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2011 Pacific Division Abstracts
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A Logic of ‘Another’
Joongol Kim, Western Illinois University
 This paper argues that in order to capture the inference patterns in logical reasoning involving the locution "there is another,” we need a logical framework that admits exclusive quantifiers (in addition to the usual inclusive quantifiers such as "there is a(n)”). It will be argued that a major advantage of such a logical framework is that it provides for intuitive definitions of basic arithmetical operations such as successor, addition, and multiplication.

A Minimalist Duty for Gender Justice
Pin-Fei Lu, Independent Scholar
 In order to meet the demand of gender justice in a pluralist democracy, I uphold there is a political duty that every citizen should and could accept. Such a duty, each person to respect all citizens as free and equal, is famously assumed in Rawls’s theory, but has not been correctly understood and sufficiently demonstrated in its connection to gender justice. Thus, with the aid primary from the theoretical framework of Rawls’ political liberalism and the critical urge of Jean Hampton’s feminist contractarianism for contracting just relationships, here I intend to sustain how the achievement of women’s substantive equality, a realization of gender justice, in a pluralistic democracy is crucially dependent on citizens following the duty by way of three arguments—a reconstruction of Rawlsian conception of the political, an amalgamation of the political and the personal, and an appeal of minimalism.

A Moral Interest in Democracy
Robert C. Hughes, National Institutes of Health
 This paper presents a new argument that one of the central features of democracy has non-instrumental value. All citizens who regard current law or policy as unjust should have meaningful opportunities to try to bring about change. Without meaningful opportunities to try to change the law, individuals who regard existing laws as partially unjust face a morally problematic dilemma. If they comply with these laws voluntarily without also trying to change them, they become complicit in injustice by their own lights, if not in fact. If they disobey, or if they obey only to avoid sanction, they respond inadequately to the important purposes that the law advances despite its injustice. Because individuals have a moral interest in acting on their considered views about justice whether or not these views are correct, a responsive political process is desirable even when a less inclusive process would likely yield more just law.

A Paradox Free Anselmianism
Michael J. Almeida, University of Texas–San Antonio
 I argue that Anselmians ought to abandon traditional Anselmianism in favor of Moderate Anselmianism. Moderate Anselmianism advances the view that a being x = God iff (i) for every essential property P of x, it is secondarily necessary that x has P, (ii) for most essential properties of x, it is not primarily necessary that x has P, and (iii) the essential properties of x include omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness and necessary existence. Traditional Anselmians have no cogent response to most a priori atheological arguments. But a priori atheological arguments present no serious problem for moderate Anselmians. Unlike traditional Anselmianism, Moderate Anselmianism explains why a priori atheological arguments can be convincing and nonetheless illusory.

A Plea for Tracking
Brett Sherman, University of Rochester
 In this paper, I challenge the traditional idea that the content of a belief is a piece of information that is separable from the mechanism by which the information is stored, a view defended recently by Robert Stalnaker. I present some puzzling data about belief reports which I argue motivate a picture of referential content that appeals to a notion of tracking an individual over time. I argue that Stalnaker’s account has trouble explaining the anomalous data.

A Priority Problem for the Constituent Solution
Andrew M. Bailey, University of Notre Dame
 Jeffrey Brower has recently offered a new solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics. In this paper, I highlight a problem for that solution; it runs afoul of a plausible priority principle.

A Radical Reconstruction of Race-Thinking
Nathan Pai Schmitt, University of Oregon
 The question that most often frames philosophic discourse on race—roughly, "what is it, and what should we do with it?”—is a question that leads us astray nearly as often as it is asked. In this paper I argue that this traditional question of race is problematic and discourages us from solving problems in a way that adequately reflects our experience of them. We should instead consider the problem of race, with help from classical and contemporary American pragmatists, in light of what I identify as the three modes of experience, and I argue that my new model of thinking offers us powerful tools that we ought to employ to solve both conceptual and practical problems of race.

A Socratic Critique of Socrates’ Noble Falsehood
Ara Astourian, University of Southern California
Michael Cholbi, California State Polytechnic University–Pomona
 Most commentators have dismissed the Republic’s "noble falsehood” as unjust and manipulative without noting that this falsehood is introduced after an explicit discussion of justified and unjustified deception. As a result, little attention has been given to whether the noble falsehood is justified on Socrates’ own terms. We first outline Socrates’ contrast between two types of falsehood: "true falsehood,” a contemptible state of the soul, and useful falsehood or a "lie in words.” Since the noble falsehood is intended to strengthen citizens’ allegiance to the just city, it belongs to a category of useful falsehood, namely lies told to prevent others from doing evil because of ignorance. However, the noble falsehood can only meet Socrates’ aims if it also meets the criteria for a contemptible true falsehood. The noble falsehood thus turns out to be both contemptible and unjustified, according to Socrates, while also being useful and justified.

Acceptance, Fairness, and Political Obligation
Edward H.K. Song, Louisiana State University
 Among the most popular strategies for justifying political obligations are those that appeal to the principle of fairness. These theories face the challenge, canonically articulated by Robert Nozick, of explaining how it is that persons are obliged to schemes when they receive goods that they do not ask for but cannot reject. John Simmons offers one defense of the principle of fairness, arguing that a person could be bound by obligations of fairness if they voluntarily accept goods produced by a cooperative scheme. Simmons, however, thinks that such a theory will do little work in justifying political obligations since virtually no one voluntarily accepts state goods. This paper will attempt to advance just such a theory by arguing that states are in fact genuine cooperative schemes, and that Simmons is overly pessimistic in his appraisal of whether the majority of citizens accept the goods provided by their states.

Acquiring Justification from Fictional Narratives: What’s Wrong with the Thought Experiment Analogy
Charles Repp, University of Toronto
 In this paper I consider and critique one popular response to what I call the "no-justification” argument—the argument that fictional narratives have no way of supplying justification for their themes. Some philosophers, including Noël Carroll and David Davies, have tried to answer the argument by drawing an analogy between fictional narratives and thought experiments. I argue that this analogy fails to capture some of the distinctive ways in which narrative fictions, especially long forms such as novels, plays, and epics, can supply justification for their themes. In particular, I argue that long narrative fictions, unlike thought experiments, can earn our acceptance of themes by leading us to recognize them as belonging to coherent systems of beliefs or as arising from virtuous habits of mind.

Activity and Experience
Gary Bartlett, Central Washington University
 The general approach of this paper is motivated by the idea that it seems abundantly clear that our experiences require neural activity, and that if this fact is taken seriously then functionalism is in trouble—for it cannot make a place for this fact in anything other than a stipulative sense (as in the lip service assumption that experiences are produced by neural firings). The argument of the paper is that since (1) functionalist theories of conscious experience entail that a human could have a conscious experience that was realized by a state involving no physical activity, and (2) conscious experiences in humans can only be realized by states involving physical activity, it therefore follows that (3) functionalist theories of conscious experience are false.

Against Frankfurt’s Care Ground of Importance
Adam Pelser, Baylor University
 Harry Frankfurt argues that importance is not inherent. He contends that importance is grounded solely in what we care about (or, love). Frankfurt argues that there is no care-independent ground of importance since, he thinks, there can be no care-independent ground of our knowledge of importance. This argument fails on account of its confusing the epistemic ground of our knowledge of importance with the ontological ground of importance. Moreover, Frankfurt’s Care Ground of Importance principle undermines his own treatment of "volitional irrationality” as a morally significant defect of some moral agents. Frankfurt argues that while those who perform even the most "unthinkable” acts are not objectively immoral, they are "volitionally irrational” and "inhuman.” Frankfurt’s Care Ground of Importance, however, undermines any plausible attempt to understand the defect of such agents as a failure of rationality or as a lack of human nature.

Alief and Affordance: The Normativity of Automaticity
Michael S. Brownstein, New Jersey Institute of Technology
Alex Madva, Columbia University
 We aim to bridge two psychologically informed movements in philosophy, which have thus far progressed independently. (1) We explore Tamar Szab Gendler’s promising concept of "alief,” an associative and arational mental state more primitive than belief. Alief represents, among other things, an attempt to make sense of so-called "automatic” behaviors, in particular those automatic behaviors which are discordant with reflective judgments. (2) We situate alief in a philosophical and psychological framework broader than the classic cognitivist picture Gendler aims to supplement and revise. By drawing on ecological psychology and phenomenology, we argue that alief is the cognitive state that responds to affordances, which are perceived opportunities for appropriate behavior. We explain how apparently brute, alief-driven behavior can actually be intelligent and norm-sensitive—neither (merely) causal nor (fully) rational—and suggest that a unified alief-affordance conception of unreflective behavior provides new directions for philosophical and empirical research.

An Argument for Old-Fashioned Intuition Pumping
Brian T. Talbot, University of Colorado–Boulder
 One mainstream approach to philosophy involves trying to learn about philosophically interesting, non-mental, phenomena—ethical properties, for example, or causation—by gathering data from human beings. This approach is associated with the use of philosophers’ intuitions as data, the making of deductive arguments from this data, and the gathering of intuitions by eliciting reactions to often quite bizarre thought experiments. These methods have been criticized, and these criticisms point out important areas for improvement. In this paper I will argue that, despite this, these methods should not be entirely jettisoned, that some of the old ways really are the best ways. Specifically, our commitment to using intuitions and gathering them with bizarre thought experiments is well founded, both philosophically and empirically.

An Epistemic Theory of Creation
Jonathan Kvanvig, Baylor University
 The standard view is that only Molinism offers any hope of preserving the doctrine of divine providence while retaining libertarian freedom. I present here a new middle position between Theistic Determinism and Open Theism, one that has no need of counterfactuals of freedom. Instead of relying on counterfactuals of freedom, this model of creation involves epistemic principles and an update semantics in place of the focus on strict and subjunctive conditionals and the truth-conditional semantics for such typical in debates in this area. The result is a view not subject to the standard worries about Molinism and its reliance on counterfactuals of freedom.

An Uncompromising Connection Between Practical Reason and Morality
Michael D. Nelson, University of California–Riverside
 Velleman defends a novel intermediate between moral rationalism and moral skepticism. Like the moral rationalist, he maintains that only irrational agents act immorally. Like the moral skeptic, he maintains that some immoral acts are not irrational; immorality is not always contrary to the dictates of practical reason. Velleman motives his skepticism by considering hard cases of agents allegedly lacking reason to be moral. I defend an orthodox Kantian view, arguing that Velleman misdescribes the reasons the hard cases have. I argue that every autonomous agent has reason to be moral. This follows, I argue, from Velleman’s conception of practical reason as having the aim of self-understanding. I end by briefly discussing the problem of conflicting requirements and Velleman’s argument against the claim that morality is self-imposed.

Antonymy in the Attitudes
Alex Grzankowski, University of Texas–Austin
 A good semantics for attitude ascriptions will allow us to make reports without paradox or puzzle. In what follows, I argue that this task cannot be accomplished without taking some attitudes to be antonyms or opposites much like "good/bad” and "large/small.” The most important feature of this relation for the present discussion is that it is not definable in terms of Boolean negation. Below I will try to say a bit more about antonymy, though my primary focus is motivating the importance of antonymy rather than offering an explication of the relation. I begin by highlighting both the virtues and limitations of a very attractive approach to the semantics of attitude ascriptions espoused by Nathan Salmon. I then show that even if one adopts this type of picture, a puzzle remains. I argue that the most natural way to solve the remaining puzzle is by appeal to antonymy.

Are Expressivists Guilty of Wishful Thinking?
Robert A. Mabrito, North Carolina State University
 Recently, Cian Dorr (2002) has argued that even an expressivist theory with sufficient resources to solve the Frege-Geach problem faces what he claims is a new and distinct objection: any such expressivist theory—regardless of the nature of its solution to the Frege-Geach problem—entails that intuitively rational beliefs are in fact irrational. If Dorr is correct about this, then the new problem he raises would be as devastating as the old Frege-Geach problem is often thought to be. In this paper, I argue that Dorr is not correct. Rather than constituting a new and potent objection to expressivism, the issue Dorr raises does not pose a serious problem for any version of expressivism that is able to solve the Frege-Geach problem.

Aristotle on the Conditional Final Value of Friends
Matthew Walker, Rutgers University
 Aristotle’s account of the value of friends generates what I call the instrumentality problem: can Aristotle simultaneously (i) argue that friends possess sufficient final value as to be essential constituents of the happy life, yet (ii) appeal to the utility of friends for eliciting self-awareness as part of his case for (i)? In this paper, I argue that Aristotle’s account of friendship can respond to the instrumentality problem. By adopting a key distinction of Christine Korsgaard’s, I argue for a reading of Aristotle according to which the value of friends for their own sakes—the "final” or "end” value of friends—is (in part) conditional upon their usefulness in eliciting self-awareness. On this reading, Aristotle’s account can reasonably appeal to the utility of friends, but in a way that does not reduce their value to that utility.

Aristotle’s Homonyms Reconsidered
Jurgis (George) Brakas, Marist College
 I address two issues pertaining to Aristotle’s homonyms. The first concerns their nature. According to the traditional interpretation, homonyms are things having the same "name” whose "definitions” are different—for example, a man and his picture are homonyms because they are both called "[an] animal.” I argue that this interpretation is false: it is the animals signified by the predicates in the two cases that are homonyms. The second concerns Aristotle’s claim in Metaphysics G2 that beings are not homonyms. This is puzzling since they should be homonyms. Scholars are divided on how to solve this puzzle. I argue that they are not homonyms at the Metaphysics G stage of his development—nor synonyms or relata falling into a category between homonyms and synonyms. They are things related to one and the same thing and for that very reason are no longer considered to be homonyms, for Aristotle.

Aristotle, the Common Good, and τὸ καλόν
Joseph Stenberg, University of Colorado–Boulder
 Among the great interpretive challenges confronting those who study Aristotle’s ethics and politics is elucidating the nature of τὸ καλόν, which is often translated the beautiful, the fine, or the noble. In this essay, I offer a basic synthesis of two views that are generally held to be irreconcilable, namely those defended by proponents of the aesthetic view of τὸ καλόν, particularly Kelly Rogers and Gabriel Richardson Lear, and those of Terrence Irwin, a proponent of what might be called a civic view of τὸ καλόν. By combining these views, I create what I call, a "modified civic view of τὸ καλόν,” which retains distinctive features of both views as well as the advantages attendant on Irwin’s view, namely responses to both the charge that Aristotle was an ethical egoist and the related charge that his theory is without even a basic conception of what we would call, "morality.”

Austin Meets Adelson: Where Ordinary Language Intersects with Experimental Phenomenology
Aaron Schiller, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
 A serious challenge to the view that facts are perceived (and not inferred or constructed, say) is the lack of plausible accounts relating fact perception to the perception of other widely recognized types of perception, most notably that of objects and properties. In this paper, I attempt to provide a sketch of such an account, one that starts from J. L. Austin’s Ordinary Language analysis of the argument from illusion for the existence of sense data and ends up in a discussion of Edward Adelson’s checkershadow illusion. My conclusions are that (1) when facts are perceived they contextualize the perception of objects and that (2) to perceive a property is to perceive an object.

Axiomatic Approaches to Truth: An Overview
Volker Halbach, Oxford University
Gila Sher, University California–San Diego
 The language of arithmetic is augmented with a new unary predicate T and axioms characterizing T as a truth predicate for codes of sentences are added to Peano arithmetic. Some well-known systems such as the Kripke-Feferman and the Friedman-Sheard systems will be surveyed and compared. I will then concentrate on some more recent developments. It will be shown that there are consistent and attractive systems that are purely disquotational, i.e., based on T-sentences as axioms and that therefore deflationary axiomatizations of truth are not necessarily weaker than compositional systems. Moreover I will look at the prospects of formulating axiomatic theories of truth in non-classical logics. I will discuss different ways to compare axiomatic truth theories. For instance, such theories can be compared by their proof-theoretic strength, their truth-free content, or their ability to define the truth predicate of the other theory.

