, who had been leading the anti-realist camp with their emphatic denial of moral facts, have begun professing belief in "moral facts that obtain independently of our opinions,” while insisting that they are not realists—but quasi-realists. However, articulating what is "quasi” about quasi-realism has proved difficult. The official expressivist line is that what is distinctive of quasi-realism is not the conclusions that expressivists have reached but the modest metaphysics they have relied on to get there. I argue that this roundabout way of contrasting quasi-realism with realism, favored by expressivists and non-expressivists alike, is extremely misguided. Whatever special route expressivists may have followed, they have certainly not ended up saying anything close to traditional realism, and to see that we must pay attention to the first-order moral content of quasi-realism.

How to Outfox Sly Pete: Semantics for Indicatives
Caleb Perl, University of Southern California
 I focus on a problem about the semantics of indicative conditionals. This problem is interestingly difficult, in a way that suggests a turn to exotic semantics: expressivism or relativism. I’ll show how to modify Stalnaker’s and Kratzer’s semantics to avoid these problems. (I’m hopeful that my account will extend to bare epistemic modals, too. But I’ll focus on getting my proposal off the ground, before seeing how far it generalizes.) So I’m pushing a technical proposal that, if viable, dissolves some otherwise puzzling philosophical problems. I begin with a challenge to canonical expressivist views. This challenge imposes constraints on semantics for indicatives that my account is well-placed to satisfy. The same resources that answer that challenge dissolve McGee’s putative counterexamples to modus ponens.

Human Nature in Aristotle’s Politics
Joseph Karbowski, University of Notre Dame
 The claim that human beings are naturally political is one of the most fundamental of Aristotle’s Politics, and, understandably, it has received a lot of scholarly attention. However, I will argue below that one very important implication of that doctrine has been overlooked by scholars. It has been well documented that within the teleological framework of the Politics that thesis implies that humans will have a natural impulse to form poleis and a natural potential for civic virtue. However, it has not been adequately appreciated that this doctrine additionally entails that human nature itself will have to exhibit a functional complexity akin to that of the bee. This proposal has implications for the place that natural slaves and women have in Aristotle’s political anthropology. So, after elaborating and defending this interpretation I conclude by explaining those implications.

Hume on the Misuse of Causal Language
Jennifer S. Marusic, Brandeis University
 In the Treatise, Hume repeatedly suggests that we misuse causal terms when we use them to try to pick out features of a cause in virtue of which it is necessarily connected with its effect. Hume thinks that this mistake results from our using an idea of necessity that is copied from our impression of necessity to give content to causal terms. Yet it is far from clear what the content of this idea of necessity is, nor therefore why we misuse causal terms. The key to understanding these mistakes lies in taking seriously Hume’s identifying the impression of necessary connection with the determination of the mind in forming a belief. I argue, contrary to a number of commentators, that Hume’s identification is not a category mistake, nor does it presuppose that there is genuine necessity in the mind.

Hyperintensional metaphysics
Daniel Nolan, Australian National University
 In the last few decades of the twentieth century there was a revolution in metaphysics: the intensional revolution. Many metaphysicians rejected the doctrine, associated with Quine and Davidson, that extensional analyses and theoretical resources were the only acceptable ones. Metaphysicians helped themselves to modal analyses, counterfactual analyses, and supervenience claims; and committed themselves to resources such as possible worlds, intensionally individuated properties and relations, and connections of modal and counterfactual dependence. The twenty-first century is seeing a hypterintensional revolution. Theoretical tools in common use carve more finely than by necessary equivalence: two pieces of language can apply to the same entities across all possible worlds but not be equivalent; thoughts can be necessarily equivalent in truth value but not synonymous. This paper argues that hyperintensional resources are valuable in metaphysics outside theories of representation, and discusses some promising areas of hyperintensional metaphysics.

If Anyone Should Be an Agent-causalist, Then Everyone Should Be an Agent-causalist
Christopher Franklin, Marymount University
 Almost all defenses of the agent-causal theory of free will portray the reasons for endorsing the theory as belonging uniquely to libertarians. According to what I call "the standard argument for the agent-causal theory of free will,” in order for libertarians to solve the problem of enhanced control, they must afford agents with the agent-causal power. Thus, it is assumed that there is only reason to accept the agent causal theory if there is reason to accept libertarianism. I aim to refute this claim, arguing that the reasons we have for endorsing the agent-causal theory of free will are non-partisan. The real reason for going agent-causal has nothing to do with determinism or indeterminism, but rather with anti-reductionism about the self and the self’s role in free action. It is in this sense that I contend that if anyone should be an agent-causalist, then everyone should be an agent-causalist.

Imagining under Constraints
Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College
 As Hume has famously claimed, we are nowhere more free than in our imagination. While this feature of the imagination suggests that the imagination has a crucial role to play in modal epistemology, it also suggests that imagining cannot provide us with any non-modal knowledge about the world in which we live. In this talk, I reject this latter suggestion. Offering an account of imagining that I call "imagining under constraints,” I provide a framework for showing when and how an imaginative project can play a justificatory role with respect to our beliefs about the world. That we can be free in our imaginings does not show that they must proceed unfettered; as I argue, our ability to constrain our imaginings in light of facts about the world enables us to learn from them. The important upshot is that the imagination has considerably more epistemic significance than previously thought.

Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility
Alex Madva, University of California, Berkeley
 Implicit social biases can influence our behavior in harmful and unjust ways, but they seem to operate outside of consciousness and control. Are individuals morally responsible for their implicitly biased behavior, or are they merely non-culpably implicated in a broader systematic injustice? One reason some philosophers have denied that individuals are responsible for their biases is that they are not sufficiently aware of them. They fail the necessary "awareness condition” for moral responsibility. However, recent empirical evidence suggests that individuals are often aware of their biases in some senses but not others. To argue that this state of partial awareness satisfies the awareness condition, I offer an argument by analogy to a close relative of implicit bias: moods. The degree of awareness individuals have of their moods meets the awareness condition, and the type of awareness individuals have of their implicitly biased behavior is importantly similar.

In Defense of the Duty to Assist: A Response to Critics on the Viability of a Rawlsian Approach to Climate Change
Sarah Kenehan, Marywood University
 Many theorists dismiss the Rawlsian framework as a viable approach to thinking through the problems of global climate change (GCC), arguing, among other things, that it demands too little, too late. In this essay, I hope to show that these critics may have overlooked or underestimated at least one key feature of Rawls’s theory: the duty to assist. I begin by exploring what Rawls says about this duty and also how he envisions it being implemented, and then I offer an interpretation of this duty as a principle of sufficientarian justice. I then move to advocate for the usefulness of this principle with regard to the issue of climate change by directly responding to concerns raised by critics. I conclude that this cursory examination of Rawls’s theory indicates that this framework will likely be helpful in thinking through our response to GCC, and so critics and Rawlsians alike should give it a second look.

In Genes We Trust: The Evolutionary and Ethical Implications of Human Germline Modification
Russell Powell, Boston University
 Bioliberals maintain that human germline modification is morally desirable because it will result in a net improvement in human health and well-being. Their conservative opponents, meanwhile, appeal to the value of the biological status quo as a reason for restraining the development and use of human genetic modification technologies. I argue that germline intervention will be necessary merely to sustain the levels of genetic health and well-being that humans presently enjoy for future generations, an ethical goal that should appeal to bioliberals and bioconservatives alike. This is due to the population-genetic consequences of relaxed selection in human populations caused by the increasing efficacy and availability of conventional medicine. This heterodox conclusion has been overlooked in medicine and bioethics due to misconceptions about human evolution, which I attempt to rectify, as well as the sordid history of Darwinian approaches to medicine and social policy, which I distinguish from the present argument.

Increasing Realism Without Getting Real
Angela Potochnik, University of Cincinnati
 Incorporating lower-level details into a model is supposed to provide information about the supervenience bases, or realizers, of a higher-level property, functional description, or black box. Yet in my view, what the incorporation of such information actually accomplishes is routinely misunderstood. Including lower-level information in a model often does not eliminate idealization, for this information is itself idealized. I thus propose a different understanding of what is gained by filling in such details. In my view, the added details improve the representation of a causal process, yet often fail to represent it with full accuracy. This suggests that the relationships of supervenience and multiple realization are less significant for science than commonly thought, and it grounds a revised conception of the role of idealization.

Infopolitics and Biopolitics: Notes Toward a Foucaultian Genealogy
Colin Koopman, University of Oregon
 Michel Foucault’s genealogical method can (and should) be put to use to study the historical emergence of conceptual formations that Foucault himself did not write about. One model of the productive re-use of genealogy is Ian Hacking’s histories of statistics. Following Foucault and Hacking, I offer a genealogy of the intersection of modern politics and what might be called modern ‘informationalization’. I show how ‘infopolitics’ is a historical extension of the intersection of political and biological formations conceptualized by Foucault as ‘biopolitics’. This paper summarizes a wider research project on the past, present, and future of the emergence of infopolitics.

Intention-dependent Artifacts and an Argument from Arbitrariness
Adam Bowen, University of Illinois
 Lynne Rudder Baker (2007) argues for an account of artifacts according to which an artifact’s proper function depends on the intentions of its designer(s), and the execution of such intentions is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be an artifact. I challenge Baker’s view and argue that the existence of artifacts does not depend on design intentions. I proceed by presenting two types of counter-example to Baker’s account, both of which demonstrate that there can be an artifact O of kind K in the absence of the appropriate design intentions. I conclude that my cases expose the vulnerability of Baker’s view to the charge of objectionable arbitrariness. Furthermore, my objections generalize to other intention-dependent accounts of artifacts.

Is Ground a Strict Partial Order?
Michael J. Raven, University of Victoria
 Interest surges in a distinctively metaphysical notion of a fact being grounded in other facts. But a Schism has emerged between Orthodoxy’s view of ground as a strict partial order on the facts and Heresy’s rejection of this view. What’s at stake is the structure of the facts (for friends of ground), or even ground itself (for those who think this Schism casts doubt upon its coherence). I defend Orthodoxy against Heresy: ground is a strict partial order.

Is Justice Possible Under Welfare State Capitalism?
Steven P. Lee, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
 According to John Rawls, our current political-economic regime, welfare state capitalism (WSC), makes his principles of justice unachievable. WSC is a system in which productive property (capital) is largely controlled by a relatively small number of individuals. One alternative he proposes that could realize justice is property owning democracy (POD), where productive property would be much more equally distributed among citizens. Rawls argues that WSC will allow neither fair value of political liberties nor fair equality of opportunity, and he argues that WSC cannot provide the social bases of self respect. In this paper, I take issue with his claims that these important aspects of social justice cannot be realized under WSC.

Is the Second-person Standpoint Non-consequentialist?
Andrew Peter Ross, Queen’s University
 In The Second-Person Standpoint(2006), Stephen Darwall argues that the second-person standpoint serves as the foundation for non-consequentialism. Despite its non-consequentialist appearances, however, it remains to be shown that the second-person standpoint actually illuminates non-consequentialist reasoning. In this respect, deontic constraints serve as the non-consequentialist benchmark for evaluating non-consequentialist credentials. If the second-person standpoint is actually non-consequentialist, then it certainly ought to produce deontic constraints. I argue that the second-person standpoint fails to yield an account of constraints that can be labeled non-consequentialist. In particular, I argue that the conceptual structure of second-personal reasons cannot demarcate legitimate from illegitimate demands. The problem, for Darwall, is that neither the conceptual structure of second-personal reasons nor the idea of address can accomplish this latter task. Without a method of arbitration, I argue, there is nothing inherently non-consequentialist about the second-person standpoint.

