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2012 Pacific Division Abstracts
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‘All You Can Eat:’ More Than Generalized Quantifier Theory Can Chew
Dean Pettit, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
 Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT) treats quantifiers as second-order predicates that apply to the extensions of first-order predicates, that is, sets of objects. The idea that quantifiers are second-order predicates goes back to Frege, but the general framework of GQT was outlined in Barwise and Cooper (1981). What I will argue in the present paper is that, contra GQT, ‘all’ cannot be understood to express a property or relation between the extensions of first-order predicates. In certain linguistic contexts the relata of quantification cannot be understood to be sets. Instead, ‘all’ seems to express a more abstract quantitative relationship that in some contexts amounts to a relationship between sets, but cannot be thus understood in other contexts.

‘Because’ and Constitutive Explanantions
Johannes Schmitt, University of Southern California
 Sentences like "The proposition that John is tall is true because John is tall” are acceptable whereas sentences of the form "John is tall because the proposition that John is tall is true” are odd. In this paper, I explain this difference by assuming an account of the acceptability of ‘because’-statements according to which "p because q” is true iff q gives at least a partial explanation for p. In the class of examples that I investigate the inference from p to q is explanatory and the inference from q to p fails to be explanatory even though p and q are a priori equivalent. I then go on to argue that the truth of a constituent proposition may in certain circumstances count as a constitutive explanation of a proposition that predicates truth of its constituent and defend this claim against one major objection.

A Defense of Aristotle’s Socratic Solution to the Paradox of Strict Akrasia
Mariana Anagnostopoulos, California State University–Fresno
 Aristotle’s solution to the paradox posed by Socrates’ denial that knowledge can be overcome by desire concedes a critical point to Socrates. Concluding that akratic action is itself reason-based, Aristotle acknowledges that it does not involve what he calls, "knowledge in the primary sense” (NE 1147b15-16). I argue that this result is reasonable: descriptions of "strict” akrasia construe the phenomenon as too irrational, effectively closing off all avenues of explanation for the relevant phenomena. This outcome is duplicated in 20th century models of practical reason and action, yet their proponents resist Aristotle’s line, instead insisting that strict akrasia is possible. I defend Aristotle’s approach, which illuminates the error of the akrates while affirming the skeptical position, that conceptual constraints render plainly incoherent the idea of intentional action contrary to one’s sincere best judgment, when such judgment constitutes a flawless integration of one’s own convictions and motivations.

A Deliberative Outlet? Rethinking the Role of Majority Rule in Deliberative Democracy
Michael Seifried, Columbia University
 Several deliberative democrats have observed a tension between the primacy of majority rule mechanisms in real politics and their peripheral role in their theoretical models. In this paper, I argue that this tension can be overcome. After outlining the basics of deliberative democracy, I consider two observations regarding this tension before briefly assessing their accuracy within a number of works by deliberative democrats. I then turn to Elizabeth Anderson's proposal for integrating these procedures more centrally. Her proposal, I contend, does not go far enough. Instead, I suggest expanding our view of majority rule procedures to include the role of their anticipation, not just their actual use. Accordingly, such procedures are central to deliberative democracy because they are the primary catalysts—or deliberative outlets—of democratic deliberation, as evidenced by the way campaign season deliberation arises in anticipation of an upcoming election, not just on election day.

A Friendly Amendment to Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics
Robert A. Mabrito, North Carolina State University
 In Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism, Mark Schroeder provides a detailed expressivist semantics for a language having the resources of the predicate calculus and containing both moral and non-moral predicates. However, due to the difficulties of extending his semantics to certain natural language constructions, Schroeder concludes that, ultimately, the prospects for expressivism are not good. In this paper, I offer an alternative way of developing Schroeder’s semantics that I believe can overcome these difficulties. If my proposal is successful, then the prospects for expressivism may be much brighter than Schroeder and many others believe.

A Kantian Account of How Following Examples Sharpens Judgment
Brian Watkins, Duke University
 Kant distinguishes two ways of sharpening the power of judgment: by imitating examples and by following examples. Kant thinks we must follow examples to develop the judgment required to strive toward an ideal, whether we are students of morality aiming to act with perfect virtue or artists struggling to represent supersensible topics, such as God’s power at the moment of creation. I draw on Kant’s remarks in the Critique of Judgment regarding how we contemplate and make sense of beautiful objects in order to provide an account of what makes an example worth following and how following an example sharpens the power of judgment. I argue that in contrast with imitation, where we learn to mediate between some determinate concept and its sensible instances, following an example teaches us to strive toward an ideal by inspiring us to organize or regulate our power of judgment in general.

A Naive Realist Argument Against Intentionalism
David Ivy, University of Texas–Austin
 Intentionalism contends that, necessarily, a perceptual experience’s phenomenology is wholly determined by what the experience represents. Typical objections to the theory take the form of counterexamples. However, in this paper, I explore an alternative type of objection. To begin, I explain intentionalism and draw attention to a cost: if intentionalism is true, what it is like for a subject, S, to see a tomato’s redness is wholly determined by a relation S bears to something that is neither a tomato nor red. This is counterintuitive and, hence, constitutes prima facie reason for rejecting intentionalism. But this should concern intentionalists only if there is another viable theory without this counterintuitive consequence. There is such a theory: naive realism. After explaining the theory, I argue on intuitive grounds that, all else being equal, we should reject intentionalism and accept naive realism. I then respond to an intentionalist objection advanced by Adam Pautz.

A New Answer to the Special Composition Question
Ned Markosian, Western Washington University
 The aim of this paper is to offer a novel, commonsense answer to Peter van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question. The approach I offer begins by considering a different mereological question. I try to show that the road to mereological sanity begins with giving the most straightforward and commonsensical answer to this other question, and then extending that answer to further questions about the mereology of physical objects, including the Special Composition Question. On the approach I am recommending, it turns out that all of the mereological properties and relations of physical objects are determined by their spatial properties and relations.

A New Role for Thought Experiments in Quantum Gravity
Mark Shumelda, University of Toronto
 In 1977 Kenneth Eppley and Eric Hannah devised an elegant thought experiment that, for decades, many have touted as ‘proof’ that the gravitational field must be quantized. Despite its popular appeal amongst physicists, Eppley and Hannah’s thought experiment has recently been criticized as being both unphysical and subject to serious problems of interpretation. I defend the thought experiment against these challenges and argue that Eppley and Hannah’s thought experiment succeeds by limiting the space of logical alternatives to a quantum theory of gravity. This result is especially relevant given the current lack of empirical data within this field of physics.

A New Timing Objection to Frankfurt Cases
Erik Krag, University of Tennessee
 Carl Ginet's "timing objection” to Pereboom's Frankfurt-style counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) argues that if we take a time-indexed view of moral responsibility whereby the moral blameworthiness of an action is evaluated in relation to the time that the action takes place, the thrust of these sorts of cases can be defused. Ginet's objection has been criticized on the grounds that it is unintuitive: we typically say that an agent who commits an immoral act is morally responsible for that act simpliciter, not just at a time. I offer a new version of the timing objection which does not rely on time-indexed ascriptions of responsibility. This new timing objection allows the PAP advocate to maintain that Pereboom's agent remains morally responsible for his action in a way that is consistent with our everyday judgments about moral responsibility.

A New-Razian Account of the Normative Requirement of Means-end Rationality
Luis Cheng-Guajardo, Stanford University
 I argue that, in order to explain why the person who takes means to his end is more rational than the person who does not, we do not need to appeal to coherence as such to avoid the conclusion that persons ought to take the means to whatever ends they happen to intend. This is a welcome result because the "Myth theorists” thesis is true. Rather, I show that a narrow-scope version of the normative requirement of means-end rationality under a Razian framework of reasons can still meet John Broome’s strict demand criterion and provide a better explanation of a person’s normative failure whenever she is means-end irrational.

A Physics of Mental Life: Spinoza's Scientific Theory of the Emotions
Julia Haas, Emory University
 Researchers in the affective neurosciences are working to understand the nature of the emotions, and an important number of them are turning to Spinoza’s Ethics for possible answers (Damasio 2003, Panksepp 2005). Problematically, the contemporary philosophical literature has focused on Spinoza’s treatment of the mind-body problem in Part II of the Ethics, to the neglect of the seemingly less-orderly discussion of the emotions in Part III. In my poster, I argue that Part III of the Ethics is instrumental for bridging these philosophical and neuroscientific theories of the emotions, and aim to 1) draw attention to the explicitly scientific nature of Spinoza’s theory of the emotions, and 2) show that the theory does not present a descriptive ”anatomy” of the emotions, but instead provides a causal account of them. I then outline a strategy for integrating Spinoza’s causal theory into a paradigm for future scientific research.

A Posteriori Reduction of Moral Judgment
Victor Kumar, University of Arizona
 An a posteriori reduction of moral judgment is warranted insofar as it supports the causal-explanatory roles assigned to moral judgment in empirical models of moral thought and action. Hybrid theories of moral judgment in general do well by this criterion. A hybrid theory on which moral judgment is an integrated state of belief and emotion also dovetails with a dual process model of moral cognition. An upshot is that the theory captures seemingly conflicting intuitions about the relationship between moral judgment and motivation.

A Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment
Bradley Rettler, University of Notre Dame
 According to Quinean meta-ontology (hereafter ‘the orthodoxy’), if one affirms the sentence "Fs exist,” then one is ontologically committed to Fs. In this paper, I offer an alternative to the orthodoxy: if one affirms the sentence "Fs exist,” one is ontologically committed to there being some thing or some things that make true the sentence "Fs exist.” I clarify the alternative using the notion of a fundamental quantifier, and then give three motivations for it.

A Value-neutral Defense of Noncomparabilism
Mark E. Wunderlich, Union College
 Many discussions of incommensurability and incomparability focus on comparisons of value. Focusing instead on value-neutral comparatives, I defend the view that some objects that fall under some comparative concepts fail to compare. I claim that there is a clear example of a comparative for which not all of its objects compare: a particular understanding of extensiveness. I then show how this example can be put to use in addressing an argument against noncomparabilism for value-laden comparatives.

Accountability, Aliens, and Psychopaths: A Reply to Shoemaker
Matthew Talbert, West Virginia University
 In "Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility,” David Shoemaker argues that a complete theory of moral responsibility will make room for three distinct conceptions of responsibility: attributability, answerability, and accountability. Shoemaker argues that "Scanlonian” theories of blame ignore the importance of accountability insofar as these theories do not require that wrongdoers possess the capacity to respond appropriately to the moral considerations that count against their behavior. In this reply, I defend the Scanlonian perspective against Shoemaker’s criticism.

Affinity and Reason to Love
Alexander Jech, University of Virginia
 What is the nature of our reasons for loving something? When someone wonders why one person or activity stimulates his imagination and hopes more deeply than others, he or she is tempted to ask whether the difference is in him, or in his beloved. Much of our discussion about reasons for love revolves around the dichotomy between subjective and objective reasons for loving, but neither way of conceiving the matter appears satisfactory, and so in this paper I will instead propose that we adopt a view of reasons for love according to which our reasons are primarily relational and based in the concept of affinity. Affinity, defined in terms of fitness between two parties, allows us to successfully analyze someone’s loving activity in terms of a practical inference concerned with spending one’s life engaged in activities and relationships that are worthwhile and suitable to oneself.

Against Primitivism about Truth
Anthony Fisher, Syracuse University
 I argue that Trenton Merricks' (2007) argument for primitivism about truth fails.

Against Representation: Accountability, Information, and Ignorance
Alexander Guerrero, New York University
 This paper presents an argument against systems of political representation on the grounds that those systems will tend to do poorly along two important outcome-related dimensions of political evaluation: responsiveness and good governance. This argument is part of a larger project in which I argue that representative democracy is inferior to an alternative system—a lottocratic system—the three distinctive features of which are (1) the legislative function is fulfilled by many different single-issue legislatures, rather than by a single, generalist legislature; (2) members of these single-issue legislatures are chosen by lottery; and (3) members of the single-issue legislatures hear from relevant experts at the beginning of the legislative process. Central to the argument of this paper and the larger project is the idea that modern political problems are information intensive, and that we need political systems that can create responsive and good policy even, and especially, under those circumstances.

Agency and Self-sufficiency in Fichte’s Ethics
Michelle Kosch, Cornell University
 J.G. Fichte was Kant's most prominent intellectual heir, in ethics as well as in theoretical philosophy, and it is puzzling that the resurgence in interest in Kant's ethics has not brought more attention to Fichte's ethical thought. While recognizably Kantian in spirit, Fichte's ethics differs radically from Kant's own in some of its important details. These differences should interest contemporary Kantians in ethics, many of whom depart from Kant in Fichtean directions. This paper gives an overview of Fichte's ethics, with the aim of introducing Fichte to a broader Kantian audience.

Agent-causal Power
Andrei Buckareff, Marist College
 Agent-causalism is the thesis that agents qua objects/substances cause at least some of their actions (either mental actions or overt actions). In this paper, I examine the tenability of agent-causalism as an account of the springs of action. I argue that even if we accept the irreducibility of the concept of agent-causation, the agent-causal relation is ontologically reducible. So even if discourse about agent-causation is true, the truth-makers for such discourse will not include agents qua substances as the direct causes of decisions. Against the backdrop of recent work on causal powers in ontology, I argue that on at least one plausible account of agent-causal power the defender of agent-causalism faces an exclusion problem that renders the theory untenable.

Aggregating vs. Balancing
Ralf Bader, New York University
 Should one save 5 rather than 1? Intuitively, the answer is a clear ‘yes.’ Yet, justifying this answer requires overcoming a number of difficulties. This paper will address one such difficulty by arguing that there is an overlooked distinction between two different aggregative procedures, namely (i) balancing gains and losses, and (ii) determining aggregate quantities. This distinction is important in that the aggregative procedure of balancing is not subject to some of the objections that have been raised by critics of ‘aggregation’ yet suffices for justifying saving 5 rather than 1 as far as axiological considerations are concerned.

Alethic Functionalism, Manifestation, and Truth
Jay Newhard, East Carolina University
 According to alethic functionalism, there are numerous lower level truth properties, had by some but not all true propositions, depending on their subject matter properties; and truth per se is a generic truth property had by all true propositions. Each lower level truth property is supposed to be a way of being truth per se. In this paper, I examine the key components of alethic functionalism, specifically, the manifestation relation holding between a truth-manifesting property and truth per se, and the nature of truth per se. I argue that the manifestation relation is not a relation through which the lower level truth-manifesting properties really are ways of being true, and suggest a replacement relation. Examining the nature of truth per se as characterized by alethic functionalism reveals that alethic functionalism does not justify the claim that truth per se exists, or that truth is a functional property.

An ‘Armstrongian’ Truthmaker Argument Against Nihilism
Brady Bowman, Pennsylvania State University
 This paper presents an argument against nihilism, i.e. against the possibility of an empty world, based on David Armstrong’s theory of truthmakers. Drawing on his Possibility Principle for providing modal truths with truthmakers, Armstrong himself has argued that it is true that there could have been nothing. I argue that, by Armstrong’s own principles, the proposition ‘There could have been nothing’ is true only if the proposition ‘There is nothing’ is false: ?p?~p, thus violating a basic axiom of modal logic. While this consequence may be interpreted in several ways, some of which cast doubt on Armstrong’s principles, I suggest we understand it as a reductio ad absurdum of nihilism. In the conclusion, I show how the character of the empty world as an essentially unrealizable true possibility can be explained with reference to the conception of ‘totality states of affairs’ Armstrong has introduced to provide truthmakers for negative propositions.

An Alternate Approach to the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions
Cody Cash, University of Arkansas
 The conditional analysis of dispositions has gone through several versions, all of which have proven to be fallible, in one way or another, to instances where the stimulus of the disposition is present yet the manifestation fails to occur. In light of this, some have suggested the conditional analysis is fatally flawed and should be abandoned altogether. In this paper I argue that the conditional analysis can be saved, but only if the objects commonly referenced in the conditional analysis as possessing the dispositional property are replaced by paradigmatic situations, and the disposition is understood as an extrinsic relation between the intrinsic properties of the objects comprising the paradigmatic situation.

An Argument for Temporalism about Propositions
Caleb Perl, University of Southern California
 This paper argues that propositions are true relative to both times and worlds, by detailing the unacceptable consequences of supposing otherwise. If you suppose otherwise, each proposition must be specific with respect to time or world. I argue for two claims: (A) If propositions are specific with respect to world, someone in the actual world can’t grasp some propositions that she would believe in a counterfactual world. (B) Similarly, if propositions are specific with respect to time, someone at the present time can’t grasp some propositions that she will believe. But the relevant propositions are graspable in the actual world and at the present time. The cost of supposing otherwise is too high—for one thing, it destroys our ability to make some inferences we can actually make. So propositions must be true relative to both times and worlds.

An Attractive Theory of Definite Descriptions
Allan Bäck, Kutztown University of Pennsylvania
 Definite descriptions are often introduced syntactically and grammatically, as having the form of "the φ.” However their standard logical analysis works only if we ignore or exclude various uses of various sentences containing phrases having that grammatical form, and instead focus only on the ones that work. Russell admits this and advises us to ignore the variant uses, especially those found in ordinary language. I opt instead not to exclude any of the grammatical phenomena for which the logical analysis is to provide the theory. I offer an alternative theory, based upon thinking of language use as a dynamic system that ends to form relatively stable attractor basins, especially when the linguistic community is closed. Russell’s theory becomes one of the attractors.

An Inconsistency Revisited: Change, Unity, and Aristotle’s Elements
Mary Krizan, Spring Hill College
 Aristotle’s general theory of change generates an inconsistency when applied to the specific case of the elemental transformations, as readers of Aristotle have long recognized; attempts to resolve the inconsistency have generated volumes of literature surrounding the so-called prime matter debate. The prime matter debate ends in a stalemate because the problems that generate the inconsistency in Aristotle’s thought can only be resolved by taking a closer look at Aristotle’s complete account of the elements in On Generation and Corruption. Before turning to the solution, we need to be completely clear on what the problem is. In this paper, I argue that three mainstream attempts to save Aristotle from his inconsistency fail because they inadvertently commit Aristotle to denying the ability for elements to undergo substantial changes or they threaten the ontological status of elements as unified substances.

An Obvious Account of Epistemic Possibility
Chris Tweedt, Baylor University
 Concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs) are statements of the form: I know that p, but possibly q, where q obviously entails not-p. "Possibly” here expresses epistemic possibility. But what is epistemic possibility? Stanley argues that on the standard version of epistemic possibility—a version based on knowledge—CKAs are contradictory. Dougherty and Rysiew propose two non-standard accounts of epistemic possibility—each of which is based on evidence—to argue that CKAs are not contradictory. I will give some problems for Dougherty and Rysiew’s non-standard accounts. Then I’ll propose an account—an account based on obviousness—that parallels Stanley’s account but overcomes the problems with Dougherty and Rysiew’s account, and I’ll show that this account, unlike Stanley’s account but like Dougherty and Rysiew’s account, allows some CKAs to be true.

Analyzing Grounding
Mark Barber, Syracuse University
 Grounding has an important role to play in metaphysics. There is a rapidly growing literature on what grounding is like and this paper is a contribution to that debate. Specifically, this paper presents an analysis of grounding in terms of two relations, more fundamental than and intimacy. Some philosophers have tried to account for relative fundamentality in terms of grounding, but I argue first that this is unacceptable and then show how we can use relative fundamentality and intimacy, an introduced, but familiar relation, to analyze grounding.

Animal Mindreading and the Principle of Conservatism
Ty Fagan, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign
 In the debate over whether animal mindreaders exist—that is, whether any animals can represent and reason about the mental states of others—each side draws quite different conclusions from the same scientific data. Where some see evidence of mindreading, others see evidence only of behavior-reading. To discredit their opponents’ purported empirical evidence, these latter often employ an inferential rule of thumb known as the principle of conservatism: all other things equal, we should prefer the hypothesis that invokes lower-order intentionality. Using a test case drawn from research with chimpanzees, I show that the principle of conservatism is best understood as an appeal to parsimony—and that no matter how one conceives of parsimony, the principle is unwarranted. Discarding the principle of conservatism means that the prospects for animal mindreading are better than most have thought.