Being Evil: RPGs, Imaginative Immersion, and Moral Complicity
Eva Dadlez, University of Central Oklahoma
 I will explore the applicability of the philosophical literature on imaginative resistance and moderate moralism to role-playing games (RPGs). Those who maintain that fiction can sometimes make us complicit in the moral perspective it endorses infer that perspective on the basis of what is fictionally the case. Moral complicity depends, in this argument, on our own conception of what is morally permissible. We will not be able to imagine the correctness of an action in the absence of some genuine belief that it is possible for actions of that kind to be right, since we can’t imagine what we can’t conceive. This would immediately seem damning when we consider role-playing games. However, I will argue that the perspective of the RPG gamer is analogous to that of an author or an actor, and that the arguments concerning moral complicity do not apply in any necessary way to writing and improvisational acting.

Belief and Difficult Action
Berislav Marušić, Brandeis University
 Suppose you decide or promise to do something that you know is difficult to do. For example, you decide to quit smoking or promise to be with your spouse all the days of your life. Should you believe that you will uphold your decision or keep your promise? If you do, you believe against the evidence. If you don’t, your decision is not serious, and your promise is not sincere. Neither option seems acceptable. My paper has two aims. First, I argue that these reflections reveal an important philosophical problem that is not recognized in contemporary discussion but that has tangible importance. After all, we know that our most important decisions are difficult to uphold and our most important promises are difficult to keep. Second, I argue that evidentialism does not offer an adequate solution to this problem. To solve the problem, we must adopt a new form of pragmatism.

Blocking the Blocking Defense
Gabriel Rabin, University of California–Los Angeles
 According to the zombie argument against physicalism, a zombie world in conceivable, and therefore possible. The possibility of such a world falsifies physicalism. Leuenberger (2008) offers an ingenious defense against the zombie argument. According to him, we do not conceive a genuine zombie world; instead we conceive a zombie-ish world in which, because of the presence of strange alien properties, phenomenal experiences are blocked from arising out of the physical world. Since no genuine zombie world is possible, physicalism is saved from the zombie argument. I’ll argue that Leuenberger’s blockers defense proves too much. The blockers move can also be used to defend preposterous metaphysical supervenience claims, including the claim that the entire state of the world supervenes on a peanut. Thus, I conclude, despite the promise of an easy reply to the most damaging anti-physicalist argument of our time, the physicalist should not adopt the blocking defense.

Blunting the Blind Impress: Autonomy, Self-Reflection, and Tracking the Truth
Dwight Furrow, San Diego Mesa College
Mark Wheeler, San Diego State University
 The dominant conception of autonomy is a hierarchical/procedural model—defended by Frankfurt, Bratman, and Christman, among others—in which reflective self-appraisal is the key element in constituting the autonomy of an action. We argue that there are two fatal objections to this model: (1) the limits of genuine self-knowledge; and (2) the plethora of counter-examples to this conception—activities directed by and under the control of the self that do not involve self-reflection. Thus, we propose an alternative model that anchors autonomy in the degree to which desires are "attuned” to what an agent cares about and the degree to which an agent’s beliefs track facts about the world that enable a desire to causally contribute to the realization of its satisfaction conditions. Neither of these conditions requires self-reflection.

Branching Versus Non-Branching Models and Moderate Moralism
Scott Clifton, University of Washington
 Noël Carroll advocates moderate moralism, which holds that in some instances moral judgments can affect aesthetic judgments of works of art. In this paper I present his view, as well as criticism made by James Anderson and Jeffrey Dean. I argue that their criticism is of the branching structure of Carroll’s position. I note that even when this is pointed out, Carroll wishes to preserve the structure by arguing against the priority of sufficient reason. I end the paper by suggesting a way that a moderate moralist can adopt a non-branching model, which needn’t take a stand on what kind of reason is apt.

Can Blue Mean Four?
Jennifer J. Matey, Florida International University
 In recent years, a growing number of philosophers have defended the view that conscious perceptual experiences have content on account of their phenomenal characters (Chalmers 2004, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Siegel 2005, Siewert 1998). One still relatively under-explored issue, however, concerns what sort of information the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is capable of representing. Positions on this issue fall into two general categories. Conservative views hold that only directly sensible properties such as colors, shapes and the spatial relations among these properties are represented in perceptual experience (Tye 1995, Dretske 1995). The liberal position on the other hand, holds that information over and above these properties can be perceptually represented. This paper presents a counterexample to conservative views, drawing on the visuo-perceptual phenomenon of higher-grapheme color synaesthesia.

Can Epistemic Obligation Be Reduced to Synchronic Evidential Justification?
Kraig Martin, Baylor University
 Richard Feldman claims that what one epistemically ought to believe is always that which fits one’s evidence. Keith DeRose challenges Feldman with two cases in which it seems as though there is a sense in which one epistemically ought not believe what fits one’s evidence. I first consider a reply to the challenge presented in the first DeRose case. It seems as though an argument by Trent Dougherty gives a means for the evidentialist to argue that the responsibilist sense of ought can be reduced to non-epistemic normativity. However, I argue that this attempt to reply to DeRose’s first challenge doesn’t work. A possible reply to the second DeRose case involves restricting what it is for one to "have evidence.” I argue that there are good reasons to doubt that restricting what it is to "have evidence” will allow the evidentialist an adequate response.

Causation, Association, and Confirmation
Richard Scheines, Carnegie Mellon University
Gregory Wheeler, New University of Lisbon
 Many philosophers of science have argued that a set of evidence that is "”coherent”” confirms a hypothesis which explains such coherence. In this paper, we examine the relationships between probabilistic models of all three of these concepts: coherence, confirmation, and explanation. For coherence, we consider Shogenji’s measure of association (deviation from independence). For confirmation, we consider several measures in the literature, and for explanation, we turn to Causal Bayes Nets and resort to causal structure and its constraint on probability. All else equal, we show that focused correlation, which is the ratio of the coherence of evidence and the coherence of the evidence conditional on a hypothesis, tracks confirmation. We then show that the causal structure of the evidence and hypothesis can put strong constraints on how coherence in the evidence does or does not translate into confirmation of the hypothesis. Our results suggest how to reset the discussion of Bayesian coherentism within formal epistemology, for once we control for the role that causal structure plays in probabilistic models of coherence, we can see that the impossibility results have a much more limited scope than generally noted.

Concept Acquisition and Perceptual Phenomenology
Kevin Connolly, University of Toronto
 Suppose you recently acquired the concept of an oriole. If you look at an oriole now, your perceptual phenomenology might differ from before. Charles Siewert and Susanna Siegel make this claim. In this paper, I evaluate it. I argue that while the concept directs your attention, you could have attended in that way without the concept, just as you might accidentally hit a backhand without ever actually learning the skill. Acquiring a concept does not add to your repertoire of perceptual acts. Rather, it selects an act you could already perform and makes it repeatable. It creates a skill.

Conceptualism and the Richness of Perceptual Content
John Spackman, Middlebury College
 This paper presents an argument for a restricted content conceptualism, which holds that the contents of conscious, human perceptual experience are, like belief contents, constituted by concepts. Several recent authors have alleged that traditional arguments for conceptualism leave open the possibility that even if concepts are necessarily correlated with perceptual contents, they might not determine their essential nature. I argue (1) that studies of change blindness are best interpreted as showing that it is a necessary condition of an item being a constituent of conscious perceptual content that the subject recognize it as a token of some type, however general, (2) that if a subject recognizes a perceptual item as a token of some type, and perhaps also satisfies certain other general conditions, she satisfies the minimal conditions on possessing a concept of that type, and (3) that the subject’s concepts determine the nature of her perceptual content.

Consequentialist Virtue
Luke Gelinas, University of Toronto
 A number of writers in the consequentialist tradition endorse the view that to be morally virtuous is to be related to the good in a causal or productive way: the virtuous person is the one who brings about a relevant measure of good. First I formulate this view in light of difficulties implied by recent statements of it. Then I advance an objection: any view which explains virtue solely by reference to the production of good is incapable of placing significant constraints on the actions or behavior associated with virtue. I show why this is undesirable, and identify the structure of a theory of virtue, present in the writings of G. E. Moore, which avoids the objection while remaining significantly consequentialist.

Context and Skeptical Theism
Justin P. McBrayer, Fort Lewis College
 Skeptical theists argue that, given our cognitive limitations, the fact that we cannot see a compensating good for some instance of evil is not a reason to think that there is no such good. If so, we are not justified in concluding that any actual instance of evil is gratuitous, thus undercutting the argument from evil for atheism. This paper focuses on the epistemic role of context to advance the debate over skeptical theism in two ways. First, considerations of context can be invoked to offer a novel defense of skeptical theism. Second, considerations of context can be invoked to undermine the most serious objection to skeptical theism, viz. the moral objection. The gist of the paper is to defend a connection between context-driven views in epistemology with skeptical views in philosophy of religion. This paper argues that the two stand or fall together.

Could Morality Have a Source?
Chris Heathwood, University of Colorado–Boulder
 It is a common idea that morality, or moral truths, if there are any, must have some sort of source, or grounding. It has also been claimed that constructivist theories in metaethics have an advantage over realist theories in that the former but not the latter can provide such a grounding. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that constructivism does not in fact provide a complete grounding for morality, and so is on a par with realism in this respect. Second, and more tentatively, it explains why it seems that morality in fact couldn’t have a source.

Decisions Without Sharp Probabilities
Paul Weirich, University of Missouri
 Adam Elga (2010) argues that no principle of rationality leads from unsharp probabilities to decisions. He concludes that a perfectly rational agent does not have unsharp probabilities. This paper defends unsharp probabilities. It shows how unsharp probabilities may ground rational decisions. Unsharp probabilities arise from sparse or unspecific evidence. For example, meteorological evidence, because unspecific, often does not suggest a sharp probability that tomorrow will bring rain. An agent may assign to rain a range of probabilities going from, say, 0.4 to 0.6. Elga argues that unsharp probability assignments may lead an agent to a sure loss. In this event, a dilemma arises: the agent may have either unsharp probability assignments that accurately represent evidence, or sharp probabilities that prevent sure losses. Should an agent’s probability assignments be faithful to the evidence, or should they promote practical success? This paper maintains that an agent’s probability assignments can attain both goals.

Defending Consciousness, Self, and Attention
Jason Ford, University of Minnesota–Duluth
 In his paper, "Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience,” Gennaro argues against Ford and Smith’s "Consciousness, Self and Attention.” I defend the Ford and Smith position against his arguments. First, Gennaro charges that the cases Ford and Smith use to motivate their position could also be interpreted as involving unconscious self-representations, rather than elements of a peripheral self-image. I introduce evidence from cases of thought insertion, phantom limbs, visual capture, and somatoparaphrenia; arguing that damage to a peripheral self-image within the structure of attention provides the best explanation for these phenomena. Second, Gennaro takes Ford and Smith to task for not matching the explanatory structure of HOT theories. I offer a more nuanced category scheme for Self-Referential approaches, thereby defusing Gennaro’s objection.

Deontic Logic and Natural Language
Kai von Fintel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Terence Parsons, University of California–Los Angeles
 In this talk, I will first give an overview of the connections and differences between the concerns of deontic logic and those of natural language semantics, touching on issues like the context-dependency of deontic modal constructions, the systematic cross-linguistic relationship between strong deontic necessity modals ("must”, "have to”) and weak deontic necessity modals ("ought”, "should”), the distinction between personal deontic modality and propositional deontic modality, the problem of free choice permission, the interpretation of imperatives, and others. The second part looks in more detail at one central problem: the interaction of "if”-clauses and deontic modals.

Desire-satisfaction, Time, and the Argument from Internalism
Dale Dorsey, University of Kansas
 A classic difficulty for a desire-satisfaction theory of welfare concerns the time at which I am benefitted by the satisfaction of a desire. Assume that I desire, at 10 a.m., January 12th, 2010, to climb Mount Everest sometime during 2012. Also assume, however, that during 2011, my desires undergo a shift: I no longer desire to climb Mount Everest during 2012. In fact, I develop an aversion to so doing. Imagine, however, that despite my aversion, I am forced to climb Mount Everest. Does climbing Mount Everest benefit me? If so, when? Recently Ben Bradley has argued that a desire-satisfaction view cannot answer this question plausibly. Bradley’s arguments are powerful and merit attention. However, as I argue in this paper, they do not hold up under scrutiny; at least one desiderative approach to the time of welfare benefits survives Bradley’s critique.

Dialectical Difficulties in Justifying the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
David Palmer, University of Tennessee
 According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Over the last few decades, PAP has dominated discussions of free will and moral responsibility. But despite this renewed attention, there is a significant gap in the literature concerning PAP. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the fundamental question of why we should think that PAP is true in the first place. What reasons are there to think that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities? How plausible are they? In what follows, I address this gap and take up the question of PAP’s justification. I survey five possible arguments for PAP but argue that each faces dialectical difficulties. More generally, I argue that, despite the principle’s apparent plausibility, it is harder to provide a convincing argument for PAP’s truth than might be thought.

Diffuse Attention
Adrienne Prettyman, University of Toronto
 While there is a growing body of empirical research on the relationship between consciousness and attention, how to interpret this evidence remains a matter of dispute. Some researchers interpret the evidence to show that attention and consciousness are "distinct processes” (Koch & Tsuchiya 2006); others think the evidence shows that attention is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness (deBrigard & Prinz 2010). In this poster, I reconsider one influential body of evidence for consciousness without attention drawn from the dual-task paradigm. I provide a new interpretation of the evidence, on which subjects rely on non-selective diffuse attention to perform tasks without selectively attending to them. I end by proposing an experiment that could help researchers determine whether the evidence supports the existence of diffuse attention, and consider the implications this study would have for the philosophical debate over the relationship between attention and consciousness.

Dis-Locating Moral Authority: Justifying Moral Claims in a Diverse and Unequal World
Alison Jaggar, University of Colorado–Boulder
Theresa Tobin, Marquette University
 In two closely related talks, Alison Jaggar and Theresa Tobin discuss some central themes of our co-authored book-in-progress. The book addresses the question of how real people in real world situations may reason well about moral issues. We assume that, in real world situations, cultural diversity and social inequality are the norm rather than the exception. Rather than offering a single model of moral justification designed to provide rational warrant for morally authoritative conclusions in all circumstances, we argue instead that different reasoning strategies are appropriate for different contexts. Drawing on several case studies, we offer some guidelines for selecting among available strategies. We think that our work has implications for conceiving the task of moral epistemology. We suggest that philosophers should not seek a single privileged method of moral reasoning but instead should seek to understand why different reasoning strategies work well in different circumstances.

Disagreeing with Peers: The Set Aside View
S. Matthew Liao, New York University
 What should you do in a case of disagreement with an epistemic peer? Are you epistemically justified in sticking to your guns or does the mere fact of the peer disagreement require at least some belief revision on your part? In this paper, I draw a distinction between two kinds of peer disagreement: Surface Disagreement and Reflective Disagreement. I first argue that in a Surface Disagreement, belief revision is required. But the explanation I offer of why belief revision is required is different from the explanation given in the literature. Next, I argue that in a Reflective Disagreement, you can stick to your guns. I defend what I call the Set Aside View, according to which you can stick to your guns because you can set aside the fact that your peer disagrees with you.

Does Moral Responsibility Require Choice?
Xiaofei Liu, University of Missouri
 A heated debate in recent discussion over moral responsibility is whether choice or voluntary control is a precondition for moral responsibility. Volitionists hold that an agent is not morally responsible for some thing unless the agent has, directly or indirectly, chosen it. Attributivists, on the other hand, hold that an agent is morally responsible for certain behavior insofar as the behavior is attributable to her in the sense that it is expressive of her attitudes, judgments, or normative commitments, and thus moral responsibility does not require choice. One serious challenge to attributivism, according to the volitionist, is that the attributivist’s notion of moral responsibility fails to be a deep responsibility, one that explains the agent’s credit or fault. After showing why some current attributivists’ responses fail to successfully silence this challenge, I will offer a new response, one that refutes a basic assumption in this deep responsibility challenge.