It Just Feels Right: Exploring Ethical Automaticity as a Theory of Moral Judgment
Asia Ferrin, University of Washington
 Recent empirical research in moral psychology has challenged moral rationalism, the view that good moral judgments require conscious reflection and reliance on general principles. One sort of response to such research insists that our moral judgments are arbitrary and incoherent, and in large part motivated by unconscious biases and prejudices, thus rendering the moral rationalist ideal unattainable. A second sort of response insists that reasoning and principles are involved in our moral judgments, though differently than traditionally understood, thus requiring revision rather than rejection of moral rationalism. Here I explore a third, alternative response, such that good moral judgment does not utilize reasoning and principles, yet nor does it succumb to arbitrariness and incoherence. Drawing on work by Brownstein and Madva on ethical automaticity of action, I offer an account of ethical automaticity of judgment. I discuss challenges facing Brownstein and Madva, and in turn suggest how an ethical automaticity account of judgment might handle these challenges.

Justice, Facts, and Ideals
Collin Anthony, University of Pennsylvania
 It is often claimed by theorists that normative principles, particularly principles of justice, should be informed by a set of facts about human nature, society, and the world. For constructivists, these facts are required if principles are to retain their practical significance for us in providing us with determinate guidance for what to do. G.A. Cohen has recently challenged this view, arguing that fundamental normative principles must be "fact-free” in that they cannot be grounded in facts about society or humans as such. I defend constructivism against Cohen’s arguments and argue for the need to separate our idea of justice from our various ideals which underlie Cohen’s fundamental normative principles. I argue that these ideals do not have final authority in determining what principles should guide our institutions, and that it is only through a constructivist procedure do we obtain suitable fundamental principles of justice.

Kant on Feelings and Sensations
Alex Rueger, University of Alberta
 In the Critique of Judgment Kant insists that feelings and sensations have to be carefully distinguished. Two years earlier, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he seemed to have held that all feelings are (nothing but) sensations. It is tempting to dismiss the claim from the third Critique (because the supporting argument is obscure) and take the second Critique to represent Kant’s position. Alternatively, one can accept the distinction of feelings and sensations and claim that Kant has changed his view on the nature of feelings in a fundamental way between the two works. I argue that both interpretations are mistaken, propose a different reading of the texts, and sketch some of its consequences.

Kant on the Happiness in Virtue
David Forman, University of Nevada, Las Vegas and University of British Columbia
 Kant’s strict distinction between happiness and morality has led many readers to think that Kantian moral demands are positively hostile to our human nature as happiness-seekers. To counter this charge, it is not enough to show that we are permitted to pursue happiness as long as it is subordinated to morality. We would have to show that subordinating happiness to morality does not, in fact, require the systematic sacrifice of one’s own happiness. In this paper, I show that Kant has an account of the harmony between virtue and happiness that fits this bill.

Kant on the Pleasures of Virtue
Erica Holberg, Utah State University
 When we compare Aristotle’s and Kant’s theorizations of virtue, important differences are evident. For Aristotle, virtue is conceptually connected to pleasure: the virtuous agent necessarily takes pleasure in his virtuous action, and the virtuous life is the key to living a pleasant, flourishing life. But for Kant, virtuous action is not any more intrinsically pleasant than any other sort of action, suggesting that pleasure and virtue are only contingently coupled in human life. I argue that even though virtuous action is not necessarily pleasant action within Kant’s ethics, in fact, Kant argues for important structural connections between a life of virtue and experiences of pleasure. For Kant, virtue is non-accidentally productive of pleasure in the moral, pleasure in aesthetic judgment, and even pleasure in the agreeable.

Kant Versus Skyrms on Universal Deception
Don Fallis, University of Arizona
 Immanuel Kant famously argued that it would be self-defeating for everyone to follow a maxim of lying whenever it is to her advantage. In his recent book Signals, Brian Skyrms claims that Kant was wrong. First, he argues that there are Lewisian signaling games in which, whenever it would be beneficial to deceive the receiver, the sender sends a signal that deceives. Second, Skyrms argues that there are even signaling games in which the sender always sends a signal that deceives. I argue here that, while Skyrms is right on the first count, he is wrong on the second. While it is not always self-defeating for everyone to follow a maxim of lying whenever it is to her advantage, this is only because it is not always beneficial to mislead. If it were, then universal deception would be futile. Thus, there is sense in which Kant was right after all.

Kant’s ‘Judgments of Perception’ and the Ambiguity of His Concept of Intuition
Paul Redding, University of Sydney
 In the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant controversially distinguishes subjective "judgments of perception” from objective "judgments of experience.” Like Longuenesse, I treat judgments of perception as genuine judgments and not mere Humean associations, and see the key to their understanding as lying in Kant’s conception of a judgment’s logical form. But Kant’s distinction, I suggest, rests on an ambiguity, noted by Sellars and others, in his account of intuition. In judgments of experience, intuitions play a role analogous to logical singular terms, while in judgments of perception they play a role analogous to Aristotelian "this-such”es. It is only this ambiguity that allows Kant to translate Aristotelian categorical judgments into a Leibnizian form in which the subject terms of those judgments are understood as predicates, predicated of some underlying "x.” This suggests that the distinction between the two judgment forms may be more basic than that between concepts and intuitions.

Kant’s Modal Theory and the Schemata of Modal Categories
Uygar Abaci, University of British Columbia
 For any attempt to reconstruct Kant’s discussion of modal categories in different sections of the Critique of Pure Reason as a coherent theory of modality, one interpretive challenge is to reconcile the "schemata of modal categories” (A145/B184), where Kant presents the temporal definitions of modal categories, with the "postulates of empirical thinking in general” (B266), where he presents the complete empirical definitions of modal categories. As a number of commentators have pointed out, it is especially difficult to make sense of the schema of necessity, "existence at all times,” given that the third postulate defines necessity as existence determined by a cause. I offer a reading of Kant’s schemata of modal categories that can account for their consistency not only with the postulates but also with the rest of Kant’s modal theory as it is laid out in the Critique.

Kant, Cannibalism, and Enjoying Others
Benjamin Chan, Lawrence University
 Kant suggests that enjoying human beings (rather than their works) is distinctively problematic. I think Kant errs in taking sex to be the paradigm of this problematic enjoyment of others. Instead, I suggest we take cannibalism as our starting point. I attempt to illuminate what might be distinctively problematic about the enjoyment of others by considering whether there is a degrading valuation implicit in even the most conscientiously satisfied cannibalistic desires. I conclude that there are two separate ways in which the enjoyment of others can be inherently degrading: first, when what one enjoys about another fails to reflect her distinctive value as a human being; second, when how one desires another fails to reflect her intrinsic value. This later problem is especially important, as it may affect our most intimate desires.

Kantian Conditions for the Possibility of Justified Resistance to Authority
Stephen Palmquist, Hong Kong Baptist University
 Kant’s theory of justifiable resistance to authority appears to conflict with his practice and/or with itself. Authority is either "public” or "private”: resistance to public (e.g., contract-based) authority is forbidden; resistance to private (e.g., morally-based or philosophically-grounded) authority is sometimes required. In "Perpetual Peace” Kant foresees a political situation wherein no political resistance (e.g., war) would be necessary. Yet in Metaphysics of Morals, he argues that a citizen never has the right to revolt against one’s government: we must cooperate even with war. Moreover, Kant openly praised the American and the French revolutions; yet when the king’s censor challenged his religious writings, Kant failed to resist the (arguably unjust) authority. The key to resolving these tensions lies in the principle that universities must promote a healthy "conflict” between philosophers and all "public” employments of reason. The only ground for disallowing public resistance is the underlying presence of genuine philosophical resistance.

Kantian Ethics and Privilege-buttressing Ignorance
Ornaith O’Dowd, College of Charleston
 Recent work in psychology and philosophy on various kinds of privilege-buttressing ignorance raises questions about moral responsibility and may raise particularly sharp questions for Kantian ethics. In this paper, I outline a Kantian account of privilege-buttressing ignorance and our moral duties with respect to it.

Knowledge and Experiments
Angel Pinillos, Arizona State University
 Recently, there have been a lot of interesting discussions (both experimental and armchair) on Gettier cases (Turri, Cappelen, Buckwalter, Nagel, Williamson, Jenkins Ichikawa, Friedman, Starmans, etc.). A lot of this research pertains not only to epistemology but also to broader methodological issues in philosophy. In this paper, I engage in a critical review of some of this work. The perspective I take is that of pragmatic encroachment, where knowledge is importantly connected to action and practical deliberation (Fantl, McGrath, Stanley, Hawthorne, Weatherson, etc.). I think that one issue which arises for typical Gettier cases is that we are often not told how the protagonist is going to use the belief in question. I argue (backed, in part, by experimental data) that if you fill this information in, then the typical "Gettier” judgment that the protagonist has no knowledge can be reversed. I think this bodes well for pragmatic encroachment theories.

Knowledge Despite Falsehood
Martin Montminy, University of Oklahoma
 Some authors contend that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I examine one representative case invoked in support of this contention. I argue that in this case either the subject does not have knowledge, or she has knowledge but that knowledge is not based on her false belief.

Knowledge Without Belief?
Katalin Farkas, Central European University
 It is standard to assume in epistemological discussions that the belief that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. This paper presents some considerations that may put this view into doubt. More precisely, I will argue that there are cases where there are certain objections to attributing beliefs to someone, but the same objections don’t apply to attributing knowledge to the same person. The kind of cases I have in mind are familiar from arguments for the so-called "extended mind” hypothesis.

Leibniz, Plato, and Two Theories of Innate Ideas
Nicholas Jolley, University of California, Irvine
 In the New Essays and other writings Leibniz supplements his dispositional theory of innate ideas with an account in terms of the mind’s reflection on its own nature. The reflection account has puzzled readers and it has been harshly criticized. In this paper I argue that this account avoids certain problems posed by the dispositional theory; in particular, it allows Leibniz to remain more faithful to his Platonic doctrine that the human mind mirrors the divine perfections. I also defend the reflection account against the objection that it is limited in scope to explaining our possession of metaphysical concepts. Finally, I reply to the objection that, far from offering a competing theory, the reflection account should be seen as a strand in a single, overarching theory of innate ideas that includes a dispositional component. I argue that, despite its attractions, this interpretation is subject to several damaging criticisms.

Mammals and Music among Others: Crossmodal Perception and Musical Expressiveness
William P. Seeley, Bates College
 The paradox of musical expressiveness can be interpreted as a question about the nature of artistic communication in music. We express an emotion when we publically display it in our behavior. Behavioral expressiveness is thereby one side of a communicative exchange whose function is, at least in part, to help integrate and coordinate the activities of individuals in social contexts—it is a subconscious means to reveal emotions indicative of our current beliefs, desires, and action tendencies. Musical works are inanimate artifacts. Therefore the exchange between music and a listener is not adequately structured to support an expressive communicative event. Yet, nonetheless, we regularly recognize music as expressive of emotions and are sometimes even aroused to experience those emotions. In this paper I propose an integrated crossmodal model for our engagement with expressive music and sketch its potential impact on the discussion of this issue.