Answerability and Criminal Responsibility
Nicholas Sars, University of Washington
 Antony Duff has recently attempted to better understand the notorious issue of strict criminal liability by reframing it in terms of strict responsibility. Duff focuses on the concept of answerability in order to help illuminate this claim. In this paper I argue that this move proves problematic. I show both that Duff blurs the line between two senses of answerability and that this undercuts his arguments based on an analogy between moral and criminal responsibility. Despite these errors, Duff’s focus on answerability does prove illuminating, and I conclude by proposing one way to keep his insights even though his arguments for them prove inadequate.

Argument Diagramming Improves Critical Thinking in Introductory Philosophy
Mara Harrell, Carnegie Mellon University
 I have developed a curriculum for our introductory philosophy course that is aimed specifically at developing students’ critical thinking skills by focusing on argument diagramming as a way to understand, evaluate and create arguments. Here I report on two studies of this curriculum in which we administered pre-tests at the beginning of the semester, and a post-test at the end. Students who took this curriculum in their introductory class improved certain critical thinking skills more than the students who did not. In addition, this curriculum had the greatest impact on the students who had the fewest skills at the beginning of the course. The students who did the poorest on the pre-test gained the most, as a percentage of what they could have gained, than the students who had average or high scores on the pre-test.

Aristotle on the Arguments for and Against Slavery
Adam Beresford, University of Massachusetts–Boston
 In Politics 1.6 Aristotle reports the argument of certain philosophical opponents of slavery. This is the only place where anti-slavery arguments are discussed in any detail in antiquity. But the passage is obscure and probably corrupt, and has baffled interpreters and generated several incompatible interpretations. I set out the main readings and issues and try to show that none of the standard proposals can be right, and offer a new reading that makes much better sense of what the opponents of slavery were saying. I also argue that previous readings have been hampered first by political prejudices, then by the imposition of misguided theories about the meaning of areté, in this passage and beyond. My reading proposes that, according to Aristotle, the central claim of the opponents of slavery was simple: human beings are intellectually and morally equal, and slavery results purely from brute force used against moral equals.

Berkeley on God’s Creation of Minds and Human Freedom
Stephen Daniel, Texas A&M University
 Like other theists, Berkeley believes that God is the creator of all sensible objects and minds. That seems to imply that God causes our volitions and we are not free. Recent descriptions of Berkeley’s position as a form of concurrentism or occasionalism have attempted to show how we can still be free as long as either our volitions are not determined in God’s creation of our minds or our volitions result in actual effects only if they are consistent with the laws of nature. But these accounts ignore how God creates minds precisely in willing that ideas are perceived or willed in specific ways. I argue that freedom, for Berkeley, does not consist in being able to will other than we do, for our volitions are specified by their actual effects in the world. Rather, it consists in willing that what we do be in harmony with God’s will.

Beyond Actualism and Possibilism
Brian Kierland, Boise State University
 The moral value of an action often depends upon later actions of the same agent. For example, the moral value of your writing a check for OxFam depends on your putting it in the mail sometime later. In such cases, how does the normative status of the action in question depend on these later actions? The debate in the literature has largely been framed around two views. Actualism claims that what an agent ought to do depends on what he would do in the future, while possibilism claims that it depends on what he could do in the future. I argue, however, that there are true ought-judgments corresponding to both actualism and possibilism. I explore three accounts which can explain this fact, the last of which I defend.

Biological Function and Biological Normalcy: Breaking the Link
Justin Garson, City University of New York–Hunter College
 In his "Against Normal Function”, Amundson (2000; also see 2011) criticizes Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of function (BST) for presupposing a conception of biological normalcy which is biologically inaccurate and which has been used to justify discriminatory policies and attitudes against people with disabilities. Biological normalcy is the view that species (or subsets thereof) exhibit a ‘uniform functional design’ based on the typical contribution of their parts to survival and reproduction, and that various disabilities represent abnormal and fitness-reducing departures from this design. In the following, I argue that a suitably-refined and rigorously defensible version of BST need not presuppose biological normalcy. An ‘abnormal’ variant has a function if it contributes to survival or inclusive fitness. As a consequence, one can accept naturalistic accounts of biological function without endorsing the problematic notion of biological normalcy with which they have been associated and which have cast them in a negative light.

Blame as a Volitional Activity
Neal Tognazzini, College of William and Mary
 Blame is fascinating yet elusive, and it is both of these things because it is so complex. It seems to have a cognitive aspect (the belief that someone has done wrong, perhaps), but it also seems to have an emotional aspect (resentment at being disrespected, perhaps). And then of course there is the outside-of-the-head aspect of blame, which manifests itself in rebukes and reprimands, accusations and distrust, cold shoulders and estrangement. Still, accounts of blame that identify it with beliefs or emotions seem inadequate. In this paper I draw on the work of Harry Frankfurt to suggest an alternative account, according to which blame most centrally involves changes in the structure of the will.

Body-body Occasionalism and the Conservation of Motion
Monte Cook, University of Oklahoma
 I criticize the assumption that if Cartesians believed that only God could cause motion, then they believed that bodies could not causally affect one another. Daniel Garber, Steven Nadler, Tad Schmaltz, and Michael Della Rocca all make this assumption in arguing that Descartes, Antoine Arnauld, Louis de la Forge, Géraud de Cordemoy, or Robert Desgabets were or were not body-body occasionalists. I show that this assumption, though natural, is wrong. First I discuss how various Cartesians use a distinction between causing motion and causally affecting the direction of motion to show that mind to body causation is consistent with the conservation of motion in the physical world. Then I show how they make this same distinction for body-body causation. Arguing that for the Cartesians bodies cannot cause motion, then, is insufficient to establish that they believe that bodies cannot causally affect one another.

Can the Categorical Imperative Test Final Ends?
Margaret Bowman, University of Utah
  The "New Kantians,” for example, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, and Barbara Herman offer a "practical interpretation” of the Kantian "Categorical Imperative.” Their approach grounds the moral assessment of actions and ends on practical rationality. Both contradictions in conception and the will are to be found in our intentions, rather than our beliefs. Problems arise whenever a proposed course of action undermines the goals one has as an agent under universalization. I argue against the underlying account of intention, particularly with respect to long term goals. While our actions work toward final ends, it is implausible to assume that we always expect or fully commit to achieving them. Without these assumptions, the practical interpretation of the "Categorical Imperative” no longer generates contradictions. I conclude that we must reject this approach to Kantian moral philosophy and recommend reexamining accounts of intention in the light of a more plausible understanding of practical commitment.

Cassirer’s Phenomenology of Culture
Donald Verene, Emory University
 Cassirer claims that in his philosophy of symbolic forms the transcendental analysis of science, ethical freedom, and aesthetic and organic natural forms of Kant’s three critiques is extended to other forms of culture, such as language, myth, and art. Thus, the "critique of reason becomes the critique of culture.” This claim tends to place Cassirer within the tradition of Neo-Kantianism. This view is offset by Cassirer’s further claim that his phenomenology of knowledge is "established and systematically grounded by Hegel.” To achieve his philosophy of symbolic forms, Cassirer joins Kantian transcendental method with Hegelian phenomenology. In so doing, Cassirer replaces the idea of system with a conception of "systematic overview,” which he connects to a theory of "basis phenomena,” especially the basis phenomenon of the work. This phenomenon allows him finally to conceive his philosophy as a fulfillment of the Socratic pursuit of self-knowledge.

Cognitive Significance and Singular Thought
James Genone, Stanford University
 In this essay, I criticize Robin Jeshion’s recent proposal of a constraint of cognitive significance on singular thought (Jeshion 2010). I argue that reflection on a number of examples she discusses suggests that significance is neither necessary nor sufficient for thoughts that refer directly to a particular object. Although I agree with Jeshion that acquaintance is not required for all cases of singular thought, I argue that her account doesn’t go far enough in rejecting semantic instrumentalism, the view that we can generate singular thoughts simply by manipulating the mechanisms of direct reference.

Commonality in Assertion and Practical Reasoning
Kenneth Boyd, University of Toronto
 Call "commonality” the view that the epistemic states that figure in the norms of assertion are the same as those that figure in the norms of practical reasoning. Here I defend what I take to be the most plausible principled explanation for commonality, what Jessica Brown calls the "instance argument”: since assertions are kinds of actions, they therefore share a common epistemic norm. I consider a number of arguments against the instance argument from Brown, but argue that they ultimately fail because Brown mischaracterizes the way in which assertion and other illocutionary acts are related to our epistemic states.

Completing the Hobbesian and Kantian Project in Ethics
James P. Sterba, University of Notre Dame
 Both Hobbes and Kant both wanted to provide a foundation for ethics that didn’t already presuppose a commitment to ethics. Hobbes attempted to do this by appealing to self-interest; Kant by appealing to rationality. The general consensus among contemporary philosophers is that neither Hobbes nor Kant successfully completed this foundational project. I propose to offer a way completing the project by appealing to the principle of non-question-beggingness. As it turns out, my way of completing the project ends up justifying a much more demanding and much more egalitarian ethics than either Hobbes or Kant wanted to defend. Nevertheless, I claim, that is just the unavoidable consequence of providing ethics with the type of foundation that both Hobbes and Kant wanted to provide.

Compulsion as Resistance to Reasoning
Jesse Summers, Rice University
 I propose an account of compulsion. I question initially whether Gary Watson’s account of compulsion can distinguish compulsion from normal desires. I then consider whether compulsion is motivation that did not originate in one’s decision. I reject this view because decisions, and consequent motivations, may be compelled. I then consider whether compulsion is motivation that one cannot change. I reject this view because even compulsive motivation can be changed. I then propose that motivation is resistance to reasoning, which captures the insights of the previous two proposals. So understood, and perhaps surprisingly, compulsion is both ubiquitous and not as obviously objectionable as we may have supposed.

Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement
Ekaterina Vavova, Amherst College
 Should learning that we disagree about p lead you to revise your opinion about p? Even those who think that it often should want to make a prima facie plausible exception for beliefs in which you are rationally highly confident. The Intuitive Thought is that if you are really sure of what you believe, and you're right in being so sure, learning that we disagree should not affect your opinion. I argue that the Intuitive Thought is false, and so we should reject recent accounts that crucially rely on it. I then show that, contra the Intuitive Thought, having a low confidence in p can make disagreement about p less significant. Understanding this surprising result can help us toward a better way of thinking about evidence and disagreement.

Conscience and What We Care About
Ian Blaustein, Boston University
 What is it to have a conscience? What is it to act conscientiously? My proposal is that to have a conscience is to have a standing desire to do the morally right thing, where ‘the morally right thing’ is read de dicto. That conception of conscience provides my answer to the second question: to act conscientiously is to act on a desire to do the morally right thing, where ‘the morally right thing,’ again, is read de dicto. In other words, to act conscientiously is to do something because you believe it’s the morally right thing to do. That’s a very minimal conception of conscience, but I think it’s an adequate one. I’ll say why by discussing some supposed facts about conscience, and how my conception explains them. Then I’ll discuss, too briefly, a couple of other supposed facts about conscience that appear to conflict with my conception. I’ll end by discussing why we might think that, even if it is on the right track, my conception is inadequate, and say why I think it really does work. My proposal is that having a conscience is part of what it is to care about morality.

Convention, Variation, and Force-Marking
Rachel McKinney, City University of New York–Graduate Center
 In this paper I discuss a set of linguistic data underdeveloped in the philosophical literature on linguistic convention. I explore an example of a cluster of linguistic conventions—force-marking—and argue that knowledge of conventions governing lexical, syntactic, and compositional form is insufficient for knowledge of conventions governing force. A misalignment of conventions governing force negatively impacts communicative uptake. I then look at sociolinguistic variation and propose a picture for how speakers are able to communicate outside of their most local speech communities. On my view, communicatively competent agents have at their disposal multiple different convention models that they employ in different contexts and with different speakers. Such models allow for agents to converge on common conventions and communicate.

Dance: The Ephemeral Art?
Renee Conroy, Purdue University–Calumet
 Ask any dancer what she thinks is special about her art, and she is likely to respond without pause: dance is an art of the moment. Dancers and choreographers often declare that artworks created in the medium of dance are more evanescent than are those created in the artistic traditions of music and drama. But what does the claim that dance is an "ephemeral” art really mean? In this paper, I argue that dancers’ claims about the fleeting character of their art form are best understood as the expression of a set of deep-seated danceworld values rather than as purely factual statements or as the articulation of an ontological theory. I also consider several elements of dance art practice that plausibly give rise to this nest of values, and suggest how these features of "dance life” contribute to the regnant belief that the art form trades in the ineluctably temporary.

Defending Rationalism from Psychopaths
Danielle Wylie, University of Wisconsin–Madison
 Michael Smith’s defense of rationalism (the claim that our concept of moral requirements is a concept of requirements of rationality, which entails that judgments are intrinsically motivating) has been objected to by David Brink and Shaun Nichols through the use of amoralists and data on psychopaths. I will use Smith’s view of conceptual analysis and findings in moral psychology to propose elements which seem to be included in our ordinary moral concepts. Given the resulting concepts, I will then argue that psychopaths do not share these concepts, and that this lack of moral concepts (for a reason other than lack of motivation) serves to support Smith’s response to the amoralist challenge. Finally, I will explain and respond to Nichols’s version of the challenge. With these objections dismissed, Smith’s position is safe from the existence of psychopaths, at least as they have been most prominently used against him thus far.

Democracy, Paternalism, and Campaign Finance
Adam Hosein, University of Colorado–Boulder
 Democracy, Paternalism and Campaign FinanceIn this paper I defend limits on corporate expenditures of the kind that were enacted by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) and struck down by the Supreme Court in Citizens United. I argue that limits are justified by the need to ensure that the government is representative of the people rather than wealthy corporations who can gain influence through campaign spending. I then present the objection that this argument makes paternalistic assumptions about the abilities of citizens to evaluate speech, assumptions that are themselves undemocratic because they reflect a lack of trust in citizens. Finally, I respond to this objection by showing that the assumptions needed to defend BCRA are compatible with democratic principles.

Deontology Monsters, Particularism, and Counterpossible Counterexamples in Normative Ethics
Thomas Metcalf, University of Colorado–Boulder
 Ethicists commonly employ hypothetical but possible counterexamples to various normative theories or applied ethics principles. But must hypothetical counterexamples describe possible scenarios? Here I argue that they need not, and that this conclusion actually has far-reaching implications in normative ethics, among other areas. In the first section of this paper, I explain how one might employ counterpossible counterexamples in general, and why we should sometimes trust them. The later sections of this paper motivate one major implication of allowing impossible counterexamples: Now there is a new and powerful argument for particularism in normative ethics, from the premise that some actions are clearly morally impermissible.

Derivative Works, Original Value
Michael Falgoust, Tulane University of New Orleans
 Creative works allow individuals to explore beliefs, cultural biases and prejudices, or simply the author’s own point of view. Derivative works allow the same kind of discourse, but they also make possible a critical mode that is especially valuable for questioning mainstream or widely-accepted ideas. Free expression, particularly expressions that criticize mainstream ideas, is chilled by the arbitrary control exercised by copyright holders. Without the ability to prepare derivative works, creators are unable to express their own views about cultural biases and prejudices, and the liberating critical mode is lost.

Descriptions which Have Grown Capital Letters
Brian Rabern, Australian National University
 Definite descriptions "which have grown capital letters” have periodically been noted for their unique syntactic and semantic properties yet they have never been given a proper linguistic analysis. My aim here is to begin this process. I will argue that the standard suggestion that "descriptions with grown capitals” should be regarded not as definite descriptions, but as proper names, is untenable. I will then suggest a new treatment that avoids these problems. My view is that they should be assimilated to definite descriptions, where the nouns that constitute the definite noun phrase are predicates of metalinguistic kinds. The discussion, aside from its intrinsic value, provides further support for the thesis that the expressions that are commonly called "proper names” are, in fact, predicates (i.e. common nouns).

Dickie’s False Mythology
Thomas Hilgers, Freie Universität Berlin
 In this paper, I seek to clear the way for a re-evaluation of the claim that our aesthetic experiences typically include the adoption of a disinterested attitude by showing that none of George Dickie’s famous objections against the notion of a disinterested attitude is succesful. I show that the notion is not the result of a conceptual confusion, and that it stands for more than a perceptual state in which one is free from distraction. Moreover, I show that the adoption of a disinterested attitude may be an important part of our typical aesthetic experience even if the adoption of such an attitude is hardly ever a conscious act or an explicit decision.

Difference-making, Reduction, and Multi-grade Causation
David McElhoes, University of Maryland–College Park
 The causal exclusion argument remains one of the most well-known and most persistent challenges to non-reductive physicalism. In this paper, I show that by shifting the discourse from talk of causation to talk of difference-making, there is a straightforward argument, the contrastive argument, which gives us an interesting and unexpected way out of the causal exclusion problem. The shift from causal relations to difference-making relations provides only eight possible ways to model the space of inter-level relations; and the contrastive argument allows us to eliminate seven of them. What we are left with, paradoxically, is a reductive model of the relationship between higher and lower-level explanatory theories that nevertheless preserves the central feature of non-reductive physicalism.

Distributive Justice, Relative Disadvantage, and Individual Obligations
Brian Berkey, University of California–Berkeley
 In this paper I consider the claim that the beneficiaries of prevailing distributive injustice are not obligated to voluntarily sacrifice their unjust advantages because by doing so they would face the prospect of disadvantage relative to others who will not make similar sacrifices. I examine some remarks made by G.A. Cohen that are sympathetic to this relative disadvantage-based defense of the refusal to sacrifice voluntarily, and raise some doubts about the support that they provide to that defense. Specifically, I argue that thinking about certain examples in which a beneficiary of non-distributive injustice can sacrifice her advantages, at the cost of relative disadvantage, in order to benefit the victims of the relevant injustice, suggest that the relative disadvantage defense cannot be accepted. I conclude that we should take seriously the view that our obligations, insofar as we are beneficiaries of distributive injustice, are more extensive than we tend to think.

E-Prints and the Social Epistemology of Peer Review
Ben Almassi, College of Lake County
 The growth of and other "e-print” archives presents a great opportunity for epistemologists to examine the social-evidential value of peer review. Traditionally framed as a cornerstone of scientific objectivity, peer reviewed publication is often presumed to be good evidence of rigor and reliability, and anonymous review can be a powerful if imperfect mechanism to mitigate explicit and implicit social bias. Given these epistemic and ethical functions, what's lost as epistemic communities move from reliance on journals to unreviewed platforms like Absent the corroboration of peer review, how can we gauge reliability and mitigate bias? Here I engage founder Paul Ginsparg's defense of arXiv and critique of traditional scholarly publication. I argue that while the development of arXiv has been responsive to other issues, problems of gender and other social biases remain neglected. I suggest how these problems might be addressed given an arXiv that takes both open access and implicit bias seriously.

Emigration, Losses, and Burden-Sharing
Gillian Brock, University of Auckland
 This paper focuses on issues of justice in emigration from developing countries. I discuss why there may be important harms that frequently follow emigrants’ departure from developing countries. My concern is with the normative case for there being important responsibilities to address these and fair ways to distribute the burdens associated with tackling these losses. I argue (inter alia) that it may be defensible to specify certain conditions (such as taxation or service requirements) that must be met when emigrants choose to live outside source countries, and that it may be fair to impose costs on emigrants and residents of developed countries who will benefit from these movements. I canvas a variety of arguments to show why such burden-sharing arrangements are fair ones, and defend the view against some key anticipated objections concerning inappropriate interference with freedom.

Empty of What? Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as Realists, Not Nihilists
Jay Garfield, Smith College, University of Melbourne, and Central University of Tibetan Studies
 The assertion of Mādhyamikas such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti that all phenomena are empty has been read as a kind of nihilism, denying the reality of the world. In fact, however, when properly understood, it is the assertion that phenomena are empty of intrinsic existence. Since emptiness itself is empty, this amounts to the claim that the everyday world is as real as anything ever could be. Madhyamaka is hence realism.

Empty Thoughts: An Explanatory Problem for Higher-order Theories of Consciousness
Adrienne Prettyman, University of Toronto
 Block (2011) has recently argued that empty higher-order representations raise a problem for higher-order theories of consciousness. In response, Rosenthal, Lau, and Brown have defended the higher-order theory on empirical grounds. In this paper, I show that this empirically motivated defense is inadequate. In support of Block, I argue that if empty thoughts are possible, then the higher-order view cannot explain what makes some mental states conscious. I conclude that the higher-order view fails to deliver on its prime motivation: a naturalistic explanation of consciousness.