Double Affection Vindicated
Nick Stang, University of Miami
 Some commentators have attributed to Kant the doctrine of double affection: subjects are causally affected both by things in themselves, and by appearances. Several commentators have claimed that this doctrine faces serious philosophical problems. I begin by explaining what I take to be the worst problem faced by the doctrine of double affection: appearances cannot cause the very representations in virtue of which they exist. I then offer my own solution to the problem, and my own version of the doctrine of double affection.

Drift as an Individual-Level Process
Grant A. Ramsey, University of Notre Dame
 In this paper, I argue (contra some recent work in the philosophy of biology) that a distinction between natural selection and drift can be drawn. I draw this distinction by conceiving of drift as an individual-level process. This goes against other attempts to distinguish selection from drift, which have argued either that drift is a population-level process or product. Instead of identifying drift with population-level features, the account introduced here can instead explain these population-level features.

Duplicate Reasons
Ian Schnee, University of Puget Sound
 Duplicate reasons are those that satisfy the following schema: that p is one’s reason for believing that p. I examine two common arguments against duplicate reasons and show that neither is successful. The first argument is that duplicate reasons are viciously circular. The second is that assertions about duplicate reasons are always inappropriate. I develop the view that duplicate reasons occur when the fact that p is one’s reason for believing that p, and I show that such reasons are neither circular nor refuted by the pragmatic bind we often find ourselves in when we hold beliefs for duplicate reasons.

Emotion, Evaluation, and Identification
Scott O’Leary, Fordham University
 Though it is not always apparent what distinguishes mental states we identify with from those that are external, it seems we cannot but identify with those things we care about. Harry Frankfurt has developed this connection between caring and identification. Recently, Agnieska Jaworska has criticized Frankfurt’s and other accounts of identification for ignoring marginal cases, in particular young children and Alzheimer’s patients. Reflecting on marginal cases reveals that caring and identification cannot be reduced to evaluative judgment or a reflective stance toward first-order desires. Jaworska’s account relies upon emotions to explain the phenomenon of identification. Yet Jaworska’s appeal to emotions is correct for the wrong reasons. Her explanation that emotions are important for maintaining psychological continuity and connections inadequately explains emotions’ importance. It also provides an unduly complicated explanation for their intuitive appeal. The answer is simpler and contradicts her conclusion: Emotions are important for identification because emotions are evaluative.

Emotion, Individuation, and Social Power in Spinoza
Ericka Tucker, California State Polytechnic University–Pomona
 In the contemporary literature on Spinoza’s metaphysics there is an ongoing debate about the status of individuals, and particularly about the status of the state. Such debates tend to ignore the context and the aim of Spinoza’s larger project and thus they tend to misunderstand Spinoza’s treatment of human beings and states as complex individuals. Rejecting Aristotelian notions of natural sociability, Spinoza argued that the emotions, the bases of human sociability, contain the seeds of both social harmony and social disintegration. On Spinoza’s view, to create strong political communities, we need to understand how to organize and coordinate the emotions of individuals. Only in affectively organized political communities can individuals become empowered and free. In this paper I outline the key features of Spinoza’s theory of the emotions, their social dimension, and show these yield Spinoza’s account of the "best state.”

Emotions in a Bind
Charles Starkey, Clemson University
 Neither of the two dominant strains of emotion theory—cognitive and non-cognitive approaches—are tenable. So-called hybrid theories of emotion which include both of these elements may seem to offer a way to resolve or circumvent the problems facing cognitive and non-cognitive theories. However existing hybrid theories fail to adequately explain emotions because they leave the relation between physiological or affective and cognitive components nebulous. This paper outlines a new direction for emotion theory that explains emotions as distinct, unified psychological states that incorporate cognitive and affective elements. But unlike existing hybrid theories of emotion, it provides a more thorough explanation of the relation of the elements of emotion than existing hybrid theories by utilizing and adapting work in cognitive science on the unification of separate streams of information into a single cognitive representation.

Epistemic Modal Belief Reports Are a Problem for von Fintel and Gillies
Benjamin Lennertz, University of Southern California
 In this paper I present a problem for the view that Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies put forward in their paper, "‘Might’ Made Right.” In that paper they offer a sophisticated contextualist view about the epistemic modal, "might,” in an attempt to account for the intuitive data about denial and retraction that seem to favor relativism. After presenting their attempt to deal with this problematic data, I argue that their view cannot explain appropriate responses to epistemic modal belief reports, like "George believes that the Dodgers might have won last night.” This is because their account relies on the suggestion that there are multiple speech acts performed by utterances of epistemic modal sentences. But beliefs are mental states, not speech acts, and so resist such a treatment.

Equal Opportunity Despite Family Autonomy?
S. Stewart Braun, University of Virginia
 Equal opportunity of life prospects and family autonomy are both valued principles. However, if they are held without compromise, they are incompatible. Thus, we must either reject equal opportunity of life prospects in favor of a weaker account of equal opportunity or abandon our commitments to family autonomy. In this paper, I contend that the choice is not as stark as it first appears. I argue for two key distinctions. First, I contend that there is a difference between family autonomy and family sanctity, the latter being consistent with a fairly robust equal opportunity. Secondly, I argue for a distinction between internal and external contingencies that demonstrates it is possible to separate the wealth of the family from the family proper. The two distinctions weaken the force of the incompatibility problem and help justify interference with the family for the sake of equal opportunity.

Equal Weight Views and the Evidential Impact of Peer Opinions
Jonathan D. Matheson, University of North Florida
 Thomas Kelly has recently criticized Equal Weight Views of the epistemic significance of disagreement. Such views claim that in cases of peer disagreement the parties of the dispute should split the difference and adopt the doxastic attitude halfway between their two conflicting doxastic attitudes. According to Equal Weight Views, what one should believe having discovered a peer disagreement is entirely a matter of the evidence coming from peer opinions—the original evidence used by both parties to form their opinions has no role to play. Kelly finds this consequence of Equal Weight Views problematic and offers four arguments in support of his conclusion. In this paper I explain Kelly’s four arguments and defend Equal Weight Views from each. As it turns out, Equal Weight Views give peer opinions exactly the evidential impact they deserve.

Evidence, ‘Ought,’ and the Mine Shaft Paradox
John Brunero, University of Missouri–St. Louis
 I consider an alleged paradox arising from Derek Parfit’s Mine Shaft example, and argue that the paradox can be resolved by disambiguating "ought” − in particular, by distinguishing between the subjective and objective senses of "ought.” An objection to this approach to the paradox has recently been advanced by Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane. They argue that the disambiguation approach predicts that in certain contexts interlocutors will be "talking past” one another when it is actually clear that they are genuinely disagreeing. Against this objection, I argue that the disambiguation approach is not committed to interpreting the interlocutors as talking past one another, and that there is a plausible interpretation, consistent with the disambiguation approach, which has it come out that the interlocutors are genuinely disagreeing. Crucial to my argument is the introduction of a third, evidential sense of "ought.”

Evidentialism and the Principle of Inferential Justification
Ryan Byerly, Baylor University
 Many epistemologists, including evidentialists Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, have found the following principle of inferential justification compelling: (PIJ) For any agent S and propositions p1-pn and q, if S is not justified in believing p1-pn, then S is not justified in believing q on the basis of an inference from p1-pn. I argue, however, that anyone attracted to evidentialist views like those of Conee and Feldman should be doubtful of PIJ. For, such a person will be attracted to the view that a subject S is justified in believing p just in case she ought to believe p, and I show that, given this thesis, PIJ is false. Further, I offer an explanation of why many have erroneously taken certain particular cases in which we are inclined to judge subjects unjustified in believing things on the basis of inferences from unjustified beliefs as offering support for PIJ.

Exclusion, Overdetermination, and Vacuity
Daniel Lim, University of Cambridge
 Jaegwon Kim argues that if mental properties are irreducible with respect to physical properties then mental properties are epiphenomenal. I believe this conditional is false and argue that mental properties, along with their physical counterparts, may overdetermine their effects. Kim contends, however, that embracing overdetermination in the mental case, due to supervenience, renders the attribution of overdetermination vacuous. This way of blocking the overdetermination option, however, makes the attribution of mental epiphenomenalism equally vacuous. Furthermore, according to Kim’s own logic, physical properties, and not mental properties, may be in danger of losing their causal relevance.

Experimental Philosophy of Art
Richard Kamber, The College of New Jersey
 Although experimental philosophers have been busy kindling fires under well-worn armchairs in many areas of philosophy, the philosophy of art has remained largely untouched. I argue in this paper that techniques borrowed from experimental psychology can begin to bring new warmth and light to the old debate over "what is art?” I begin by explaining why systematic data on intuitions are indispensable to this debate, then present data from a recent survey I conducted that suggest that none of the principal theories of art advanced since the 1950s is fully successful in tracking the intuitions of art professionals (or others) about what is or is not art. I close by arguing that although there are other roles for theories of art besides tracking people’s intuitions about what is art, these roles also require experimental research.

Expressivism, Constructivism, and the Supervenience of Moral Properties
C. D. Meyers, University of Southern Mississippi
 A major argument for non-cognitivism is the claim that moral realism cannot provide a satisfying explanation of why moral properties supervene on natural properties. Non-cognitivism, however, has its own problems explaining supervenience. Explanations based on second-order disapprovals of type-inconsistent moral evaluations are not sufficient because these are merely a contingent attitudes that people just happen to have. And appeal to pragmatic considerations does not allow for appraisers to take their own moral attitudes seriously enough. What has been overlooked is a third alternative. The metaethical theory that can best account for supervenience is neither realist nor non-cognitivist but an objectivist version of constructivism. On the constructivist theory, right and wrong are determined by the principles that people would (hypothetically) consent to under ideal conditions. Type-consistency (and thus supervenience) is a required feature of any principles regulating our conduct, if they are to be freely agreed to by ideally rational people.

Fickle Consent: Why Is There No Time Like the Present?
Thomas Dougherty, Stanford University
 It is familiar enough that typically we ought not lay hands on someone’s body without their consent. What has not received attention is the fact that it is their present consent that matters—even if James has consented and will consent to my piercing his ears at the moment, it is (all else equal) impermissible for me to pierce them if he presently does not consent. In this paper, I discuss the question of why present consent matters. I consider several possible explanations, which I find unsatisfactory. I end by suggesting that a pragmatic conventionalist theory could provide an explanation. But this will be, at the very best, only a partial solution to the problem, because I am not able to fully defend such a theory here. As such, the main purpose of this paper is to pose a puzzle, rather than solve it.

Fiction and Projection in Nietzsche’s Conception of Value
Aaron Harper, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign
 In this paper, I develop Nietzsche’s conception of value. I argue that Nietzsche believes values are projections or expressions of drives and desires. Nietzsche does not mean this in the same way as many in the neo-Humean tradition. Valuing reflects a complicated process of the development of commitments. Valuing is an achievement, involving the ability of people to commit to something. Valuing can be understood through natural and physiological explanations, but Nietzsche retains the use of the language of value. This means Nietzsche offers values as fictions or pretense, yet in practice it amounts to a naïve or quasi-realism. Values are important for Nietzsche since they reflect the individual, and Nietzsche’s therapeutic aims entail the revaluation and creation of values. To give further context to my view, I contrast my view with Hussain’s interpretation of Nietzschean fictionalism. I argue that my account best makes sense of Nietzsche’s activity of valuing.

Fictions of Bodies’ Existence in Hume’s Treatise
Jonathan Cottrell, New York University
 In his landmark study of Hume’s philosophy, Norman Kemp Smith observed that "Hume’s manner of employing the terms "fiction” and "illusion” places many difficulties in the reader’s path.” In this paper, I address one such difficulty: that of reconciling Hume’s claim to believe in the existence of bodies with his claim that this belief involves accepting a "fiction,” or "fictions.” In order to resolve the apparent tension between these claims, I propose a general interpretation of Hume’s use of the term "fiction” in the Treatise, show how this interpretation illuminates his discussion of our belief that "there be body” in the "Treatise” section "Of scepticism with regard to the senses,” and show its superiority to several other interpretations.

Fools, Malice, and Public Refutation in the Philebus
Emily A. Austin, Wake Forest University
 In Plato’s Philebus, Socrates argues that the pleasure we receive from watching fools is tinged with the pain of injustice. We are pleased when those who believe themselves wise are exposed to ridicule (49e9). However, taking pleasure in someone’s self-ignorance is malicious (48b11-12), and malice is a "pain of the soul” (48b8-9), so we mix pain with pleasure when we laugh at fools. Since malice is "unjust” (49d6-7), commentators have assumed that the philosopher does not experience mixed pleasures when fools are exposed, and that mixed pleasures do not contribute to the good human life outlined at the end of the dialogue (61b-67b). I argue that that absent universal self-knowledge or a solitary life, Plato thinks the philosopher will enjoy some mixed pleasures, which are an element of the best life available to her. She encounters fools, enjoys exposing them as fools, and this pleasure increases the value of her life.

Formal and Material Theories in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Interpretation
Alan C. Love, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities
 John Norton’s argument that all formal theories of induction fail raises substantive questions about the philosophical analysis of scientific reasoning. What are the criteria of adequacy for philosophical theories of induction, explanation, or theory structure? Is more than one adequate theory possible? Using a generalized version of Norton’s argument, I demonstrate that the competition between formal and material theories in philosophy of science results from adhering to different criteria of adequacy. This situation encourages an interpretation of "formal” and "material” as indicators of divergent criteria that accompany different philosophical methodologies. I conclude that one way to negotiate between conflicting criteria is to adopt a pluralist stance toward philosophical theories of scientific reasoning.

Freedom from Autonomy
Eric L. Chwang, University of Colorado–Boulder
 One very popular deontological explanation for the wrongness of some actions appeals to respect for autonomy. In this paper I argue that freedom is better suited to play this role than autonomy is, where an autonomous choice (person) is both free and rational. In other words, to the extent that autonomy can explain—in a non-consequentialist way—why an action is wrong, the related but distinct concept of freedom provides a better non-consequentialist explanation. The argument subdivides into cases (restriction with no benefit, restriction on one to benefit another, and paternalistic restriction) and argues that respect for freedom coupled with consequentialist sympathies better explain our moral intuitions in every case than respect for a non-consequentialist autonomy does.

Frege versus Dedekind: On the Nature and Purpose of Logicism
Erich Reck, University of California–Riverside
 When thinking about logicism in the philosophy of mathematics, the two representatives that typically come to mind are Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege. However, in the late nineteenth century Frege’s contemporary Richard Dedekind played an equally important role in this connection. After illustrating that role in terms of Dedekind’s early reception, the sense in which he can be seen as another main logicist is analyzed (building on earlier work by Howard Stein, José Ferreirós, and myself). This will lead to a further comparison of Frege’s and Dedekind’s approaches, and especially, of their views about the nature of logic, partly based on their responses to each other. It will also require a clarification of what the purpose of logicism should be taken to be, while observing how views about this issue have changed over time.

Friendship and Enlightenment in Kant
Brian Watkins, Duke University
 Kant claims, on the one hand, that friendship is a privileged site for self-disclosure while, on the other hand, he warns that friends should not become excessively familiar with each other. Some have argued that this tension is a result of the difference between the kind of friendship Kant thinks we can achieve and the ideal. By contrast, I argue that, for Kant, we have achieved the best kind of friendship not when we find someone with whom to share everything, but, instead, when we find someone with whom we can discuss those things that are actually worth revealing, namely, what we think when we think for ourselves. In other words, the best kind of friends are those who feel free to use their reason and participate together in what Kant calls enlightenment.

From Thought to Action
Jonathan Dancy, University of Texas–Austin and University of Reading
 In this paper I consider the nature of practical reasoning, with special attention to the various arguments that are supposed to show that the conclusion of such reasoning cannot be action and must be either belief or intention.

