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A Defense of Epistemic Permissivism
Matthew C. Kopec, University of Wisconsin-Madison
 The Uniqueness Thesis, which holds, roughly, that there is a unique rational response to any body of evidence, has recently attracted interest within the disagreement literature. But even though the truth or falsity of this thesis might impact how one should react to disagreement with an evidential peer, it has received little direct argument. The exception is White (2005) who argues for the thesis by way of arguing against various forms of its negation. First, this paper hopes to show that White’s main argument fails. I will then raise a counterexample to Uniqueness, and finish by presenting a view according to which counterexamples to Uniqueness are widespread.

A Defense of Epistemological Monism
Mark E. Wunderlich, Union College
 Contemporary epistemologists suppose that both truth-acquisition and error-avoidance are fundamental epistemological goals, and that these goals must be balanced in any viable theory of epistemic justification. I argue that epistemological monism, taking only error-avoidance to be a fundamental value, is a viable approach. The most salient charge against epistemological monism is that it leads to skepticism. I argue that at least with regard to the project of constructing a theory of epistemic justification, this charge is misguided.

A Feminist Defense of Capitalism
Ann Cudd, University of Kansas
 An important feminist critique of capitalism is that it inevitably causes inequality. I argue that there is a vast middle ground between unfettered global capitalism and economic systems that either fail to engage with world trade or those that forcibly impose egalitarian solutions. Within this middle ground there is room for a progressive capitalism that minimizes inequality to a level that is morally acceptable, while still keeping the engine of innovation in gear. I will argue that this kind of capitalism is morally superior to its alternatives on three grounds. First, it promotes technical innovation that tends, in the medium run, to improve quality and length of life. Second, it truly maximizes freedom, taking into account both positive and negative aspects of freedom. Third, it reduces the oppression of traditional societies that impose hierarchies of gender and caste. In all three ways capitalism promotes a feminist definition of social progress.

A Hybrid View of the Ontology of Consent
Xiaofei Liu, University of Missouri-Columbia
 Theorists debate over the ontology of consent. A subjective view holds that consent is essentially a mental state of permission. A performative view holds that consent is essentially a behavior that expresses that permission. Further, there is a hybrid view, according to which consent consists of both a mental component and a behavioral component. In this paper, I will argue for a different hybrid view, a view that consent can be either a mental act of permission or a behavior that expresses permission.

A Latin American Philosophy Beyond Pernicious Knowledge
Alejandro Vallega, California State University–Stanislaus
 This paper seeks a space for new directions in philosophical thought—a space not determined by the history, practices, and conceptual expectations of the subjective rationalism that sustains Western modern philosophy. I first outline specific characteristics of modern philosophy as viewed from a Latin American perspective; making explicit some of the practices and expectations that organize modernity and obscure and deny other possible forms of thought. I then explain how one might relocate thought in light of the recognition of total exteriority in Latin American philosophy, an exteriority that occurs out of concrete situated experiences and in contrast to the Western conception of temporality as a single lineal natural progression that must culminates with Western rationality. The paper closes with specific examples of how thought might be conceived from a position of radical exteriority. Some of the figures discussed are Augusto Salazar Bondi, Enrique Dussel, and Anibal Quijano.

A Necessitarian Account of Counterfactual Conditionals
Amy Karofsky, Hofstra University
 There are several problems with the contingentarian view of counterfactual conditionals: First, one nonobtaining fact cannot follow from another. Second, a particular individual cannot be the referent of any proposition expressing a counterfact. Third, a proposition that is known to be false cannot be used as an antecedent. Fourth, the consideration of counterfactual conditionals is not merely philosophically futile, it encourages bad reasoning. All of these problems disappear with the rejection of contingentarianism. On the necessitarian account, there are no genuine counterfactual conditionals. The perspicuous reading of any (so-called) counterfactual conditional is a nonconditional, universal proposition about properties and natural kinds. Since the nature of properties is necessary the generalizations involve necessities, only. Finally, unlike the consideration of counterfactuals, the consideration of general propositions is consistent with the basic metaphysical principles that underlie reality and is, thus, philosophically productive.

A Priori Concepts and ‘Relation to an Object’
Lucy Allais, University of the Witwatersrand
 This paper gives a reading of those passages in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories in which Kant says that the categories are necessary for relation to an object that is compatible with recognising Kant’s view that intuitions are singular, immediate representations which give us objects, and that this is something that concepts could never do. I argue that Kant’s intention is to show the categories to be conditions of attributing properties to objects, and that what is meant by relation to a object is referential thought. However, I distinguish between the requirements of referential thought and the requirements of being perceptually presented with an object and argue that Kant’s argument does not imply that the categories are necessary for things to be perceptually presented to us. And I argue that Kant’s reasons for thinking that the categories are necessary for referential thought do not depend on his idealism.