Manipulation and the Reactive Emotions
Justin Coates, University of Chicago
 In this paper I argue that the manipulation argument against compatibilism is unsound. Specifically, I claim that the reactive emotions of resentment and indignation can be fitting responses to actions performed by manipulated agents. To motivate this claim, I first provide an analysis of the reactive emotions that specifies the conditions under which they are appropriate. Because resentment and indignation are mental attitudes that represent others’ actions as disrespectful, they are fitting just in case the agent’s action is in fact disrespectful. I proceed to argue on the basis of three independently motivated arguments that manipulated agents like Professor Plum (a creation of Derk Pereboom) act in disrespectful ways. Consequently, manipulated agents like Plum can be fitting targets of the reactive emotions. And because being responsible should be understood in terms of being an apt target of the reactive emotions, I conclude that manipulation doesn’t undermine responsibility.

Meadian Pragmatism and Scientific Objectivity
Joshua Houston, Vanderbilt University
 In this paper I argue that George Herbert Mead’s account of sociality provides a framework from which we can articulate objectivity as an epistemic norm (or cluster of norms) that emerges from the intersubjective, communicative dimension of sociality. Drawing on resources from Mead’s work, I follow Helen E. Longino in articulating a social account of the norm of procedural objectivity, according to which a process of inquiry is evaluated as objective insofar as it allows for criticism from diverse perspectives. I construe this general requirement, of the subjection of knowledge claims to legitimation via the input and negotiation of various perspectives, as the inherently social core of the epistemic ideal of objectivity. I go beyond Longino, however, in arguing that the normative force of the ideal of procedural objectivity requires a regulative ideal from which it gains its normative force.

Metaphysical Analyticity and the Epistemology of Logic
Gillian Russell, Washington University in St. Louis
 On one traditional approach to the epistemology of logic, logic is analytic and our knowledge of it is based on our knowledge of meaning. On another, beliefs about logic are just one part of the interconnected web of our beliefs about the world, a web that can be revised as a whole in response to new data of any kind. This paper argues for a third view, on which logical truths are true in virtue of meaning, though their epistemology is more holist (and perhaps even a posteriori).

Minimal Structural Essentialism
David Glick, University of Arizona
 John Stachel has proposed that quantum mechanics and general relativity share an interesting trait: both fail to distinguish "which is which” when it comes to objects and their properties. This paper is concerned with the metaphysical implications of this feature, which Stachel calls "general permutability” (GP). It has been argued that GP provides support for scientific structuralism, but extant proposals are problematic. My own view, "Minimal Structural Essentialism” aims to provide a clear structuralist metaphysics motivated by GP. Roughly, my view is that points and particles have their structural properties essentially. This compels us to view representations related by permutation as equivalent, thus supporting GP. It also serves as an explication of the structuralist image of fundamental objects as principally elements of structure.

Mirror Realism
Matt Leonard, University of California, Davis
 This paper concerns how the mereotopological structure of material objects is related to the mereotopological structure of those objects’ locations in spacetime. If an object x is a part of an object y, does it follow that x’s location is a part of y’s location? If x’s location is connected to y’s location, does it follow that x is connected to y? Mirror realism is the view that, for any objects, they are mereotopologically related in a given way iff their locations are mereotopologically related in that way. In this paper, I do a few things. I provide some reasons to think that mirror realism is true. I then provide some natural principles which capture the view. I then show how the introduction of these principles leads to two undesirable results: the ‘expansions’ of objects and the exclusion of some views people often defend: namely, one version of endurantism, one view regarding time-travel, and the view defending coincident objects. Lastly, I discuss how mirror realism relates to the big picture. In particular, I discuss how the view and its consequences relate to the debate between (dualist) substantivalists and supersubstantivalists.

Modus Darwin Reconsidered
Casey Helgeson, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 Modus Darwin is the name given by Elliott Sober to a form of argument that Sober attributes to Darwin in the Origin of Species, and to subsequent evolutionary biologists who have reasoned in the same way. In short, the argument form goes: Similarity, ergo common ancestry. In the present paper I review and critique Sober’s analysis of Darwin’s reasoning. I argue that modus Darwin has serious limitations that make the argument form unsuited for supporting Darwin’s conclusions. Thus, either Darwin argued badly, or he didn’t use modus Darwin.

Moral Antirealism and the Problem of Self-defeat
Joshua Rasmussen, Azusa Pacific University
 I argue that, given certain commonly held assumptions, certain moral antirealist theories are ultimately self-defeating. Here is the barebones outline: (i) if moral antirealism is true, then any evaluative judgment could be "true” relative to certain people; (ii) but the judgment to disobey all moral judgments cannot be true relative to anyone; (iii) therefore, moral antirealism is not true. I spell out the details and discuss potential objections.

Moral Responsibility Without Moral Considerability
Timothy Nailer, University of Adelaide
 Applied ethicists distinguish between moral agents, who can legitimately be held morally responsible, and moral patients, to whom we owe direct moral consideration. Recent explorations into the moral responsibility of groups and artificial intelligences, entities that do not obviously seem to be owed direct moral consideration, highlight the question of whether moral agency requires moral considerability. Whether one accepts the possibility of non-patient moral agents depends on the theories of moral responsibility and moral considerability that one accepts. Specifically, it requires that no condition necessary for moral responsibility is also sufficient for moral considerability. I analyse reactive attitude, hierarchical, and valuational theories of moral responsibility, and Kantian, preference-satisfaction, and hedonistic theories of moral considerability, which I cross-reference to argue that certain pairs of theories allow for the possibility of such agents, others do not, and others require further clarification or development before we can make a clear determination.

Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism
Taylor Cyr, Florida State University
 Libertarians about free will, those who believe that at least some human beings have free will despite free will’s incompatibility with determinism, have been criticized for their view’s failure to show how agents’ actions are not subject to present (or cross-world) luck. Recently, some have argued that compatibilists about free will and determinism likewise encounter the problem of luck. The aim of this paper is to develop a history-sensitive compatibilist strategy for dealing with luck of both stripes. Although officially agnostic concerning whether or not free will and moral responsibility are historical concepts, I suggest that the history-sensitive compatibilist’s best strategy for dealing with luck leads to a nonhistorical compatibilism. One implication of this paper, if it succeeds, is that at least one version of event-causal libertarianism (modest libertarianism) can avoid the problem of present luck just as compatibilism can.

Mushy Skeptical Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil
Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini, Oxford University
 Bergmann and Rea (2005) hope to defend skeptical theism against the charge that it entails moral skepticism by offering a credible hypothesis about the conditions under which a rational skeptical-theistic agent ought to act to prevent the occurrence of a prima facie horrific evil. I show that the hypothesis in question is not credible; skeptical theism and rational obligation to prevent prima facie horrific evils are inconsistent according to standard decision theory, even when credence functions are allowed to ‘go mushy’. In the absence of a compelling alternative theory of decision, I conclude that the moral challenge remains an important problem for skeptical-theistic responses to the evidential argument from evil.

Naturalism vs. the First-person Perspective
Hilary Kornblith, University of Massachusetts Amherst
 Many philosophers have discussed features of the first-person perspective that seem to create problems for naturalism. Qualitative character, consciousness itself, and our ability to think of ourselves from a first-person point of view have each been alleged to create problems for naturalism. These suggestions have been much discussed. But I will not be discussing any of these problems. I am not interested here in the ways in which the first-person perspective might create problems for naturalism. I am interested, instead, in how it is that naturalism creates problems for the first-person perspective. In my view, the first-person perspective gets far more respect than it deserves. There are serious problems with the view which the first-person perspective affords, and naturalism nicely brings these out. The first-person perspective needs to be taken down a notch, and naturalism is well-placed to do the job. Or so I will argue.

Newtonian and Evolutionary Forces
Christopher Hitchcock, California Institute of Technology
Joel Velasco, California Institute of Technology
 A number of recent papers have criticized what they call the "dynamical interpretation” of evolutionary theory found in Elliott Sober’s The Nature of Selection. Sober argues that we can think of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces analogous to Newtonian mechanics. These critics argue that there are several important disanalogies between evolutionary and Newtonian forces such as that unlike evolutionary forces, Newtonian forces can be considered in isolation, they have source laws, they compose causally in a straightforward way, and they are tertium quid in a causal chain. Here we defend and extend the forces analogy by arguing that each of these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of Newtonian forces. Our discussion also has the interesting consequence that natural selection turns out to be more similar to forces such as friction and elastic forces rather than the more ‘canonical’ gravitation.

On Correctly Applying ‘Aubergine:’ Defending Semantic Normativity
Adam Auch, Dalhousie University
 In recent years, a number of philosophers, most notably Wikforss (2001), Boghossian (2003), and Hattiangadi (2006, 2007), have argued that linguistic meaning cannot be genuinely normative because the correctness conditions for words and phrases imply only hypothetical, and not categorical imperatives. Only categorical normativity, they argue, has the intrinsic action-guiding property required to pose problems for naturalist and realist accounts of meaning. In this paper, I attempt to defend the semantic normativity hypothesis against these arguments. In particular, I present reasons to resist the notion that only categorical semantic correctness conditions should be considered to be genuinely normative. While meanings may be distinguished by non-normative means, the significance of this distinction is a normative matter. In other words, though there are facts about the proper application of words like ‘aubergine’ and ‘courgette’, it is a normative matter that these facts (and not others) are taken to be decisive.

On Gödel and the Ideality of Time
John Manchak, University of Washington
 Gödel’s (1949a) remarks concerning the ideality of time are examined. In the literature, some of these remarks have been somewhat neglected while others have been heavily criticized. In this note, we propose a clear and defensible sense in which Gödel’s work bears on the question of whether there is an objective lapse of time in our world.

On the Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Schnall and Widerker
Yael Loewenstein, University of Arizona
 Peter van Inwagen’s Direct Argument (DA) makes use of a rule of inference he calls "Rule (B).” Michael McKenna has argued that van Inwagen’s defense of this rule is dialectically inappropriate because it is based entirely on alleged "confirming cases” of the rule which are not in fact the type of cases at the heart of the compatibilism/incompatibilism dispute and can thus do no work in justifying van Inwagen’s use of Rule (B) in DA. Recently, however, Ira M. Schnall and David Widerker have put forth a powerful two-pronged attack against McKenna’s objection to DA. My aim is to demonstrate that neither prong of their attack is successful: first, Schnall and Widerker fail to construct a legitimate confirming instance of Rule (B); and, second, they are wrong in thinking that it is not dialectically inappropriate to mount a defense of Rule (B) that relies on van Inwagen’s own cases.

On What There Is, Too
John Keller, Niagara University
 A growing number of philosophers have come to doubt that we should follow Quine’s Commandment: thou shalt not deny the entailments of thy best theories. This paper argues that rejecting Quine’s Commandment commits one to irrationality or skepticism. This consequence of rejecting Quine’s Commandment has gone undetected in part due to misconceptions about the role of paraphrase in Quinean meta-ontology. In the final section of the paper, I point out the worst of these misconceptions.