G. A. Cohen and the Logic of Egalitarian Congruence
David Rondel, Trent University
 In this paper I argue that G. A. Cohen’s argument against Rawls’s "lax” interpretation of the difference principle depends for its intelligibility on the ability to distinguish—with reasonable but perhaps not perfect precision—between those situations in which what Nancy Rosenblum has called "the logic of congruence” is validly invoked and those in which it is not. More importantly, I will be suggesting that the philosophical shape of Cohen’s critique makes it impossible for him to supply the required criterion, and that the methodological "intuitionism” he claims to be committed to is at odds with his larger argument against the Rawlsian interpretation of the difference principle.

Genetic Testing, Parenting, and Moral Identity: A Response to Jeff McMahan
William P. Kabasenche, Washington State University
 Prenatal or pre-implantation genetic testing offer prospective parents a significant amount of insight into and control over what children they will gestate and give birth to. Jeff McMahan has argued for what I will call the Parity Claim—that the evaluative perspectives of those who would prefer no child to a disabled one and those who would prefer a disabled child to no child are on a par. I argue against the Parity Claim by showing that parental identity consistent with the latter perspective better positions parents to achieve childrearing goods in any parenting context. Parents who are prepared to care for a disabled child are also prepared to care for any child who might become disabled throughout his or her life. And parents who move from the first to the second evaluative perspective are, I argue, making moral progress. But the reverse is not true.

Genuine Empirical Metaphysics
Tyler Hildebrand, University of Colorado–Boulder
 David Hume believed that the practice of metaphysics was impossible. He was a skeptic about genuine metaphysics, the discipline concerned with discovering the nature of the world itself. Skeptics of genuine metaphysics are generally inclined to accept the following dichotomy: either genuine metaphysics is possible and we possess synthetic a priori reasoning, or genuine metaphysics is impossible. This, however, is a false dichotomy. This essay argues that genuine metaphysics does not require synthetic a priori reasoning by defending a method of practicing genuine empirical metaphysics. The basic idea behind the method is that a properly constrained method of defining theories ensures that logical and analytical conclusions (features of our language or concepts) apply to the world itself. The two most crucial components of the theory are the Ramsey/Carnap/Lewis method of defining theoretical terms and Carnap’s logical interpretation of probability.

Grassroots Organizing for Compensation Equity
Jill Gordon, Colby College
 Overview of organizing efforts on my own campus aimed at equity for women with respect to salary, endowed or distinguished chairs, other forms of material compensation, and public visibility in institutional publications, both print and electronic. I will discuss strategies and tactics that we used, both effective and ineffective.

Grotius and Aristotle: The Justice of Taking Too Little
Andrew Blom, Central Michigan University
 The influential theory of international justice that Hugo Grotius developed in his 1625 work, The Rights of War and Peace, evolved, I argue, out of Grotius’ engagement with a certain reading of Aristotle’s account of justice. The account of justice that troubles Grotius conceives of justice as a mean between taking too much and taking too little. While such a conception turns out to be problematic as a reading of Aristotle, the criticisms that Grotius levies against it reveal significant features of his own conception of justice. I argue that we can best understand the implications of Grotius’ mature conception by considering the ends to which he had deployed the Aristotelian notion in his own earlier work on international justice. Grotius came to perceive that his earlier understanding of justice too easily ruled out the sorts of humanitarian concerns that could have a moderating effect on the recourse to war.

Grounding and Entailment
Elijah Chudnoff, University of Miami
 Recent work on the grounding or "in virtue of” relation has given us reason to think it is a sui generis non-causal dependence relation, and that substitutes, such as supervenience, cannot do the same work it can do in structuring philosophical inquiry. A common assumption is that grounds entail, suffice for, or necessitate, what they ground: if P (wholly) grounds Q, then P entails Q. I challenge this assumption. I argue that the most popular reasoning in favor of it provides no independent support for it, and that there are good reasons to reject it. I briefly consider an epistemological application of this rejection.

Grounding Explanations
Louis H. deRosset, University of Vermont
 A compelling idea holds that reality has a layered structure. We often disagree about what inhabits the bottom layer, or even if there is one; but we agree that higher up we find chemical, biological, geological, psychological, sociological, and economic entities. How is the intuitive idea of layered structure to be understood? A plausible view holds that layered structure is to be explicated by appeal grounding explanations. Grounding explanations tell us what obtains in virtue of what. Unfortunately, the use of grounding explanations to articulate the layered conception faces a problem, which I call the collapse. The collapse turns on the question of how to ground the facts stated by the explanations themselves. In this paper I sketch a way to ground explanations that avoids the collapse. Briefly, the suggestion is that the fact stated by a grounding explanation is grounded in its explanans.

Grounding the Luck Objection
Neal Tognazzini, College of William and Mary
 Many object to libertarianism by arguing that it manages to solve one problem of luck (the threat of determinism) only by falling prey to another (the threat from indeterminism). According to this objection, there is something freedom-undermining about the very circumstances that the libertarian thinks are required for freedom. However, it has proved difficult to articulate precisely what about these circumstances is supposed to undermine freedom—the absence of certain sorts of explanations has perhaps been the most common complaint. In this paper, however, I argue that recent work on the metaphysics of ontological dependence actually provides the resources for formulating the luck objection in its strongest form.

Heidegger’s Name for Dasein’s Being: ‘Existence’ or ‘Care’?
Joshua L. Tepley, University of Notre Dame
 According to the early Heidegger, different kinds of entities have different kinds of being. While it is clear that one of these kinds of being is had exclusively by human beings, the kind of entity Heidegger calls "Dasein,” it is not clear what name Heidegger gives to this kind of being. While "existence” (Existenz) is a popular suggestion in the literature, there is much textual evidence to support the view that it is "care” (Sorge). In this paper I examine the evidence for and against these two positions and come down in favor of the latter. I argue that all of the passages in which Heidegger appears to say that "existence” is the name for Dasein’s being are ambiguous and can be read as saying that "existence” is the name for one of the structures of Dasein’s being.

Higher-Order Perception and Aristotle’s Use of ‘Sunaisthanesthai’ in Nicomachean Ethics IX.9
Anthony Carreras, Rice University
 The primary concern of Nicomachean Ethics IX.9 is the aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship—the question of whether the happy person will need friends or not. Aristotle offers three different arguments for why the happy person will need friends: the argument from self-awareness (1169b29-1170a4), the argument from pleasure (1170a4-12), and the argument from nature (1170a13-b13). Though Aristotle is not entirely explicit about this, he seems to give preference to the third argumen, the argument from nature, which will be the primary focus of this paper. It is that argument that closes the chapter and provides the basis for Aristotle’s final verdict that "anyone who is to be happy will need friends who are good” (1170b16). In addition, that the argument appeals to nature is an indication that Aristotle sees it as closer to the truth. It is part of my aim in this paper, however, to show that the argument from nature has great value independent of the aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship. I demonstrate that a careful reconstruction of that argument shows that it contains an important appeal to, and sheds important light on, Aristotle’s vexing claim that true friends are a single soul (mia psych). This turns out to be significant, for it shows that Aristotle is caught up in trying to resolve not only the aporia regarding self-sufficiency and friendship, but another regarding the relation between self-regarding and other-regarding motives when they coexist in the virtuous agent.

How Assurance-Based Accounts of Promising Can Solve Their Circularity Problem
Charlie Kurth, University of California–San Diego
 Assurance-based accounts of promises are appealing because they give central place to the assurance that the promisor’s promise provides to the promisee. But the standard versions (e.g., Scanlon 1998) are viciously circular. In this essay, I argue that the circularity problem results from too narrow an understanding of how promises assure—one that focuses exclusively on what the promisor does. Moreover, I demonstrate that the circularity problem can be avoided once we recognize the importance of the interaction that occurs between promisor and promisee—and, in particular, the special role that the promisee plays.

How Internalism Cannot Be Saved from the Psychopath
Peter Brian Barry, Saginaw Valley State University
 The psychopath is one of the more common putative examples wielded by opponents of various meta-ethical theses to refute their target. We are told that the possibility of psychopaths, if not their very existence, refutes various forms of moral rationalism, non-cognitivism, and, perhaps, internalism. Jeanette Kennett and Cordelia Fine present an empirically informed defense of internalism against the threat of the psychopath. They suggest at least two different strategies to defend internalism: one appeals to the affective deficiencies of psychopaths, and the other to their cognitive deficiencies. I shall have something to say about the former strategy but my main concern will be with considering the latter. Ultimately, I conclude that Kennett and Fine’s cognitivist defense of internalism is not successful, and ruminate about just which meta-ethicists ought to fear the psychopath.

Imagination and the Experience of Objectivity
Jennifer Church, Vassar College
 Perception requires that we experience something as objective, as independent from any particular way it may appear. In order for such independence to be evident from within a given experience, we must actively imagine alternative presentations of the same thing. (Potential imagining is not enough.) Understanding the active role of imagining helps to explain some otherwise puzzling aspects of causal perception, moral perception, and the perception of logical truths.

Immigration and Freedom of Association
Christopher Heath Wellman, Washington University in St. Louis
 In this essay, I appeal to freedom of association to construct a presumptive case in favor of a state’s right to set its own immigration policy and then defend this prima facie case against formidable arguments on behalf of open borders. I ultimately conclude that, even if egalitarians are right that those of us in wealthy societies have demanding duties of global distributive justice, and even if libertarians are correct that individuals have rights both to freedom of movement and to control their private property, legitimate states are entitled to reject all potential immigrants, including those desperately seeking asylum from corrupt governments.

In Defense of Consistency Checks
Mark E. Wunderlich, Union College
 Kornblith (1989) and Goldman (1999) use the alleged impossibility of checking one’s beliefs for coherence in an attack on the coherence theories of BonJour (1985) and Lehrer (1990), among others. These theories, they observe, require that the features that make a belief justified be accessible to the believing subject. These theories also make the consistency of the subject’s collection of beliefs a necessary condition for—or at least a contributor to—the justification of that subject’s beliefs. Kornblith claims that a result from Cherniak (1986) shows that these two elements of theories of justification cannot be combined. It is apparently a physical impossibility for us to do what coherence theories would require that we do. I argue that one version of the attack is misguided, and that consistency checks can be defended against more sophisticated versions as well.

In Defense of the Distinction Between Cognition and Mere Association
Cameron Buckner, Indiana University–Bloomington
 Several high-profile critics have recently called for the ouster of the distinction between cognition and mere association from comparative psychology. Against these critics, I argue that "cognition” and "mere association” function there as mutually-exclusive kind terms. These kinds can be characterized by reflecting upon the empirical tests that psychologists currently perform to differentiate between cognition and mere association. An analysis of these tests evinces a family resemblance of properties, centered on the notion of behavioral flexibility, which comparative psychologists attribute to cognition. An investigation into the neural bases of this flexibility may finally place the distinction on firm metaphysical foundations.

Indeterminacy of Compatibilist Counterfactuals in Consequentialist Theories of Right
Sean Drysdale Walsh, University of Minnesota–Duluth
 This paper concerns a metaphysical issue about the application of the study of counterfactuals to the study of ethics. Many consequentialists claim that it is a virtue of their view that there is always a determinate metaphysical fact about which of our options would maximize utility, even if we do not always know which of those options it is. In this paper I challenge this metaphysical claim. I argue that on standard variants of David Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals, there could be no such metaphysical facts about what maximizes utility in deterministic worlds. On Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals, I argue, the "similarity of worlds” relation is too coarse-grained (imprecise and vague) to allow for such metaphysical facts. Lewis’s own way of precisifying coarse-grained counterfactuals using "interest” is relativistic in a way that is unacceptable for most consequentialists, who wish to avoid ethical relativism.

Individual, Social, and Institutional Virtue
Guy Axtell, Radford University
 This paper examines recent research on individual, social, and institutional virtues and vices; the aim is to explore and make proposals concerning their inter-relationships, as well as to highlight central questions for future research with the study of each. More specifically, the paper will focus on how these studies can be approached in a systematic way such that it contributes to greater convergence between virtue theory, feminist epistemology, and social epistemology.

Inescapability and Authority
Stan Husi, Rice University
 Neo-Kantian attempts to ground normativity in agency and its constitutive standards face the Agency-Shmagency objection: Why should one be an agent? Why believe agency is itself a normatively relevant condition and reasons-providing? For agency to lend authority to anything it must already have it, but does it? In response, proponents of agency-based accounts—Korsgaard, Velleman, and Ferrero among others—have appealed to what they consider the unique inescapability of agency. They claim that the norms constitutive of agency are authoritative and reasons-providing because we have no choice but to be agents. This essay contests the normative significance of inescapability and its capacity to explain the authority of agency-constitutive norms, granting for the sake of argument that there are agency-constitutive norms and that agency is inescapable. Agency’s authoritative status cannot be established by showing it to be inescapable.

Intuition and Judgment: How Not to Think About the Singularity of Intuition (and the Generality of Concepts) in Kant
Thomas Land, University of Chicago
 According to a widely held view, a Kantian intuition functions like a singular term. I argue that this view is false. Its apparent plausibility, both textual and philosophical, rests on attributing to Kant a Fregean conception of judgment. I show that Kant does not hold a Fregean conception of judgment and argue that, as a consequence, intuition cannot be understood on analogy with singular terms.

Intuitive Justice: Thoughts on Neutralizing Luck
Jeff Cervantez, University of Tennessee
 This paper provides a measure of intuitive support for luck egalitarianism. Particularly, it supports the fundamental idea behind the luck egalitarian project—viz. the intuition that justice requires neutralizing the bad consequences of morally arbitrary disparities. I claim this intuition is especially relevant when inequalities present a significant disadvantage to someone, simply on account of bad luck. While arguing this point, I interact with a formidable challenge to the luck-neutralizing project presented by Susan Hurley. Hurley claims that neutralizing luck cannot provide a basis for justice. She provides two main reasons for this: the egalitarian fallacy and the responsibility regress. I conclude that both of these challenges fail to undermine the intuition that justice requires neutralizing bad luck. In the end, there’s reason to think neutralizing bad luck makes a state more just than it would be otherwise.

Is Ockham’s Mental Language a Language of Thought?
Eric Hagedorn, University of Notre Dame
 A number of prominent medievalists have claimed that the theory of mental language, which was promulgated by Ockham in the early fourteenth century and discussed and modified by Scholastic philosophers for the following three centuries, is in fact extraordinarily similar to Fodor’s Language of Thought, so similar it can be said without blushing that Fodor’s and Ockham’s theories are "variants of a single picture.” In this paper, I discuss three difficulties for this interpretation of Ockham: Ockham’s hesitancy concerning the existence of real mental syntax, his idiosyncratic account of the propositional attitudes, and finally the problems that Ockham intends his theory to solve.

Is Scientific Theory Change Similar to Early Cognitive Development? Gopnik on Science and Childhood
Tim Fuller, Ohio State University
 I offer a sustained and two-part critique of Alison Gopnik’s position that early cognitive development is highly similar to scientific theory change. In the first part, I criticize the "strong” thesis that scientific inference and early cognitive development are subserved by the very same mental mechanisms. I contend that Gopnik fails to distinguish among several different types of theories of scientific inference—including population-level, normative, competence, and performance theories—and that the strong thesis fails to hold for any of them. In the second part, I argue that even a weaker analogy between childhood cognitive development and scientific inference has severe limitations. In particular, I maintain that scientific inference is centrally subserved by cross-domain processing while early cognitive development is not. The hope is that the inadequacies in Gopnik’s position are instructive. For one, they suggest a tighter analogy between adult quotidian cognition and scientific theory formation and confirmation.”

Is There a Hierarchy of Indirect Senses and References?
Kai von Fintel, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Terence Parsons, University of California–Los Angeles
 Frege argues that embedding a phrase in an indirect context produces an indirect sense and an indirect reference (its customary sense). His argument assume that a that-clause is syntactically the same as the sentence that it contains. Once we see a that-clause as a complex expression containing a sentence as a part, we can hold that no expression ever changes sense or reference; the that-clause refers to the sense of the sentence that it contains and has a sense of its own, which is determined by the sense of the contained sentence. A semantic theory is sketched in which no expression changes sense or reference and in which there are no "levels” of senses. Further assumptions allow one to reintroduce a hierarchy of senses of the sort that Frege envisaged, with a semantics having a Fregean structure. The additional apparatus, however, plays no additional role in the theory.