A Question Unthought of by Philosophers
Jennifer S. Marusic, Brandeis University
 Hume claims to be the first philosopher to raise a certain question about the nature of belief, asking what the difference between belief and the simple conception of something is. Yet it isn’t clear what exactly Hume’s new question is, nor why he takes it to be new. I argue that Hume is responding to predicative models of judgment, according to which judgment consists in predication. David Owen claims that Hume’s question is new because it presupposes a rejection of the predicative model of judgment, and Hume is the first philosopher to reject this model of judgment. However, earlier philosophers, including Descartes, also reject the predicative model of judgment. I propose that Hume rightly takes his question to be importantly new, because his account of belief, unlike Descartes’s theory of judgment, treats belief as paradigmatically a state arrived at in response to evidence that is less than certain.

A Reconciliation Between Radical and Liberal Feminism
Carol Hay, U. Mass Lowell
 Many feminist critiques of liberalism claim that liberalism provides a problematic framework for understanding women’s oppression. Feminist liberals have replied that liberalism provides the best explanation of what is wrong with women’s oppression. I argue that this longstanding antagonism between liberalism and feminism is based on a fundamental mistake. Radical feminist critiques of liberalism often concern its method of discovering oppressive harms, while liberal moral theory typically seeks to justify the idea that these harms are serious wrongs. I demonstrate that radical feminists and liberals have often talked past each other in this way by focusing on Lisa Schwartzman’s recent critique of Martha Nussbaum, but I believe the point holds more generally. Once we see that radicals have been generally right about what is the best method for uncovering oppressive practices, while liberals have been generally right about the explanation of exactly what is wrong with these practices, we can see hope for a promising reconciliation between radical feminism and liberalism.

Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons
Rebekah L. H. Rice, Seattle Pacific University
 The Agent-Causal Theory of Action claims that an event counts as an action when, and only when, it is caused by an agent. Randolph Clarke is sometimes characterized as defending a ‘hybrid’ view which incorporates both agent-causation and event-causation. According to Clarke, an action is a behavior that is both caused by the agent (i.e. agent-caused) and caused by the agent’s reasons (i.e. event-caused). The central merit of the view, Clarke contends, is that it secures the agent’s control over her action while also offering a satisfying account of reason-explanation. This paper aims to show that Clarke’s version of the agent-causal theory fails to adequately account for what it is to act for a reason. And it thereby fails to account for the sort of action properly understood to characterize much, if not all, significant human activity.

Al-Ghazali on the Oneness and Simplicity of the Necessary Existent
Aladdin Yaqub, Lehigh University
 The medieval Islamic philosophers held a certain conception of the divine unity that assumes the necessary existent to be both one and simple: there is only one necessary existent and it admits no composition whatsoever. In The Incoherence of the Philosophers Al-Ghazali presents, on behalf of the philosophers, several arguments for this conception and his critique of these arguments. In this paper I consider six of these arguments and offer two possible interpretations of them. The first interpretation sees the first argument as employing the simplicity of the necessary existent to establish its oneness and the other five arguments as invoking oneness to establish simplicity. The second interpretation doesn’t offer a new reading for the first argument but sees the other five arguments as defending the simplicity of the necessary existent based on its basic concept. I present reconstructions of three arguments and explain my preference for the second interpretation.

Are All Attitudes Propositional Attitudes?
Alex Grzankowski, Texas, University of, at Austin
 Intensional transitive verb constructions, such as ‘John loves Sally’ seem, much like propositional attitude reports, to be reports of mental states. In fact, it is tempting to think that the intensional transitive reports are, in some way, to be assimilated to reports of the second kind. Such a move is supported by the observation that propositions are a well motivated object of the attitudes. But are all attitudes propositional attitudes? I argue that they are not by showing that the states to which the intentional transitive constructions answer don’t even supervene on the states to which the propositional attitudes answer.

Are the Folk Objectivists about Morality?
John Park, Duke University
Hagop Sarkissian, City University of New York–Baruch College
 Moral philosophers of varying theoretical commitments maintain that ordinary, pre-philosophical folk are objectivists about morality, that they view moral issues as having a single correct answer as opposed to several correct answers that are all true relative to a given perspective or culture. This empirical claim has been an article of faith for many philosophers, a datum that must be captured or explained by any theory of morality. But is the claim correct? After reviewing some of the extant philosophical and psychological literature on this topic, we present evidence from a new study suggesting that even while folk often speak in objectivist terms, they might, at some deeper level, embrace relativism about morality.