On What There Seems to Be: Reflections on Phenomenal Conservatism and Common Sense
Philip Osborne, Purdue University
 Phenomenal Conservatism (or "PC”) is a foundationalist epistemological theory according to which non-inferential justification arises from mental states known as ‘seemings’. PC is standardly thought of as being well within the common sense tradition in epistemology, according to which subjects need not have access to sophisticated anti-skeptical arguments in order to have knowledge of themselves and the world around them. This short paper calls PC’s common sense credentials into question. I identify the following assumption as key to PC’s status as a common sense view: Necessarily, a belief’s degree of non-inferential justification co-varies with the strength of the associated seemings. I then argue that because this assumption has normatively implausible consequences, the proponent of PC must surrender the assumption, leaving PC’s point of contact with the common sense tradition unclear.

One Theory to Rule Them All
Fabrizio Cariani, Northwestern University
 In recent literature in natural language semantics, there has been a lot of interest in how to derive some broadly decision theoretic verdicts concerning deontic modalities (specifically ‘ought’ and ‘should’) and their interactions with conditionals and probability operators. It is easy to argue that a traditional Kratzer-style premise-semantics needs some revisions in order to get these facts right. The difficulty is how to develop a semantic theory that gets those facts while remaining, as much as possible, ‘ethically neutral’—without, for example, building facts about rational decision-theory into the semantics of ‘should’. This paper answers this challenge by providing a probabilistic (but not decision-theoretic) semantics for deontic modals.

Ontological Dependence Grounds Grounding
Mark Makin, University of California, Irvine
 I propose a novel account of what grounds grounding that involves a connection between grounding and ontological dependence that has heretofore been overlooked. Particular grounding facts, I argue, are grounded in facts about ontological dependence, where ontological dependence is defined in terms of essence. The paper is divided into two sections: in the first section I present my ontological dependence account of what grounds grounding, and in the second I illustrate how it applies to putative cases of grounding. The ontological dependence account possesses multiple virtues, including its coherence with a plausible theory of the nature of explanation and its versatility in accommodating the full range of putative grounding facts.

Ontological Parsimony and Erosion
Thomas Metcalf, University of Colorado Boulder
 I present a novel argument against the widely employed principle that we should ceteris paribus prefer smaller ontologies to larger ontologies. I argue that this preference commits one to an implausible epistemological thesis, according to which evidence for the existence of some entity is at least prima facie evidence against the existence of all other entities. Therefore, philosophers have good reason to cease appealing to one very common principle of ontological parsimony.

Politics and the Nature of Violence: Ricœur’s Negotiation with Arendt and Levinas
Mark Gedney, Gordon College
 The crisis of European liberal democracy after the horrific violence of two world wars led many to speculate that violence is lodged at the core of political power itself. In this paper, I develop an account of the work of Arendt, Levinas and Ricœur that puts their accounts of violence and politics into a productive tension. I begin by examining Arendt’s claim that politics, rather than being the source of violence is in fact the realm in which violence is overcome. Arendt, however, seems to consign much of social life to violence, and so I turn to Levinas’s claim that a proper understanding of violence requires a more radical account of human desire that renews suspicions about political action. In my conclusion, I sketch an account of Ricœur’s work as a productive negotiation of these two thinkers that defends Arendt’s fundamental insights, modified, however, by his close reading of Levinas.

Praiseworthiness and Phronesis-enhanced Freedom
Andrew Eshleman, University of Portland
 Much recent work on moral responsibility has focused on responsibility as accountability—a particular type of responsibility associated primarily with the blame-oriented attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt, as well as with their accompanying practices. Though certainly important, near exclusive attention to responsibility as accountability fosters a truncated portrait of our moral lives by largely ignoring responsibility for actions that merit praise and emulation. Making sense of praiseworthy action requires that we raise the profile of another type of responsibility—what Gary Watson has identified as its attributability, or "aretaic” face. I argue that when we do so, some important distinctive features of virtuous agency are thereby highlighted, including a sense in which such agency may exhibit an oft-overlooked and distinctive type of freedom.

Precedent Autonomy and the Authority of Advance Directives
Eric Vogelstein, Jefferson College of Health Sciences
 Advance directives are commonly praised as an important way to safeguard the autonomy of incompetent medical patients; nevertheless, important questions remain about their moral authority. The main philosophical concern with advance directives involves cases in which the incompetent patient no longer possesses the desires on which the advance directive was based (for example, in cases of severe dementia). The question is, does that entail that prior expressions of medical choices are no longer morally binding? I believe that the answer is ‘yes’. I argue that a patient’s autonomy is not respected by honoring the preferences she used to have but no longer does. If this is correct, then advance directives in the kind of case at issue are not morally binding, and it may even be morally required to act contrary to a patient’s explicit advance directive.

Prelude to a Theory of Music Representation
Brandon Polite, Knox College
 This paper offers the beginnings of a resemblance theory of musical representation. I start by examining how Peter Kivy and Roger Scruton, two prominent philosophers of music, conceive of artistic representation. Each model’s artistic representation (in part) on a Gricean conception of linguistic communication on which the audience’s ability to grasp an artwork’s intended subject is necessary for it to count as a representation. This model, I claim, confuses problems surrounding musical representation. I offer in its place a model of representation that philosophers have productively applied across a number of domains: structural resemblance. This model not only accommodates examples that the linguistic model cannot, but, by divorcing a piece of music’s representational status from our grasping its subject, also clarifies how a composer’s intention to represent a given subject can be realized musically, how the audience grasps the subject in the music, and how linguistic conventions facilitate both processes.

Problems for Classical Incompatibilism
Joseph Campbell, Washington State University
 Classical views of free will hold that S freely does a only if S is or was able to do otherwise. Classical incompatibilism holds that if determinism is true, no one is or was able to do otherwise. This paper explores two problems for classical incompatibilism. In section 2 it is shown that the best arguments for classical incompatibilism do not really prove the thesis (AUTHOR 2007). Several recent responses to this criticism are considered and rebutted. Section 3 establishes that there is no adequate classical incompatibilist analysis of "ability to do otherwise.” There is a very clear necessary condition: S is able to do otherwise only if that S does otherwise is consistent with propositions about the past and the laws of nature. Yet there is no single underlying classical incompatibilist analysis and all the analyses that spring to mind are subject to compelling criticisms.

Professional Norms and Institutional Exploitation
Daniel Koltonski, Amherst College
 In a market economy, members of professions are vulnerable to a distinctive kind of exploitation—the exploitation of their vocational commitment—and this exploitation, particularly in the ‘caring’ professions, is morally wrong. The fact that professionals are vulnerable to this kind of exploitation is not a contingent one, as it seems a structural feature of a market economy that includes professions. This is important to note, say, in cases concerning nurses (or members of other caring professions), because, when such exploitation is allowed to occur, it becomes difficult for the nurse to live both as a person of integrity—as someone who is able to live up to the demands of her own reasonable personal projects and relationships outside of work—and as a morally conscientious agent, for she finds herself in situations where she feels morally compelled to allow herself to be exploited.

Rearming the Slingshot
Megan Wallace, University of Kentucky
 Slingshot arguments aim to show that an allegedly non-extensional sentential connective—such as "necessarily (_)” or "the statement that Φ corresponds to the fact that (_)”—is, to the contrary, an extensional sentential connective. Neale (1995, 2001) argues that a reformulation of Gödel’s slingshot shows that (certain) theories of facts are forced to adopt a Russellean or non-referential theory of descriptions, on pain of metaphysical collapse. I will present a revised version of the slingshot argument—one that piggy-backs on Neal’s formulation that relies on Kaplan’s notion of ‘dthat’—in order to show that whatever our treatment of descriptions, the slingshot is either (i) still threatening or (ii) was never a threat to begin with.

Reasons Wrong and Right
Nathaniel Sharadin, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 The fact that I just put my children to bed is a reason for me to believe my children are safely asleep in their beds; the fact that you’ve offered me a great deal of money to believe my children are safely asleep in their beds is also a reason—a different kind of reason—for me to believe they’re asleep in their beds. Philosophers mark the difference between these two kinds of reasons by saying the first is the right, whereas the second is the wrong, kind of reason for an action or attitude. The thought is that the wrong kind of reasons are somehow defective in a way the right kind of reasons are not. The philosophical task is is making sense of this intuitive thought. I argue that three recent attempts to do so are mistaken. I then present an alternative view and argue that it makes good on the promise of the failed accounts while avoiding the difficulties plaguing them.

Releasing Prisoners with Dementia: Could There Be a Recollection Requirement for Expressivist and Communicative Justifications of Punishment?
Annette Dufner, Westf‰lische Wilhelms-Universit‰t M¸nster
 This paper is based on the assumption that a prison is not the right place for criminals in the late stages of dementia. More specifically, I will argue that applicable theories of punishment, especially theories with an appropriate expressivist, or communicative element, fail to justify the imprisonment of the late-stage demented, because this would require a capacity for comprehension on the part of the punished, and, under certain narrowly specified conditions, even a capacity to be at least in principle capable of recalling the crime.

Rescuing Rule-following: How Dispositionalism Can Help with Rule-following Primitivism
Nathaniel Bulthuis, Cornell University
 A feature typical of standard models of rule-following is that the analyses they offer break down at some fundamental level. Recently, Paul Boghossian has provided a diagnosis of why these breakdowns occur. He locates the problem in an assumption, common to standard models of rule-following, that rule-following necessarily involves drawing a deductive inference. This assumption, he argues, leads to a vicious regress upon which typical analyses founder. But, having diagnosed the problem, Boghossian is at a loss as to how to rescue rule-following. I argue that one possible source of rescue which Boghossian rejects—rule-following primitivism—holds much promise. Furthermore, I argue that rule-following primitivism need not make rule-following mysterious. For, while we ought not to identify one’s acceptance of a rule with one’s dispositions to act, we can—and should—appeal to dispositionalism as an account of what determines the rules we follow.

Responding to Marx (Groucho, Not Karl) on Obligations to Posterity
Martin Benjamin, Michigan State University
 Anthropogenic climate change poses a serious threat to the well-being, if not the lives, of distant future generations. Averting the most serious effects is likely to require significant reductions in consumption, comfort, and convenience. Do we have an obligation to make such reductions? If so, what is its basis? A quip attributed to comedian Groucho Marx implies there is no such obligation. "Why should I care about posterity?” Groucho asks. "What’s posterity ever done for me?” This is a compressed argument based on reciprocity. Distant future generations can do nothing for us, Groucho assumes, because we will be gone before they exist. Therefore we have no obligations to them. Is there a plausible response? I argue there is. The prospective existence and well-being of distant future generations give shape and meaning here and now to our finite lives.

Responsibility and Implicit Bias
Michael S. Brownstein, New Jersey Institute of Technology
 "Implicit biases” are typically unconscious, negative evaluative attitudes about individuals based on their membership in stigmatized social groups. Such biases have been shown to impact social behavior in many unsettling ways. It is a difficult question whether, and in what way, individuals are responsible for behaviors affected by implicit biases. I argue that such behaviors are attributable to agents, in Watson’s (1996) sense. Attributability tells us that an agent is an appropriate subject for judgments of responsibility for a particular behavior. Determining that behavior is attributable to an agent, however, does not settle questions about the responsibilities an agent bears to others or to the expectations and demands others might have of responsible agents. This sort of responsibility is what Watson calls accountability. I analyze accountability for behaviors affected by implicit biases.