Kant on Beauty and Morality Circa 1784: On the Genesis of the Third Critique
Alex Rueger, University of Alberta
 While Kant throughout the 1770s had regarded judgments of taste as having merely empirical generality, I present evidence that in 1784 Kant, for the first time, accorded them the status of being "universal and necessary.” Such judgments need a "deduction” and although he had assembled many of the ingredients of the aesthetic theory of the Critique of Judgment (1790) already in notes and lectures during the 1770s, it was only in 1784 that he used these tools to justify the pleasure of taste’s claim to universality and necessity. He thereby granted this pleasure a status that up to then he had given only to moral satisfaction. The reasons for this change in Kant’s aesthetic views lie, I argue, in the important revisions he made to his theory of moral incentives at the time he wrote the Groundwork (1784).

Kant on the Ontological Argument
Ian Proops, University of Texas–Austin
 Kant’s criticisms of the ontological argument are, I argue, directed against a specifically Wolffian version of the Cartesian argument. They are: (a) that it is contradictory to bring the concept of a thing’s existence into a concept, if one would think of that thing merely in terms of its possibility (A 597/B 625); (b) if (waiving this objection) one were allowed to do that, one would in any case have committed "a mere tautology” (ibid.); and (c) that being is not a real predicate (A 598/ B 626). Since criticism (b) is usually taken to be successful but unoriginal, the paper focuses on the original but problematic criticisms (a) and (c). I argue that although each of these criticisms is ultimately unsuccessful, they fail for rather subtle and interesting reasons. In the course of making this case I offer a novel account of Kant’s notion of a real predicate.

Kant’s Conception of Autonomy in Two Objections to Metaethical Constitutivism
Paul Tulipana, Georgia State University
 This paper suggests that two recent objections to metaethical constitutivist views in the Kantian vein can be traced back to the conception of autonomy that those constitutivist theories employ. On this conception, autonomy is conceived both as a metaphysical fact about agents, and, for that reason, as a constitutive norm that categorically applies to them. I suggest that David Enoch’s shmagent objection can be understood as the complaint that autonomy as a metaphysical fact does not entail autonomy as a law, and that Shah and Hussain’s no-metaethics objection can be understood as the complaint that if autonomy as a metaphysical fact entails autonomy as a law, Kantians have not told us why. This diagnosis suggests that it is open to those sympathetic to Kant’s project to concede that these objections hold given a certain conception of agency, but need not therefore despair of the Kantian moral desiderata.

Kant’s Two Concepts of Virtue
Jeppe von Platz, University of Pennsylvania
 In this essay I argue that there are two connected by distinct concepts of virtue at work in Kant’s moral philosophy. The first is virtue as an ideal of moral character, the second is virtue as the degree to which a person has achieved the ideal. I further argue that these correspond to two of three modalities of the central concept of Kant’s moral philosophy: freedom as moral self-determination. Humanity, I maintain, is the capacity (or possibility) of moral self-determination. The ideal of virtue is the ideal of complete (or necessary) moral self-determination. And the degree to which an agent has achieved the ideal of virtue is the degree to which she has achieved moral self-determination (her actual moral self-determination).

Kim and Shoemaker on Causal Inheritance
Justin Tiehen, University of Puget Sound
 What is the relation between the causal powers of a particular instance of a mental property and the causal powers of its physical realizer? According to Jaegwon Kim’s causal inheritance principle, if a mental property M is realized in a system at time t in virtue of the physical realization base P, then the causal powers of that M-instance are identical with the causal powers of the realizing P-instance. Here Kim is opposed by Sydney Shoemaker, who in connection with his subset model of realization holds that mental property instances have fewer causal powers than Kim’s principle entails. In this paper I defend Kim’s view against Shoemaker’s, arguing that the subset model of realization has intolerable consequences that can be avoided by accepting causal inheritance.

Know-Who and Testimony Mediated Acquaintance
Michael R. Hicks, Brooklyn College
 According to David Braun, to know who so-and-so is is to know an answer to the question, who is so-and-so? At first glance his account appears to complement a contemporary trend towards skepticism about testimony-mediated acquaintance. However, in order to alleviate a discomfort Braun notes with his context-free account of know-who we need a (relatively) robust notion of testimony-mediated acquaintance, incompatible with that skepticism.

Knowledge for Whom? The Question of ‘Significance’ in Feminist Epistemology
Heidi Grasswick, Middlebury College
 Many epistemologists have rejected the idea that the accumulation of knowledge (or truths) per se is the goal of knowledge-seeking. Rather, they have recognized that it is really significant knowledge that we are after when we engage in epistemic pursuits (Anderson, 1995; Kitcher, 2001). Arguments to this effect have been used to explain how and why contextual interests necessarily play a role in our knowledge endeavors. In the case of feminist epistemology, many have asked the question "knowledge for whom?” as a way of articulating the need to take a knower’s situatedness into account. The question itself suggests a rejection of the assumption that knowledge, in its objectivity, always serves the interests of everyone. This paper investigates the degree to which framing differences in knowers as differences in what knowers take to be significant knowledge can assist feminist epistemologists in understanding knowledge as both objective and situated.

Knowledge Is Sexy
Alexis Mourenza, University of California–Santa Cruz
Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College
 In this paper, we do not take up Plantinga’s positive probabilistic argument for preferring supernaturalism to naturalism. Instead, we review the arguments for and against a defense of naturalized epistemology in terms of survival, and then offer a rather different account of why human evolution supports the reliability of our cognitive equipment. The view for which we will argue is that philosophers’ appeals to the processes of natural selection that are adaptive in terms of survival have provided an incomplete picture of what naturalists have available to them to make the sort of defense Plantinga claims cannot be made. To supplement this picture, we provide evidence from what Darwin called "sexual selection” and also what others now call "social selection” to provide a more complete picture of why it is reasonable to suppose that evolution has supplied human beings and many other animals highly reliable and also veridical cognitive processes.

Knowledge-Free Decision Theory
Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College
 This paper defends what I call "knowledge-free decision theory.” According to this view, whether an act is rational has nothing to do with what the agent who performs the act knows. In tension with this view, some philosophers have recently tried to connect practical reasons with knowledge. John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley have argued that it is appropriate for S to treat P as a reason only if S knows that P. John Hyman and Peter Unger have argued that P is S’s reason only if S knows that P. Combined with the plausible assumption that an act is rational only if it is performed for the right kinds of reasons, these alleged connections spell trouble for knowledge-free decision theory. Interestingly, while several philosophers have argued against Hawthorne and Stanley’s thesis, Unger and Hyman’s thesis has received little criticism. Here I offer a refutation of Unger and Hyman’s thesis.

Korsgaard, Kant, and Animals: A Response
Mark Shelton, Central Michigan University
 In this paper I defend Kant’s conception of indirect duties to animals against Korsgaard’s argument that a conception of direct duties to animals would be better. It is commonly thought, and Korsgaard seems to share the sentiment, that the concept of "indirect duty” implies a merely secondary and therefore less serious or stringent duty, providing part of the motivation for those who hold that duties to nonhuman animals can be equally serious and stringent to understand such duties as direct duties. I maintain, however, that Kant’s distinction between direct and indirect duty is primarily technical, having to do with how the determination of a nonrational animal’s interests (Kant would say "will”) takes place in moral deliberation. I argue that this technical distinction does not imply less serious duties, but does make a moral difference in the application of rights and principles to cases involving nonrational parties.

Lewis Versus Kripke: The Debate over the Rigidity of ‘Pain’
Paul R. Audi, University of Nebraska–Omaha
 Kripke’s argument against materialism exploits the idea that terms for sensations are rigid designators. David Lewis gave an argument that such terms, in fact, are non-rigid. That argument trades on the idea that, while it is easy to tell (i.e., we can know through introspection) whether or not we are having a given sensation, it is not easy to tell what the neural realizer of that sensation is. I give a precise statement of Lewis’s argument, and indicate briefly how its premises might be rejected. I then argue that, in fact, Lewis’s point about introspection tells strongly against his own view. The view that terms for sensations are non-rigid cannot do justice to the extent of our epistemic access to those sensations, or to our ability to name and reliably re-identify them.

Life After Death: Making Sense of Grief
Ingrid V. Albrecht, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign
 We commonly assume that grief is sadness experienced upon a loss. Dan Moller makes this assumption in a recent article. He then concludes, from empirical surveys, that we are more resilient to the loss of a particular person than we might have thought, and more replaceable in our relationships than we might have hoped. On my account, in contrast, our relationships with particular other people orient us: they give us a sense of our personal, particular selves, and an understanding of our place in the world. I suggest that "grief” is the appropriate description of our response when a loss disrupts that orientation. Moller is right that grief involves sadness, and total devastation is an extreme case. But recognizing that it concerns our practical orientation will make better sense of certain common elements of grief, including the pathologies that grief is liable to, namely hopelessness and despair.

Logical Forms, Indeterminacy, and the Subjective Unity of Consciousness in Kant
Seung-Kee Lee, Drew University
 The relation between logic and psychology is recognized to be an important albeit difficult topic for understanding Kant’s aims and argumentation in the Critique of Pure Reason. One aspect of this relation is represented by Kant’s famous claim in the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique that self-consciousness is a condition for the possibility of cognition. One problem associated with this claim is what Henry Allison calls "the problem of subjective unity of consciousness,” namely, that Kant never clarifies what "subjective unity” is. Having shown that Kant links this "unity” with an indeterminate (as opposed to determinate) way in which the logical forms of judgment are employed, I argue that "subjective unity of consciousness” is that form of consciousness in which the subject is aware of an indeterminate relation of representations or a relation in which a representation is not a specific or a determinate instance of a more general one.

Losing Grip on the World: From Illusion to Sense-Data
Derek Brown, Brandon University
 The claim that perceptual illusions can motivate the existence of sense-data is familiar and controversial. My aim, through the lenses of sense-data and intentionalist approaches to illusions, is to carve out a subclass of illusions that are up to the task, and a subclass that are not. It follows that when we engage the former we are not simply incorrectly perceiving the world outside ourselves, we are directly perceiving a subjective entity: one’s grip on the external world has been marginalized—not fully lost, but once removed. However, admitting that various illusions do not give evidence for sense-data considerably limits the power of the Argument from Illusion and brings out its distinctness from the Argument from Perceptual Relativity.

Lying and Content I
Eliot Michaelson, University of California–Los Angeles
 I approach the topic of semantic content not, as has been standard in recent literature, by arguing for or against its bearing a particular set of formal properties—truth-conditionality, determinacy, or compositionality—but by looking for other properties which it might plausibly exhibit. In particular, I explore the suggestion that semantic content is what we are fundamentally responsible for having put forward, or what we cannot disclaim without contradiction. This property is potentially of interest since, unlike the properties more standardly attributed to semantic content, endorsing it doesn’t seem to presuppose significant commitments in other philosophical domains. It therefore offers the potential to move this debate forward without first settling a myriad of other philosophical disputes. I use this suggestion to motivate a "Lying Test” for semantic content and demonstrate the potential of this test to deliver some interesting, and surprising, semantic results.

Lying, Deceiving, and Degrees of Belief
Julia Staffel, University of Southern California
 Traditionally, lies have often been taken to involve an intention to deceive by definition. This claim has recently been called into question by philosophers like Don Fallis, Thomas Carson, and Roy Sorensen, who argue that there are many examples of lies that are not meant to deceive their addressee. Although I agree that there are some examples of non-deceptive lies, I argue that many supposedly non-deceptive lies are in fact deceptive, given a more plausible notion of deception. I show this by focusing on two classes of supposedly non-deceptive lies, which Sorensen calls "knowledge-lies” and "bald-faced lies.”

Managing Women and Men of the Faculty: Reflections of an Outgoing Dean
Janet McCracken, Lake Forest College
 2010-11 is my sixth and last as Provost and Dean of Faculty at the small Midwestern liberal arts college where I have been teaching philosophy since I defended my Ph.D. at Texas-Austin in 1993. Receiving my BA at the tail end of second-wave feminism (I graduated in 1982), I have been working, hiring, and managing faculty under the regime, such as it is, of the nebulous "third wave.” In a conversation with several other women deans in my consortium, we found ourselves uniformly answering, "no” to the question, "do you feel, as dean, that you’re representing women?” Reflecting on some particular, enlightening, experiences, I will address what I see as the current interactions between gender and academic work life at my college. Are women faculty members less likely to negotiate with me than men? Do I perceive a difference in teaching quality? Student evaluations? Research expectations? Work-life balance?

Maturity and Self-Presentation
Svetlana Beggs, University of California–Riverside
 In a well-known essay "Lost Innocence” Herbert Morris argues that to lose the innocent state of mind requires coming to know, through experience, concepts of good and evil. Thus, lost innocence carries with it a realization of our vulnerability in the face of potentially hostile motives of other human beings. I propose an alternative paradigm. David Velleman’s work on shame and rational agency nudges us to consider shedding of innocence as acquisition of thick social know-how, enabling a competent self-presenting agency.

Middling Credence and Suspended Judgment
Jane Friedman, Oxford University
 There has been a good deal written recently about the relationship between full (flat-out, coarse-grained) belief and (partial, fine-grained) degrees of belief. There has been some, but far less discussion of the analogous relationship between suspended judgment (or the state of agnosticism) and degrees of belief. In this paper I intend to add to that small discussion. I want to show that being in a state of suspended judgment is not just a matter of having a "middling” credence (and in particular that middling credences are not necessary for suspended judgment), and that, in the end, suspension looks compatible with nearly any degree of belief.

Might the Methodology of Biostatistics Be Telling Us Something Important About Semantics?
Joan Weiner, Indiana University–Bloomington
 To judge from the philosophical literature on vagueness, it is widely assumed that facts about the methodology of empirical research need not be included among the data to which our philosophical discussions of vague predicates must answer. I will be arguing that this assumption is false—that a number of views about the semantics of vague predicates conflict with accepted and unexceptional scientific methodology. In particular, I will argue that certain assumptions about meaning need to be abandoned if we are to have a semantic theory that fits the methodology of biostatistics.

Moral Theorizing on the Ground
Richmond Campbell, Dalhousie University
Victor Kumar, University of Arizona
 According to a dual process model of moral cognition, two cognitive systems guide moral evaluation: a specialized, emotion-driven, intuitive system and a general-purpose, deliberative, reasoning system. The current application of the dual process model fails to capture a species of moral reasoning familiar to ethicists and legal theorists, that exemplifies a norm of consistency, treating like cases alike, what we call "moral consistency reasoning” (MCR). Empirical investigation may tell us something more about just what MCR is such that it influences our moral attitudes—no less when philosophers engage in it. On our integrated dual process model, the intuitive and reasoning systems work together to detect moral inconsistency and elicit moral change. Whereas Greene offers a debunking psychological account of Kantian moral theorizing, we offer instead a friendlier account of a pattern of moral theorizing common to utilitarians and deontologists.

Mysticism in Plato and Plotinus
David J. Yount, Mesa Community College
 Surprisingly, most scholars (in English) hold that Plato and Plotinus are mystics of some sort. However, an appreciable (though still a minority) number of Plato scholars hold that he is not best read as a mystic. My paper argues that, given that Plotinus is nearly unanimously taken to be a mystic, if I can show that Plato and Plotinus describe the same ultimate experience (of knowing/seeing the One/Good), then Plato is best read as a mystic as well. To support my thesis, I will show that (1) a precise definition of mysticism is not necessary for this project (given the assumption that Plotinus is a mystic); (2) Plotinus is best read as a mystic; (3) my opponents’ claims can be addressed; and (4) Plato is best read as a mystic, given the textual evidence.