Aristotle on Belief and Rationality: Fiction, Response, Restraint
Ian Flora, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
 In book 3, chapter 3 of his On the Soul, Aristotle gives several arguments meant to demonstrate the type non-identity of belief (doxa) and imagination (phantasia). I focus on one of these (3.3.427b21-4) that gets very little attention, though it can lead us deep into Aristotle’s theory of human rationality, doxastic epistemology, and psychology of fiction. For Aristotle, believing an object to have a response-dependent feature is sufficient to have the response, while imagining that it does is not sufficient. Imagination does, however, cause affective response, pace most commentary on this passage. A discussion of the Poetics makes this clear. Animals, which have phantasia in place of belief and knowledge, cannot avoid being moved by their mental content: there are no skeptical animals. Humans, by contast, can withhold their commitment when of sound mind. This is part of what makes humans rational.

Aristotle on Reference and Generality
Philip Corkum, University of Alberta
 Mathematical logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence is true if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer. A sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I’ll argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I’ll argue that Aristotle’s core semantic notion is one of containment, not identity: an ordinary predication such as ‘Greeks are mortal’ is true just in case a certain mereological relationship obtains between the distinct referents of the relevant terms.

Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism
Rebecca Lynn Stangl, University of Virginia
 In this paper, I defend an account of right action that I shall call asymmetrical virtue particularism. An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is deontically irrelevant or because it is actually wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions, in contrast to the virtuousness of actions, is not deontically variant; if any action is vicious in some respect Y, then Y is always a wrong-making feature of any action whatever that has Y. This paper focuses on the asymmetricality thesis. Suppose one is trying to offer some virtue-ethical criterion of right action. And suppose that one also finds particularism convincing. Then, I shall argue, one ought to adopt asymmetrical virtue particularism.

Attention and Perceptual Content
Bence Nanay, Syracuse University and University of British Columbia
 There has been a recent flood of counterexamples against intentionalism, the view, according to which the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on the content of this experience. These counterexamples all have the same structure: two perceptual experiences have the same content, but they have different phenomenal character because our attention is different in the two cases. I argue that these alleged counterexamples presuppose an implausible concept of attention, therefore they do not jeopardize intentionalism. But even if one is not interested in the intricate debates surrounding intentionalism, the role attention plays in these examples is extremely important as it helps us to clarify how we should (and how we should not) think about perceptual content.

Autonomy and Creative Responsibility
Eric Barnes, Southern Methodist University
 I develop a notion of ‘creative responsibility’ which is an important component of human autonomy which is clearly distinct from moral responsibility but ignored in contemporary literature on free will. A person who vigorously deploys powers of creative thought in deliberating about what to do (including what to believe) displays a kind of autonomy that allows him to escape the power of a local culture to induce conformity in its members. This confers upon his actions a kind of ‘originatory value.’ The notion of creative responsibility is useful to compatibilists in arguing that determinism does not drain human action of originatory value (contra Nozick and Kane) but also useful to the incompatibilist who should concede that creative responsibility confers an kind of autonomy on individuals that can supplement the incompatibilist program.

Back to Stalemate: The Motivational Internalism/Externalism Debate
Danielle Bromwich, National Institutes of Health
 Motivational Externalists have claimed a victory of sorts in recent years. They claim to have shown that the burden of proof lies firmly on their opponent’s—the Motivational Internalist’s—shoulders. In this paper, I critically examine the arguments designed to establish a presumption on behalf of externalism, and conclude that these attempts to shift the burden of proof are either predicated on a false philosophical psychology or simply fail to show anything other than a conceptual tie between the positions.

Being F Intrinsically and Extrinsically
Ralf Bader, University of St Andrews
 According to the duplication account of intrinsicality, x is F intrinsically iff all duplicates of x are F, while x is F extrinsically iff x is F and some duplicate of x fails to be F. In this paper, I will show that this account is inadequate since it mistakenly makes being F intrinsically and being F extrinsically incompatible. This inadequacy of duplication principles can be illustrated by cases involving objects that have both intrinsic and extrinsic value. This problem affects not only duplication accounts, but also other accounts of intrinsicality that are extensional in nature, such as combinatorial or mereological accounts. The problem with all these accounts is that they only assess whether a property is had and not how it is had. They thereby ignore important hyperintensional differences in the ways in which properties can be had.

Berkeley’s ‘Defense’ of ‘Commonsense’
Seth Bordner, UNC
 Depending on the interpretation, Berkeley’s claims that his immaterialism is a defense of commonsense are either foolishly optimistic or intentionally dissembling. It is agreed on all accounts, though, that his philosophy is no defense of commonsense. Unfortunately, the received interpretations fundamentally misunderstand the way in which Berkeley conceives his immaterialism to stand as a defense of commonsense. In this paper, I give new answers to two old questions: what does Berkeley think he is defending in the defense of commonsense, and how does he go about defending it? I argue that Berkeley’s immaterialist defense of commonsense is best understood not as an apology for commonly held opinions, but as a weapon to be used against what he sees as a threat to the valuable faithful and anti-skeptical tendencies of the vulgar. That is, Berkeley’s defense of commonsense just is his attack on materialism and its concomitant representational realism.