Epistemic Justification and the Epistemic Ought
Andrew Moon, University of Missouri
 I present a counterexample to Mark Nelson's (2010) thesis that there are no propositions that we epistemically ought to believe. I then show how Nelson's paper and mine open up further discussion and research by making clear possible differences between epistemic justification and the epistemic ought.

Epistemicism and the Liar
Jamin Asay, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
 Recently Paul Horwich has defended an epistemicist approach to the liar paradox. While granting that the liar proposition has a truth value, Horwich denies that we can deduce a contradiction from that fact because we lack the liar proposition’s corresponding T-biconditional. Although this approach may be thought to offer a uniform solution both to the liar paradox and the paradoxes associated with vagueness, I argue that epistemicism is of no help in solving the liar paradox. Even without the liar proposition’s corresponding T-biconditional, we can still derive a contradiction. I conclude by showing how, contrary to what has previously been argued, the epistemicist approach to the liar paradox does not encounter an obvious revenge problem. But this fact is of little comfort, given that the approach offers no solution to the original paradox.

Equality and the Kantian State
Michael Nance, University of Pennsylvania
 Commentators have pursued two main strategies for extracting an account of distributive justice from Kant’s Rechtslehre. The first strategy, pursued by Paul Guyer, involves a re-interpretation of the theory of property Kant develops in Private Right. Guyer argues that Kant’s account of what a right to property is implies a substantial egalitarian commitment. Guyer is correct to say that Kant’s RL is compatible with an egalitarian account of distributive justice, but I suggest some problems with his argument that Kant’s property theory requires property egalitarianism. The second strategy for showing that Kant’s theory has distributive implications, pursued by Arthur Ripstein, focuses on Kant’s remarks about poverty and the state in Public Right. Ripstein is correct that the Kantian state must provide welfare programs for the poor. But Ripstein suggests that the Kantian state may not pursue more robustly egalitarian economic policies. I stake out a middle ground between Guyer’s argument that the Rechtslehre requires robust egalitarianism and Ripstein’s argument that the Rechtslehre is incompatible with robust egalitarianism.

Ethical Professionalism Versus Cronyism: How Women and Minorities Are Affected
Naomi Zack, University of Oregon
 Ethical professionalism today is based on assumed standards of excellence in research and pedagogy, transparent decision processes, and non-discrimination; it is formally protected by non-discrimination laws and policies. Diversity is not mere inclusion: Women and racial/ethnic minorities are demographically new to academic philosophy departments and should expect ethical professionalism after admission or hire. When women or minorities do not participate in professionally powerful subgroups in a department, they may individually experience their exclusion as sexist or racist. When white males form affective and instrumental small groups that control power across a larger demographically diverse group, they are participating in a structure of cronyism. White male cronyism is the other side of institutional sexism and racism-it does not require avowed or explicit white supremacy or misogyny to impair ethical professionalism for women and minorities.

Exclusion, Yet Again
Douglas Keaton, University of Arkansas–Little Rock
 In recent work Karen Bennett has offered a clear defense of non-reductive physicalism against the charge that mental properties, if efficacious, overdetermine their effects. Her defense is compatiblist, and operates on standard assumptions about the functionalist picture of the base physical (neurological) properties that necessitate mental properties. I argue that one of these standard assumptions is false, rendering Bennett’s argument for compatiblism unsound. I argue that Bennett’s argument relies on the assumption that the causal background conditions that fix the effects of the core realizer of a mental property are the same conditions as the conditions that guarantee that the core realizer realizes an instance of the mental property. I show that this is not true. The result, while bad for Bennett’s specific argument, is probably good for the non-reductive physicalism that she and many others wish to defend.

Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology
Mark Alfano, University of Notre Dame
 The last few decades have witnessed the birth and growth of both virtue epistemology and the situationist challenge to virtue ethics. It seems only natural that eventually we would see the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology. This article articulates one aspect of that new challenge by spelling out an argument against the reliabilist brand of virtue epistemology. The trouble can be framed as an inconsistent triad: (non-skepticism) many people know quite a bit; (reliabilism) knowledge is true belief acquired and retained through the exercise of intellectual virtue; (epistemic situationism) most people do not possess the intellectual virtues countenanced by reliabilism. Non-skepticism is a Moorean platitude we should aim to preserve at most if not all costs. I muster evidence from cognitive psychology to argue for epistemic situationism. If my argument is correct, then reliabilism must be rejected.

Expecting Too Much of Epistemic Rationality: Why We Need Two Notions Instead of One
Miriam Schoenfield, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 In this paper I argue that we need two notions of epistemic rationality. We need one notion to help us deliberate and another to help us evaluate. In section one I introduce the two notions. In second two I supply the central idea for why these notions must be distinct: the notion we use for deliberation should respect a principle about higher order evidence which I call epistemic modesty, and the principle we use for evaluation should not. In sections three and four I provide two arguments for the importance of this distinction: the first shows why need the distinction to make sense of principles of deference to others, and the second shows why need the distinction to avoid violations of the reflection principle. I sum up with some thoughts about why notions that are relative to agents’ capacities are not good notions to use for evaluation.

Ted Poston, University of South Alabama
 I advocate explanationism in epistemology. Explanationism is the view that inference to the best explanation is a central, if not the central part of normative epistemology. The goal of normative epistemology is to specify the conditions under which a subject has good reasons for believing some propositions. My aim in this paper is to clearly layout the explanationist position. First, I formulate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief's justification. Second, I discuss the nature of explanation. Finally, I offer four cases to distinguish explanationism from rival views in normative epistemology.

Fact of the Matter: Political Ideals and Democratic Consensus
Jeremy Neill, Houston Baptist University
 The consensus among critics has so far been that the deficiencies of ideal theory are serious enough to merit our more concentrated attention. Their criticisms could perhaps be answered to some extent if ideal theorists were willing to pay greater attention to their modeling of empirical circumstances. Three of the most prominent of the roles of ideal theories are edification, inspiration, and general-purpose guidance. A fourth role, practical prescription, is sometimes also capable of being played by ideal theories and is usually even more empirically demanding than the other three roles. It usually is not a very good idea for ideal theorists to be attempting to lay out wide-ranging political prescriptions in situations in which their assumptions are not being regularly and rigorously tested against real-world circumstances.

Facts, Principles, and Justice
Sameer Bajaj, University of Arizona
 G. A. Cohen argues that normative principles justified by facts cannot be fundamental principles. According to Cohen, facts only justify normative principles in light of further principles that play a more foundational justificatory role. Cohen relies on this conclusion to argue that any constructivist selection procedure incorporating facts among its justificatory considerations cannot produce fundamental ethical principles. In this essay, I contend that Cohen’s argument does not undermine constructivist approaches to social justice and morality. Focusing on John Rawls’s "Original Position,” I argue that constructivist procedures can produce principles that are fundamental as substantive ethical principles, even though they are justified by other normative principles. I further argue that the disagreement between Rawls and Cohen over whether fundamental principles of justice can be justified by facts arises from their differing views of the conceptual nature of justice.

Feedback Bias in the Social Sciences: The Case of Paraphilia
Matthew Drabek, University of Iowa
 In this paper I discuss problematic interactions between social scientific work and the public. I do this by examining a form of bias embodied in some of the classificatory work done by the scientists who study and classify human beings. I call this form of bias ‘feedback bias,’ a form of bias where negative social portrayals and marginalization of specific groups come to be reinforced by the study and classification of the group in question. I explore a case study in psychiatry, the classification of the various paraphilias in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA). I point out some of the problems with the DSM and suggest a few positive moves grounded in positive steps the APA has taken in the past.

Feminism and Political Liberalism: A Return to Comprehensive Liberalism?
Jennifer Warriner, University of Utah
 Is liberalism compatible with the feminist aim of ending gender oppression? Some feminist thinkers argue that only comprehensive liberalism provides a suitable normative framework to advance feminist aims. However, in her 2007 paper, "Pornography and Public Reason,” Lori Watson argues that feminist thinkers ought to appeal to political liberalism to fight gender injustice. According to Watson, political liberalism not only has the resources to address gender injustice, political liberalism requires that gender injustice be addressed. This is because gender injustice in the private or social world interferes with the legitimacy of political deliberations between citizens in the political world, which in turn threatens the legitimacy of the exercise of political power. In this paper, I argue that if Watson’s interpretation is correct, this pushes political liberalism in the direction of comprehensive liberalism. I argue that Watson’s account of political liberalism is comprehensive liberalism in disguise: one that purports to describe a general theory for political justice and social relations and which commands citizens’ allegiance over and above any other "private” beliefs they might hold. If I am right, my argument presents a consideration in favour of comprehensive liberalism, for it turns out that feminist critics were right—only comprehensive liberalism can deal with gender oppression.

Formulating Principles of Reasoning
Julia Staffel, University of Southern California
 It has been recognized in recent years that logic, probability, and decision theory are ill-suited for directly providing norms of good reasoning. In a nutshell, these systems either contain rules that would constitute bad reasoning, or they contain rules that are too difficult for humans to follow. In response to these problems, there have been multiple attempts to formulate principles of reasoning that rely upon, but are distinct from rules of logic, probability and decision theory. In this paper, I will present two different approaches that may be called the "criterial approach” and the "tradeoff approach.” The attempts we find in the literature turn out to be all versions of the criterial approach. I will argue that the criterial approach is problematic, and that we should instead focus on developing versions of the tradeoff approach.

Foucault’s Kant
Robert B. Louden, University of Southern Maine
 Foucault issued many statements about Kant’s philosophy, both pro and con, throughout his writing career. But it was not until 2008 (nearly twenty-five years after his death), when his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (originally submitted to the University of Paris, Sorbonne in 1961 as part of his complementary doctoral thesis) was finally published that readers were presented with a book of Foucault’s that focused directly on Kant. How does Foucault understand Kant’s anthropolopgy in this text, and in what ways does this understanding influence his subsequent writings? How does Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s anthropology compare to those of contemporary German and anglophone Kant scholars, and how plausible is his interpretation? In my presentation I will try to answer these questions.

Foundational Theories of Linguistic Meaning and the Heterogeneity of Speech Communities
Daniel Harris, City University of New York–Graduate Center
 In virtue of what does a sentence have meaning for a community of speakers? According to Lewis and Schiffer, the meaning relation is mediated by conventions to use public languages. I offer a variety of criticisms of this theory, the common theme being that it cannot be reconciled with the large degree of linguistic variation found within actual speech communities. According to the Grice-inspired theory I offer, a sentence is meaningful in a community just in case the community members are disposed both interpretively and performatively to pair the sentence with a certain type of speech act. The theory is not committed to public languages, conventions, mutual knowledge, or any particular psycholinguistic theses. I show how it obviates several prominent dilemmas in the philosophy of linguistics and how it can accommodate widespread linguistic variation.

Get Over It: Praising Fairness Over Forgiveness
Krista Thomason, Swarthmore College
 Forgiveness is widely considered a virtue in moral philosophy. Forgiving people are praised for having compassion and humility, and unforgiving people are criticized for being resentful. In this paper, I argue that those who praise the forgiving person for her compassion are committed to an untenable conception of wrongdoing. I argue further that the unforgiving person is not necessarily vicious. Finally, I raise a puzzle about the inconsistency with which we urge others to forgive. In order to solve this puzzle, I suggest the trait we actually praise is fair-mindedness rather than forgiveness.

God Knows (But Does God Believe?)
Jonathan Livengood, University of Pittsburgh
Dylan Murray, University of California–Berkeley
Justin M. Sytsma, East Tennessee State University
 It is standardly held in epistemology that propositional knowledge entails belief. While potential counterexamples have been proposed (e.g., Radford, 1966), they have generally been dismissed as unconvincing. Recently, however, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) have provided empirical evidence that a non-trivial percentage of English speakers do not treat propositional knowledge as entailing belief in some cases. Based on this evidence, they argue that the claim cannot simply be taken for granted, and propose an alternative account of knowledge that better accords with their data (the capacity-tendency account). Here, we provide further fuel for the fire, presenting the results of four new studies that use rather different examples from those given by Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel. These new examples are not well explained by the capacity-tendency account, however, and we conclude by suggesting a different account: that the responses at issue are better explained by a conviction account of belief.

Harm and Reasonable Expectations
Jeffrey Watson, Arizona State University
 A counterfactual account of harm defines an event as harmful to a person if and only if that a person’s well-being is lower compared to the nearest possible world in which the event does not occur. I propose an improvement to existing counterfactual accounts of harm. I suggest that the relevantly "nearest” world for comparison is that which would be most reasonable to expect, had the event not occurred, given the set of evidence available beforehand from the relevant perspective. This account avoids many of the typical objections to counterfactual accounts of harm, and is more informative than current contextualist accounts.

Heidegger and the Properties of Being
Joshua Tepley, University of Notre Dame
 It is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different kinds of being, most notably between the kind of being possessed by human beings and those he calls "presence-at-hand” and "readiness-to-hand.” Nevertheless, there has been very little discussion in the literature about what exactly these kinds of being are. In this paper I provide an answer to this question: I argue that the various "thick” kinds of being countenanced by the early Heidegger are properties of the entities which have those kinds of being. One result of this position is a new opportunity for dialogue between Heideggerians and analytic philosophers. If what Heidegger refers to as "kinds of being” just are properties, then analytic philosophers should have no trouble understanding a large part of what the early Heidegger is doing, namely offering a novel account of what different kinds of entities, especially human beings, are like.

Heidegger’s Kantian Cartesianism
Matthew Shockey, Indiana University–South Bend
 In a pair of easily overlooked remarks in Being and Time, Heidegger claims that two key ideas in Kant’s theoretical philosophy—his view that existence is not a real predicate and his understanding of the subjectivity of space—develop central aspects of Descartes’ theory of substance. While not an implausible view, it raises an interesting question about Heidegger himself: given that his own project of "fundamental ontology” develops just those aspects of Kant’s thought that he links to Descartes’, does that mean there is also a positive link between fundamental ontology and Descartes’ metaphysics? I argue that there is: Heidegger’s account of the understanding of being aims to complete the separation Kant had begun of Descartes’ views of the a priori intelligibility of being from his commitment to a substance ontology.

HOT: Keeping Up Appearances?
David Miguel Gray, Vanderbilt University
 David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states (i.e., a conscious episode consisting of a HOT without the presence of a relevant lower order thought). Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to do the work they are supposed to, we cannot draw a mental appearance/reality distinction. I provide an alternative story that a HOT theorist can invoke to account for cases of conscious misrepresentation. Such a story will require denying the existence of HCS while still accounting for conscious misrepresentation. This is a cost I believe the HOT theorist should be willing to pay.

How Fast Time Passes
Steven Savitt, University of British Columbia
 Many have argued that it is not possible for time to pass because it is impossible to specify meaningfully a rate at which it passes. The natural suggestion, one second per second, is not a rate (it is argued) because (a) it collapses into a pure number when the dimensions cancel or (b) because there is no other possible alternative rate. After reviewing some of the main arguments for (a) and (b) and finding them inconclusive. I show that in Minkowski spacetime it is possible to specify a variable rate for the passing of proper time in terms of coordinate time, and also vice versa. Therefore, even if a no-rate-of-passage argument succeeds pre-relativistically, it fails in special relativity. One might think that my argument could be parodied to produce a rate of passage for space. Interestingly, that’s not so.

How Interactionist Dualism Runs Afoul of Physics
Peter Bokulich, Boston University
 There is a recurring argument in philosophy of mind (presented in various forms by, e.g., Lycan, Montero, Bishop, Averill and Keating) which denies that current physics rules out interactionist dualism. Physics only tells us how physical things behave in the absence of non-physical causes (the argument claims), it tells us nothing about whether or not there actually are any non-physical causes. Here I argue that this objection rests on a mistake. The existence of physical causes does rule out non-physical causes (setting aside worries about overdetermination), and physical research does provide us with good evidence for the claim that all causal processes in our brains are physical. I argue that scientific knowledge of the domains of applicability of physical theories is sufficient to rule out interactionist dualism.

How Should We Claim They Were Philosophers? Reclamation Reconsidered
Sarah Tyson, Vanderbilt University
 In the mid-1980s, feminist philosophers began to turn their critical effort toward reclaiming women in the history of philosophy who had been neglected by traditional histories and canons. There are now scores of resources treating historical women philosophers and reclaiming them for philosophical history. This paper explores the four major argumentative strategies that have been used within those reclamation projects. I argue that three of the strategies unwittingly work against the reclamationist end of having women engaged as philosophers. The fourth type, the one that seeks to transform philosophical practice and reconstruct its history, is the only strategy that will result in that engagement. I argue that is because it is the only strategy that pays sufficient attention to the mechanisms by which women have been excluded from philosophy and its history. Further, I suggest that to bring about engagement with historical women’s writing reclamation must be undertaken as transformation.

How the Doctrine of Double Effect Can Vindicate the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing
Howard Nye, University of Alberta
 The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing states that it’s harder to justify inflicting harm than allowing harm. This is directly plausible, but it faces the objections that it focuses on personal purity, permitting us to let others do our dirty work, and it invests the course of nature with moral significance. Drawing on the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), I offer an explanation of why, in paradigm cases, doing harm is worse than allowing harm, which avoids these objections. I argue that we should interpret the DDE as saying that it’s hard to justify benefiting some at the expense of others, which is a matter of benefiting them by means of events that cause others to be harmed. Typically, doing harm benefits some at the expense of others while allowing harm doesn’t, but the DDE explains the wrongness in action and the permissibility of interference when this is not the case.

How to Be a Biological Racial Realist
Quayshawn Spencer, University of San Francisco
 This paper shows that the case for biological racial realism is more formidable than philosophers have thought, provided that one adopts the right semantic and biological assumptions. Specifically, I will argue that given a referentialist account for the meaning of ‘race,’ and the landmark results from Rosenberg et al. (2002; 2005), one can fashion a respectable population genetic definition of ‘race’ in much the way that Neil Risch et al. (2002) first proposed. However, after developing this position and defending it against salient criticisms, I show that it lacks adequate empirical support due to a systematic error in genetic cluster analysis research. Nevertheless, I leave it as an open empirical question as to whether adherents to this population genetic view of race can overcome my objection.

How to Square E=K with Perceptual Knowledge: The Single State View
David Chavez, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
 Timothy Williamson’s account of perceptual knowledge remains puzzling. The combination of a strictly propositional theory of epistemic support with a nonpropositional view of perception leaves it inexplicable how perceptions function epistemically. Despite Anthony Brueckner’s arguments to the contrary, adopting the Propositional View (PV) of perceptual content can rectify the account while still supplying the preferred answer to skepticism. For Williamson, PV requires embracing what I call the Single State View (SSV). On SSV, one’s favorable perception that p and one’s corresponding knowledge of p are the same mental state. On E=K, such a state would count as evidence and be poised to justify, and the epistemic function of perception would be clarified. This option warrants consideration because it coheres better with key remarks from Williamson on such factive mental states as seeing that A. According to those remarks, seeing that A is a state of knowing—just as SSV says.

Hume, Counterfactuals, and Causation
Joshua Anderson, St. Louis University
 David Hume famously argues against the then current rationalist conceptions of causation. Hume believes that since there is no impression of a power causal influence or necessary connection, rationalist understandings of causation cannot be correct. Instead, Hume argues, what one does have is the constant conjunction of cause c and effect e and the expectation that e will follow c. In this paper, I argue that the considerations that Hume brings against rationalist and powers theories of causation can be applied to present-day counterfactual theories of causation. That is not to say that Hume is right. Rather, if his arguments are effective against the rationalist and powers theories, then they are effective against counterfactual theories. Now, counterfactuals, possible worlds and modality—despite the influence of Leibniz—were not ideas that would have been overly familiar to Hume. Thus, some reconstruction of Hume’s arguments will be necessary.