No Chance for Nothing?
Neil A. Manson, University of Mississippi
 Why is there something rather than nothing? This paper addresses Peter van Inwagen’s argument that the proper answer to this question is that the probability of there being nothing is zero. After restating van Inwagen’s argument, the author makes the case that the premises of van Inwagen’s argument coupled with two very obvious metaphysical principles form an inconsistent set. The conclusion reached is that the concept of probability cannot coherently be applied to the actualization of one amongst the set of all possible worlds. If there is some explanation of why there is something rather than nothing, it is not that the probability of there being nothing is zero.

Objectivity Without Falsehood: Disagreement, Reference Magnetism, and the Possibility of Systematic Error
Tim Sundell, University of Kentucky
 Lewisian "reference magnetism” has been defended as a theory of linguistic content determination in recent work by, among others, Weatherson and Sider. Two of the chief advantages claimed for the view are its capacity to make sense of systematic error in speakers’ use of their words, and its capacity to distinguish clearly between verbal and substantive disagreements. I argue that, with respect to systematic error, the reference magnet view delivers less plausible results than has been recognized. In response, I suggest an alternative view that, while it delivers more plausible results in the case of systematic error, distinguishes between verbal and substantive disagreements just as effectively as the reference magnet view. Finally, I suggest that my alternative view embeds more easily within a unified account of the methodology of linguistics, and thus allows for a view of semantics that is preferable generally.

On Frege’s Supposed Hierarchy of Senses
Nicholas Georgalis, East Carolina University
 It is widely held that Frege is committed to the existence of an infinite hierarchy of independent indirect senses. I argue that this is false. The apparent plausibility of this view is based on misapplication of Frege’s theory, abetted by the complete neglect of two crucial passages in Frege.

On the Intrinsic Evil of Death
Jason Raibley, California State University–Long Beach
 This paper responds to two, related Epicurean arguments against the evil of death. The first argument is that, since death involves the absence of all sensation, dying never leads to anything that is intrinsically bad. Some philosophers have responded to this argument by expanding their conception of extrinsic value and arguing that dying is extrinsically bad because it deprives its victim of future pleasures. This paper argues that, using a more holistic conative theory of well-being, we can establish that death is intrinsically bad for the one who dies. The paper then responds to a second Epicurean argument based on the idea that there is no time at which death is bad for the one who dies. The term, "death,” can refer to either the state of being dead, in which case Epicurus’s argument is sound but uninteresting, or the process of dying, in which case Epicurus’s argument is unsound.

On Why Liars, Drunks, and Squash Players Should Emulate Virtuous People
Ian Stoner, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities
 The exemplar model of right action in virtue ethics holds that an act is right iff it is what a virtuous person would do. Though defended by many advocates of virtue ethics, the exemplar model has been the target of several well-known counterexamples, among them Robert Johnson’s mendacious man, Gilbert Harman’s weak-willed socialite, and John Doris’s hotheaded squash player. I argue that these counterexamples fail for one of three reasons. (1) Some trade on a confusion between ends and means; these examples only threaten an untenable interpretation of the exemplar model. (2) Others elide the morally relevant features of a situation that elicit a characteristic response from virtuous people; as a result, we fail to give the morally-relevant features of the situation due weight. (3) Others exploit our willingness to tolerate immoral behavior in strangers in order to keep the peace.

Overdetermination and Counterfactual Sensitivity
Sara Bernstein, Duke University
 I show that the counterfactual structure of the world is richer than previously thought. I introduce a novel class of events that are insensitive to the additive force of multiple causes. They do not covary counterfactually with the multiplicity or force of their causes. They are to be contrasted with sensitive effects, which counterfactually covary according to the number and sorts of causes they have.

Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: Problems for Color Projectivism
Peter Ross, California State Polytechnic University–Pomona
 Color subjectivists claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, the world external to the mind is colorless. However, in giving an account of color perception, subjectivists about the nature of perceived color must address the nature of perceived spatial location as well. The general question I’ll pose is whether there is a theory of color perception that can plausibly coordinate a subjective metaphysics of perceived color with a metaphysics of perceived location. The focus here is on so-called projectivist theories of perception, in which perceived colors are said to be projected onto external physical locations. I’ll conclude that the projectivist theories of color perception are untenable.

Perceiving with Compensatory Devices: Quasi-Vision or New sensory Modality?
Malika Auvray, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique
 Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g. audition) the kind of information that is normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g. vision). Various kinds of devices have been developed, tested, and shown to allow their users to behave to some degree as if they possessed the substituted sensory organ. These systems thus question the usual taxonomy of our sensory modalities. Through a set of behavioral and theoretical studies, the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to will be addressed. Though certain results might be taken to point to the conclusion that perception with sensory substitution devices belong to the substituted modality, overall evidence leads to an alternative view. According to it, the experience after sensory substitution is a transformation, extension, or augmentation of our perceptual capacities, rather than something equivalent or reducible to an already existing sensory modality.

Persons and Bodies
Japa Pallikkathayil, New York University
 On Kant’s view, property rights in the state of nature involve certain defects and these defects render them merely provisional. Conclusive property rights can only be established through political institutions and this consideration grounds the duty to establish those institutions. Although Kant treats bodily rights as largely unproblematic in the state of nature, I will argue that bodily rights can be defective in many of the ways that property rights can be. These defects in our bodily rights alone are sufficient to ground a duty to establish political institutions. In arguing for this view, I will not be arguing that our rights to our bodies just are property rights. Important differences remain, which have surprising consequences. I will argue that the Kantian view cannot legitimize directly selling or even donating parts of our bodies to others. But this conclusion is ultimately not as counterintuitive as it might first seem.

Persons, Animals, and Persistence Conditions
Kevin W. Sharpe, St. Cloud State University
 Animalism is the view that human persons, such as you and I, are human animals—biological organisms that belong to the species Homo sapiens. While so much may seem obvious, many opponents of animalism object that it is inconsistent with any plausible account of the persistence conditions of persons. The idea, in brief, is that the persistence conditions of persons differ from those of animals. Since nothing can have different persistence conditions than itself, it follows that human persons are not animals. In this paper, I show why this argument fails.

Political Liberalism, Marriage, and the Family: A Reply to Brake
Christie Hartley, Georgia State University
Lori Watson, University of San Diego
 Elizabeth Brake argues that political liberals can and must recognize minimal marriage to support the social bases of adult caring relationships, which she claims are social primary goods, and she says that the recognition of a more robust form of marriage cannot be supported by political liberals, given their conception of public reason and liberal neutrality. Against Brake, we claim the social bases of adult caring relationships can be provided without legal marriage. However, we argue that given certain conditions in a politically liberal society, public reason may support the legal recognition of a more robust form of marriage than minimal marriage because of its connection to the rearing of children as future citizens or because it can help protect the fundamental interests of citizens in freely chosen associations.

Pride as a Virtue: Learning from Aristotle and Ayn Rand
Allan Gotthelf, University of Pittsburgh
 In this paper I discuss pride as a trait of character and a principle of action. I draw significantly on the analyses by Aristotle and Rand, and endorse and defend their shared thesis that pride is a central moral virtue. In the course of this defense I will explore the value of self-esteem to a human life, and the connection between the virtue of pride and this value of self-esteem. That will position us to examine the roots of the historically frequent attack on pride as a great vice. I will conclude with a brief account of the way in which pride is a precondition both of Aristotelian character-friendship and of a genuine romantic love.

Pritchard, Safety, Value
Daniel Immerman, University of Notre Dame
 In the forthcoming book, The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Duncan Pritchard argues that by combining virtue-theoretic conditions on knowledge with a safety condition on knowledge, we can get a good account of knowledge. In my paper, I criticize Pritchard’s account, arguing that adding a safety condition is a liability for the view, and that virtue-theorists are better off without it. Firstly, the safety condition has problems handling both Gettier cases and cases of environmental luck. Secondly, by incorporating a safety condition, Pritchard fails to take advantage of the virtue theorist’s explanation of the value of knowledge.

Proper Functions and the Natural and Divine Designers
Eric R. Kraemer, University of Wisconsin–La Crosse
 In the 2008 book co-authored with Michael Tooley, Knowledge of God, Alvin Plantinga continues his defense of supernaturalism by honing improved versions of a well-considered set of objections to its currently dominant alternative, naturalism. In particular, Plantinga argues that naturalism cannot adequately accommodate teleology. In this paper I focus on this objection. I begin by showing why the teleology objection is important for naturalistic philosophers. I then how show Plantinga’s own proposed deistic solution to the teleology problem falls prey to the same objections that Plantinga raises for naturalists. Given that both supernaturalist and naturalist accounts of teleology are inadequate, a neutral alternative is needed. I defend an alternative general approach to teleology which accommodates both supernaturalists and naturalists, and has the additional advantage of providing an account of teleological functions which unifies the many different kinds of function claims.

Property Theories of Belief and Degrees of Belief
Joel Pust, University of Delaware
 According to property attribution theories of belief (such as those defended by David Lewis, Barbara Davidson, and others), belief is not a relation between a person and a proposition. Rather, to have a belief of any sort is to attribute or self-attribute a property. I argue that, contrary to some of their proponents, property attribution theories cannot plausibly account for degrees of belief and so they should be rejected.

Propositions and Judgments in Locke and Arnauld: A Monstrous and Unholy Union?
Jennifer S. Marusic, Brandeis University
 Philosophers have accused Locke of holding an account of proposition formation that simply conflates the formation of a proposition with the judgment that a proposition is true, and that this has obviously absurd consequences. Indeed, a loose chronicle of the role of the proposition in modern philosophy runs as follows: Most of the Early Moderns conflated the formation of a thought with propositional content with endorsement of that content and simply failed to see the disastrous implications of this. Is this story accurate or merely a myth, as Walter Ott has argued? I claim that the story comes close to the truth: Locke and Arnauld do hold that to form a propositional thought is to endorse that things are a certain way. Yet what seems to be a simple confusion is actually a view about how we form propositions: the view purports to explain proposition formation in terms of judgment.

Re-conceiving Identities: A Pragmatist Ontology of ‘Groups’ for a Critical Feminist Politics
Amrita Banerjee, University of Oregon
 A feminist politics of sameness based on "common oppression” has come under severe criticism. To avoid its assimilatory tendencies, third wave feminists tend to call for a politics of location that emphasizes the specificity of group identities. However, regressive versions of identity politics are not unusual in the current political landscape. In this scenario, there is a need for rethinking the bases for identity politics rather than dismissing it completely given the bleak history of colonialism with its aggressive assimilatory agenda. For a postcolonial feminist politics that is truly decolonizing, we need alternative conceptions of "borders” and "identity” that neither embrace cultural essentialism nor end up endorsing a borderless and aggressively assimilationist politics. Inspired by philosophical pragmatism (particularly the works of Josiah Royce and Mary Parker Follett), this paper seeks to develop an alternative paradigm for thinking about these concepts in order to facilitate a more dynamic identity politics.

Reconsidering What It Is to Pay Attention: Heidegger and Letting-Be-ness
S. West Gurley, Sam Houston State University
 Contemporary scientific investigations into the topic of attention have taken as self-evidently true the idea that attending is an intentional act, characterized by a kind of aboutness that continental philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century attempted to elucidate. While it might be the case that in order to track the movement of a person’s attentional directedness, one may need to presuppose that attention is an intentional modification. This paper shows that such presuppositions are parasitic upon a conception of reality as fundamentally divided into subjects and objects and that we do not receive an understanding of what it is, truly, to pay attention when we do so. Relying on Heidegger’s critique of technology and some of the remarkable insights of Simone Weil, I offer an alternative way to think about what it is to pay attention.

Reid on Aesthetic Response and the Perception of Beauty
Laurent Jaffro, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
 The paper deals with the "Essay on Taste” in Reid’s Intellectual Powers (1785) and makes three points: (1) about the nature of aesthetic perception; (2) about the content of aesthetic perception, i.e the objective side of beauty, which Reid terms "excellence”; (3) about the location of beauty in the forms of nature or works of art. The main claim is that "pneumatology” is the key to the understanding of Reid’s account of aesthetic perception.

Reidian Internalism
Daniel M. Johnson, Baylor University
 Thomas Reid is the paradigm epistemological externalist. The great strength of (and major motivation for) his epistemological views, which remains the great strength of contemporary externalism, is their ability to resist the skeptical challenge. However, there has arisen in recent years a strong family of arguments against externalism in favor of evidentialist internalism, which threatens the viability of a Reidian response to skepticism. An independently motivated alteration to Reid’s theory of perception results, I’ll argue, in a neo-Reidian theory of perception which can both preserve a fundamentally Reidian response to the skeptic and accommodate evidentialism. The result is a kind of Reidian internalism which navigates a via media between the Scylla of the most powerful arguments against externalism (the case for evidentialism) and the Charybdis of some of the most powerful arguments against internalism (derived mainly from elements of skeptical challenges).

Relational-System Natural Kinds and the Function of Analogy
Theodore Bach, University of Connecticut
 Natural kinds are stable, mind-independent structures that support inductive practices. I claim that an important type of natural kind supports induction because kind-members exhibit a stable higher-order relational structure. For example, atoms and solar systems share certain likenesses because each exemplify the higher-order relational structure of a central force system—a type of relational-system natural kind of which atoms and solar systems are members. I argue that relational-system natural kinds are needed to explain the recent empirical finding that relational schema concepts have significant epistemic value. I further argue that analogical cognition—the cognitive process through which we can abstract relational commonalities—functions so as to develop relational concepts that describe relational-system natural kinds. These considerations bring together recent theoretical work in the philosophy of science and recent empirical work in the cognitive sciences. They also provide a new and naturalistically accommodating interpretation of the function of analogical cognition.

Representational Content and Perceptual Organization: On a Counterexample to Intentionalism
René Jagnow, University of Georgia
 At a minimum, intentionalism is the thesis that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content such that two experiences can differ in phenomenal character only if they differ in representational content. Intentionalism can therefore be falsified by means of a counterexample consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. Recently, Bernhard Nickel has presented an interesting counterexample consisting of two visual experiences of a 3 x 3 grid of straight lines, and Bence Nanay has argued that we can reject this counterexample by appeal to the thesis that perceptual contents are always sensitive to attention. In this paper, I will first show that Nanay’s response does not succeed in rejecting Nickel’s counterexample to intentionalism and then provide an alternative response based on the phenomenon of figure/ground organization.

Retributive Prepunishment
Joseph Q. Adams, Rice University
 This paper argues that many of our most important theories of retributivism—classed as Balancing Act Retributivism (BAR)—are unwittingly committed to the radical thesis that prepunishment, or punishment before an offense, is morally permissible. A retributive theory is a member of BAR just in case it says that punishment is morally justified because it balances against an injustice (however characterized) where this balancing is required in order to preserve a morally important equilibrium (however characterized). BAR includes Kant, Herbert Morris, George Sher, Jean Hampton, and others. The innocent commitment to balancing against injustice—and a fortiori to diachronic justice—makes BAR indifferent, ceteris peribus, with respect to when we punish. Indifference alone is some reason to permit prepunishment, but there’s even more: under certain conditions (e.g. when we cannot apprehend the offender afterward) BAR requires prepunishment as sometimes the best way, sometimes the only way, to secure justice.

Rotation Without Change in the Statesman
Brian Prince, Rice University
 In Plato’s Statesman, the Visitor tells a myth in which the universe rotates sometimes in one direction, at other times in the opposite direction. The reason he offers for the reversal implies two surprising metaphysical assumptions. First, he is thinking of the mind of the god who guides the universe as engaging, literally, in spatial rotation. This is because his comparison of the universe’s rotation with "the most divine things” is best read as a comparison with the god or gods, rather than with the Forms. Second, he is treating rotation in one direction as a way of not changing at all. Otherwise, the Visitor has failed to give a reason that the universe has to reverse its direction of rotation.