Responsibility for Vulnerability and Non-identity
Howard Nye, University of Alberta
 It can seem wrong to cause individuals to exist, even when their lives are worth continuing, if we could have caused different, better-off individuals to exist instead. The non-identity problem is that causing the existence of the individuals who are less well-off does not seem to make anyone worse off, and it is difficult to explain why else it would be wrong. In response to this problem, several authors have suggested that we have special obligations to create better-off individuals. But reflection on the non-identity problem itself seems to undermine the plausibility of these obligations. In this paper I argue that special obligations to create better-off individuals can be supported by a plausible understanding of obligations to prevent others from suffering harms to which we have made them vulnerable in cases where their levels of well-being after we create the vulnerability are neither higher, lower, nor equally as high as before.

Roles and Relationships: Why Social Roles Cannot Ground Associative Obligations
Nina Brewer-Davis, Auburn University
 Associative reasons, which attach to interpersonal relationships and hold by virtue of the relationships, have received some attention recently, but basic features of these reasons, including what grounds or justifies them, remain underdeveloped. One common theory of such reasons is that they attach to a special kind of status, position or social role, and when an individual identifies with that role or status (such as "mother,” or "member of this political community”), she acquires associative reasons. However, I will argue that social role, or identification, views provide reasons that are different in kind from associative reasons, assuming that they provide any reasons at all. Social roles depend on the individual inhabiting the role, and the way she does that, rather than features of her relationship with another person. They also cannot account for the wide and deep variations between particular relationships of the same type.

Russell Versus Wittgenstein on Nonsense
Dominic Alford-Duguid, University of Toronto
 In Theory of Knowledge Bertrand Russell developed a sophisticated multiple relation theory of judgment. Russell later abandoned this theory in response to an objection from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein claimed that Russell’s theory fails a basic constraint on any right account of judgment, viz. that such a theory should entail that it is impossible to judge nonsense. In this paper I argue that Russell’s theory can resist Wittgenstein’s attack. The paper has three parts: §1 sketches the Theory of Knowledge view, while §2 develops Wittgenstein’s criticism; §3 contains my case in favor of Russell.

Scotus on Omnipotence and the Disunity of the Sciences
Joseph Anderson, University of South Florida
 In John Duns Scotus’s Reportatio, he considers two questions: Whether omnipotence can be proved by natural reasoning?, and whether God can, through omnipotence, directly produce anything that is possible? Scotus offers a negative answer to the first and a positive answer to the second. One would think, then, that omnipotence is neither proved true nor proved false by natural reasoning, but this is not the case. Scotus’s arguments for the negative answer to the first question are arguments that omnipotence is inconsistent with those things that are known by natural reasoning. If Scotus were able to overcome these difficulties, his arguments for the negative answer to the first question would be undermined. I conclude (with evidence from other passages from the Reportatio that Scotus held that the sciences that employ natural reasoning are independent from theology. These disciplines are able to come to contradictory conclusions.

Scrupulous Agents
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University
Jesse Summers, Rice University
 Scrupulosity (a form of OCD involving obsession with morality) raises fascinating issues about about the nature of moral judgment, about what is morally permitted in therapy, and about moral responsibility. After defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and discussing concrete cases studies, we will focus on some peculiar aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients (such as thought-action fusion) and on the issue of whether these patients are reasons-responsive in the ways required for control and moral responsibility.

Seeing, Noticing, and Noteworthiness
Chris Smith, Wake Forest University
 I develop and defend a theory about the nature of seeing called the noteworthiness view. According to this view, seeing something requires noticing it if it is noteworthy. More specifically, seeing something requires noticing it if the information that it is present at an egocentric location is noteworthy. This view implies that seeing is referentially opaque, i.e., that it’s possible for "S sees x” and "S sees y” to differ in truth value even though x = y. The main motivation for the view is its ability to resolve a paradox about camouflage recently articulated by Fred Dretske: we see something in the spaces occupied by perfectly camouflaged objects, so it seems that, contrary to what we ordinarily say, we see perfectly camouflaged objects. I argue that the referential opacity of seeing allows us to say we see the occupants of the spaces without seeing the perfectly camouflaged objects.

Self-defense and Culpability: Fault Forfeits First
Richard Arneson, University of California, San Diego
 When one person’s behavior or bodily movement threatens to cause serious harm to another, under what circumstances is it morally permissible to use violent force, even lethal force, to save one’s life (or the life of a threatened victim)? Recent authors on self-defense disparage the idea that culpability or blameworthiness has an important role to play in answering this question. This essay resists this consensus. I propose Fault Forfeits First: In a situation in which the bodily movements of some place others under threat of suffering physical harm, resulting in a predicament in which someone must die, if one person is significantly morally at fault (culpable) with respect to this situation, and at fault (culpable) to a significantly greater extent than others with respect to this situation, then it is morally preferable that this culpable agent should be the one who dies.

Selves Without Subjects
Benj Hellie, University of Toronto
 This paper is titled "Out of This World.” The crown jewel of analytic philosophy, "classical modal semantics,” treats meaning as content. True enough when meaning is "purely objective.” But that leaves out almost everything of philosophical interest. In particular, our attempts to understand consciousness have been extraordinarily procrustean. Fortunately, we can look for a panacea to "mindset semantics,” an enrichment of the classical approach according to which meaning is a relation between content and mindset. On the resulting picture, discourse about consciousness does not concern the constituency of objective reality—we are out of this world.

Slip-proof Actions
Santiago Amaya, Washington University in St. Louis
 Most human actions are complex, but some of them are basic. Which are these? In this paper, I seek to answer this question by invoking slips, a common kind of mistake. The proposal is this: an action is basic if and only if it is not possible to slip in performing it. The argument discusses some well-established results from the psychology of language production in the context of a philosophical theory of action. In the end, the proposed criterion is applied to show why basic actions should not be identified with bodily movements.

Socrates and Gorgias on the Aims of Argument
Tushar Irani, Wesleyan University
 Most studies of the Gorgias that consider Socrates’ exchanges with its eponymous character focus on the well-known refutation passage at 460a-e. This paper argues that Socrates’ questioning of Gorgias in the early stages of the dialogue sets the pattern of inquiry he pursues in his subsequent exchanges with Polus and Callicles. His purpose here is to reorient his interlocutors’ attitudes towards argument—to get them to reconceive what it means to use argument well and what the role of argument should be in civic life. This calls for Socrates to offer an alternative to Gorgias’s view of argument as a purely competitive skill, an approach to discourse that requires not just a commitment to truth, but also a commitment to the good of others, and by focusing in this way on what I call the social dimension of argument, he meets the rhetorician on his own terms.

Spinoza on a Supposed Right to Lie
Matthew Homan, Kennesaw State University
 According to Ethics 4p72, a free man always acts honestly, never deceptively, even in the face of death. According to Spinoza’s principle of self-preservation, however, an individual has an absolute right to do whatever is to his advantage, including, it would seem, to lie. The conflict between 4p72 and the principle of self-preservation presents a difficult problem. I argue against a solution which turns on reading the free man of 4p72 as an ideal limit concept. Since the ideal free man cannot actually die, this solution renders 4p72 senseless. The only way of making sense of 4p72 is to understand how death can be the lesser of two evils for actual finite human beings. I show how death qua lesser evil fits with the principle of self-preservation, for Spinoza, by (i) distinguishing between kinds of "self” in "self-preservation,” and (ii) pointing to certain rare cases where duty prevails over life.

Spinoza on Extension
Alison Peterman, University of Rochester
 In this paper, I argue that when Spinoza talks about the attribute of Extension he does not mean the three-dimensional extension, and that by "an extended thing” he does not mean a volume. The argument proceeds in two parts: first, I present Spinoza’s argument that corporeal substance is not extended in length, breadth and depth. Second, I make the more controversial case that Spinoza does not believe that extension understood this way emerges from certain modifications of Extended substance in any way, and that our perception of physical things as volumes is a function of the imagination, and hence inadequate.

Strict Egalitarianism about Medical Treatment
Robert C. Hughes, University of California, Los Angeles
 If Kant’s argument for public support of the poor is sound, then the state is required to ensure that citizens’ finances do not affect their access to life-saving medical treatment. It must ensure this even if doing so involves leveling down and even if a less egalitarian health care system would offer better care to the poor.

Supervaluating at Higher Orders: How to Incorporate Intransitive Admissibility
Carl Ehrett, Furman University
 Two types of problems afflict supervaluationist attempts to avoid sharp semantic boundaries for vague expressions. Firstly: how can it be indeterminate whether o is absolutely determinately F, given that o is absolutely determinately F iff o is determinately F at all levels of vagueness? Secondly are arguments found in Wright (1987), (1992) and (2010), and Fara (2003) and (2011). Call these the structural problems: under seemingly innocuous assumptions about determinacy, paradox results. Wright also diagnoses supervaluationism as unhappily committed to the "Buffering View,” that the extension and anti-extension of a vague term are buffered by another category, as purple buffers red and blue. A strategy for absolute determinacy has been suggested by Williamson (1994, pp. 156-61), and modifed by Keefe (2000, pp. 202-10). Keefe’s suggestion is purely formal; an explanation is needed to integrate it into a supervaluationist framework. I offer one which resolves not just the problem of absolute determinacy, but also the structural problems.

Teaching How to Teach Philosophy: Aims, Challenges, and Insights
Sarah Cashmore, University of Toronto
Trevor Norris, University of Toronto
 In this paper we describe how we have begun training teachers how to teach secondary philosophy. Since the late 1990’s philosophy has been offered in the province of Ontario. Currently some 30,000 students per year are enrolled in grade 11 and 12 philosophy in some 300 schools by some 700 teachers. In this presentation we describe the design and development of this teacher education course. We explore the conceptual underpinnings, larger pedagogical objectives, and political implications of preparing candidates to teach philosophy. Perhaps the most significant guiding principle was that this course wasn’t designed or intended to help advance students’ content knowledge, familiarity with philosophy, or fill gaps in their knowledge. It was necessary to emphasize the intense and demanding dynamics of a high school classroom, the challenges of working within a school structure, and the centrality of relationships with students to the daily life of a high school teacher.

Temptation and Moral Resolution
Richard Holton, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Resolutions enable us to resist temptation by committing us to a course of action decided in advance. Moral resolutions likewise enable us to resist the temptation brought by morally challenging situations. I discuss this with reference to recent US policy on torture. I suggest further that this explains why morally effective action can require agents to look not just out to the world, but also inwards towards their own resolutions; and that this in turn can provide a justification for something like the doctrine of double effect.

The Absolutism Problem in On Liberty
Piers Norris Turner, Ohio State University
 In On Liberty, Mill’s liberty principle restricts absolutely paternalistic social interference with any basically rational adult. Yet, in his ethical writings Mill argues that, apart from the principle of utility itself, his utilitarianism is incompatible with absolutes. Making sense of the absolute character of the liberty principle in the context of his utilitarianism—what I will call the "absolutism problem”—is an instance of the general problem of reconciling Mill’s liberal and utilitarian commitments. I argue that four main solutions to the absolutism problem—the vital-interest view, the infinite-value view, the institutional-scope view, and the rule-utilitarian view—fail on their own terms, or are not supported by the text of On Liberty. I then defend a fifth solution—the competence view—that turns on Mill’s focus on expertise in decision-making structures.