Ideal Agency and Minimum Agency
Caroline Arruda, University of Texas–El Paso
 I consider whether standard accounts of agency must include the possibility that individuals who meet the criteria for agency must also be able to fail to be agents, such as in cases of weakness of will. I show that the standard view of agency is unable to account coherently for this possibility because it equates agency with ideal rational agency. In place of the standard view, I propose a minimum conception of agency that individuals must meet to count as agents. On the latter view, it follows that individuals ought not be characterized as agents solely in terms of whether they meet the conditions for ideal agency. This view is thus better able to account for the possibility of failure. Since this view is a minimum conception, the possibility of failure is built into the very definition of what it means to be an agent. Modifying the definition in this way is significant, but not simply because it suggests that individuals who intermittently fail to be ideal agents, as in cases of weakness of will or temporary incapacitation, are still agents. There is a more controversial claim that, I will show, follows from this modified definition of agency. Namely, perennially deficient agents, various non-human primates, seriously cognitively disabled individuals, among others, are nonetheless agents on this view. I argue that this is the case because the minimum conception of agency in conjunction with its allowance for failure entails a sliding scale, from less to more ideal, of the kinds of agents that exist.

Implicit Biases: Beyond the Hype
Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh
 Philosophers have recently shown a lot of interest in implicit biases. Their discovery is sometimes viewed as calling for a new taxonomy of mental states, their existence is said to have important epistemological consequences, and they are often mentioned to explain the striking gender disparities in philosophy. In this talk, I will look critically at the science behind these claims.

Indexical Guarantees
Brett Sherman, Brandeis University
 I argue that, insofar as there is a pre-theoretical guarantee associated with "I am here now,” we can explain it without restricting the kind of object to which we relativize the contents of indexicals. Specifically, I argue that the tools needed to explain the guarantee associated with an utterance of "You’re watching NBC” when broadcast on NBC as a station-identification are also available to explain the guarantee associated with "I am here now.”

Indirect Epistemic Teleology Explained and Defended
David Copp, University of California–Davis
 The standards of normative epistemology determine what we ought epistemically to believe. I contend that these are the standards, a disposition to conform with which in the ordinary circumstances of human life equips human beings to deal as well as can be with what I call "the epistemic problem.” The problem is that our untutored processes of belief formation are not in general reliable in all the circumstances where we need them to be, given the kind of things we value and aim to achieve. J. L. Mackie proposed that morality as a "device” needed to solve a "problem” faced by humans because of "certain contingent features of the human condition.” I propose that the standards of normative epistemology have a similar status. The paper aims to develop the view and to answer at least some of the more important objections.

Individual Rights and the Restrictive Force of Just Cause: A Response to Jeff McMahan
Crystal Allen, University of Missouri
 Jeff McMahan gives an account of just cause for war in terms of individual liability, making considerations of individual responsibility, narrow proportionality, and necessity internal to this traditional constraint. I argue that this pulls much more strongly in the direction of pacifism than McMahan himself recognizes, and will rule out many of the paradigmatic just causes for war, including ones McMahan himself endorses. However, I think McMahan is correct to bring considerations of individual rights into just cause, and that we should adopt the implications of this view.

Infallibilism and Contradiction in Plato’s Theaetetus
Matt Duncan, University of Virginia
 In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates attempts to refute Protagoras' measure doctrine (M). There is much debate about how to interpret M. Some argue that M is an expression of relativism and others argue that M is an expression of infallibilism. Gail Fine claims that we should prefer an infallibilist interpretation of M to a relativist interpretation of M because, if M is an expression of relativism, Socrates' refutation of M does not succeed. In this paper I argue that Socrates' refutation of M also fails if M is an expression of infallibilism. So if Fine is right that we should favor interpretations of M that render Socrates' arguments against M successful, then Fine's own interpretation of M (i.e., as an infallibilist thesis) should not be favored. Furthermore, I argue that the way in which Socrates' arguments fail to refute infallibilism casts special doubt on the infallibilist reading of M.

Is Foot an Immoralist?
Ryan Kemp, University of Notre Dame
 In this paper I argue that Philippa Foot’s account of natural goodness commits her to the following theses: (1) the human species is such that we cannot formulate a generalized account of goodness for all its members, and (2) some people, by their very nature, are rationally required to perform actions that Foot is inclined to call categorically bad. Though it’s not clear that either thesis poses a problem for natural goodness accounts per se, Foot claims that each is a hallmark of Nietzschean immoralism, a position she goes to great lengths to attack. If this is right, my contention that each thesis can just as easily be attributed to her account should be worrisome.

Is Intuition Based on Understanding?
Elijah Chudnoff, University of Miami
 According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective: I argue that there are cases in which intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p but not because your intuition is based on your understanding of p.

Is Moral Education a Condition of the Possibility for Moral Obligation?
Joseph Cannon, Marquette University
 Kant’s account of moral education raises questions about his apparent claim that human beings universally recognize the moral law, that "what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone.” Namely, Kant’s account of education often paints it as a precondition for recognizing the ‘ought’ of the moral law, for what in the second Critique he calls the "subjective practicality” of the law. I ask whether for Kant it is possible for a person who has received no moral education to be a moral agent, that is, to be objectively obligated by the moral law. Kant’s account of education and moral development partially answers this question, and shows him to be committed to a social conception of the achievement of the minimal capacity for practical reasoning that is a precondition for moral obligation.

It’s Still Not What You Know that Counts
Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College
 In his classic "It’s Now What You Know that Counts” (1985), Mark Kaplan argued that knowledge is not required for rationality. Focusing primarily on practical rationality, several authors have recently challenged Kaplan’s thesis. One of the most well-known challenges is offered by John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (2008), who argue that it is appropriate to act on one’s belief that P only if one knows that P. When combined with an implicit assumption connecting rationality to appropriately acting on one’s beliefs, Hawthorne and Stanley’s principle poses a direct threat to Kaplan’s thesis. In this paper I defend Kaplan’s thesis by arguing against Hawthorne and Stanley’s principle. I argue that the latter ought to be replaced by a principle that requires sufficiently high justified credence to appropriately act on one’s belief, where ‘sufficiently high’ is determined by the nature of the choice one faces.

Jacobi and the Problem of Nihilism
Jeremy Proulx, Eastern Michigan University
 To the classical German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, we are indebted for the philosophical use of the concept of nihilism. In this paper I argue that 1) Jacobi articulated the main problem of modern rationalist philosophy as the problem of nihilism, and that 2) he offered a solution that articulated a compelling theory about the structure of consciousness that accounts for the constitution of the world as meaningful.

John Milton, Ideas, and Kant’s Opus postumum
Sanford Budick, Hebrew University
 Kant recognized the incompleteness of his first Critique account of how ideas of "reciprocity” and "community of reciprocity” construct experience. I here explore his efforts to complete that account in his repeated levying upon Milton’s integrated representation of ideas of reciprocity in community of reciprocity. Kant turned to products of "poetic art,” especially Milton’s poetry of the sublime, to encounter aesthetic ideas. In the case of Milton’s representation of an aesthetic idea of reciprocity, Kant first follows its "transfer” from empirical objects to a priori ideas of reciprocity within community of reciprocity. In his second engagement with the very same representation, now in the Opus postumum, he follows the "transition” from a priori ideas of reciprocity and community of reciprocity (including sexual reciprocity) to experience of a whole of empirical objects. The "swing” ("Schwung”) between this transfer and this transition is the full reciprocity that constructs "subjectively actual” experience.

Kant and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions
Paul Katsafanas, Boston University
 Kant argues that we can assess the permissibility of actions by asking whether their maxims are in accordance with the "Categorical Imperative.” Critics of Kantian ethics argue that an insuperable difficulty arises at this point: whether a particular action is deemed permissible by the "Categorical Imperative” depends on the way in which the action is described. Accordingly, in order to generate consistent results Kantian ethics needs some way of specifying how particular actions should be described. Defenders of Kantian ethics, including Onora O’Neill, Allen Wood, Mark Timmons, and Barbara Herman have proposed solutions to this problem. In this paper, I investigate these proposed solutions and argue that they fail. We lack a convincing solution to the problem relevant descriptions.

Kant on Newton, Genius, and Scientific Discovery
Bryan Hall, Indiana University–Southeast
 In the Critique of Judgment, Kant defines genius by distinguishing it from science and uses Newton as his paradigmatic example of a ‘great mind’ who was nevertheless not a genius. Kant believes that Newton possesses what today would be called a ‘logic of discovery,’ i.e., a rule-governed procedure where the discovery is the logical consequence of certain well-established premises. Since Newton possesses a logic of discovery, there is no gap that the creativity of genius could occupy between what the rule-governed procedure dictates and the discovery itself. Although I will argue (pace Kant) that Newton does possess a logic of discovery for establishing his law of universal gravitation, nevertheless, he does not possess a rule-governed procedure for generating the logic of discovery he uses to establish the law of universal gravitation. As I hope to show, this second-order discovery makes Newton count as a scientific genius by Kant’s own lights.

Kant on the Primacy of Schematized Categories
Samantha Matherne, University of California–Riverside
 Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims about categories and schemata have given rise to two competing views of their relationship: the external view, according to which schemata are sensible conditions external to the categories; and, (in the minority) the internal view, according to which schemata are an internal constitutive moment of the categories. In this paper, I argue that a new defense of the internal view is needed, which explains the tension in Kant’s account without resorting to either positing two sets of categories, unschematized and schematized, or charging him with confusion about the relationship between the logical functions and categories (Aquila). I show that it is Kant’s clarity about the distinction between categories and functions that gives us reason to reject the external view, and this paves the way for a new interpretation of his conflicting claims, as reflecting either methodological constraints or an abstract characterization of the fundamentally schematized categories.

Kant on the Uses and Abuses of Contempt
Aaron Bunch, Washington State University
 Though it is common to think that the unconditional respect for persons demanded by Kant’s ethics rules out all contemptuous treatment, I argue that Kant thinks there are in fact edifying expressions of contempt that are not only morally permissible, but even morally obligatory. The universal proscription of contempt at MS 6:463 should be understood to refer only to the malicious forms discussed in that section (arrogance, defamation and ridicule), and not to the edifying forms of contempt Kant condones elsewhere. In particular, Kant says we have a moral obligation to avoid "giving scandal,” which requires that we express contempt for public instances of morally degrading behavior.

Kierkegaard on Approximation Knowledge and Existential Truth: An Incompatibilist Interpretation
Nathan Carson, Baylor University
 Kierkegaard (through Johannes Climacus) argues that if human thought always translates actuality into possibility, empirical reality and human knowers themselves are in flux, and empirical knowledge is perspectivally shaped by the data choice and will of the knower, then all human knowledge of empirical reality is at best, an unfinished and uncertain approximation. With Climacus’s addition that it is the non-cognitive passion of belief that nullifies this uncertainty, many scholars have declared Kierkegaard the irrationalist Christian skeptic, par excellence. Against this view, I argue that Kierkegaard is a mitigated skeptic, for he countenances fallibilist approximative knowledge that corresponds to reality. However, I will also argue that, for Kierkegaard, pursuing such knowledge severely undermines the "essential knowing” of subjectivity that he wants to commend. For Kierkegaard, the approximative project should be eschewed in favor of the "essential truth” for an existing being, that is, the task of becoming a self.

Levels, Layers, and Degrees of Resolution
M. Hayden Thornburg, University of Cincinnati
 Kim (2010) identifies both an ontological and epistemic motivation for the "layered model” of nature, according to which the world divides into levels of natural organization. First, he argues that it is necessary to formulate emergentism. Emergentists commit to the layered model, he argues, because higher-level emergents supervene on lower-level non-emergents. Though skeptical about the ontological import of emergence, Kim suggests that salvaging higher-level explanation may require levels of description. Kim (1998) argues that reductive and non-reductive explanations can compete to explain the same event. Understanding this competition requires countenancing levels of explanation. I challenge the ontological motivation for the layered model by endorsing an alternative proposed by Ryan (2007), on which emergence is tied to scope, not level. I also challenge the epistemic motivation for the layered model by suggesting the notion of resolution provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding how "different level” explanations compete.

Limning Structure as an Epistemic Goal
Allan Hazlett, University of Edinburgh
 In this paper I define a property of beliefs—that of being "structure-limning,” or of "carving nature at the joints”—and propose two epistemological applications: (i) that limning structure has pro tanto epistemic value, (ii) that a species of understanding can be defined by appeal to this notion.

Localizing Intrinsic Function
Charles Rathkopf, University of Virginia
 This paper describes one style of functional analysis commonly used in the neurosciences called task-bound functional analysis. The concept of function implicitly invoked by this style of analysis is distinctive in virtue of the complex dependence relations it bears to transient environmental properties. It is argued that task-bound functional analysis cannot explain the presence of structural properties in nervous systems. In addition, an alternative concept of neural function is introduced—one that has been invoked in the contemporary theoretical neuroscience literature. An argument is given to show that this alternative concept of functional analysis may help to overcome the explanatory limitations of task-bound functional analysis.

Locke’s Reply to the Skeptic
Shelley Weinberg, University of Illinois
 Locke has been chastised for what has been called his "insouciant attitude” toward the skeptical problem. Along with a representational theory of perception and the ensuing veil of ideas, Locke, without much explanation, claims that we have knowledge of the external world, albeit in a less certain form. I argue that although Locke does not offer a full-fledged solution to skepticism, in his theory of the three degrees of certainty of knowledge (intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive), and in the reasons for the different degrees of certainty, is an interesting, consistent, and philosophically satisfactory reply to the skeptic.

Love and (Polygamous) Marriage? A Liberal Defense of Opposition to Polygamy
Emily Crookston, Washington University in St. Louis
 The issue of legalizing polygamy arises in relationship to the US debate concerning legalization of gay marriage. Opponents of gay marriage raise the threat of a slippery slope: allowing gay marriage would require allowing other non-traditional domestic partnerships, including polygamy, which we think should remain impermissible. This creates a dilemma for political liberal thinkers: (a) allow the slide and explain why we shouldn’t worry about polygamy or (b) stop the slide and explain why polygamy is intrinsically anti-liberal. In this paper, I argue, that political liberals ought to oppose legalization of polygamy on the grounds that it is intrinsically a structurally inegalitarian practice. While legalization would be permissible within an ideally just democratic political system, I argue that legalization within non-ideally just democratic political systems would increase the risk of exploitation of members of disadvantaged groups in society.

Luck and Control
Stephen Steward, Syracuse University
 I discuss the popular view that luck excludes control. Coffman (2009) and Levy (2009) defend this view against objections from Lackey (2008). I argue that Coffman’s formulation of the view is incomplete without a temporal index. I discuss four different options for time-indexing, and give counterexamples to all of them. Then I propose that luck excludes a different kind of control: guidance control. The resulting account avoids the problems with Coffman’s view.

Lying with Conditionals
Roy Sorensen, Washington University in St. Louis
 If you read this abstract, then you will understand what my essay is about. Under what conditions would the preceding assertion be a lie? Traditional definitions of lying are always applied to straight declaratives such as `The dog ate my homework.’ This one sided diet of examples leaves us unprepared for sentences in which conditional probability governs assertibility. The truth-value of conditionals does not play a significant role in the sincere assertion of conditionals. Lying is insincere assertion. So the connection between lying and falsehood is broken when lying with conditionals. Drawing on Frank Jackson’s account of indicative conditionals, I argue that it is possible to lie with true conditionals by virtue of their false conventional implicatures. False conversational implicatures only guarantee misleading assertions, not lies. Lying remains a semantic rather than a pragmatic affair.

Manipulation and the Rational Capacities
Moti Gorin, Rice University
 Despite its ubiquity, its conceptual richness, and the subtlety of the ethical problems it raises, interpersonal manipulation has received relatively little attention from philosophers. In this paper I take one modest step toward developing a full account of interpersonal manipulation by examining a claim I have encountered occasionally both in the literature and in conversation. This is the plausible claim that manipulation is, or at least always involves, the bypassing or subversion of the manipulated agent's rational capacities. If this were true, it likely would be an ethically salient fact about manipulation. I explore various interpretations of what it means to bypass or subvert an agent's rational capacities and I argue that none of them captures a phenomenon that is always inconsistent with manipulation. Manipulation is sometimes consistent with treating others as rational beings.

Marmor, Putnamian Externalism, and the Semantics of ‘Law’
John Kwak, University of Southern California
 In chapter five of his Interpretation and Legal Theory, Marmor argues that the natural language word ‘law’ is not possibly semantically externalistic, in the sense of Putnam (1975), on the ground that the concept expressed by ‘law’ is a "purely cultural product” and hence incompatible with externalism. The aim of this paper is to present and critically evaluate Marmor’s argument, judging it to be unsound on the ground that it rests on a key equivocation.

Mary Anne Warren and Duties to Animals
Michael Boylan, Marymount University
 This presentation will support Mary Anne Warren’s "weak animal rights” position. In particular the following positions will be discussed: the flaws in the "strong animal rights position” and a critical examination of the weak animal rights position including (1) any creature whose natural mode of life includes the pursuit of certain satisfactions has the right not to be forced to exist without the opportunity to pursue those satisfactions, (2) that any creature which is capable of pain, suffering, or frustration has the right that such experiences not be deliberately inflicted upon it without some compelling reason, (3) that no sentient being should be killed without good reason. In the practice of implementing these principles, it is understood that there needs to be an overarching tie-breaking system that will apply to all non-human organisms.

Mary Anne Warren on Replicants, Cyborgs, and Pre-Cogs: Personhood and Feminist Ethics
Wanda Teays, Mount St. Mary’s College
 Early in her career, Mary Anne Warren examined the issues of personhood and membership in the moral community. Her criteria included consciousness, reasoning ability, ability to communicate, among others. (Genetic) humanity was not on the list. Someone could reason, communicate, feel pain and yet not be human. This opened the potential-person door for such entities as vampires, cyborgs, androids, avatars, humanoids, extraterrestials, and dolphins. In addition, Warren thought it unwise to rest moral agency on one criterion, such as rationality or sentience. In her book Moral Status she suggested a few principles to help guide us. The result was a wider view of moral agency and the role of relational properties in moral reasoning—thereby reinforcing the work of Feminist Ethicists. Warren’s discussion merits our attention and helps us better appreciate her legacy.

Masks, Abilities, and Opportunities: Why the New Dispositionalism Cannot Succeed
Christopher Evan Franklin, Biola University
 Conditional analyses of ability have been nearly entirely abandoned by philosophers of action as woefully inadequate attempts of analyzing the concept of ability. Recently, however, Kadri Vihvelin (2004) and Michael Fara (2008) have appealed to the similarity between dispositions and abilities, as well as recent advances in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to construct superior conditional analyses of ability. Vihvelin and Fara claim that their revised conditional analyses of ability enable them to show that Frankfurt-style cases fail to severe the connection between freedom and responsibility and that compatibilism about free will and determinism is true. I show, however, that even granting the truth of their dispositional analyses, they cannot achieve these aims. Vihvelin and Fara’s fundamental error lies in failing to appreciate the complex nature of free will and moral responsibility, specifically that agents’ freedom and responsibility depend not only on their abilities, but also their opportunities.

Meeting the Demand of Family Justice: Arguing for Rawls’s Consistency
Pin-Fei Lu, Taipei Medical University
 How should justice be applied to the family? Susan Okin challenges John Rawls for his inconsistently applying the principles of justice to the basic structure of society and the family. In this paper, I defend for Rawls against Okin’s charge of inconsistency. Rawls’s view is not contradictory, for his way of application implies a space for different kinds of duty for people who are near and dear and who are not; moreover, his account of political justice offers a reasonable protection for justice within the family. In other words, Rawlsian way is a dualist arrangement of justice, which is supported by the fact that citizens’ multiple identities and standpoints necessitate different duties and affections. Eventually, Rawlsian family justice could serve as political philosophy for what many of us believe public policy should be in accordance with women’s equality.

Metaphysics as Foundations of Science
Johanna Wolff, University of Puget Sound
 The question of how much metaphysics is involved in doing science and/or doing philosophy of science is a pressing one. Some philosophers of science consider themselves ‘anti-metaphysicians’ and aim to avoid metaphysics altogether. Others, by contrast, propose that philosophers of science should do metaphysics, but a scientifically grounded metaphysics. These opposing views about the role of philosophers of science vis-à-vis metaphysics indicate a need for clarification: when we look for metaphysics in science, what are we even looking for? In this paper I distinguish two different ways in which metaphysics might be thought to be involved in science, and suggest three conditions for telling whether elements of scientific theories are metaphysics.