Sarah Kofman on Ecce Homo: or, How Thus Spoke Zarathustra Became a Fable of Hitlerism
Thomas Steinbuch, Independent Scholar
 Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo is a marginalized work among his writings, despite the importance he attributed to it. Sarah Kofman’s 1993-94 two-volume commentary, Explosions I and II, reads Nietzsche as a proto-Nazi, marginalizing it further. Her approach is no where better represented than in her commentary on Chapter I, Why I Am So Wise, section eight. Through her analysis of this text and its selection from On the Rabble from Zarathustra, Kofman is able to impugn the value, not only of Ecce, but of the Zarathustra-project as a whole. Documenting her position in the original French, I reverse her judgment, consulting a wide range of Nietzsche’s texts, including original translations of variant texts from Ecce and Zarathustra. The upshot of my criticism is that her project in Explosions is misguided, traceable back to her commentary on Wise 1 and her Freudian reading of Nietzsche’s psychological situation as he states it there.

Saving for Retirement Without Harming Others
Steven J. Daskal, Northern Illinois University
 In this paper I discuss moral issues raised by 401(k) retirement plans. I argue that participation in 401(k) plans is strongly encouraged by the following three factors: (1) the lack of adequate public provision of retirement support, (2) the tax-advantaged status of such plans, and (3) the availability of matching contributions from employers. Given that most 401(k) plans fail to offer adequate socially responsible investment options, these factors constitute significant pressure to commit indirect harm by owning stock in companies that engage in harmful behavior. In order to eliminate this pressure, I argue that the federal government ought to require 401(k) plans to include a range of socially responsible investment options, that corporations ought to incorporate such options into their 401(k) plans with or without a government mandate, and that individuals ought to take advantage of such options when available and advocate for them when unavailable.

Scientific Realism Defended
Gerald Doppelt, University of California–San Diego
 I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories on the ground that it provides the best explanation of their success and that of falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and structural realism (SR). I show that PR and SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories possessed true components. PR is undone by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims about unobservables are false. SR argues that the realist is only committed to the truth of the mathematical equations of the outdated theory, to explain its success. I argue that such mathematical equations are too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these objections to PR and SR.

Self-Identification and a Puzzle about Mental Ownership
Tony Cheng, City University of New York–Graduate Center
 Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has long been intuitive but controversial. Recently, Caleb Liang and Timothy Lane (2009) invoke empirical studies to argue against IEM. I think the case they elaborate on—"somatoparaphrenia”—does put much pressure on IEM, but rather than abandoning it altogether, I use this pathology as a tool to sharpen our understanding of IEM. Patients of somatoparaphrenia have a sense of alienation from certain part(s) of their bodies. This is at odds with IEM. To reconcile the tension, I improve our formulation of IEM by modifying those from Sydney Shoemaker, David Rosenthal and James Pryor. Contrary to the received view that Shoemaker’s thesis is a contemporary version of Wittgenstein’s one appeared in the Blue Book, I argue that somatoparaphrenia helps us see that Wittgenstein’s version is actually preferable. I also use cases such as "dental fear” and "extreme empathy” to strengthen my case.

Self-Love in the Aristotelian Ethics
Jerry Green, University of Texas–Austin
 The Nicomachean Ethics is nearly universally given pride of place in Aristotle’s ethical corpus. I argue there is at least one topic in Aristotle’s ethics where this is a mistake. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents self-love as the paradigm form of friendship, using it to explain how love of others occurs and why it is an important component of eudaimonia. But self-love has some theoretical problems, one of which is that it cannot be reciprocated the way Aristotle argues friendship requires. In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle addresses this worry, and uses it to motivate a modified view from that of the Nicomachean Ethics. This change is difficult to explain if the Nicomachean Ethics were Aristotle’s last word on the subject, but makes perfect sense if the Eudemian Ethics were the revised version. This suggests we should follow Aristotle in turning to the Eudemian Ethics for Aristotle’s considered view.

Semantic Defect in Context
James R. Shaw, University of Pittsburgh
 There is an increasingly common objection to views allowing some expressions to only contingently express truth-evaluable propositions. The objection is that those views cannot make sense of the coherent beliefs and intentions speakers have when accidentally using those expressions in defective contexts. I show why no version of this objection is successful, in part by developing systematic ways to work from the semantics of defective utterances to the coherent attitudes of speakers issuing them.

Semantic Modelling and Probabilistic Analysis: A Defence of Stalnaker’s Account of Conditionals as a General Theory of Conditional Reasoning
Vanessa Lehan-Streisel, York University
 Though an examination of empirical results from psychologists is not commonly found in the philosophical literature on logic, psychologists do not seem to have trouble incorporating philosophical logic into their own theories. I examine the arguments of empirical psychologists on Stalnaker’s theory of conditionals and argue that their criticisms are misplaced. Stalnaker’s account of conditionals shares similar elements with the mental models theory proposed by Johnson-Laird et al and the probabilistic approach outlined by Oaksford and Chater. Most notably, this account combines the beneficial elements of both theories, a probabilistic analysis and a method of semantic modelling, making Stalnaker’s account of conditionals remarkably similar to the alternative mental models theory proposed by Schroyens and Schaeken. Given the broad empirical support for the alternative mental models theory, Stalnaker’s account of conditionals is the most promising candidate for use as a general description of conditional reasoning.

Shifts of Attention and the Content of Perception
Adrienne Prettyman, University of Toronto
 Chalmers (2004), Wu (2010), and Block (2010) have independently argued that the effect of attention on the content of perception raises a challenge for representationalism. Covert shifts of attention seem to involve a change in the phenomenal character of perception, without a corresponding change in representational content. In this paper, I show that the challenge fails because the arguments provided do not rule out a change in representational content. I argue that the strongest version of the challenge dissolves once we reject the "Sandwich Model” of perception, on which perception, thought and action are in principle dissociable (Hurley 2002). I end by proposing a different model, on which representational content depends on a subject’s ongoing thought and action.

Sophisticated Joint Attention and Intersubjective Explanation
Ray Rennard, University of the Pacific
 Humans are capable of sophisticated forms of joint attention, which include attention to abstract objects and to phenomena removed in space and in time. One of the more sophisticated forms of joint attention involves the attribution of attitudes to an individual in the context of an intersubjective explanation of behavior. Whereas individual acts of "mindreading” serve the predictive and explanatory purposes of an individual, intersubjective explanations serve additional social functions and are, therefore, sensitive to factors that do not arise at the individual level. The act of communicating an intersubjective psychological explanation produces a shared cognitive environment that may include, inter alia, a subset of the intersection of the cognitive systems of the participants. I sketch an account of intersubjective attitude ascription—situated within the relevance theoretical approach to communication—that is sensitive to the myriad cognitive and social factors at play in intersubjective explanations of behavior.

Suicide Terrorism and the Hobbesian Sovereign
Jeremy Anderson, DePauw University
 In separate papers, Williams and Koukal argue that Hobbes’s political philosophy is seriously deficient because it is incapable of addressing the problem of suicide terrorism. They maintain that because Hobbes believes fear of death is paramount he holds that rule can be maintained by means of physical force alone, and therefore Hobbes cannot account for and cannot counter attackers who are willing to die. I argue that the critics are mistaken. Hobbes is aware sovereigns may face opponents who are willing to die, and in response he maintains that physical force must not be a sovereign’s sole means of ruling. The picture of Hobbesian sovereignty which emerges from rebutting the critics is more nuanced and less unattractive than is widely appreciated.

Surprise Exams Are Conditionally Possible
Alex Baia, University of Texas–Austin
 I offer a solution to the paradox of the surprise exam. I claim that surprise exams are conditionally possible: It is possible to have a surprise exam, but the existence of this possibility is conditional on there being a possibility of having an unsurprising exam. I proceed as follows: First, I briefly overview the paradox. Second, I describe the conditional possibility solution. Third, I diagnose the reasoning—here called The Elimination Argument—which leads to the paradoxical conclusion that surprise exams are impossible. Fourth, I close by considering a variant of the surprise exam that involves self-defeating belief.

Synthetic A Priori Infallibility
Glen Hoffmann, Ryerson University
 On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified to a degree that is truth entailing and falsity precluding. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism. Focusing on what seems to be the only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I argue against the possibility of the infallible a priori justification of so-called self justifying propositions.

Teaching Research Ethics Across Disciplines
Mark Greene, University of Delaware
 Explicit attention to ethics is increasingly important in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). This interest is partly driven by the demands of congress and funding agencies, but it also reflects the commitment to ethics of many working in STEM fields. The challenge is to develop practical ethics training that is philosophically competent and that also has credibility among working scientists. The Responsibility and Integrity in Science and Engineering (RAISE) program at the University of Delaware responds to the challenge with an innovative approach to research ethics training. A research ethics class, team taught by philosophy and science faculty, is offered to STEM grad students. The RAISE program teaches the teachers; preparing and funding participants to provide ethics outreach for their disciplinary peers. This talk will reflect on the lessons of the RAISE program, with special mention of the role of the philosopher in the room.

Teleological Explanation in Aristotle’s Meteorologica
Margaret Scharle, Reed College
 Commentators agree that Aristotle’s biological works reflect Physics 2’s theoretical commitment to the explanatory priority of final over efficient causation. In this paper I argue that the Meteorologica also reflects this priority. The teleological process of animals’ perpetual generation serves as the explanatory touchstone of the biological works. We find it in Aristotle’s frequent slogan "man is generated from man” (Parts of Animals 640a25-27, Physics 193b8, 194b13). I argue that the sun-directed elemental cycles of transformation and locomotion (for example, the seasonal evaporation and condensation cycle) play the teleological role in the Meteorologica that animal generation plays in the biological works.

The Barcan Formula(e) for Determinacy
Jon Erling Litland, Harvard University
 I discuss the Barcan Formula for an operator "it is (metaphysically) determinate that.” I argue that the Barcan Formula in the form ¬D¬∃xφ → ∃x¬D¬φ is not valid, but that the following form is: ∀xDφ → D∀x¬¬φ. In order to accommodate this, classical logic is given up in favor of intuitionistic logic. I develop a novel model theory for intuitionistic logic with a determinacy operator. The theory is applied to debates about composition.

The Certainty of Baconian Forms
Daniel Schwartz, University of California–San Diego
 There is no question that Francis Bacon holds that his inductive method can achieve "certainty.” As Bacon is often read, however, he holds that a good natural philosopher temporarily holds off on claiming anything for certain—until the sixth and final part of his Great Instauration, the stage during which we arrive at knowledge of formal causes. In this paper, I argue that this focus on part six is misplaced. Although Bacon does say that forms must be certain, he is using that word in a technical sense derived from his reading of Aristotle in Latin translation, where the term akribeia was translated with the Latin certitudo. He is not referring to epistemic certainty. This argument casts some doubt on the characterization of Bacon as a temporary skeptic.

The Dis-assemblage of Genetic Meaning: Countering the Bio-normative Valuation of Genetic Relatedness: A Strategy for Queer Politics?
Kimberly Leighton, American University
 Queer theorists such as Lee Edelman (2004) have argued that the pursuit of a queer politics within the framework of reproduction is a self-dooming project. In response to his call to refuse "reproductive futurism,” however, Jaspir Puar (2007) has countered that Edelman’s critique "recenters the very child-privileging, future-oriented politics he seeks to refuse.” While I agree that we must not make reproduction the central target of queer strategies, the family does continue (and will continue in the US and elsewhere) to be the site of the naturalization of identity logic through its reiteration of the realness of genetic relatedness. Consequently this site of ontological reproduction must still be a focus of queer analysis. Using the recent work of Ladelle McWhorter (2009) together with Puar, I suggest how a dis-assembling of genetic kinship can destabilize not only the centrality of family, but the racial logic of normative history.

The Domain Relativity of Norms of Strength of Will
Alida Liberman, University of Southern California
 I argue for a norm of rational strength of will (or enkrasia) stating that if you believe that you rationally ought to Φ, then you (subjectively) rationally ought to intend to Φ, and are necessarily subjectively irrational if you do not. I propose a parallel norm of moral enkrasia—that if you believe you morally ought to Φ, then you (subjectively) morally ought to intend to Φ, and are necessarily subjectively immoral if you do not; likewise for prudential enkrasia. I explain why we need norms of enkrasia to be effective agents, and why this general framework will encompass a parallel norm of enkrasia in other normative domains. Finally, I conclude that my proposal puts pressure on views that cannot accommodate the domain-relativity, discussing the view of John Broome and noting the relevance my view has for the debate over the logical scope of enkrasia as a conditional requirement.

The Education of Amour-Propre
Ty Landrum, University of Virginia
 Rousseau’s interpreters commonly suppose that the education of amour-propre is supposed to tame the desire for differential recognition, such that the educated citizen is content to be recognized as an equally valued member of the political body. In my view, this is a serious mistake and one that obscures what is most interesting in Rousseau’s vision of democratic politics. Taking departure from Frederick Neuhouser (who continues the interpretive trend of Nicholas Dent, John Rawls, Joshua Cohen, et al.), I argue that Rousseau’s innovative solution to the problem of integrating the citizen’s desire for recognition into political life is not (as Neuhouser and company would have it) to deprive that desire of concern for the radically singular aspects of the individual self. Instead, Rousseau aims to show that the desire to be recognized as an incomparably singular being is essential to the very possibility of moral freedom.

The Independence Requirement for Robust Evidence
Tarun Menon, University of California–San Diego
Jacob Stegenga, University of California–San Diego
 Robustness: a belief is better supported with multiple kinds of independent evidence for the belief. We investigate the notion of independence required for robustness. Most philosophers of science who make such arguments rely on a notion of ontic independence (OI)—when the multiple lines of evidence depend on different materials, assumptions, or theories. We formulate a probabilistic criterion of independence (PI) and prove that evidence that meets this criterion is collectively more confirmatory than its individual pieces. Some seem to assume that OI entails PI. However, we argue that OI does not entail PI, since OI focuses solely on the independence of the techniques by which the evidence is gathered rather than the relationship between the evidence and a hypothesis. We show that OI evidence can collectively confirm a hypothesis to a lower degree than any of the individual pieces, so OI alone cannot be sufficient for robustness arguments.

The Intentional Underpinnings of Convention
Marija Jankovic, Indiana University–Bloomington
 A convention is an arbitrary, social, practice. In this paper, I aim to explicate the social nature of convention. In part 1, I compare two cases of coordinated behavior, only one of which can give rise to a convention. I take the contrast between the two examples to show that there is an interesting connection between the concepts of convention and agreement, and in subsequent discussion I aim to elucidate this connection. I lay out David Lewis’s (1969) account of convention as a foil against which to develop my alternative account (1.1), give some reasons for my account and explain in more detail some of the crucial notions it appeals to (1.2), and give the full analysis (1.3). In part 2, I argue that Lewis’s account is inadequate because it is both too weak and too strong, and because it does not account for conventions which are not actual regularities.

The Is-Ought Correlation in Neo-Confucian Qi-Naturalism: How Normative Facts Exist in Natural States of Qi
JeeLoo Liu, California State University–Fullerton
 This paper attempts to reconstruct the ontology of qi in the framework of contemporary ontological naturalism. The three philosophers selected for this study are three Neo-Confucians of Ming Dynasty: Luo Qinshuen (1465-1547), Wang Tingxiang (1474-1544) and Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692). In particular, one issue that will be addressed in this paper is how value and normativity can be derived from the way the world is. Under analysis, there are two sets of normative facts that Neo-Confucians assert in the realm of qi. The first set of normative facts lie the internal logic of the development of qi, which they call Principle (Li). The second set of normative facts are manifested in the inherent attributes such as creation, nourishment, harmony, impartiality in the effect of qi and natural phenomena. This second set of normative facts, which are called "dao,” lay the foundation for human ethics.

The Moral Asymmetry of Praise and Blame
Chelsea Haramia, University of Colorado–Boulder
 What if feelings of desert are not justified? Determinism challenges their intuitive strength, and many have wondered how we should we proceed if responsibility and desert are not theoretically sound. In this paper, I aim to point out that, when answering this question, an important moral consideration has been largely overlooked—a consideration of unjustified harm. I argue that when we blame people we unjustifiably harm them, but this does not follow with respect to praise. While conceding the theoretical significance of the claim that we lose all desert under deterministic conditions, I point out that we need not adopt it wholesale. Instead, we are perfectly capable of positive, desert-based reactions that do not jeopardize our interests in being morally good agents. However, negative, desert-based reactions are in fact morally bad acts and ought to be avoided for important ethical reasons.