The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic
Alexandra King, Brown University
 The amoralist debate in metaethics has come to a kind of stalemate. While I don’t want to rehash the entire debate surrounding the possibility or plausibility of amoralists, I want to reopen the debate with a slightly different approach. I will draw on intuitions other than those directly surrounding the amoralist and her ability to make sincere ethical judgments. Instead, by looking at parallels in another normative domain, aesthetics, we might be able to revive our exhausted amoralist intuitions. I will argue that an aesthetic analog of the amoralist exists, the anaesthetic, and that such a person makes sincere aesthetic judgments, but is not motivated to act accordingly. Thus, the sincere avowal of robustly normative concepts does not seem to have a necessary connection to motivation, and so we have less reason to deny the existence of amoralists.

The Bayesian Critique of Dogmatist and Evidentialist Anti-skeptical Strategies
Dorit Ganson, Oberlin College
 Dogmatism is a substantive, formidable epistemological program with considerable intuitive appeal, yet a simple set of Bayesian considerations seems to destroy its viability, at least as a Moorean anti-skeptical strategy. A similar case can be made against evidentialist and explanationist responses to skepticism. Drawing from work in the defense of scientific realism against charges of probabilistic incoherence, I explore a number of ways of trying to make considerations of explanatoriness compatible with Bayesian constraints, and suggest that some of these proposals may be relevant to answering the Bayesian worries concerning dogmatist and evidentialist anti-skeptical strategies.

The Coherence of Cartesian Freedom
Georges Dicker, College at Brockport, State University of New York
 Descartes holds that clear and distinct perceptions are "assent-compelling,” that is, that during the time that one clearly and distinctly perceives some proposition p, one cannot but assent to p. Yet he insists that when we assent to a clear and distinct perception, we do so freely; indeed he thinks that freely assenting to such perceptions is the "best” kind of freedom that we can have. In Descartes’s day, following the dictates of one’s reason was neither the favored method of fixing belief nor conducive to one’s personal safety, so his position may well strike us as a salutary celebration of intellectual freedom. But it also raises what looks like a radical problem: how can it be true that we are free when we assent to a clear and distinct perception if we cannot do otherwise than assent to it? I argue that Descartes could have resolved this apparent inconsistency.

The Concept of a Composite Agent
Siwing Tsoi, University of Texas at Austin
 An agent is the subject that acts, and a composite agent is an agent constituted by multiple agents. However, a set of several agents do not always constitute a composite agent. In other words, there is a concept of a composite agent such that it only applies to some sets of agents but not others. Taking how people ordinarily think of actions and agents as a starting point, I will argue that the concept of a composite agent is disjunctive, i.e., there is no essential feature shared by all composite agents. That means there are at least two distinct sufficient conditions of being a composite agent.

The Economic Model of Forgiveness
Brandon Warmke, University of Arizona
 It is sometimes claimed that forgiveness involves the cancellation of a moral debt. This way of speaking about forgiveness exploits an analogy between moral forgiveness and economic debt-cancellation. We can call the view that moral forgiveness is like (in a way to be explained) economic debt-cancellation the Economic Model of Forgiveness. In this paper I articulate the model, motivate some of its theoretical and practical advantages, and defend it against some recent objections.

The Epistemic Rationality of Mind-wandering
Zac Irving, University of Toronto
 Cognitive neuroscientists have recently begun to debate the anatomical basis and functional role of mind-wandering. Yet there has been no sustained philosophical discussion of whether, as suggested by cases I discuss, mind-wandering has a rational role in epistemic inquiry. I argue that it does, focusing on how mind-wandering facilitates what I call `consideration receptivity’, which occurs when we think about a proposition other than the one we chose or planned to. In turn, I argue that consideration receptivity can be epistemically valuable because it allows us to consider propositions that we initially deemed to be irrelevant, but turn out to be relevant. My argument for these theses draws on cognitive neuroscience, phenomenological data, and a brief sketch of epistemic value that I develop elsewhere.

The Fragility of Beliefs: A New Eliminativist Argument
Chris Jenson, University of Utah
 I offer a new argument for the elimination of "beliefs” from scientific psychology based on Wimsatt’s (1981) concept of robustness and its inverse, fragility. A theoretical entity is robust if multiple independent means of detection show invariant results in measuring the posited entity. A theoretical entity is fragile when multiple independent and reliable means of detecting it produce variant results. Recent work in social psychology shows radical variance between what people sincerely report their "beliefs” are and what their nonverbal behavior indicates about their "beliefs.” This variance between self-report and nonverbal behavior, two independent means of detection, is evidence that "belief” is a fragile theoretical posit and thus a strong candidate for elimination.

The Fundamental Quantifier Is Restricted
Bradley Rettler, University of Notre Dame
 There is a growing movement towards construing some classic debates in ontology as meaningless, either because the answers seem obvious or the debates seem intractable. In this paper, I give some ammunition to the ontologist. The ontologist should say that there is a quantifier more fundamental than the English quantifier, and that it is this quantifier that one should use when doing ontology. The reason some debates seem intractable is because some people are using this quantifier (or at least trying to), and others are not. Thankfully, the two quantifiers are not wholly unrelated; the austere ontologist’s quantifier is simply a restriction of her opponent’s quantifier—a restriction to the fundamental things. I define three senses of quantifier restriction and argue that in every sense, the fundamental quantifier is a restriction of the ordinary English quantifier.

The Inconsistency of Pure Libertarianism
Matthew Braham, Universität Bayreuth
Martin van Hees, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
 Libertarianism, whether in its "left” or "right” variety, is about the allocation of individual rights. We argue that there are four requirements that any rights structure should meet in order to be called purely libertarian: completeness, conclusiveness, non-imposition, and symmetry. Completeness means that we cannot add extra rights to individuals without yielding inconsistencies; conclusiveness states that agents can always ensure that all issues are decided through the exercise of rights; non-imposition ensures minimal richness of the options about which individuals have to make a decision; and symmetry implies that all agents have the same rights. We show that no rights structure exists that satisfies all four of these conditions: pure libertarianism is an inconsistent political theory.

The Independence Approach to Mindreading: Knowing What It’s like to Be Someone Else, Low-level Simulation, and Theorizing
Anastasia Panagopoulos, Minnesota State University, Mankato
 I begin by linking my notion of shared experiential-knowledge to Alvin Goldman’s low-level simulational mindreading. We will see that sharing experiential-knowledge is necessary for the ability to low-level simulate. An important consequence follows: when experiential-knowledge is not present (hence, not shared nor sharable), low-level simulation is not possible, yet successful low-level mindreading still occurs. Why? I propose that low-level mindreading in the absence of low-level simulation is the result of theorizing. My defense of independence in low-level simulational mindreading rests on empirical evidence in Goldman (2006) with respect to selective impairment patterns for several emotions which show that since "there is a deficit both in experiencing a given emotion and a selective deficit in recognizing that very emotion” (p. 115), there is a consequent deficit in mindreading for the impaired emotion using low-level simulation, but not for mindreading for it using theorizing.

The Metaphysics of Reconciliation: How Forgiveness Relieves Moral Debt
Jeffrey Helmreich, University of California, Irvine
 Philosophical treatment of forgiveness has focused on the attitudes or commitments of victims of wrongdoing. But forgiveness is also a formal speech act, associated with absolution ("I hereby forgive you”), which has powerful, but largely under-explored, moral consequences. Specifically, the formal act can relieve wrongdoers of significant duties of moral repair, including apology and restitution. Even when there are sound moral reasons to apologize and compensate a victim for harms wrongfully inflicted on them, victims can render these reparatory steps unnecessary, and their absence blameless, by forgiving their offenders. Here I seek to explain this unique power of the formal act of forgiveness. The account draws on two basic theses: first, restitution requires respecting the victim’s right to do what she wishes with any restitutionary benefits, including having them remain with the offender. Second, the formal speech act of forgiveness requires uptake of a kind that involves respecting the victim in all the essential ways apology does.

The Moral Risk in Self-defense
David K. Chan, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point
 Self-defense carries the risk that someone who is perceived as a threat is killed unjustifiably. This risk has been recognized in Lazar’s discussion of the agency view of the liability to be killed in self-defense. In this paper, I show that the risk in self-defense applies also to the unjustified-threat and culpability views. There is usually uncertainty in real-life concerning culpability and the existence of a threat. The moral risk in self-defense arises because the defender’s choice to kill involves a gamble that the person killed is morally liable to be killed. I argue that whether the criterion for the right to kill in self-defense is interpreted subjectively or objectively, the results are unsatisfactory. Thus, killing in self-defense is, contrary to common intuition, morally problematic in a way not fully recognized in any account of the right to kill in self-defense. I suggest an alternative approach derived from virtue ethics.

The moving spotlight view isn’t as bad as you think
Ross Cameron, University of Leeds
 The moving spotlight view gets a hard time amongst A-theories. It is often thought that in comparison to presentism, it faces both a metaphysical problem (in the face of McTaggart’s paradox) and an epistemic problem (how can we know we’re present?); whereas in comparison to the growing block view, it lacks the resources to account for the distinction between the closed past and open future. I think these claims are all wrong and that the moving spotlight view is at least as good as its A-theoretic rivals. In this talk I will argue for some subset of these claims.

The New Mechanists and the Myth of Negative Causation
Sarah Roe, University of California, Davis
 Currently, the philosophical literature is peppered with purported cases of negative causation. Here, I outline the new mechanists’ approaches, and argue that none of the approaches can handle purported cases of negative causation. I further argue that Philip Dowe’s approach regarding negative causation is flawed. As a result, I offer an enhanced version of Wesley Salmon’s account. By combining my view with those of the new mechanists, I argue that even those alleged cases that are deemed negative causation in fact are not upon further examination. Simply, the new mechanists’ accounts can explain alleged cases of negative causation when coupled with my account.

The Phenomenology of HOT, or What Is It like to Think That You Think That p?
Richard Brown, LaGuardia Community College
 In this paper I argue that a surprising consequence of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness as developed by David Rosenthal (2005; 2011) is that it is committed to the existence of cognitive phenomenology. The basic argument can be stated rather simply. Once one comes to accept that a suitable higher-order state is necessary and sufficient for there to be something that it is like for one to have a conscious mental state there is no way to deny cognitive phenomenology. A conscious thought and a conscious pain both involve a higher-order state deploying concepts and result in one being aware of oneself as being in the mental state in question. If it is only thoughts about oneself as being in qualitative states that results in phenomenology then there must be something special, hence unexplained, about qualitative properties or concepts.

The Precautionary Principle and the Dilemma Objection
Daniel Steel, Michigan State University
 The dilemma objection charges that "weak” versions of PP are vacuous while "strong” ones are incoherent. I argue that the "weak” versus "strong” distinction should be replaced with a contrast between PP as a meta rule and PP proper. Meta versions of PP insist that environmental decision-making procedures not be susceptible to paralysis by scientific uncertainty. Such claims are substantive because they often recommend against cost-benefit analysis as a basis for environmental policy. I argue that the second horn of the dilemma fails as a result of disregarding the role of proportionality in applications of PP.

The Principle of Charity and Non-inferential Coding in Interdisciplinary Behavioral Research
Thomas Cunningham, University of Pittsburgh
 Because philosophers are increasingly evaluating their theses empirically, we must adopt rigorous methods for data measurement and analysis. This poster describes a methodological issue that arose during a non-inferential coding analysis of 73 transcripts of physician-family conferences about end-of-life decisions in intensive care units. An interdisciplinary team of behavioral researchers, including a philosopher, developed and employed a coding framework to identify how physicians and families incorporate patients’ values into medical decisions. Training revealed systematic differences in coding, which we hypothesized were caused by team members’ differing assumptions about the non-propositional context of conversations. To improve the transparency and reliability of our analysis, we appealed to Quine’s "principle of charity.” Adopting the principle led to subjects’ verbal behaviors being coded in ways that were more consistent with unstated norms for medical decision-making than were warranted, prima facie, which increased inter-rater reliability while maintaining consistency with other methodological commitments.