Methodology in Biological Game Theory
Simon Huttegger, University of California–Irvine
Kevin Zollman, Carnegie Mellon University
 Game theory has a prominent role in evolutionary biology, in particular in the ecological study of various phenomena ranging from conflict behavior to altruism to signaling and beyond. The two central methodological tools in biological game theory are the concepts of Nash equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). While both were inspired by a dynamic conception of evolution, these concepts are essentially static—they only show that a population is uninvadable, but not that a population is likely to evolve. In this paper we argue that a static methodology can lead to misleading views about dynamic evolutionary processes. Instead, we advocate a more pluralistic methodology, which includes both static and dynamic game theoretic tools. Such an approach provides a more complete picture of the evolution of strategic behavior.

Modeling Without Representation
Alistair Isaac, University of Pennsylvania
 Recent analysis of the scientific practice of modeling has puzzled over how to understand the use of models that appear to represent the causal structure of the world incompletely or incorrectly. I argue that this puzzle is an artifact of the realist emphasis on representation that has worked so well in analyzing other areas of scientific practice. I offer an alternative, pragmatic methodology of modeling, inspired by classic papers by modelers themselves. I conclude by arguing that there is no inconsistency between realism about theories and pragmatism about models. Furthermore, apparent inconsistencies between the assumptions of a successful model and a successful theory should not be treated as a puzzle about the model, but as a clue for better understanding the theory.

Moral Emotions: Detectors or Projectors of Moral Values?
William A. Rottschaefer, Lewis & Clark College
 I sketch a scientifically based moral realism that has cognitive and motivational roles for moral emotions as detectors of moral properties and motivators of moral action rather than as projectors of moral properties onto a valueless world. To do so, I outline an ontology of objective moral values as relational entities, a theory of moral agency derived from Bandura's social cognitive theory of agency and a psychological theory of moral affordances. Applying a modified version of Jesse Prinz's account of emotions, I argue that moral emotions are perceptual detectors of objective moral values and motivators of actions to achieve them.

Moral Intuitionism Defeated?
Nathan Ballantyne, Fordham University
Joshua Thurow, Mount Marty College
 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument against moral intuitionism—the view on which some moral beliefs enjoy noninferential justification. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights a set of facts relevant to the truth of moral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that many moral beliefs are false. Once we realize this, he argues, then either our moral beliefs are unjustified or we produce some special reason for thinking that some of them are reliably produced. Either way, our moral beliefs will then no longer be noninferentially justified. This paper argues that Sinnott-Armstrong's argument employs a dubious epistemological assumption about how defeaters can be defeated.

Moral Luck Defended
Nathan Hanna, Drexel University
 Moral luck occurs when someone’s moral standing is affected by factors beyond her control, i.e., "luck.” Many philosophers reject moral luck, but I don’t. I think there’s lots of it. Here, I defend a particular kind of it: circumstantial luck. Circumstantial luck is luck in one’s circumstances that affects one’s moral standing, say luck involving the choices and opportunities one has. I’ll criticize the standard argument against circumstantial luck. The argument claims that counterfactuals about what one would do in different circumstances affect one’s moral standing just as much as what one actually does.

Moral Perpendiculars
Hallie Liberto, University of Connecticut
 Certain morally evaluative terms do not occupy a clear sub-section on the traditional scale of moral rightness and wrongness. In this paper I will argue that certain such terms, ‘supererogation’ and ‘evil,’ require axes perpendicular to the traditional scale in order for us to comprehensively assess a variety of actions. Luke Russell has argued that no philosopher has produced a plausible account of evil that has successfully arrived at a qualitatively distinct set of characteristics to demarcate evil actions from mere wrong-doing. I will argue that there is a type of distinctness by which two action-types can be identified by the same set of qualities, but measured on different scales. Since an account of evil that Russell deems plausible can be measured on just such a perpendicular axis, Russell is incorrect in his assessment of evil as a ‘wrong intensifier.’

Moral Responsibility, Ignorance, and Akrasia
Philip Robichaud, Rice University
 In this paper I critique an influential account of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. Any account of the epistemic condition should explain the difference between culpably ignorant agents and blamelessly ignorant ones in a way that illuminates why it is fair or reasonable to blame the former but not the latter. Volitionists maintain that ignorance is culpable only if the ignorance is the product of an agent’s witting violation an epistemic requirement or norm. The relevant norms are understood as requirements to act in certain belief-producing ways. The witting violation of a requirement of this kind is a paradigm instance of akrasia. Volitionists have a powerful argument against any account of the epistemic condition that does not ground culpable ignorance in akrasia. In the most developed version of this strategy, Neil Levy, argues that it is unreasonable to expect agents to take measures to modify their beliefs in cases where agents did not form their beliefs akratically. There are two central claims in his argument. First, he claims that it is unfair to expect agents to modify their beliefs in accordance with an epistemic standard so long as the agent lacks the capacity to do so. Second, he claims that agents possess this capacity only if they can conform to the epistemic standard in a rational way. In this paper, I raise several challenges to this argument. First, I argue that even on the sense of rationality Levy presupposes, agents do have the capacity to modify their beliefs in accordance with epistemic requirements. Second, I argue that Levy’s conception of rationality is far too stringent. On a less stringent and indeed more plausible conception of rationality, Levy’s case against the non-volitionist breaks down. This is a significant result, since much intuitively culpable ignorance is not traceable to akratic actions.

Music as Communication of Aesthetic Ideas
Georg Mohr‏, Universität Bremen
 One crucial and complex claim in Kant’s philosophy of music (Critique of the Power of Judgment, sect. 53) can be unpacked as follows: As beautiful art, music is the expression of "aesthetic ideas.” Aesthetic ideas are expressed by "proportionate dispositions” of sensations with a "mathematical form.” "Composition” with this form leads in music to the "unity of an affect.” This "dominant affect of the piece” is related to a "theme” that is in turn characterized by an "unutterable fullness of thoughts.” This paper attempts to determine what aesthetic ideas in music might be. It attempts to articulate what music might have to do with "fullness of thoughts.” Finally, it attempts to determine what musical theory of "dominant affect” might allow Kant to conceive of music as communication of aesthetic ideas.

Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?
Barbara Gail Montero, City University of New York–Graduate Center
 The standard arguments against physicalism purport to establish that certain mental properties do not supervene on the fundamental properties of physics, where supervenience is supposed to capture the idea that one set of properties determines, or suffices for, another set of properties. The supervenience of mental properties on fundamental physical properties is taken as a necessary condition for physicalism because the failure of such supervenience is thought to render mental properties nonphysical; and if there is something nonphysical, physicalism, which holds that everything is physical, is false. Many have objected to various aspects of the standard antiphysicalist arguments, but most, if not all, agree that if physicalism is true, then mental properties supervene on the fundamental physical properties. I aim to question this widely, perhaps even universally, held view: Why should the supervenience of the mental on the physical be a necessary condition for physicalism?

Negation and Normative Belief
Vladimir Vlaovic, Brown University
 Expressivists have not given a convincing account of inconsistency. An agent’s accepting a normative sentence and its negation is a serious mistake. If this is construed by expressivists as an agent’s having logically distinct types of non-cognitive attitudes directed toward the same bit of content, it is unclear what the mistake is. And if this is construed by expressivists as an agent’s having an incompatible (inconsistent) pair of instances of a single type of attitude, the mistake seems to be that these instances of this attitude cannot be jointly realized. The problem with this is that incompatible pairs of wishes seem to be inconsistent in virtue of the fact that they cannot be jointly realized. But there is no rational pressure on an agent with such wishes to abandon or revise his or her wishes, which suggests that the property of being jointly unrealizable does not explain rationally vicious inconsistency relations, such as those involved in an agent’s accepting a normative sentence and its negation. But an individual belief that is untrue is in some sense incorrect, and this is more serious than being unrealized. So a pair of beliefs both of which cannot be true is more seriously at fault than a pair of instances of any non-cognitive attitude which cannot be realized. This is a point in favor of construing normative judgment cognitively, though perhaps not a decisive one.

Nietzsche and the Tradition of Minimalist Moral Psychology
Joseph Swenson, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign
 This paper argues that Nietzsche’s enigmatic claims to originality as a psychologist are best understood in terms of two distinct senses of psychological originality operative within his writing. Drawing on Bernard Williams, I argue that the first sense of originality is discovered through Nietzsche’s identification with a minority ‘minimalist’ tradition of moral psychology whose membership stands in opposition to the dominant moralizing tendencies of the Western tradition. But I will argue that Nietzsche also presents us with a second sense of his originality as a psychologist through his claim to inaugurate a radically new evaluative project—the ‘Revaluation of all Values’—that reveals why he is not only the greatest exemplar of the minimalist moral tradition but also its "opposite.” The novelty of this claim, I will argue, not only serves to significantly qualify Nietzsche’s broadly naturalistic commitments to the tradition of minimalist moral psychology but also serves to justify his otherwise odd claim that psychology did not exist before him.

Non-intentional Action
Brandon Johns, University of Southern California
 The existence of intentional and unintentional action is relatively uncontroversial. The question of whether there exists a third type of action—non-intentional action—is the controversial subject of this paper. I present an argument that non-intentional action exists in the form of lucky and side-effect action.

Nonmonotonic Thoughts on Conditional Oughts
Malte Willer, University of Chicago
 Every adequate semantics for conditionals and deontic modals must solve a number of paradoxes involving deontic conditionals. Puzzles involving deontic conditionals that articulate contrary-to-duty obligations—obligations that hold in deontically non-ideal circumstances—have received a lot of attention in philosophy and linguistics. I present a semantics for "ifs” and "oughts” that combines insights from dynamic semantics with recent work on informational modal operators. The resulting nonmonotonic logic preserves intuitive rules of inference for iffy oughts (including modus ponens) while offering a plausible treatment of deontic conditionals that articulate contrary-to-duty obligations.

Normativity and Critique
Beatrice Han-Pile, University of Essex
 This paper distinguishes two main critical questions: the "how possible,” which looks for enabling conditions (empirical or transcendental) and raises issues of epistemic normativity, and the "whether permissible,” relating to ethical conditions and normativity. It considers the interplay of both questions in Foucault’s work and the various demands for justification which were put to him. It argues that as a consequence of such interplay Foucault is faced with the three sides of the Agrippan trilemma (regression, circularity, and dogmatism), exemplified in various commentators’ attacks about the issue of crypto-normativity, and charts the complex conceptual space available for a defence. After examining several possible replies and their difficulties, it concludes that the best strategy is to refuse the demand for normative justification as self-defeating and to cultivate the development of an appropriate ethical sensibility through an emphasis on critique as a practice of the self.

Normativity and the Will
Ruth Chang, Rutgers University
 What is the role of the will in practical normativity? I offer an answer.

Omissions as Possibilities
Sara Bernstein, Duke University
 What are omissions? Suppose that an airplane technician eats lunch rather than perform a safety check, and the airplane crashes due to a malfunction. Intuitively, the technician’s failure to check the plane causes the plane to crash. What, exactly, is the failure to check the plane? Omissions are metaphysically puzzling. On the one hand, they seem to be nothing: they are events that do not occur. On the other hand, we intuitively reify omissions and grant them causal efficacy. I present and develop the view that omissions are de re possibilities: they are possibilities of actual events. They do not literally fail to occur; rather, they possibly occur. Once we have an ontology of omissions, we can better understand their role in causation and in attributions of moral responsibility.

On Believing in Neutrons but Not Numbers
Kenneth Boyce, University of Notre Dame
 Scientific realists who do not want to be mathematical realists face a challenge. It seems that our justification for believing in unobservable entities like quarks and neutrons primarily stems from the fact that their existence is entailed by our best, most well-confirmed scientific theories. But our best scientific theories are shot through with mathematics and thereby also entail the existence of mathematical entities. Doesn't epistemological consistency demand, if one believes in concrete unobservables, that one believe in mathematical entities as well? Elliot Sober has suggested a line of response to this challenge of which scientific realists who are not mathematical realists might want to avail themselves. But (as I argue) it is not obvious that the suggested line of response succeeds. I then show how to extend this line of response so that it does meet the above challenge.

On the Infinite Richness of Seeming and Its Relevance to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Bernard Molyneux, University of California–Davis
 I show how a previously ignored a priori principle explains the existence of the hard problem of consciousness.

On the Scope of Causal Explanation in Physics
Andrew Wayne, University of Guelph
 Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even in physics. Preeminent among these approaches is James Woodward’s influential argument that a wide range of explanations in physics are causal explanations, based on his interventionist approach to causation (Woodward 2003; Woodward 2007). The present paper argues that Woodward’s account of causal explanation is inconsistent with one significant kind of explanation in physics, namely explanations involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, yet they do not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes. This constitutes a significant limitation on the scope of causal explanation in physics. Causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as Woodward and other proponents have claimed.

One Dogma of Millianism
Derek Ball, University of St. Andrews
Bryan Pickel, Universitat de Barcelona
 We argue that standard epistemic arguments for Millianism can be generalized to show that every judgment is revisable in light of empirical information, and, therefore, knowable only a posteriori. We argue that Millians are ill-suited to resist this generalization of their arguments, and that they would be better served by a Quinean empiricism.

Open Possibility and the Knowledge Argument
Torin Alter, University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa
 In his recent book, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, Derk Pereboom presents an intriguing challenge to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The challenge is based on what he calls the open possibility of introspective inaccuracy: the claim that, given what we now rationally believe, it is epistemically possible that phenomenal properties are not as they are introspectively represented to be. That claim can be understood in different ways, depending on how the relevant notions of possibility and inaccuracy are explicated. I will argue on no plausible interpretation does it undermine the knowledge argument. Time permitting, I will also briefly explain why similar problems arise for other physicalist strategies, such as the meta-modal objection to the conceivability argument.

Paradox Lost and Gained: The Coherence of Maximal God
Majid Amini, Virginia State University
 The classical monotheistic concept of God has been bedevilled by a plethora of logical and metaphysical paradoxes. Recently there have been a number of attempts claiming that by reforming the traditional concept of God as an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being to a concept of God as the being with maximal consistent set of knowledge, power and benevolence, the monotheistic concept of God can be rescued from contradictions and thereby reinstating a viable version of Anselmian theism. By focusing on omnipotence specifically, the purpose of this paper is therefore twofold: (1) to show the logical impossibility of maintaining an absolute or infinite conception of divine attributes, and (2) to show that even a maximal conception of divine attributes is plagued with the problem of uniqueness of God and a variant of the paradox of omnipotence thus indicating that such reformulations are still beset with dilemmas and paradoxes.

Partiality and the Significance of Shared History
Nina Brewer-Davis, Auburn University
 We have reasons to act differently toward some people than we do toward others, just in virtue of our relationships with them. What can explain the difference between relationships that give rise to partiality and those that do not? Niko Kolodny has recently tried to explain the difference by appeal to shared history, but his account leaves important questions unanswered. These gaps leave him unable to defend his claims about which relationships call for partiality. I argue that shared history between two people is important because of the psychological connectedness that forms between them, which fills in the gaps left by Kolodny's account. People affect each other's values and beliefs, and this reciprocal influence grounds special reasons. This account gives us a fuller understanding of the significance of particular relationships, and in some cases, calls for revisions to Kolodny's conclusions about what reasons those relationships give rise to.

Patience and Perspective
Nicolas Bommarito, Brown University
 In Western philosophy, patience has largely been overlooked. When it is discussed, it is often described as being non-moral and valuable only instrumentally. This is in stark contrast with its central role in Buddhist ethics. I suggest an account of patience, inspired by Buddhist ethics, that analyzes patience in terms of having perspective on our desires and values. This account explains what sort of patience has intrinsic moral value and why.

Perception, Feature Perception, and Object Perception
Jonathan Cohen, University of California–San Diego
 There is a long and distinguished tradition in philosophy and psychology according to which the mind’s fundamental, foundational connection to the world is made by connecting perceptually to features of objects. On this picture, which we’ll call feature prioritarianism, minds like ours first make contact with the colors, shapes, and sizes of distal items, and then, only on the basis of the representations so obtained, build up representations of the objects that bear these features. The feature priority view maintains, then, that our perception/knowledge of objects asymmetrically depends on our perception/knowledge of simple features. This paper has two aims. First, we will present evidence, drawn from a variety of perceptual effects, that feature prioritarianism cannot be true, since there are cases that speak against the priority of feature representations in perceptual processing. Instead, we claim that the evidence supports an alternative—and more complex—no-priority view. Second, we will offer a framework for a no-priority view that both captures the cases we cite and provides a more sensible architecture in which to understand a variety of productive projects in perceptual science, and show how the framework cross-cuts some recent discussions in philosophy of perception.

Perfectior”: Reconciling Heaven and Resurrection in Aquinas' "Treatise on Happiness
Daniel Bader, University of Toronto
 Aquinas must reconcile two aspects of Christian doctrine: that the disembodied souls of saints in heaven are happy, and that the resurrection is a desirable thing. Denial of the first appears to deny the reward of heaven for the holy, and denial of the second would deny the importance of a central doctrine of Christianity. In order to reconcile these positions, Aquinas claims that the disembodied soul has its perfect good, but that the incarnate soul is more perfect still. However, Aquinas appears to be using a comparative degree of an inherently superlative concept: the perfect good. His reconciliation rests in considering perfection under two different aspects: under a psychological aspect as desires needing to be satisfied, and under a metaphysical aspect as being which is interchangeable with goodness. Under the former, no levels of perfection are possible. However, under the latter, they are.

Perseverance as an Intellectual Virtue
Nathan King, Whitworth University
 Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of cognitive character traits. These traits comprise an important kind of intellectual virtue. Among the intellectual virtues that have received extended treatment in the literature are responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. To my knowledge, no philosopher has undertaken an extended treatment of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. In the present paper, I take up this task. In section 1, I locate perseverance as a specifically intellectual virtue. In section 2, I adopt an oft-borrowed Aristotelian structure in locating intellectual perseverance in relation to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. In section 3, I consider some important relations between perseverance and other intellectual virtues. In particular, I argue that intellectual courage is a species of perseverance—an important result, given the prominence of courage in the present literature.

Philosophy in Japan after World War II
Yukio Irie, Osaka University
 After World War II, philosophical research in Japan addressed Marxist and Existentialist philosophies. Research into Marxism moved from a focus on the theory of alienation to a focus on the theory of reification, and Wataru Hiromatu was a distinguished philosopher in this area. Research on Existentialism shifted to research on Phenomenology, Structuralism, Poststructuralism, and Postmodernism. However, the popularity of Marxism declined after the end of Cold War, and that of Postmodernism eroded after the economic bubble burst in 1991. Subsequently, the primary focus of philosophical research shifted gradually to analytic philosophy. Research on applied philosophy and on Japanese philosophy after the Meiji Restoration is currently attracting substantial attention, and these theoretical perspectives are developing into new movements. It is difficult to place the development of philosophy in Japan after World War II into a linear framework. However, an understanding of developments in this domain may reflect the development of theories of personhood or selfhood.

Plato and Movie Violence
Sarah Jansen, University of California–Los Angeles
 I shall argue that Plato proposes a plausible model of how popular drama negatively impacts adults, one which ought to shake our collective confidence that the adult psyche is somehow "immune” to the adverse effects of movie violence. First, I shall explore the differences between Greek drama and modern movies. Second, I shall interpret Plato’s analysis of how tragedy corrupts the adult psyche and conclude that Plato’s model is transferrable to modern film, despite differences between Greek and modern theater. In section III I will apply Plato’s model to violent movies, suggesting that contemporary theorizing about the effects of violent movies supports Plato’s model, even though Plato’s model is more comprehensive in that it considers and links the immediate effects of drama inside of the theater (i.e.,—the evocation of emotion) to the effects of drama outside of the theater. In section IV I consider ‘pretense theories’ of how film evokes emotion and argue that Plato’s non-pretense model is a formidable rival, insofar as it is better able to explain the after-effects of violent movies on the adult psyche, while remaining sensitive to the fact that adults are less impressionable than youths.

Plato on Mimesis and Mirrors
Rebecca Bensen Cain, Oklahoma State University
 I examine how the "mirror passage” in Republic Book X (596c-e) helps Socrates formulate the conception of mimesis used in his arguments against painting and poetry. The focus of my discussion is the metaphysical argument which contains the mirror passage (596a-598b). I show that the mirror analogy gives Socrates a dialectical advantage that he would not otherwise achieve. Socrates builds a framework of Form, artifact, and image which relies heavily upon the appearance-reality distinction which in turn relies upon the metaphorical imagery of the mirror passage. When the argument is examined closely as a dialectical argument, it is quite inadequate. If Socrates succeeds at all with Glaucon in his attempt to show that painters and poets are both imitators, his success is due primarily to the mirror analogy and its metaphorical force.