The Non-Transitivity of Metaphysical Explanation
Kelly G. Trogdon, Lingnan University
 Consider the locution "grounding,” along with its variants "in virtue of,” "priority,” "metaphysical explanation,” and so on. Familiar claims include: Socrates is grounded in Socrates; mental properties are instantiated in virtue of physical properties; the categorical is prior to the dispositional; wholes are metaphysically explained by their parts; and so on. There is a burgeoning literature on grounding, and one point of dispute concerns the structural principles that characterize it. In this talk I argue that grounding is non-transitive, contrary to what many assume. My argument appeals to the idea that the subject matters of the enabling conditions at issue in chains of grounding explanation are sometimes orthogonal.

The Peculiar Photographic Character of Documentaries
Marina Folescu, University of Southern California
 In his recent book, Kendall Walton (2008) revisits his earlier position on the interaction between the transparent and the representational character of photographs, in order to tie some loose ends. However, his treatment of documentary photographs remains problematic. Walton claims that even documentary photographs are representational and this means that imagination is the main faculty essentially involved in the appreciation of documentary photographs. Whereas, it seems clear to me that documentary photographs are supposed to trigger the formation of beliefs in their viewers, rather than imaginings. In this paper, I identify the source of this problem and offer an alternative analysis, that emphasizes the intuitive distinction between pictures that are works of fiction and those that aren’t.

The Physical Realizations of Mind
James Blackmon, San Francisco State University
 The human brain is a scattered material object commonly held to be the thing that has, realizes, or instantiates conscious properties or states. Using a thought experiment, I show that this view leads to practical absurdities. If we are to avoid these absurdities, we must reject the view that it is the material of the brain that alone instantiates consciousness and embrace a theory (perhaps yet a physicalist theory) that accounts for things or features of the world that are strictly not material. I suggest that the most plausible alternative is to acknowledge the apparently essential role played by energy transfer unmediated by matter.

The Power to Do the Impossible
Brandon Carey, University of Rochester
 Several recent arguments purport to show that omnipotence is incompatible with the possession of certain necessary properties. These arguments appeal to one of two plausible but false principles about the nature of power: (i) that if it is metaphysically impossible for a being to actualize a state of affairs, then that being does not have the power to actualize that state of affairs, or (ii) that if it is impossible given some contingent facts about the world that a being actualize a state of affairs, then that being does not have the power to actualize that state of affairs. I pose several problems for both principles, thereby undermining the plausibility of these arguments. I then suggest an alternate way of evaluating a being’s power that allows for a being to have the power to do something even if the being has necessary properties which make doing that thing impossible.

The Priority and Posteriority of Right
Jon Garthoff, Northwestern University
 In this essay I articulate two pairs of theses about the relationship between the right and the good and I sketch an account of morality that systematically vindicates these four theses, despite a nearly universal consensus that they are not all true. In the first half I elucidate and motivate the four theses and I explain why leading ethical theorists maintain that at least one of them is false. In the second half I outline an account of the relationship between the right and the good that satisfies all four theses. The principal aim of the essay is to show that the view I sketch is promising and deserves investigation as a rival to more familiar theories. There is considerable value, furthermore, in formulating and juxtaposing these theses, since this provides a taxonomy of ethical theories and explains the characteristic theoretical virtues and vices of different families of theories.

The Significance of Consequentialism
Sean Aas, Brown University
 The vast majority of moral theories can, it seems, be represented in a consequentialist form. Some conclude from this that there is no significant difference between consequentialist and non-consequentialist views. This paper explains why that conclusion is mistaken. Though there are thin senses of "right” and "good”—"choiceworthy” and "promotable,” respectively—on which it is all but analytic that any action-guiding moral theory is consequentialist, there are also senses of these terms on which this may well not be the case. These thicker senses encode information about reasons for various attitudes, as well as reasons for action. The consequentializing dialectic leaves it entirely open whether consequentialisms posed in these terms can make interesting and substantive claims about the relationship between these different sorts of reasons. The possibility of consequentializing thus has little to do with the real significance of the consequentialism/non-consequentialism distinction.

The Skeptical Challenges of Hume and Berkeley: Can They Be Answered?
Michael Tooley, University of Colorado–Boulder
 Hume argued that no beliefs can be justified by induction, while Berkeley argued that belief in a mind-independent external world cannot be justified. Can these skeptical contentions be refuted? I shall argue that various present-day attempts to do so are unsound, but that there are promising avenues. Thus, in the case of skepticism about induction, everything turns, I shall contend, upon whether the only coherent account of laws of nature is one that equates laws with certain cosmic regularities, or whether, on the contrary, a governing law conception is coherent, according to which non-probabilistic laws are, near enough, atomic states of affairs that entail corresponding regularities. If governing laws are impossible, then inductive skepticism is correct. But if governing laws are possible, then inductive skepticism can be refuted. Finally, what about skepticism concerning a mind-independent world? That is a tougher challenge, but I shall suggest one line of attack.

The T-schema Argument Against Realism
Paul Saka, University of Texas–Pan American
 According to the disquotational T-schema, the sentence "snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. But this entails that snow is white only if the sentence "snow is white” exists. Assuming naturalism, then, it follows that facts about the external world depend on the existence of speakers; metaphysical realism and semantic realism are jointly inconsistent. I shall argue that this argument survives in good part when the disquotational T-schema is reformulated in terms of statements, beliefs, that-clauses, and propositions, and it survives when it is reformulated with Tarskian and Davidsonian punctilio. Consequently some important theories of truth bear on the question of metaphysical realism, contra Alston, Devitt, Goldman, Horwich, Kirkham, Searle, Tennant, et al.

There Is No Easy Bootstrapping Problem
Peter Kung, Pomona College
Masahiro Yamada, Claremont Graduate University
 Some epistemological views accept that certain belief-forming mechanisms can deliver justified beliefs even if the subject lacks justification to believe that the mechanism is reliable. The bootstrapping objection charges that such views make it too easy to acquire justified belief that these belief-forming mechanisms are reliable by inductive reasoning. We offer a novel way to diffuse this charge. An independently plausible constraint on inductive reasoning is also available to those epistemological views targeted by bootstrapping argument. The constraint arises from consideration of clear cases of bad inductive reasoning and does not require commitment to potentially controversial epistemological views.

Toward a Pragmatic Conception of Mental Disorder
Abigail Gosselin, Regis University
 There is much debate about how we should conceive of mental disorder, in particular whether and in what sense disorder is thought to be "real.” Essentialists argue that disorders are natural kinds, categories that reflect natural and essential differences in human mental functioning. Constructivists argue that disorders are social constructions, practical categories that reflect contingent social and historical values. While these models appear dichotomous, they share a realist view of causation which assumes that mental disorders are only "real” if they have the right kinds of causes. Epistemological limitations suggest a contrary approach, however, which is anti-realist and pragmatic, looking not at the causes of disorder but at the states which it describes, i.e. the nature and severity of the dysfunction and harm that are experienced. Developing a robust account of human functioning would better allow us to understand, assess, and treat mental disorder.

Truth and Knowledge in Logic and Mathematics
Volker Halbach, Oxford University
Gila Sher, University California–San Diego
 In this talk I develop an account of truth and knowledge for logic and mathematic. The underlying methodology is a synthesis of holistic and foundational principles, logical and mathematical truth are based on indirect correspondence, and logical and mathematical knowledge is quasi-apriori (as opposed to being either empirical or purely-apriori).

Truth: The Worst of All Goods
Chase B. Wrenn, University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa
 Some intrinsic goods are not as good as other intrinsic goods. It therefore makes sense to wonder if there is a worst intrinsic good. This paper argues that true belief is a prime candidate for the title "Worst of All Goods.” The intrinsic value of truth, I argue, does not outweigh the intrinsic value of anything else we care about. So, if truth is an intrinsic good at all, its intrinsic goodness is utterly minimal.

Tye on the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Esa Diaz-Leon, University of Manitoba
 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) claims that there is an alternative explanation of the epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths, which does not involve an ontological gap between them. In this paper my main aim is to defend the PCS from some recent criticisms offered by Michael Tye (2009). Tye’s main critique of the PCS, in a nutshell, goes as follows: "The phenomenal-concept strategy is in deep trouble. No one has yet managed to produce a plausible account of phenomenal concepts that gives them the features they must have in order to do the work needed to defend physicalism” (55-56). In response, I will argue, first, that Tye’s general characterization of the goals of the PCS is misguided, and secondly, that his more specific objections to two influential accounts of phenomenal concepts, namely, the recognitional account and the quotational account, can be solved.

Unity in Aristotle’s Metaphysics H.6
Evan Keeling, University of Virginia
 In this essay I argue that the central problem at issue in Aristotle’s Metaphysics H.6 is the unity of forms and that Aristotle solves this problem in just the way he solves the problem of the unity of composites—by hylomorphism. I also discuss the matter-form relationship in H.6, arguing that they have a correlative nature as the matter of the form and the form of the matter.

Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy
Cristian Constantinescu, University of Cambridge
 The paper examines two competing accounts of value incomparability presented in the recent literature. According to one account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, incomparability means determinate failure of the three classic value relations (better than, worse than, and equally good): two items are incomparable if and only if (i) it is false that a is better than b, (ii) it is false that a is worse than b, and (iii) it is false that a and b are equally good. Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained not in terms of determinate failure of the trichotomy of value relations, but in terms of vagueness. The paper aims to defend Broome’s view by warding off an objection recently put forward by Erik Carlson.

Veridical Idealizations
Roy Sorensen, Washington University in St. Louis
 Idealization looks like a counterexample to scientific realism. How could scientists be aiming at the truth if they deliberately falsify the data (by ignoring friction, scale effects, and so on)? Veridical idealizations are used to show that idealization involves indifference to truth rather than falsification. This indifference suggests that the key speech act is supposition rather than assertion (even of an attenuated sort such as temporally indirect, relative or pretend assertion). The underlying reasoning is indirect proof (conditional proof or reductio ad absurdum) rather than direct proof (in which all premises are asserted).

Virtues of Creativity and Productivity, Moral Theory, and Human Nature
Christine Swanton, University of Auckland
 In this paper I show the centrality of virtuous creativity and productivity in a life of virtue. Certain tendencies in moral theory have downplayed creativity and productivity as ethically central, including Aristotle’s distinction between action and production, and his relegating the latter to secondary status. Drawing on insights of Nietzsche, Rand, and the philosopher- psychologist Otto Rank who was greatly influenced by Nietzsche, and for whom creativity is central to self love and thereby to healthy love of other, I show that the creative productive life is central to human nature, and the healthy development of the self. However not all creativity is virtuous: some forms of what Rank calls "creative will” are unproductive, destructive, and expressive of self contempt. An account of creative and productive virtues is required for what might be called an "ethics of creativity”.

What Are the Prospects for an Optimism Induction from the History of Science?
K. Brad Wray, State University of New York–Oswego
 I examine Nola’s recently developed optimistic induction over the history of science, an induction that is meant to offer support for scientific realism. I argue that it fails to provide compelling support for the continuity of reference that realism presupposes. Further, I argue that anti-realism is based on an optimistic view about the prospects of future science. Thus, even given very optimistic assumptions about the future of science, I argue that we have reason to believe that our current best theories probably misrepresent the world in significant ways.

What Can Pleasure Tell Us About the Good?
Christiana Olfert, Tufts University
 In many respects, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is a text that struggles to find the proper place for pleasure in our lives. This extends to the role of pleasure in how we think—especially how we think about the good. But according to Aristotle, does pleasure influence our thinking for better or for worse? Recent scholarly work focuses on his more pessimistic comments: he suggests that pleasure is deceptive, illusory, and otherwise interferes with our practical reasoning. I argue for a more optimistic view, which begins with Aristotle’s claim that pleasure is an appearance of goodness; that is, experiences of pleasure present pleasant things to us as good. Furthermore, I argue, it is possible for these appearances to be correct. Contrary to what some scholars have thought, then, Aristotle allows that pleasure can be a starting-point for learning about the good, and about what makes our lives go well.

What Is Deceptive Lying?
Don Fallis, University of Arizona
 According to a popular definition, you lie if you say something that you believe is false with the intent to deceive about what you say. However, there are two respects in which this definition fails to capture the phenomenon that is of interest to moral philosophers. First, this definition does not count as lies in cases where you intend to deceive your audience about your believing what you say rather than about what you say. Second, it handles inconsistently cases where you say something because you know that your audience does not trust you and will likely conclude that you believe something else. I propose a new definition of lying that handles both doxastic misdirection cases and double bluffing cases correctly. Basically, you lie if you say something that you believe is false with the intention of deceiving someone about something on which you have invited him to trust you.

What’s Luck Got to Do with It?
Christopher Evan Franklin, Biola University
 Libertarianism has, seemingly, always been in disrepute among philosophers. While throughout history philosophers have offered different reasons for their dissatisfaction with libertarianism, one worry is recurring: namely a worry about luck. To many, it seems that if our choices and actions are undetermined, then we cannot control them in a way that allows for freedom and responsibility. In this paper I argue that Robert Kane’s important formulation of libertarianism actually generates an acute worry about luck. In particular, the location and role of indeterminism in Kane’s theory renders indeterminism a threat, rather than a help to freedom and responsibility. I offer a careful analysis of Kane’s theory and diagnosis of what went wrong. I then reformulate libertarianism to avoid the worries embedded in Kane’s theory and show how my reformulation avoids two prominent versions of the luck argument, as presented by Ishtiyaque Haji and Peter van Inwagen.

What, Me Worry: Cohibitation and the Problem of the Many
H. E. Baber, University of San Diego
 Rebecca Roache suggests that David Lewis’s response to Parfit in defense of the view, that identity is what matters for survival fails because, given the character of personnel involved in branching cases, we cannot infer that what matters for their survival is what matters for us. According to Roach, since the survival of individuals involved in fission cases is guaranteed through fission, they cannot be concerned about their survival in the same sense that we, whose survival is not guaranteed, worry about our futures. And so, she claims, what matters for our survival is not what matters for them. I argue however that given the criterion for individuating persons and the account of self-interested concern she assumes, both ordinary people and those destined to undergo fission are in the same boat. Our survival, like theirs, is in one sense guaranteed, but neither we nor they should be sanguine about that.

Why Care for the Severely Disabled? A Critique of MacIntyre’s Account
Gregory S. Poore, Baylor University
 In Rational Dependent Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre attempts to ground the virtues in a biological account of humans. Drawing from this attempt, he also tries to answer the question of why we should care for the severely disabled. MacIntyre’s difficulty in answering this question begins with the fact that his communities of practices do not naturally include the severely disabled within their membership and care. In response to this difficulty, he provides four reasons why we should care for the severely disabled. I argue that three of MacIntyre’s answers to this question are inadequate, and that his fourth answer is incomplete, although it does point in a promising direction. Drawing from Wendell Berry, whose work MacIntyre admires, I conclude with a few suggestions for a more satisfactory account of why we should care for the severely disabled.

Why Parity Arguments Cannot Save Normative Realism
Travis N. Rieder, Georgetown University
 Many philosophers reject moral realism because they believe that it requires an objectionable ontology. In response, realists have formed various "companions in guilt” strategies, which attempt to show that the supposedly objectionable features of moral realism are required by other, acceptable views. One recent version of this argument, by Terence Cuneo, works by positing parity between the epistemic and practical domains, and then claiming that, because of this parity, whatever objectionable features moral realism has must be had by its sister position, epistemic realism. But, the argument goes, we shouldn’t thereby embrace epistemic antirealism; so we shouldn’t embrace practical antirealism either. In this paper, I will argue that The Parity Argument fails. It does not fail because of a disanalogy between the epistemic and practical domain; rather, it fails because we should reject epistemic realism as well. The assumption that epistemic realism is on more sure footing is unwarranted.

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