The Private Language Argument and a Second-person Approach to Mindreading
Joshua Johnson, Saint Louis University
 Until recently, the debate over how we are able to know the mental states of others has largely been restricted to Theory-Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST). However, both TT and ST share common assumptions about the nature of how we come to understand mental terms that render both theories implausible in light of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument (PLA). In this paper I defend the claim that, if the PLA is correct, both TT and ST fail as adequate theories of mindreading. Further, I argue for a "Second-Person Approach” to mindreading that both avoids the objections of the PLA and provides a much more intuitive account of how we come to know what others are thinking.

The Problem of Origin in Derrida’s Early Reading of Husserl
Jacob Rump, Emory University
 It is commonly held among interpreters of Derrida that his early readings of Husserl uncovered internal inconsistencies in the transcendental phenomenological project and led to the development of his own conception of différance. This paper examines Derrida’s earliest published critique of Husserl, Le Problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl, arguing that the inconsistency discussed in that work is not internal to Husserl’s thought, but arises from existential commitments that Derrida brings to his reading of phenomenology which preclude the complete undertaking of the phenomenological reduction, thus betraying a fundamental principle of Husserl’s method. Derrida takes phenomenology’s concern with meaning to hold existential commitments and attempts to look beyond the constituting role of transcendental subjectivity, which must be understood as an absolute limit from the Husserlian standpoint. This shows that différance is already presupposed in Derrida’s early reading of phenomenology, not a result of inconsistencies internal to it.

The Rational Relations View Wide and Narrow
Mark Rosner, Queen’s University
 The rational relations view of moral responsibility holds that it is not the connection with choice that is the mark of responsible agency; rather it is the connection of an attitude or action with an agent’s evaluative capacities that determines when an agent is responsible. In this paper I defend the rational relations view of moral responsibility against two criticisms—first, that it cannot make good sense of our responsibility for practical irrationalities such as akrasia and second, that it cannot account for our responsibility for what we notice and neglect, forget and omit. I distinguish a wide and narrow version of the rational relations view and in each case claim that the criticisms are convincing only on the narrow, but not on the wide, reading.

The Relationship Between Intrinsic Goodness Attributions and Thick Evaluative Judgments: Reversing the Direction of Analysis
Ayca Boylu, University of Tennessee
 There is a growing interest in what Bernard Williams has dubbed ‘thick evaluative concepts’ such as kindness, and greediness. What lies behind this interest isn’t just the fact that the revival of virtue ethics seems to require their invocation. There is also a well-placed concern about the compatibility of judgments involving thick concepts with the fact-value divide—a divide that many contemporary ethical theories have taken for granted, following their modern predecessors. ‘Compatibilists’ argue that the meaning of a thick evaluative judgment can be captured by appealing to two components: one purely descriptive component and some pure evaluation. By contrast, ‘incompatibilists’ hold that a successful analysis of thick judgments is incompatible with a division of fact and value. I argue that in the case of intrinsic goodness attributions, the direction of analysis that compatibilists work with is reversed: attributions of intrinsic goodness are explained by thick evaluative judgments.

The Role of Normative Uncertainty in Bioethical Argumentation: The New Understanding of the ‘Pro-life’ View on Human Embryo Research
Tomasz Zuradzki, Jagiellonian University
 In this paper I present a new interpretation of the ‘pro-life’ view on the status of human embryos. In my understanding this position is not based on presumptions about the ontological status of embryos and their developmental capabilities but on the specific criteria of rational decisions under uncertainty and on a cautious response to the ambiguous status of embryos. This view, which in my interpretation uses the decision theory model of moral reasoning in situations of normative uncertainty, promises to reconcile the uncertainty about the ontological status of embryos with the certainty about normative obligations. I will demonstrate that my interpretation of the ‘pro-life’ view, although seeming to be stronger than the standard one, has limited scope and cannot be used to limit research, e.g., on human embryonic stem cells.

The Role of Sympathy in Reid’s Action Theory
Marina Folescu, University of Southern California
 Thomas Reid’s views on sympathy and its role in human action are less known than his views on the principles of common sense or human cognition. He argues that sympathy is both a principle of action, and a moral virtue connected with a rational principle of action. The present paper argues that Reid should have construed sympathy only as an animal principle of action, and not also as a moral virtue, based mainly on the following reason. To be sympathetic in a virtuous way requires one to determine one’s will to act according to the Golden Rule, whenever there is opportunity. The problem is that some actions that would be sympathetic, when sympathy is understood to be an animal principle of action, would not count as sympathetic, when sympathy is understood to be a moral virtue. This type of divergence is unacceptable, on Reid’s theory of action.

The Saviour of JL? The Redistribution Problem and the Reframing Strategy
Philip Shadd, Queen’s University
 A major challenge faced by Justificatory Liberalism (JL) is that it jeopardizes redistributive policies. In response, Andrew Lister has recently proposed what I call the "reframing strategy.” According to this strategy, we need to distinguish between two ways in which JL can be framed. The right frame applies JL’s unanimity condition to reasons, with a default of exclusion; the wrong frame applies it to decisions, with a default of state inaction. I point out three problems faced by this strategy. First, it is premised upon a detachment of decisions from reasons, but normally the two are attached. Second, the strategy mischaracterizes the nature of JL’s default position when the unanimity condition is applied to reasons. Third, the strategy is unfaithful to the liberal ideal of public justification which emphasizes justifiability to affected persons. Consequently, the reframing strategy’s prospects for success in saving JL from libertarian implications are quite limited.

The Significance of Psychopathic Wrongdoing
Matthew Talbert, West Virginia University
 I respond to Neil Levy’s and Gary Watson’s recent arguments that psychopaths are not open to central aspects of moral blame. In particular, on these authors’ views, psychopaths are not proper targets for negative reactive attitudes like resentment. On the approach I pursue, blame is a response to the significance that other agents’ actions have for us. I argue that despite their moral impairments, psychopaths possess rational and agential capacities that endow their behavior with a significance that makes blaming responses like resentment appropriate. However, on Levy’s view, psychopaths’ impairments entail that their actions cannot convey ill will. Watson, on the other hand, grants that psychopaths express morally significant ill will (or at least malice) through their behavior, but he argues that their moral impairments still render them unfit for resentment.

The Stoics on Clarity and Distinctness of Impressions
Pavle Stojanovic, Johns Hopkins University
 In this paper, I offer an analysis of the two properties the Stoics assigned to impressions, clarity and distinctness. I argue that clarity of an impression is its phenomenal property that the Stoics thought is necessarily cognitively accessible to the subject entertaining the impression. On the other hand, an impression’s distinctness is a property of the impression that need not be cognitively open to the subject, and that it is a property of a special kind of impression, the apprehensive impression (phantasia katalƒìptikƒì). This analysis further reveals that, since the Stoics thought that one could achieve apprehension (katalƒìpsis) by assenting to an impression without being aware of its distinctness, their epistemology was essentially a form of access externalism that shares some basic features with contemporary reliabilism.

The Telling Absence of Moderation in Foucault’s Discussion of Parrhesia
David Vessey, Grand Valley State University
 In this paper I consider Foucault’s discussion of Parrhesia, frank or candid speech, in his very last writings. I use many of his own examples, especially his brief discussion of Euripides’ Hyppolytus, to show that a proper account of parrhesia needs to be connected with an account of the virtue of moderation, sophrosyne. Speaking frankly needs to be understood within the broader context of speaking appropriately and the virtues that guide that activity. Talking about courage but not moderation opens himself up again to some common criticisms of his overall project.

The Trouble for Strawsonians: Nazis in, Psychopaths Out
William Smith, University of Notre Dame and Emory University
 A number of theorists argue that psychopaths should not be held morally responsible. Generally, they believe that, to properly be held morally responsible, one must be a moral agent—that is one must (at least) have access to moral reasons. "The trouble with psychopaths” is that they are thought to be agents, but precisely non-moral agents; and so, on this view, they should not be held morally responsible. I believe that many of the best accounts of the exemption of psychopaths from moral responsibility are indebted to Peter Strawson. While these accounts have an intuitively plausible account of the exemption of psychopaths, they cannot account for another widely held intuition—that many of the most repulsive agents can properly be held morally accountable—or so I will argue. The "trouble for Strawsonians” is that they cannot both claim to exempt psychopaths and to hold other "incorrigibles” responsible.

The Value of Service-Learning for Philosophy
Matthew Altman, Central Washington University
 Academic service-learning allows students to develop skills that are needed to apply their philosophy education outside of academia. This is especially important given the limited number of academic positions in philosophy. In this presentation, I will define service-learning, explain its academic and professional benefits for students, and show how it can help to bridge the town-gown divide. More concretely, I will show how service-learning can make students more employable and can give chairs a rationale for maintaining funding for philosophy programs. I will use my own medical ethics course as an example to demonstrate how academic service-learning can benefit philosophy students and faculty, the university, and the community.

Theseus’s Ship, Buddhist’s Vehicles, and Our Identity Crisis
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Montana State University
 The ship of Theseus problem is a problem about personal identity taken from Greek philosophy. Distinguishing between two versions of this problem, I argue that the first version shows the inability to define what makes the ship; and the second version raises the question, When does the original ship cease to exist? Buddha regarded such metaphysical questions as useless in alleviating human sufferings, and consequently became silent when such questions were posed. To understand Buddha’s silence and teachings, two major schools (Hinayana and Mahayana) have emerged with varying and often incompatible interpretations of his teachings. Among their radical differences, they share a common thread of ideas. One is the theory of momentariness, which states that every event, physical or otherwise, exists only for a moment. Based on an insight from the theory of momentariness, I argue that a Buddhist is able to address the ship of Theseus problem.

Thomas Reid on Arguing for First Principles
Gregory S. Poore, Baylor University
 According to Thomas Reid, the foundation of knowledge consists of first principles that are justified on externalist grounds, and therefore do not require reasoning for their justification. But there is a difference between not requiring reasoning for justification and not admitting of justification from reasoning. According to Reid scholars such as Peter Baumann, Philip de Bary, John Greco, James Harris, Dennis Holt, Douglas McDermid, Patrick Rysiew, and Paul Vernier, Reid’s first principles not only do not require reasoning for their justification, but they do not admit of justification from reasoning. These scholars accept the No-Inference Thesis: In Reid’s epistemology, it is impossible to infer (deductively or inductively) the truth of a first principle. I argue that this thesis is false. Its philosophical and textual grounds are unsatisfactory, and there are strong philosophical and textual reasons to reject it. Reid does, however, see some epistemic dangers in arguing for first principles.