Positively Misleading Errors
Matt Haber, University of Utah
 Positively Misleading Errors (PMEs) are cases of scientific reasoning in which adding data to an analysis systematically strengthens support for an erroneous hypothesis over a correct one. PMEs bear resemblance to false positives and statistical inconsistency, but warrant distinction. Notably, PMEs are not a function of poor or insufficient data. Once diagnosed, the very same data may be used to accurately discern features of the system of study. PMEs are also not simply a failure to satisfy statistical consistency, but something logically stronger. PMEs may play both a confounding and constructive role in scientific reasoning, demonstrated by cases drawn from phylogenetics and medicine. The presence of PMEs challenges the notion that accumulation of and simple conditionalization on good data will produce good reasoning. The real story, as is so often the case, is more complex.

Preferences vs. Desires: Debating the Structure of Conative States
Armin Schulz, London School of Economics
 In this paper, I argue that the question of whether our conative states are monistic (desire-like) or comparative (preference-like) is, despite appearances to the contrary, still very much in need of resolution. In particular, I try to show that, on the one hand, none of the major decision theories can be used to answer this question (as they remain mute on precisely this point), and on the other, the only explicit attempt at settling this debate to date—that of John Pollock—is unsuccessful as well (as it is unjustifiably biased towards desires). In this, way, I hope to show that the structure of conative states is a widely overlooked issue that still needs to be further investigated.

Profit-driven Research and Conflicts of Interest: Is Impartiality the Solution?
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin, Cornell University
Kristen Intemann, Montana State University
 Increased private funding of research has raised two related concerns: a fear that commercial interests may bias the direction of research toward profitable aims, regardless of its social value; and a worry that researchers' financial conflicts can lead to biases in scientific reasoning. In attempting to address these problems, some have argued for a renewed commitment to a norm of scientific impartiality. Presumably, if scientists are impartial, this will minimize the undue influence of commercial interests. Moreover, several philosophers of science have provided more sophisticated accounts of objectivity that promote impartiality of scientific communities. We argue that problems related to commercialized science cannot be successfully addressed by scientific impartiality, understood as a norm for governing either individual researchers or scientific communities. Instead such worries require reframing the debate from one focusing mainly on epistemic concerns to one attentive to the best way to promote socially responsive research.

Proper Place, Form, and Natural Elemental Motion in Aristotle
Richard Tierney, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
 In Physics VIII 4, Aristotle articulates a problem that directly relates to the natural motions of the elements (although he actually frames it in the more general terms of "light and heavy things”). The problem is that, in the case of their natural motions, "it is no longer evident, as it is when the motion is unnatural, whence their motion is derived.” This is a problem because of Aristotle’s conviction, of which he also wants to convince his audience, that "all things that are in motion must be moved by something”; a central premise in his argument for the unmoved mover. He purports to solve the problem by appealing to a distinction between two levels of potentiality. In this paper, I argue that in making this appeal, Aristotle implicitly draws upon a particular conception of natural motion, which enables us to understand that the elements must indeed be moved by something.

Provocation, Sex, and Fashion
Jessica Wolfendale, West Virginia University
 The belief that women’s outfits can provoke sexual assault is resilient. Variants of the phrase "dressing provocatively” are used without question in academia and in popular culture, and studies show that many ordinary people believe that a provocatively dressed woman is more likely to be assaulted and bears some responsibility if she is attacked, despite no correlation between wearing revealing clothing and the likelihood of being sexually assaulted. Yet men’s clothing is never described as sexually provocative. Why? I argue that the concept of provocative dress reflects problematic attitudes about women’s responsibility for men’s sexual behavior and women’s relationship to their bodies. These attitudes are based on the depersonalization and objectification of women’s bodies that alienates women from their bodies and undermines women’s autonomy by creating the threat of sexual attack. The use the phrase masks the seriousness of this harm to women’s autonomy and women’s relationship to their bodies.

Putting Fallibilism to Work
Charity Anderson, St. Louis University
 Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath defend the following thesis: (KJ) If you know that p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in f-ing, for any f. In this paper, I discuss their argument for this principle. First, I undermine their argument for KJ and argue that KJ is false: sometimes reasons—even known reasons—are insufficiently warranted to justify action. Second, I argue that a weaker principle can account for an intimate connection between knowledge and action, without the cost of rejecting purism or fallibilism. Finally, I argue that the trilemma they advance is misconceived. KJ, purism, and fallibilism do not form an inconsistent trio. Instead, the trilemma depends on a specific kind of fallibilism. I clarify what kind of fallibilism is needed for the trilemma, and argue that despite a fallibilist position that can maintain both KJ and purism, we nevertheless have sufficient reason to reject KJ.

Questioning Contextualist Error Theory
John Waterman, Johns Hopkins University
 Epistemic contextualism’s semantic theory is usually paired with a cognitive failure theory to explain, or explain away, problems like Cartesian skepticism. The semantic theory claims "know” is context sensitive. The failure theory claims that while most people make context-sensitive knowledge attributions, they do not recognize the logical commitments of those attributions. Accordingly, the theory claims (i) we know in low scrutiny contexts that there is an external world; (ii) we do not know in high scrutiny contexts that there is an external world; and, (iii) we fail to recognize this is not a contradiction. While the semantic theory has become the object of intense, largely negative experimental scrutiny, the cognitive failure theory has received none. I present data that suggests (i) contrary to prevailing results there is evidence for contextualism’s semantic thesis, but that (ii) the cognitive failure theory is not robust enough to explain away the problem of Cartesian skepticism. Contextualism is correct, but The Demon abides.

Race and Context-sensitivity
Jeremy Pierce, Le Moyne College
 In philosophical literature on race, contextualist accounts usually involve wholesale meaning-change, such as different racial-classification criteria in different locations or changes in how we have thought about race over time. This paper argues for context-sensitive features of race-language and racial-classification more along the lines of the kind of contextualism in epistemology, namely a meaning-shift that admits of degrees along a continuum, such as with ‘flat’ and ‘tall.’ Especially in mixed-race cases, rules of classification can change from context to context, and shifts in which factors we care about or which facts we pay attention to can determine what race someone might be classified as. These cases are mostly outliers, but they indicate something about how race-terms, race-thinking, and racially-influenced behavior operate, elements that are mostly hidden when changes in context fail to change the factors we use in assigning people racial categories.

Reason Claims and Contrastive Reasons
Justin Snedegar, University of Southern California
 This paper addresses puzzles about two kinds of reason claims: (i) negative reason existentials like ‘There’s no reason to cry over spilled milk,’ and (ii) reason against ascriptions like ‘The fact that you’ll make a scene is a reason not to cry over spilled milk.’ I argue that by adopting a contrastivist view of reasons, on which all reasons are reasons relative to a set of alternatives (or more naturally but less generally, a reason for x rather than y), we can solve both puzzles. I close by discussing how revisionary this suggestion really is.

Reasonableness, Respect, and the Response to Civil Disobedience
Samuel Huang, Rice University
 In this paper I argue that civil disobedients should be not punished unilaterally with ordinary offenders of the same crime, but that sanctions given in cases of civil disobedience may sometimes be adjusted downwards based on two factors: the plausibility of the reasons for the disobedience, and the respect for other citizens shown in the act of disobedience. I argue that this policy could be assimilated into consequentialist, retributive and communicative theories of punishment, and suggest that disobedients in these cases be allowed to choose from differing levels of legal sanction.

Receptivity, Reactivity, and the Successful Psychopath: How Psychopathy Undermines Three Assumptions about Moderate Reasons Responsiveness
Erick Ramirez, University of California–San Diego
 I argue that research on psychopathy undermines three important claims in support of moderate reasons responsive (MRR) theories of responsibility. I characterize psychopathic agents as having difficulty with feeling empathic distress, as having problems with understanding the salience of their agency, and as not susceptible to "aversive conditioning.” First I argue that psychopathic agents show that the systems that underlie receptiveness to moral and pragmatic reasons bifurcate. This raises a unique form of mechanism individuation problem. Second, these bifurcations newly challenge the claim that "reactivity is all of a piece.” If moral and pragmatic receptivity and reactivity are distinct then we lack a reason to believe that pragmatic reactivity implies moral reactivity. Thirdly, I argue that attempts to incorporate bifurcation into MRR relies on a notion of ‘appropriate’ receptiveness that implies motivational internalism, a claim Fischer and Ravizza have previously rejected.

Reflective Equilibrium and Cognitive Diversity
Susana Nuccetelli, St. Cloud State University
 This paper challenges the ‘cognitive-diversity argument’ offered by Stephen Stich and his collaborators against the Goodman account of the justification of rules of inference. An early version of the argument (Stich 1988, 1990) invokes the logical possibility of cognitive diversity to raise a relativism problem for that account, but a more recent version (Nichols, Stich, and Weinberg 2001; Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 2003) contends that such diversity is a fact. I first show that experimentalists have gained nothing for their argument by taking cognitive diversity to be a fact. I then offer a line of reply that gets Goodmanians off the hook from the experimentalist attempt to raise a relativism problem for them with the early version of the cognitive-diversity argument.

Remembering the Dinosaur: The Role of Memory Traces in an Account of Constructive Memory
Sarah Robins, Washington University in St. Louis
 When I recall a particular past experience, the representation I retrieve may contain features from multiple experiences and even things I have never experienced. A theory of memory traces must explain the constructive nature of memory. Connectionist accounts explain construction as the result of memory traces that are stored suprapositionally. Remembering, reconstructing, and guessing are the same process of activating a network of features amalgamated from various experiences. I propose an alternative dispositional account of memory traces, which accommodates construction without sacrificing the distinction between remembering and other inferential processes. On my view, retrieval is constructive; memory traces are not. Responses to retrieval cues are manifestations of the disposition to remember a past experience. Constructed at cueing, the features manifested in the representation vary as a function of the cue. I conclude by exploring the advantages of an account that distinguishes memory traces from their manifestations in retrieval.

Representing the Impossible
Jennifer J. Matey, Florida International University
 A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious visual perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the visual receptors. According to the active-externalist account of perception, amodal perception draws on a type of knowledge that depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper presents a counterexample to the claim that perception of amodal properties depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. The counterexample involves the experience of so-called ‘impossible objects,’ objects experienced in visual character as having geometrical properties that no physically real object can have. Several potential objections to the counterexample are also considered and rejected.

Respect for Autopilots: Defending Person-based Ethics from Empirically Grounded Skepticism
C. D. Meyers, University of Southern Mississippi
 Recently, skeptical arguments have been raised against the existence of persons as morally responsible, self-governing agents. John Doris appeals to psychological evidence indicating that much of our behavior, including important life decisions, is determined by automatic processes below the level of awareness rather than by conscious reflection. I argue that the moral concept of persons is not threatened by these skeptical considerations. First, even if these automatic processes are pervasive, they might only influence behavior within a range narrow enough not to undermine autonomy. More importantly, if we reject moral realism, then the question is what attitudes we should adopt toward our fellow human beings, not whether persons exist independently of our moralizing. Moral concepts do not aim to explain or predict but to prescribe. Even if we have reason to doubt the existence of persons, we still have reasons to retain the concept of personhood in our moral theory.

Respect for Racists and Homophobes
John Draeger, Buffalo State College
 This paper considers some of the complexities surrounding respect for those with morally disagreeable views (e.g., racists and homophobes). Because moral attitudes take a variety of objects, it is possible to respect them as persons and admire them as friends, neighbors, professionals, and fellow citizens. Distinguishing between objects allows us to bracket various disagreements especially when these do not have a direct bearing upon fulfilling our role appropriate expectations (as friends, neighbors, professionals, and fellow citizens). But because living with integrity and self-respect requires standing up to injustice, respect for others as fellow moral works in progress requires holding the accountable for their views. Thus, respect for persons requires confronting the racist and homophobe in a role appropriate way.

Revisionism’s Experimental Evidence
Chris Weigel, Utah Valley University
 A revisionist theory of free will says that what we ought to think about free will conflicts with what we do think about free will. A new result in experimental philosophy gives evidence for the view that we must all be revisionists in at least this sense: what we ought to believe about free will cannot include everything we do believe about free will. The folk find neither incompatibilism nor compatibilism intuitive simpliciter. Rather, intuitions change as a function of whether the question is "Is determinism compatible with free will?” or "Is free will compatible with determinism?” No theory can accommodate both intuitions (unless the view that they are mutually exclusive is revised), so revisionism is justified empirically.

Rock Stars, Fine Wine, and Healthcare: Questions about Living by One’s Political Beliefs
Daniel Halliday, University of Melbourne
 People often endorse a certain political principle and yet apparently fail to live by it. Libertarians opposed to the state-provision of certain goods may still consume them when their state in fact provides them. Verbal proponents egalitarian redistribution may fail to transfer their wealth voluntarily when the state fails to impose redistributive policies itself. Both cases have been discussed in the Libertarian and Egalitarian literatures, but not together. This paper develops a framework for doing so. In particular, two strategies are identified. First, Libertarians may exploit the fact that many state-provided resources come as public goods, whereas taxation does not have an analogous character. Second, as suggested by some egalitarian authors, political principles may have a sort of collective character. Rejecting some existing developments of this idea, I advance a proposal guided by the way in which a moral requirement may take wide rather than narrow scope across agents.

Self-blindness and Rationality
Matthew Parrott, University of Puget Sound
 Hume believed that all psychological states were distinct existences; each one could exist without any of the others. Even though this thesis intuitively seems to be correct, many contemporary philosophers reject it. Instead, they believe that, with an individual mind, the existence of a psychological state entails knowledge of its existence. On this view, some psychological states ontologically depend on others. Support for this view is found in a well-known argument presented by Sydney Shoemaker in a number of papers. Shoemaker argues that if a person’s psychological states were ontologically independent from her knowledge of them a condition he calls "self-blindness” would be possible. But, according to Shoemaker, this condition is absurd. In this paper, I will argue against Shoemaker that the best explanation for this impossibility does not deny Hume’s distinct existence thesis. Rather, it can be fully explained by aspects of our rational cognitive agency.

Self-defense, Bystanders, and Human Projectiles
Tyler Doggett, University of Vermont
 I consider a powerful and influential argument that, if sound, severely restricts which things may be killed in self-defense. I argue it is unsound and for reasons that have far-reaching implications for which things may be killed in self-defense. The result is a novel theory of why we may kill in self-defense.

Sensitivity Enhancement: The Ethics of Testing Cognitive Enhancements on Non-human Research Subjects
John Basl, Bowling Green State University
 Cognitive enhancement technologies are already in use, but the future promises technologies that offer the possibility of truly robust, cognitive enhancement. Robust Enhancement Technologies (RETs) raise novel ethical issues. While some of these issues have been discussed, there has been little discussion of the ethics of testing these technologies on non-humans. Testing RETs on non-human research subjects raises the possibility that these research subjects will have their sensitivity to suffering altered or enhanced. For example, drastically increasing the memory of, say, a mouse changes the amount of time it might suffer from a painful experience. In this paper, I argue that the probability of such enhancements is relatively high and that, given the moral relevance of animal suffering, this raises and ethical concern. After developing these concerns, I propose research oversight practices to mitigate against mistreatment of sensitivity enhanced research subjects.

Slote’s Metaphorical Moral Phenomenology
Rachel Schneebaum, University of Arizona
 In Moral Sentimentalism, Michael Slote works to develop a metaethical theory that both grounds moral judgments in contingent human sentiments and allows those judgments to be justifiable a priori. Slote relies on a phenomenological claim about moral experiences to support this account: that we feel warmed or chilled when witnessing others’ right or wrong actions. In this paper, I claim that Slote’s appeal to phenomenology is more problematic than it might immediately appear. I work from the position that phenomenology is too idiosyncratic and too theory-laden to serve as argument for or foundation of a metaethical position, and suggest that the metaphorical nature of Slote’s chosen phenomenology allows him to implicitly build normative care ethical commitments into his metaethical semantic account. Thus, I argue, the phenomenology that grounds Slote’s semantic argument cannot serve as the basis for a non-question-begging sentimentalist semantics.

Socrates: Being an Athenian by Loving Wisdom
Robert Scharff, University of New Hampshire
 Historians of philosophy, like historians generally, say that history matters to them. So do men and women of action, who use knowledge of the past to guide decisions. To all of them, history matters because they choose to make it matter. There is, however, another sense in which history simply does matter—in philosophical practice, as elsewhere. Our cultural, social, and political past already belongs to us as an inheritance before it becomes a topic of inquiry or source of practical guidance. Understood this way, history belongs to us unchosen and to some extent eludes our efforts to make it explicit. I offer here a case study of the point: the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues. He may not be "interested in history,” but he is very much aware of how it is to "be” historical, which is why he always connects his examined life with being an Athenian.

Spinoza and the Young Leibniz on Chimaeras and Other Unthinkable Things
Tom Cook, Rollins College
 In his early writings Spinoza discusses extensively the problem of impossible things and our ideas thereof. Insofar as we understand that these things are impossible (say, round squares), we cannot think them at all. They are chimaeras, and just as these self-contradictory "essences” cannot be instantiated in the attribute of extension, neither can they be instantiated under the attribute of thought—i.e., there can exist no ideas of them at all. We can’t even feign (fingere) them. They are mere words. Rather surprisingly, this is also true of those things whose essences are not internally contradictory, but whose necessary causal conditions are not fulfilled. Only our ignorance and confusion makes it possible for us even to think about such things (or, better, to think that we are thinking about such things). I argue that Leibniz’s thoughts about the ontological argument, the Christian mysteries, and possible worlds can be better understood when approached with these early writings of Spinoza in mind.

Stigmatization and Denormalization as Public Health Policies: Some Kantian Thoughts
Richard Dean, California State University–Los Angeles
 The stigmatization of some groups of people, whether for some characteristic they possess or some behavior they engage in, will initially strike most of us as wrong. For many years, academic work in public health, which focused mainly on the stigmatization of HIV-positive individuals, reinforced this natural reaction to stigmatization, by pointing out the negative health effects of stigmatization. But more recently, the apparent success of anti-smoking campaigns which employ stigmatization of smokers has raised questions about whether stigmatization may sometimes be justified, because of its positive effects on public health. Discussion of the issue so far has focused on consequences, and on some Kantian considerations regarding the status of the stigmatized. In this paper, I argue that further Kantian considerations, regarding the treatment of the general public (the potential stigmatizers) also count against any public health policy involving stigmatization.

Substance, Function, and the A Priori
Jeremy Heis, University of California–Irvine
 In his book Substance and Function and later writings, Ernst Cassirer articulated a novel two-part theory of the a priori. This theory assigns, I argue, both constitutive and regulative roles for a priori representations. These a priori representations help explain the possibility of scientific objectivity and thus also objective reference. I consider three questions. Can Cassirer’s theory avoid collapsing into conventionalism (as Schlick and Reichenbach alleged)? Are the two parts of the theory in tension with one another (as some more recent commentators have alleged)? Can the theory coexist with the very strong confirmation holism that Cassirer also advocates (as Quineans would suspect)? I argue that Cassirer has resources to answer all three questions.

Substantive and Formal Goods in Aristotle: Contemplation and Friendship
Daniel Farnham, St. John’s University
 There is a large divide in Aristotle scholarship between people who think that the final end of eudaimonia is contemplation (dominant end theorists) and those who hold that it is morally virtuous action (inclusive end theorists). In this paper, I introduce a distinction between substantive and formal goods to show that contemplation and friendship are two distinct kinds of good, and that on Aristotle’s view the latter takes priority. Because friendship is a formal good, though, the end result is an argument for inclusivism.

Superstrong Multimodality: A New Approach to Perception
Bryce Dalbey, Lewis & Clark College
 Recently, investigations into the contents of perception have looked at sense modalities other than vision. I present three ways sense-specific contents could be unified and provide an argument for the strongest. Weak multimodality holds that modality specific experiences are co-conscious: they are experienced simultaneously as parts of a conjoined overall experience. Each sense could be enjoyed in isolation from the others without change in sense specific content. Strong multimodality claims that sense specific experiences are unified across multimodal frameworks. A tomato can be both red and smooth. A rumbling sound can come from the same location as a diesel motorcycle. Superstrong multimodality holds that we experience only ordinary objects, in a way irreducible to a stable core of modality-specific experiences. Overall perceptual experience is explanatorily and experientially basic. Superstrong multimodality furthermore solves the many-properties problem of common perceptibles by allowing that only overall phenomenal character supervenes on overall content.

The Argument for Subject-body Dualism from Transtemporal-identity
Kirk Ludwig, Indiana University–Bloomington
 Martine Nida-Rümelin has argued recently for subject-body dualism on the basis of reflections on the possibility of survival in fission cases from the literature on personal identity. The argument focuses on the claim that there is a factual difference between the claims that one or the other of two equally good continuers of a person in a fission case is identical with her. I consider three interpretations of the notion of a factual difference that the argument employs, and I argue that on each of them the argument either begs the question or is unsound.

The Balancing Theory of Ought and Reasons Transmission
Ryan Millsap, University of Maryland–College Park
 This paper investigates one standard account of how all things considered oughts are determined by reasons, a view I’ll refer to as the balancing theory. On the balancing theory of ought, one ought to perform an action just in case the reasons for performing that action outweigh the reasons against doing so. So stated, this is a very generic view, and various questions might arise in an attempt to fill in the details. My primary aim in this paper, though, is to look at what sorts of commitments even this general balancing theory will incur in light of the underlying structure it requires. More specifically, I’ll argue that the balancing theory needs to be supplemented with principles that outline the entailment relations that hold between reasons. However, once the principles are in place, new issues appear that threaten to weaken the revised theory’s overall plausibility.

The Confucian Conception of Freedom from a Feminist Perspective
Chenyang Li, Nanyang Technological University
 In this essay, I argue that it will be fruitful to utilize contemporary feminist theories of freedom and autonomy, particularly the notion of autonomy competency (Diana Meyers), in understanding Confucian freedom. I articulate the Confucian notion of freedom in terms of choosing (ze), and advance a Confucian conception of freedom as choosing the good (ze shan) in unfolding the human xing as endowed by heaven. Utilizing a Hegelian notion of freedom as recognition of necessity, I resolve an apparent contradiction between human freedom and the necessity of human nature.

The Difference Between Indexicals and Demonstratives: A Case Study
Alex Radulescu, University of California–Los Angeles
 This paper discusses Kaplan’s claim that one can split indexicals into two: pure indexicals and true demonstratives. Briefly, pure indexicals are words like "today” and "I”, which get their semantic value directly from the context, irrespective of the speaker’s referential intentions. True demonstratives are words like "this” and "that”, which can only get a referent by working off the speaker’s intentions, or some other agent-related feature of the situation. I have a number of goals in this paper. First, I argue that the singular second person pronoun "you” is in some ways like typical pure indexicals, and in some other ways more like typical true demonstratives. Second, I argue that there are good reasons to count "you” as a pure indexical. This will lead me to propose a new criterion for the distinction, which plays down the importance of intentions and focuses instead on the word’s stable meaning.

The Epistemic Function of Virtuous Emotions: The Neo-Confucian View
Kai Marchal, Soochow University
 The general issue of emotions is complex in Neo-Confucian thought, in part because emotions are closely linked to the idea of Neo-Confucian subjectivity. As is well known, the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (1130-1200) particularly emphasizes the role of emotions in human life: the genuineness of "human nature” (xing) becomes manifest only in "emotions” (qing). Furthermore, virtuous or moral emotions seem to have epistemic functions in Zhu’s thinking: they serve crucial roles for perceiving salience and provide the ground for a criterion how to react to a specific situation. This paper examines the issue of virtuous or moral emotions in Zhu Xi. In order to make Zhu’s claim more intelligible, it also analyzes his theory of moral motivation and explains the reason why Zhu Xi has often been perceived as a Kantian avant la lettre.

The Evolution of Spite
Patrick Forber, Tufts University
Rory Smead, University of California–Irvine
 Spite is the shady relative of altruism. Biological altruism is social behavior that incurs a cost (in fitness) to confer a benefit on other individuals. If altruism involves paying a cost to benefit another, spite involves paying a cost to inflict a greater cost on another. After W. D. Hamilton showed that correlated interactions among kin can produce the evolution of altruistic behavior, he came to realize that spiteful behavior could evolve by a similar process. Here we analyze a model of spite. Generally, spiteful behavior is unstable, but we show that it can evolve and be maintained under specific conditions. While the model is Hamilton’s, we have a novel extension to cases where population size fluctuates over time. By focusing on a paradigm case of spite, our model helps clarify philosophical puzzles surrounding the concept of spite and its application to animal behavior.

The Just Soul
Jeff Sebo, New York University
 We typically think that we are morally permitted to engage in "self-binding”—i.e., to coerce or physically restrain ourselves—in order to get our future selves to do what our present selves want to do. For example, if you currently want to keep yourself from drinking tonight, then you are morally permitted to give all your beer and money to a friend to keep until morning, as well as, if you really want to cover your bases, have your friend lock you in your room overnight. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. You have a duty to let everyone live the way they want, including yourself. It follows that self-binding is prima facie morally wrong: you need to have a very good reason to justify binding yourself, just as you do with other people.

The Kyoto School on Nothingness: Japan’s Philosophical Response to the West
Curtis Rigsby, University of Guam
 For the Kyoto School—modern Japan’s most impressive philosophical response to the West—the ultimate Reality grounding and evaluating all being is "Nothingness” (mu). Kyoto thinkers have synthetically characterized Nothingness in terms of Hegelian dialectic, Kantian noumenon, and Christian Divinity, but also as Buddhist Amida and Emptiness. Although Western commentators of Nothingness have focused on its religious and political dimensions, Kyoto School Nothingness is radically holistic, entailing and informing all being, from abstract math and logic, to physics and biology, to ethics and political philosophy, and finally to maximally concrete and complex religious reality. This paper examines the Kyoto architectonic of Nothingness and the epistemology and praxis of its realization, noting its unique formulations by different Kyoto thinkers. This paper also proposes that the holistic character of Nothingness suggests—as intended by the Kyoto thinkers—a critique of Western thought, especially in its highly compartmentalized and non-life-transformational manifestations.

The Limits of ‘Limited Blockage’ Frankfurt-style Cases
Michael Robinson, Grand Valley State University
 Traditionally, philosophers engaged in employing Frankfurt-style cases to challenge the Principle of Alternative Possibilities have mostly sought to construct scenarios that eliminate all an agent’s alternatives. One of the chief difficulties for this traditional approach is that the closer one gets to eliminating absolutely all alternative possibilities the more it appears that agents’ actions in these cases are causally determined. "Limited blockage” versions of these cases are intended to sidestep this worry by blocking all and only those pathways that constitute robust alternative possibilities while leaving open all other alternatives. I argue that, owing to the fact that omissions (and not just actions) are capable of constituting robust alternative possibilities, limited blockage cases cannot avoid collapsing into the more traditional Frankfurt-style cases to which they are meant to be an alternative, and so are vulnerable to the very same concerns they are meant to avoid.

The Malfunction Problem and the Functional Individuation of Biological Traits
Adrian Kwek, Harvard University
 Systemic theories of biological functions hold that a biological trait token’s function is its causal contribution to the overall capacity of its containing system. Coupled with the common view that biological traits are functionally individuated, systemic theories incur the problem of denying the possibility of malfunctions. Amundson and Lauder offer an influential solution to the malfunction problem by rejecting the claim that all biological traits are functionally individuated. Instead, they argue from the practice of functional ascription in anatomy that many biological traits are anatomically—physically as opposed to functionally—individuated. Their solution, however, is limited and they themselves admit to the existence of many important biological traits that are functionally individuated. I propose a reading of their solution that enables a systemic theorist of biological function to accommodate the twin everyday phenomena of malfunctioning biological trait tokens and biologists’ functional individuation of biological traits.

The Metabolism of the State: Machiavelli’s Treatment of the Theme of Auxiliaries at Discorsi II.20
Sean Erwin, Barry University
 For many commentators, Machiavelli’s analyses of kinds of armies are only meant to furnish ‘practical’ solutions to a variety of historical problems and not to be seriously considered beyond their Renaissance context. However, my contention in this paper is that Machiavelli’s criticism of princes and republics that make use of the arms of others (arma alienis) deserves more careful attention than it generally receives. In the paper I show how Machiavelli, in his interpretation of the Capuan episode in Livy’s History of Rome (Book VII, chapters 38 to 42), uses the theme of arma alienis in the Discorsi to show how the people, no matter how apparently neutralized by the grandi, can be viewed as outside the projects of the state and, because of that fact, capable of effecting decisive change to its structures of authority and to the ‘metabolism’ of the state overall.

The Metaphysics of Non-propositional Attitudes
Alex Grzankowski, University of Texas–Austin
 Most philosophical discussions of the attitudes start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. This is unfortunate, for there are non-propositional attitudes. I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. Such states feature prominently in our folk-theory of the mind, but their objects seem to be, at least on the face of things, something other than propositions. Without some treatment of these attitudes, a theory of the mind can’t be complete. The present paper offers a positive treatment of the non-propositional attitudes that avoids especially difficult problems that they pose concerning non-existent entities.

The Nature and Value of SoTL
David Concepcion, Ball State University
Paul Green, Mount St. Mary’s College
 In order to teach well, we need to develop content expertise. But we also need to develop pedagogical expertise. Many philosophers interested in maximizing student learning have turned to the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL) to develop pedagogical expertise, and some are now making important contributions to the SoTL field. Our presentation is designed to address basic questions regarding the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning: What is SoTL (and how is it different from good teaching; from scholarly teaching)? What is its value to the practitioner? To the profession? And, most importantly, to students? What are the first steps for faculty who wish to newly engage themselves in SoTL? The goods of SoTL are many, and our aim is to help faculty who care about student learning make effective and innovative use of the extant research regarding teaching and learning.

The Philosopher’s Path
Julia Annas, University of Arizona
 The Dewey Lecture offers an opportunity "for personal reflection on a lifetime of work as a teacher and scholar”. I hope to present my thoughts on aspects of my philosophical life which are somewhat unusual in the U.S: my journey from classics to philosophy, from Britain to the United States, from all-women’s schools and university college to teaching in a different and changing intellectual world.

The Queer Work of Remembering for the Future: Affect, Memory, and Bioethics
Alexis Shotwell, Laurentian University
 In this paper, I examine the ACT UP Oral History Project’s depiction of medical activism around the HIV/AIDS crisis. I offer an account of how we should think of genealogy and its reclassificatory work as a kind of memory project, using Sue Campbell’s conception of "remembering for the future.” I render this idea—of remembering for the future—in relation to Ladelle McWhorter’s recent work on biopolitics, and on classification and its consequences, and situated memory work in relation to a larger set of questions about disability, genealogy, memory, and queers reclassifying ourselves in relation to medical knowledge and memory practices. I close with an account of why understanding bioethics in terms of biopolitics might help us think about a critical disability politics of time in a mode of queer futurity, and how that work benefits from a Campbellian attention to affect and memory.

The Role of Imagination in Delusion: Two Hypotheses
Kengo Miyazono, University of Tokyo
 In this presentation, I investigate the role of imagination in delusion by examining two hypotheses on the relationship between imagination and delusion in light of recent empirical research. The first hypothesis says that delusion is caused by (perceptual) imagination (McGinn). According to the second hypothesis, on the other hand, delusion is (propositional) imagination (Currie). The first hypothesis posits a misidentification by the patients between perception and perceptual imagination, while the second posits a misidentification between belief and propositional imagination. My main claim in this presentation is that there is some empirical evidence for the perception-perceptual imagination misidentification, and therefore the first hypothesis is more empirically credible than the second, at least, in the present stage of empirical research. The relevant empirical evidence mainly come from recent researches on reality monitoring deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia, hallucination, and confabulation.

The Role of Internal Reasons in Psychiatry
Gary Gala, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
Daniel Moseley, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
 Psychiatric evaluations ought to centrally involve the psychiatrist apprehending the patient’s internal reasons for treatment. By focusing on the patient’s internal reasons, the psychiatrist is well positioned to provide effective and justifiable psychiatric intervention and treatment of the patient’s psychiatric disorder. We focus on cases of self-harm because they are often invoked by civil libertarians that contend that psychiatry is essentially coercive and unduly paternalistic.

The Rule-standard Continuum
Richard Greenstein, Temple University
 As commonly understood, rules and standards are distinct tools available to legislators, judges, and administrators to use in fashioning the law to meet the relevant policy objectives. This paper argues that the reality is far more complicated. First, rules and standards do not represent binary alternative forms that legal provisions can take, but rather poles of a continuum, along which legal provisions display various blends of rule-like and standard-like qualities. Second, the location of a provision of law along this continuum is not fixed at the time the law is promulgated; rather, it emerges out of an ongoing dynamic among lawmakers, the population subject to the law, and those tasked with administering the law—a dynamic that is fueled by social attitudes toward the values underlying the provision. Examining three specific examples of legal provisions, the paper offers an account of what determines their locations along the rule-standard continuum.

The Senses
Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow
 In this paper I elaborate on a suggestion that I made in earlier work that we can arrange the sensory modalities in a space that enables us to see how similar and how different they are from each other. In particular, I respond to worries for such a view recently articulated by Richard Gray who suggests that the dimensions of such a space must be independent and continuous. I outline different ways in which dimensions can be independent and continuous. I argue that they that they need not be independent and that they need only be continuous in one sense. I then illustrate how we can use all four criteria that are standardly taken as competing accounts of individuating the senses to determine (in some cases overlapping) sets of dimensions within which we can order the actual and possible sensory modalities.

The Skill of Virtue and the Psychology of Expertise
Matt Stichter, Washington State University
 One approach to understanding virtue has been to compare and contrast virtues with practical skills, since both involve learning how to act well. If the thesis that a virtue is a type of skill is correct, then it will have a significant impact on our conceptions of virtue and moral knowledge. Determining whether a skill model of virtue is plausible requires answering two central questions. First, what is the nature of skills and expertise? Second, what characteristics would virtues and the virtuous person have if they are modeled on skills and expertise? This paper delves into both questions, by analyzing some of the current psychological research on expertise and exploring the philosophical implications of that research for virtue theory. Various arguments that have been given both for and against the skill model of virtue will be examined in order to determine which arguments are empirically consistent with the psychology literature.

The Sortal Resemblance Problem
Joongol Kim, Seoul National University
 This paper presents a new problem for the neo-Fregean interpretation of Hume’s Principle (HP) as an implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number. More specifically, it will be argued that we cannot determine by HP whether cardinal numbers are any more similar to real numbers than to persons, and so, contrary to the neo-Fregean view, HP cannot be viewed as providing an adequate characterization of the sortal essence of cardinal numbers.

The Standard Theory of Conscious Perception
Carolyn Dicey Jennings, Boston University
 In this paper I argue that, assuming the possibility of a natural explanation of conscious perception, the prioritization of sensations brought about by attention is constitutive of and essential to conscious perception. That is, where "conscious perception” refers to the experience of sensory content arranged within a space-time framework, attention can be shown to be at the heart of any explanation of such content. Put another way, attention is required to solve the neuropsychological problems of division and unity. Thus, attention is necessary for conscious perception as we know it. I present this argument through a theory, which I call the "Standard Theory.”

Theories of Presentness
Ulrich Meyer, Colgate University
 I argue that there is no property of presentness that only one time possesses, and whose possession makes it the case that that time is present. In this short version of the paper, I focus on what I call internal theories of presentness, and show that they run into the same difficulties as the property theories of actuality discussed in Robert Merrihew Adams' 1974 paper "Theories of Actuality.” Examples of internal theories of presentness are the moving spotlight theory and Lynne Rudder Baker's BA theory of time. The longer version of the paper presents a second argument against external theories, which include presentism and the growing block view.

Thinking again about Mechanisms
Melinda Fagan, Rice University
 Many explanations of biological phenomena describe underlying causal processes. Woodward’s manipulability theory offers a satisfying analysis of these causal relations. But if this theory is correct, then mechanistic explanations are not causal explanations. The concept of ‘jointness,’ parts working together to constitute a whole, better explicates mechanistic explanations in biology.

Thinking and Learning: Does the Concept of a Philosophy High School Entail Particular Principles of Education?
Jana Mohr Lone, University of Washington
 "Philosophy high schools” are schools in which philosophical inquiry on the part of the students is the foundation of everything that goes on in classrooms. This structure demands a commitment to the following four principles of education: collaborative inquiry, independent thinking, epistemological modesty, and the value of questions. Collaborative inquiry is aimed at constructing meaning and acquiring understanding through the examination of questions of interest to the classroom community. Cultivation of students’ ability to think independently is at the heart of this endeavor, which facilitates student reflection about some of the fundamental aspects of human experience and supports the development of strong analytic reasoning skills. Epistemological modesty involves an acknowledgement that all members of the class, including the teacher, are fallible, and therefore hold views that could end up being mistaken. Finally, the ability to construct and ask good questions is understood as an indispensable skill for navigating contemporary life.

This Present Suffering: An Early Feminist Revision to Leibnizian Theodicy
Jill Graper Hernandez, University of Texas–San Antonio
 Contemporary feminists have criticized theodicy for its use of a theoretical concept of moral evil that is disconnected from, especially, concrete atrocious evil. But these feminists were not the first to do so. This paper demonstrates that the philosophical work of Mary Hays grounds evil in particular concrete sufferings of the exploited, but also provides several defenses of the divine that can only be called ‘theodicy’: God had to create the world as he did, and concrete moral evil is a part of the world that does not impinge upon divine omniscience, omnibenevolence, or omnipotence. This theodicy, I will argue, should be considered as a rich, unique philosophical project that compliments and furthers traditional theodicy while better assuaging the contemporary feminist critique.

Three Concepts of Agnosticism
Scot Yoder, Michigan State University
 In this paper I will argue that debates regarding religious agnosticism have suffered from a failure to distinguish between three possible conceptions of agnosticism. My hope is that paying attention to these distinctions will make future debates about the justification of agnosticism more productive. In Part One I look at the emergence of the term "agnosticism” in the work of T.H. Huxley. In Part Two I identify and describe three distinct conceptions of agnosticism—agnosticism as not knowing, agnosticism as not believing, and agnosticism as not accepting. In Part Three I examine Richard Dawkins’s argument against agnosticism in The God Delusion to illustrate how a failure to recognize these different conceptions can undermine arguments regarding the justification of agnosticism.

Toward a Naturalistic Reformation of Quinean Meta-ontology
Matthew Haug, College of William and Mary
 In this paper, I explore the prospects for reforming the standard Quinean approach to answering ontological questions. Drawing on and revising work by Penelope Maddy and Zoltan Szabó, I formulate and defend a schema for determining ontological commitments according to which it is not possible to read off such commitments from the theories one accepts. I argue that Maddy's critique of confirmational holism and her focus on detection, a novel form of evidence that goes beyond Quinean theoretical virtues, can be used to improve Szabó's account of ontological commitment, which holds that in some cases it is rational to believe that some entities exist while refusing to believe in such entities (i.e. while refraining from full-blown ontological commitment to those entities). The resulting hybrid account captures the grain of truth in skeptical attitudes toward ontology and has interesting implications for the nature of naturalized metaphysics and its relation to other disciplines.

Truthmaker Theory Without Truthmakers
Pablo Rychter, Universitat de València
 The idea that there may be truthmaking without truthmakers is familiar. Several authors have argued that although every true proposition is made true by reality, there need not be particular entities (like facts, states of affairs, or tropes) that make these propositions true. Here I would like to go further and argue that we can also have truthmaker theory without truthmakers: talk about truthmakers within the theory can be understood as metaphoric and as conveying valuable information about something other than the supposed truthmakers (about truthmaking). In section 1, I will outline the debate between truthmaker theorists and their critics. In section 2, I will discuss two arguments for truthmaker theory and show how they can be resisted. This will help me motivate the figuralist approach to truthmaker theory, which I introduce in section 3.