Three Concepts of Harm
Jason Raibley, California State University, Long Beach
 In his forthcoming paper, "Doing Away with Harm,” Ben Bradley recommends that we jettison the concept of harm when doing serious moral philosophy. This paper argues that we can affirm the moral importance of traditional injunctions against doing harm be distinguishing between absolute harms, temporal harms, and preventive harms, and providing separates analyses of these three concepts. While there is strong moral reason to avoid harms of the first two kinds, preventive harms are a mixed bag. This paper first critiques the counterfactual comparative account of harm, traditional absolutist accounts of harm, and temporal comparative accounts of harm. It builds on the work done by Matthew Hanser in "The Metaphysics of Harm” and the work done by Elizabeth Harman in "Harming as Causing Harm,” conjoining the best parts of these approaches. It answers the objection that Hanser mistakenly analyzes harm in terms of the loss and prevention of extrinsic goods by supplying a holistic, agency-based theory of welfare that shows that Hanser’s basic goods are not extrinsic but intrinsic goods. It simutaneously answers the objection that Harman’s approach to absolute harm is disunified.

Three Kinds of Social Kinds
Muhammad Ali Khalidi, York University
 In this paper, I argue that there are three kinds of social kinds: 1) social kinds whose existence does not depend on human beings having any attitudes towards them (e.g., recession, racism); 2) social kinds whose existence depends in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them, though attitudes need not be manifested towards their particular instances (e.g., money, war); 3) social kinds whose existence and that of their instances depend in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them (e.g., permanent resident, prime minister). Although all three kinds of social kinds are mind-dependent, this does not make them ontologically subjective or preclude them from being natural kinds. Rather, what prevents the third kind of social kinds from being natural kinds is that their properties are conventionally rather than causally linked.

Transforming Anger: Three Approaches to the Morality of Anger
Emily McRae, University of Oklahoma
 In this paper I compare three approaches to understanding the role of anger in moral life. I begin by arguing that neither the Stoic view nor the Aristotelian view can capture the moral complexity of anger since neither can preserve our moral obligation to cultivate humanity and still account for the moral efficacy of anger. I will present and defend a third view on anger, one that I argue can encourage the cultivation of humanity while still recognizing a robust role for anger, especially in the public moral order. I call this third approach the Tantric view: the rightness or wrongness of anger depends primarily on the emotional capacities of the agent. On this view, moral development requires increasing and refining one’s emotional capacities; moral excellence involves a sophisticated facility with complex emotional states. In my presentation of the Tantric view, I turn to two 10th-century Buddhist texts by Dharmaraksita.

Trivalent Expressivism
Jeff Snapper, University of Notre Dame
 An expressivist semantics for moral sentences must explain why certain patterns of reasoning using moral sentences are valid. According to the Frege-Geach objection, expressivist semantics have trouble doing this. But, I argue here, expressivism plus a trivalent logic allows for a clean, logical answer to the Frege-Geach objection: all such reasoning is trivially valid and the conclusions of such arguments logically follow from the premises by way of trivalent valid rules of inference.

Truth Promoting Non-evidential Reasons for Belief
Brian Talbot, University of Colorado Boulder
 Sometimes a belief that p promotes having true beliefs, whether or not p is true. This gives reasons to believe that p, but most epistemologists would deny that it gives epistemic reasons, or that these reasons can epistemically justify the belief that p. Call these reasons to believe "truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.” This paper argues that three common views in epistemology, taken together, entail that reasons of this sort can epistemically justify beliefs. These three views are: epistemic oughts are normative, epistemic oughts have a source, and the source of epistemic oughts is an end that has true belief as a necessary component. The paper considers a range of accounts that endorse these views but might seem to avoid the consequence that truth promoting non-evidence reasons generate real epistemic oughts; it shows that none do avoid this.

Two Interpretations of Contractualist Moral Agency
Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin, University of California, Riverside
 T. M. Scanlon holds that agents who cannot understand the force of moral reasons may be morally blameworthy for what they do. This claim is controversial. I show how one can excise it from Scanlon’s contractualist moral theory. On Scanlon’s view, the ability to reason about what could be justified to others is a prerequisite for morally responsible agency. But this ability is subject to a weaker and a stronger interpretation. Scanlon appears to assume the weaker interpretation, as evidenced by his reasoning in support of the controversial claim. But the stronger interpretation is compatible with the core elements of his moral theory and supports an account of morally responsible agency that exempts those who cannot understand the force of moral reasons.

Valuable But Not Viable: Collaborations as Knowledge Producing Communities
Meghan Dupree, University of Pittsburgh
 This paper explores the relationship between collaborative research projects and scientific knowledge within the framework of Helen Longino’s feminist contextual empiricism. I suggest a potential problem for Longino’s view with respect to collaborations: it appears that individual members of a collaborative research project can know their findings, but independent researchers cannot know their findings. However, collaborative research projects are often given the same weight by the scientific community as individual research projects. I argue that feminist contextual empiricism can be revised to accommodate this fact by introducing a constraint on communities that produce scientific knowledge called viability. Only viable communities are capable of having knowledge, and individuals can only derive knowledge through membership in a viable community. I argue that because collaborations are not viable, the members of collaborations do not know the findings of their research until the scientific community at large absorbs the research results.

Varieties of Obligatory Control and Ascriptions of Know-how
Marija Jankovic, Indiana University Bloomington
 Sentences (1) are examples of obligatory control (OC). (1) a. Pete wants [to play with John]. b. Pete ordered his sister [to play with John]. Each contains an infinitival complement with an understood subject whose referent is determined ("controlled”) by one of the arguments of the main verb. The understood subject is usually represented as PRO, and in obligatory control contexts, its referent is uniquely determined grammatically. Thus, in (1a) the subject of the matrix verb, and in (1b) the object, obligatorily controls the understood subject of the complement. In this paper, I discuss some issues regarding the interpretation of OC complements that are relevant for the arguments in favor of intellectualism about practical knowledge. In particular, I address the cross-linguistic variation of attributions of practical knowledge. I show that Stanley’s optimism that the full range of these attributions can be captured by the propositional paradigm is unfounded.

Veridicality Judgments and High-level Perception
Grace Helton, New York University
 In this paper, I make three primary points: first, I suggest that high-level perceptual disputes, i.e., disputes over whether properties other than shape and color can be perceptually represented, have important implications for both philosophy and psychology. Second, I criticize Tye’s veridicality argument for singularity perception, on the grounds that the argument establishes, at most, that singularity is represented by some attitude or other but does nothing to establish that singularity is represented by perception in particular. Third, I claim that the shortcoming of Tye’s argument is shared with veridicality arguments in general, which suggests an important constraint on how high-level perceptual claims can be defended.

What Are Directions of Fit?
Allen Coates, East Tennessee State University
 We might unpack the notion of direction of fit to explain the fact that we adjust the world (specifically our actions) to fit our intentions and we adjust our beliefs to fit the world. Or we might unpack it to explain the fact that we adjust our intentions to fit the good and our beliefs to fit the true. But it is not obvious that we can unpack it in a way that explains both of these facts. I will offer an account of directions of fit that can explain both.

What Does Eternal Recurrence Weigh on?
Scott Jenkins, University of Kansas
 Nietzsche clearly takes his theory of eternal recurrence to have practical significance. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra he suggests that the thought of recurrence can weigh on us in our practical lives, and in The Gay Science he claims that belief in recurrence generates "the heaviest weight.” Most commentators have focused on the question of why the eternal recurrence of all existence, including one’s own life, should generate any sort of practical weight. I consider the more fundamental question of what eternal recurrence weighs on. Contrary to the received view that eternal recurrence weighs on the process of deliberation, I argue that in Gay Science 341 eternal recurrence actually plays no role in deliberation. Instead, eternal recurrence undermines our capacity to deliberate and act. Since no interpretation of eternal recurrence can explain why this would be so, I conclude that we still have no adequate interpretation of this central Nietzschean idea.

What Is the Problem of Negative Existentials?
Luke Manning, Independent Scholar
 Consider the sentence ‘Dorothy does not exist’, said to correct someone’s misunderstanding that a discussion about The Wonderful Wizard of Oz was about a real person. The sentence is problematic, but I argue that common characterizations of the problem are wrong. It is not problematic because it denies something exists, or merely because the name ‘Dorothy’ may fail to refer, thus preventing the sentence from expressing a proposition. Instead, the general problem is that it both carries ontological commitment to Dorothy and, inconsistently, denies such commitment. This problem also arises in cases without names, such as ‘There are ten gods that she worships, but really those gods don’t exist’. My goal is to give a precise characterization of the problem, and thereby to establish some common ground on a very confusing topic.

What’s the Point of Blame?
Miranda Fricker, University of Sheffield
 Both remorse and blame are clearly negative moral emotions. But while few have considered remorse to be an unhelpfully negative moral sentiment, the idea that blame is pointlessly negative, even cruel, is frequently expressed, with the implication that moral life would be better without it. While there are undoubtedly certain pathologies of blame, which should be avoided, I argue that the purely negative view of blame is mistaken. As an antidote, I try to present a more positive, because transformative, style of blame: Communicative Blame. I propose it as an essential moral emotion, and as the second-personal counterpart to remorse. This pair of mirror emotions structure our most basic moral "reactive attitudes,” and together they work both to bring the different parties’ moral understanding into greater alignment; and also to align their moral reasons. In so doing, they serve to continuously (re-)generate our shared moral life.

What’s Wrong with Judgmentalism?
Yujia Song, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
 An exclusive focus on problems with the content of one’s judgments misses an important respect in which judgmentalism is objectionable. I will argue that having a tendency to judge may constitute a kind of moral failure regardless of whether it comes with a disproportionately large number of poor judgments. This is so because the tendency to judge others is at odds with what I call "the receptive attitude” towards them, an attitude that is deeply valuable.

When the Shape of a Life Matters
Stephen Campbell, Coe College
 There is a puzzle about well-being and time. It seems plausible that something is good or bad for us only if it is so at some particular time. Yet, certain things, such as death, seem good or bad for us, though not at any particular time. An increasingly popular response to this puzzle embraces the idea of non-synchronic benefits and costs—that is, things that are good or bad for an individual, though not at any particular time. One motivation for this view is an influential line of argument that implies that the "shape” of a life (roughly, the pattern of benefits and costs over the course of the life) can be a non-synchronic benefit or cost. In this essay, I critique a well-known version of this argument from David Velleman and offer a positive proposal as to when the shape of a life can matter prudentially.

Why Empathy Is Necessary for Morality
Meghan Masto, Lafayette College
 In this paper I argue that empathy is necessary for morality. In particular, I argue that empathy is necessary for being a competent, genuinely moral agent. I begin by briefly discussing some arguments that have been offered for the conclusion that empathy is not necessary for morality and I explain why the general argument strategy is unsuccessful. I go on to argue that empathy is necessary for morality because facts about people’s affective states often determine whether an act is morally right. If an agent wants to be able to act on the morally relevant reasons—wants to do the right thing for the right reasons—then the agent needs access to the facts about others’ mental states. If an agent wants reasonably reliable access to these facts, he or she needs to develop the empathy to get things right.

You Are What You Think You Are
David Mark Kovacs, Cornell University
 According to non-substantivism about persons, the answers to certain (apparently metaphysical) questions about people will not, at the end of the day, be revealed by metaphysics. The most popular brand of non-substantivism is weak conventionalism, the view that which things are picked out by the term "person” or the personal pronoun "I” are a matter of social convention. This paper offers an alternative: persons are self-made, rather than simply conventional things. That is, within certain constraints it is in my power to decide which thing is picked out by the personal pronoun "I.” On the basis of a plausible principle about how personhood is tied up with rationality, I offer an argument to the effect that people are in part self-made and then discuss an interesting consequence of the view. Eventually I conclude that we should at least take seriously the idea that persons are to a certain extent self-made.

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