Twelfth Century Reflections on Mereological Changelessness
Andrew Arlig, Brooklyn College
 The doctrine of Mereological Essentialism states that a whole is necessarily individuated by and depends upon a specific sum of parts. There is a principle entailed by Mereological Essentialism, which Alvin Plantinga once dubbed the Principle of Mereological Changelessness. Plantinga’s principle entails a claim about part-whole dependence, namely, that if something is a part of a whole, then if it ceases to be a part of that whole, the whole ceases to exist. In the Twelfth Century there was much reflection on Mereological Changelessness and the propositions concerning persistence and dependence that are entailed by this principle. In this paper I will examine some of these reflections. I will pay particular attention to a fascinating treatise that takes a hard look at the thesis that a whole existentially depends upon each and every one of its parts.

Two ‘Oughts’ of Kant’s Common Sense
Linda Palmer, University of California–Irvine
 In §22 of the Critique of Judgment Kant raises a puzzling question about the ‘common sense’; here I would like to relate Kant’s question to a normative requirement for the development of both our cognitive and aesthetic capacities, as individuals and in society. This approach draws on a suggestion originally made by Henry Allison regarding the ‘aesthetic common sense.’ I take it that Kant’s new principle of reflective judgment is fundamentally epistemologically normative (in Hannah Ginsborg’s sense), but that this very demand inevitably shades into the morally normative in connection with our use of concepts embedded in society and in the human community.

Type Pluralism and the Semantics of Cardinals
Eric Snyder, Ohio State University
 In this paper I argue for two key claims. First, contrary to certain influential views within the Philosophy of Mathematics, I claim that cardinals are neither exclusively referential nor exclusively quantificational expressions. They also occur as predicative expressions. Secondly, I claim that cardinals can denote all three of those semantic types, i.e. cardinals are type-ambiguous, and certain type-shifting principles serve to relate those various semantic types, similarly to other type-shifting noun phrases. The resulting view, what I call "type pluralism,” is altogether better than its "monist” alternatives in that it respects the linguistic data without having to posit a (potentially) infinite number of lexical ambiguities. I offer a semantics for cardinals consonant with type pluralism, showing how various apparently conflicting but important intuitions can be reconciled and explained once the appropriate domain structure is in place.

Undermining Tracing Globally
Roman Altshuler, State University of New York–Stony Brook and Marymount Manhattan College
 Most accounts of moral responsibility appeal to a tracing condition, on which responsibility for actions that lack the usual responsibility-bestowing features is explained by tracing those actions to prior ones which do have them. Recently, the appeal to tracing has come under assault from Vargas, who argues that in many ordinary cases a tracing analysis can yield no help with establishing responsibility. Thus, tracing fails to explain moral responsibility in a troublingly large number of the sorts of cases it is designed to make sense of. Fischer and Tognazzini have responded that Vargas’s case-based arguments fail to establish either a need for tracing or any reason to doubt its appropriateness. I argue that Vargas’s argument survives if we understand it as focusing on the difficulty involved with tracing responsibility for character. In fact, the argument is even stronger than Vargas takes it to be: it shows that tracing fails globally.

Understanding Some Cases of Altruism as Permissible Mistakes
Elizabeth Harman, Princeton University
 I develop a view on which some supererogatory actions are morally permissible mistakes: while they are morally good things to do, nevertheless, one should not do them, all things considered. I consider the example of gamete donation as a possible instance of something morally good to do but that is nevertheless a mistake. I argue that the view is coherent and plausible, and that it may apply to many supererogatory actions.

Understanding the Conceptual Interdependence of Justice and Injustice
Sean Aas, Brown University
 "We do not live in a just world,” says Tom Nagel, "That may be the least controversial claim one can make in political theory.” Our world, taken as a whole, is not just. But this doesn’t mean that it’s unjust. Some things are neither just nor unjust. To understand whether and how the world is unjust, then, we need to get clear on the nature of the justice-injustice relation. But we can’t do this until we get clear on the nature of a third property, the property things have when they are unjust-if-not-just. Questions about this property are closely related to question about what kind of justice (the justice of states of affairs, people, actions, or relationships) is most fundamental. Drawing on this relation, I argue here that there’s some reason to think that things in general are either just or unjust if they are suitably related to distributively significant social relationships.

Unity and the Frege-Geach Problem
Christopher Hom, Texas Tech University
Jeremy Schwartz, Texas Tech University
 The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth-conditions for the sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’s solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. According to him, propositions are speech act types, and the attitudes that the speakers take toward propositions are essential for their contents. Although Hanks does not draw the inference, his proposal extends naturally to metaethics as a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, since expressivists believe that the attitude of the speaker is part of the content of a normative term. Unfortunately Hanks’s theory isn’t successful, but it does point to significant connections between expressivism, unity and embedding.

Use, Reference, and Experimental Data
Genoveva Marti, ICREA and Universitat de Barcelona
 My purpose is to discuss recent proposals by experimental philosophers based on data that seem to indicate that the semantic intuitions on which philosophers have relied when discussing the theory of reference and, in particular, the semantics of proper names and other singular terms, are not universal, since there appear to be wide differences, both cross-cultural and intra-cultural in intuitive judgments about reference. I contend that the tests conducted by experimentalists do not elicit the kind of data that could have an impact in the theory of reference and that they are thus irrelevant for semantic theorizing. This discussion leads to a reflection on what kind of data constitutes the input of semantics.

Using Optimality Models to Explain Evolutionary Phenomena
Collin Rice, University of Missouri
 Recently philosophers of science have begun to pay more attention to the use of idealized mathematical models. An important example of idealized mathematical modeling is the widespread use of optimality models in evolutionary biology. In two recent articles, Angela Potochnik has argued that it is their ability to identify general causal patterns—by focusing on a modular part of a causal process and omitting other causal factors—that secures optimality models a permanent role in the future of evolutionary biology. In this paper, I first argue that Potochnik’s account misleading implies that the explanations of optimality models are necessarily more general than those provided by more inclusive evolutionary models. In addition, I argue that not all optimality explanations can be understood as censored causal explanations in the way required by Potochnik’s view. In response, I suggest an alternative approach that emphasizes optimality models’ reliance on representing tradeoffs, appeal to equilibrium, and use of idealizations.

Value and Reasons for Preservation
Erich Matthes, University of California–Berkeley
 Many philosophers (including G.A. Cohen, Samuel Scheffler, T. M. Scanlon, and Joseph Raz) have claimed that reasons for preservation are fundamental to the concept of value. In contrast with these philosophers, I argue that reasons for preservation are subordinate to and dependent on other reasons associated with value, namely, reasons for engagement: the prima facie demand for preservation of a valuable object falls away where it is inconsistent with proper engagement with that value. Nevertheless, I argue that the intuition at the core of the thesis about the fundamentality of reasons for preservation can be accommodated, while providing an alternative that offers a clear explanatory advantage. In addition to this theoretical payoff, the priority of engagement over preservation that I present offers a framework for analyzing and resolving disputes in the applied literature on environmental ethics, bioethics, art restoration, and heritage ethics.

Vargas-style Revisionism and the Problem of Desert
Stephen Morris, City University of New York–College of Staten Island
 Manuel Vargas argues that we ought to accept a revised understanding of the terms "free will” and "moral responsibility” that eliminates the libertarian commitments inherent in the commonsense conceptions of these terms. His rationale is that these revised terms are plausibly attributable to human beings and can play virtually all of the important roles that the commonsense terms have been traditionally valued for. In response to Derk Pereboom's criticism that Vargas's revisionist position cannot adequately address the question of whether or not people are capable of possessing the basic desert sense of responsibility, Vargas argues that we are justified in accepting a revised notion of basic desert since this notion fosters attentiveness to moral reasons. I argue that Vargas's attempt to preserve the notion of basic desert within his revisionist account does not succeed since he does not adequately explain why being attentive to moral reasons is valuable.

Vindicating Testimonial Acquaintance
Michael J. Raven, University of Victoria
 Someone is testimonially acquainted with something just in case one’s ability to think de re about it is grounded in communication with others who already have that ability. The apparent expensiveness of acquaintance in general conflicts with the apparent cheapness of acquiring it testimonially in particular. I explore a sketch of how this conflict dissolves by distinguishing the cheapness of having a de re thought from the expensiveness of accessing it.

Virtue and Skill: Virtue Epistemology and Chinese Philosophy
Chienkuo Mi, Soochow University
 We have been witnessing a "virtue” turn since 1980, not only in ethics and epistemology in the western philosophy, but also in a new way of exploring Chinese philosophy. In order to grasp clearly what philosophical significances it has brought to the interdisciplinary dialogues and the international collaboration, we must pay attention to what the concept of "virtue” really connotes. There are at least three different approaches in which we can accommodate and manipulate the concept of virtue: virtue as personal traits or character, virtue as faculties or competence, and virtue as abilities or disposition. However the concept of virtue can also be understood as "skills” or background expertise. This way of revealing virtue will more suitably link the theories of "virtue” to Taoism and Zhuangzi. When "virtue” and "skill” are bound more closely together, we can make much better sense of "flow” and "flourishing” in Zhuangzi’s philosophical viewpoints.

Virtues and Pre-political Life in Plato’s Laws III and IV
George Harvey, Indiana University Southeast
 In his discussion of the origins of political systems (politeias), the Athenian Stranger finds a great deal to be admired in the ethical characters of the individuals living in the period prior to the emergence of political life. He describes their superiority to modern man in terms of the ethical qualities they possess (679e), but makes clear that pre-political individuals do not possess complete virtue (678b). In book IV the Athenian presents this Age of Cronus as the model for what the art of politics, even in the best possible circumstances, can only imitate (713a-714b). This paper aims at offering a clearer account of the ethical character the Athenian associates with pre-political life, and showing that the features the Athenian finds so admirable are the same as those he identifies as central to his conception of ethical virtue.

Was There Something in Nothingness? The Debate on the Primordial State Between Neo-Daoism and Neo-Confucianism
JeeLoo Liu, California State University–Fullerton
 The notion of nothingness (wu) can be taken as either a cosmological or an ontological concept. As a cosmological concept, it is contrasted with something and the issue is whether there was something or nothing at the beginning of the cosmos. As an ontological notion, it is contrasted with being and is closely associated with such notions as non-being and emptiness. This paper deals with nothingness in the cosmological sense. In Daodejing, ‘wu’ is sometimes used to signify something vague, elusive, formless, shapeless, inaudible, invisible, and nameless. This undifferentiated something, which existed before heaven and earth, is what Laozi calls "Dao.” It can be understood as nothingness since there was no object, no thing, no shape nor form; however, it is not primordial absolute nothingness. Some neo-Daoists as well as neo-Confucians identify this primordial something as "primordial qi” (yuan qi). This paper examines whether there really could be primordial absolute nothingness.

What Are Groups?
Katherine Ritchie, University of Texas–Austin
 In this paper I argue for a view of things like teams, committees and courts, which I call groups. I begin by examining the features all groups seem to have in common. I formulate a list of seven criteria that any adequate theory of groups must capture. I then examine three of the most prominent views of groups currently on offer that groups are fusions, aggregates and sets. I argue that each fails to capture one or more of the criteria. Last, I develop the view that groups are realized structures. Such a view has two components. First, groups are entities with structure. Second, groups are concreta, so they exist only when a group structure is realized. I show how the view captures the seven criteria while offering a substantive answer to the question, "What are groups?”

What Can/Ought I Do? Vagueness in Abilities, Options, and Utilities
Sean Drysdale Walsh, University of Minnesota–Duluth
 In this paper, I argue that: 1. Options, but not abilities, satisfy the "Simple Conditional Analysis” of counterfactuals. One has the option to do X if one both (a) has the ability to do X and (b) meets certain other "move forward conditions” (regarding finks, masks, etc.). Having the option to do X implies one has the ability to do X, but not vice versa. It will turn out that having the option to do X implies that certain subtle, complex counterfactuals hold (more complex than David Lewis’s in his "sophisticated dispositionalism”). These subtle counterfactuals will be important to the vagueness of options. 2. Due to this "counterfactual analysis” (and other factors), it is often metaphysically vague what a given agent is able to do, and thus, 3. It is often metaphysically vague what options an agent has, and thus, 4. It is often metaphysically vague for a given option or options whether there are better options, and thus, 5. It is often metaphysically vague what, on utilitarianism, the rightness status for many options is, since it is vague whether they are indeed the maximal option, and, 6. Epistemological alternatives to metaphysical vagueness lack the proper motivations (e.g., holding Leibniz’s Law) that obtain for other domains, and thus we should accept that there is metaphysical (rather than merely epistemological) vagueness concerning abilities, options, and utilities (e.g., Leibniz’s Law) in this domain.

What Is the Kantian Will?
E.S. Elizondo, Yale University
 Kantian ethics is an ethics of will. But what does Kant take the will to be? In this paper I sketch an answer. I take as my starting point Kant’s identification of the will as a rational faculty of desire. I make three points. First, the will is not merely a faculty of desire, a faculty to bring things about. It is also, insofar as it is rational, a faculty of cognition, a faculty to cognize objects as to be brought about, i.e., as good. Second, as a consequence of this double nature, the will is subject to double success conditions. It is successful both when it brings things about and when it correctly cognizes what is good. Third, it is this cognitive success in which the goodness of the will properly consists. I conclude by reflecting on the significance of these points for Kant’s account of moral motivation.

What Would It Take to Change Your Mind?
Peter Thielke, Pomona College
 Most of us have settled views about various philosophical debates, and much of the activity of philosophers is devoted to giving arguments that are designed to convince opponents to change their minds about a certain issue. But, what might this process require? More pointedly, can you clearly imagine what it would take to make you change your mind about a position you currently hold? I argue that the surprising answer to this question is no; you cannot imagine what would convince you to change your mind, since in doing so you would actually have to find that reason compelling. I then briefly look at some implications of this conclusion.

White on Imprecise Credences
Dylan Dodd, University of Aberdeen
 According to the Imprecise Credence Framework (ICF), a rational believer's doxastic state should be modeled by a set of probability functions rather than a single probability function, namely the set of probability functions allowed by the evidence (Joyce [3]). Roger White has recently given an arresting argument against the ICF, which has garnered a number of responses. In this paper, I attempt to cast doubt on his argument. First, I point out that it's not an argument against the ICF per se, but an argument for the Principle of Indifference. Second, I present an argument that's analogous to White's. I argue that if White's premises are true, the premises of this argument are too. But the premises of my argument entail something obviously false. Therefore, White's premises must not all be true.

Why Gay and Feminist Scholars Should Stop Opposing Same-Sex Marriage
Christine Pierce, North Carolina State University
 The concept of "beyond marriage” as advocated by sociology professor Judith Stacey and law professor Nancy Polikoff, among others, is based on the assertion that a focus on legalizing same-sex marriage is discriminatory against the unmarried and either will or might derail the more important goal of reforming family law for all families. I argue that the Stacey-Polikoff view (1) is wrong-headed from a rights point of view, (2) barely takes account of and certainly gives no serious weight to the argument from respect for marriage equality,(3) is incorrect, at least from the history of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the definition of "family,” in claiming that same-sex couples must wait for comprehensive family law reform before they can marry,(4) ignores social science evidence that undermines their claims of discrimination,and (5) risks being homophobic in effect, if not in intent.

Why It Doesn’t Matter Whether Simplicity Is Truth-conducive
Robert Fischer, Texas State University–San Marcos
 Given a number of competing hypotheses, inference to the best explanation (IBE) recommends believing the one that scores best on the explanatory virtues: conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, and predictive power. Whatever IBE’s appeal, many philosophers deny that its epistemic credentials are in good order. One standard objection is that (1) some of the explanatory virtues are not truth-conducive, so (2) IBE is not truth-conducive, and so (3) IBE cannot provide epistemic justification. I argue that the move from (1) to (2) is illegitimate. I argue that the move depends on an implausible model of how IBE works; and, once that model is exposed, it becomes clear that the objection fails. If there is a problem with IBE’s epistemic credentials, this line of reasoning doesn’t identify it.

Wisdom as an Expert Skill
Jason Swartwood, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities
 Recently, some philosophers have suggested that we can vindicate the claim that wise people intuitively see what ought to be done by modeling virtue and wisdom on expert skills: just as, for example, expert chess players learn through feedback and practice to see what moves are best, a person can learn through feedback and practice to see what virtue requires. Daniel Jacobson (2005) has argued that this expert skill model of wisdom fails to fulfill its promise, since wisdom is "not a plausible human skill.” While it is clear how a chess player can get good feedback on her moves, feedback on the virtue of our conduct comes from objectionably parochial sources such as our own guilt reactions and the dictates of our culture. I argue that Jacobson's critique fails to undermine the expert skill model because it overlooks a kind of feedback that can reform objectionably parochial intuitions.

Wittgenstein and Linguistic Idealism
H. Benjamin Shaeffer, Humboldt State University
 I argue, on both textual and philosophical grounds, that, contra GEM Anscombe and David Bloor, it is misleading to characterize the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations as a linguistic idealist. First, such an interpretation conflicts with Wittgenstein’s therapeutic method; second, the textual evidence adduced in favor of this reading is ambiguous at best; and finally, it misses the fact that Wittgenstein rejects the underlying assumption, common to both realism and idealism, that language and reality can be clearly distinguished.

Writing Groups and Peer Evaluation in Undergraduate Courses
Kate Padgett Walsh, Iowa State University
 Written assignments are essential to developing critical thinking skills and encouraging deeper philosophical reflection. Yet, large (and increasing) class sizes make it challenging to provide constructive feedback on student work. To address this challenge, two colleagues (in Sociology) and I are currently developing and studying a writing group model for use in medium and large size courses. The model emphasizes: effective strategies for enhancing writing skills, teaching students to be critical readers, teaching students how to use peer-review feedback to revise their own papers, and using multi-step assignments to improve student writing.

Xunzi (荀子) and Virtue Epistemology
Cheng-Hung Tsai, Soochow University
 Ernest Sosa establishes a bi-level virtue epistemology, according to which there are two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective. For Sosa, animal knowledge is apt belief, and reflective knowledge is apt belief aptly noted. In this paper, I reconstruct Xunzi’s epistemology in line with the idea of Sosa’s bi-level virtue epistemology. I first highlight the bi-level structure of Xunzi’s epistemology by focusing on his two core notions: "tianguan” (the natural faculties) and "tianjun” (or "xin”; mind-heart). I then discuss Xunzi’s idea about the superior relation of xin over the natural faculties, and his solution to the problem of the blindness of xin (that is, dispelling blindness by emptiness-unity-stillness of xin). After reconstructing Xunzi’s epistemology, I address the significance of such an interpretation of Xunzi’s epistemology, and the possible contribution by Xunzi to contemporary virtue epistemology.

Zeno’s Definition of the Apprehensive Impression
Pavle Stojanovic, Johns Hopkins University
 Zeno’s definition of the apprehensive impression is of crucial importance for understanding the epistemology of the Hellenistic period. Although scholars today mostly agree on general intentions Zeno had when he formulated it, showing how exactly its clauses are supposed to bring about the desired result has been a matter of serious controversy. In this paper, I propose an interpretation that, in my opinion, solves all the difficulties. First, I argue that the word huparchon that occurs in all three clauses should be interpreted to mean ‘actual,’ i.e. a corporeal object with its properties. Second, unlike virtually all scholars, I argue that the second clause must be interpreted as formulating a weak requirement if Arcesilaus’ objection is to make sense. Finally, I argue that the purpose of the third clause was to add a new requirement to the definition, and that only then the definition can achieve its purported aim.

Metaphysics Θ 6 1048b18-35: A New Take on the Energeia-kinesis Distinction
R. Kathleen Harbin, University of Pennsylvania
 I argue that despite claims that the distinction Aristotle makes in the much disputed passage at Metaphysics Theta 6 1048b18-35 is primarily linguistic and suggestions that it is somehow confused, it presents a genuinely interesting metaphysical distinction that sheds light on the nature of energeia. I claim the passage shows that in the case of energeia, the present and perfect tenses entail one another, as the ‘mutual entailment reading’ of Makin and Burnyeat claims. But further, this linguistic marker indicates an important metaphysical difference between energeia and kinesis, marking kinesis as a kind of activity that is incomplete, and energeia as a kind of activity more complete than any kinesis and, contrary to some readings, more complete than any hexis. At the same time, in a way that Burnyeat and Makin do not recognize, the mutual entailment reading shows that kinesis and energeia are both capable of development over time.

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