Blame and the Moral Relationship
Andrew Peter Ross, Queen’s University
 In Moral Dimensions, T. M. Scanlon argues that blame is primarily concerned with, and operates as a response to, the impairment of human relationships. Significantly, explaining blame as relationship-dependent, commits Scanlon to the view that we are in an ongoing relationship with all potentially blameworthy agents. Prior to any form of interaction, or so Scanlon argues, we have a moral relationship with all rational agents. R. Jay Wallace, in a forthcoming essay, argues that it is misleading to think of the moral relationship as anything more than a merely notional connection. I interpret the significance of Wallace’s claim to lie in the fact that a notional connection cannot account for the particular way in which we focus on, and feel vulnerable to, the attitudes of immoral strangers. In response to Wallace, I argue that the contractualist understanding of justifiability can account for the shortcomings of a notional connection.

Can One Bet on One’s Own Ignorance?
Johannes Schmitt, University of Southern California
 In this paper I shall investigate a well-know problem for Dutch book arguments for the Ratio formula, i.e. arguments that aim to show that anyone whose conditional subjective probability of C given A does not equal the ratio of their subjective probability of A & C and their subjective probability of A is thereby irrational. The problem is that some conditional probabilities of a subject cannot be captured by any (conditional) betting strategy offered by a bookie. I will suggest that the problem is closely related to the fact that for any subject there are some true propositions that are unknowable for the subject. I suggest a way to avoid the problem by choosing what I call an interpersonal betting strategy—I will then argue that this solution will not be universally acceptable and that it fails to vindicate the tight correspondence between betting prices and (conditional) degrees of belief.

Can There Be Associative Political Obligations?
Bas van der Vossen, Independent Scholar
 The primary purpose of theories of political obligation is to establish the legitimacy of a state. Because these are typically thought to be enforceable, showing that subjects have political obligations might justify the state’s right to rule. According to the theory of associative obligation, the members of certain associations, namely good associations, have obligations in virtue of their membership. As a theory of political obligations, it holds that the subjects of good societies are obligated to obey the law. However, even if the theory succeeds in establishing the (controversial) conclusion that there are associative obligations, it still fails as a view about political obligation. The problem, I argue, is that the special bond identified in the associativist argument as generating obligations is typically dissolved by the very acts of disobedience. Therefore, the theory cannot support the enforcement of the law, and consequently fails to support the legitimacy of states.

Character Matching and the Envelope of Belief
Gregory Wheeler, New University of Lisbon
 The Lockean position on rational belief maintains that an individual fully believes a proposition just when her degree of confidence is high enough to pass some previously specified threshold. One historic challenge for the view is persuading a probabilist why he should bother with the Lockean position altogether. Scott Sturgeon (2008) has recently offered a probabilism-friendly defense of the Lockean position which turns upon a principle he calls ‘Character Matching.’ In this paper I argue against accepting this normative principle and in doing so I present an alternative threshold view that I call the Envelope of Belief. My view maintains that full belief is sensitive not only to the evidence for a claim, but also to the ratio of the risk to reward from acting on the belief. The view is briefly contrasted with recent discussions of stake-sensitive accounts of belief as well.

Clickers: Restoring Purpose, Focus, and Intensity in the Traditional Classroom
Gregory R. Mayes, California State University–Sacramento
 CPS RF response pads (aka: clickers) are hand held devices that allow students to communicate directly with an instructor’s laptop. Clickers provide a delightfully counterintuitive solution to the problem of technology induced distractions in the classroom: give them another piece of technology. Used properly, clickers not only eliminate these distractions completely, but provide a strong incentive for the student to be prepared for class and to stay focused during it. They also raise the bar on instructor preparedness and delivery.

Closure Reconsidered
Yuval Avnur, Scripps College
 Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume that closure for justification holds, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the two most common arguments against it. The upshot is that dissatisfaction with standard, closure-accepting theories of justification, according to which we are somehow justified in believing that we are not brains in vats (or otherwise massively deceived), need not lead to skepticism.

Coercion, States, and the Practical Function of Principles of Responsibility
Scott A. Anderson, University of British Columbia
 When philosophers have asked how coercion affects moral responsibility, they have largely analyzed the way coercion impacts the coercee’s psychology, compelling her, and thereby undermining the freedom of her will. This understanding of coercion is unsuited to explain why states commonly exempt coercees from responsibility for coerced actions. This essay offers a different analysis of coercion that indicates why states have good reason to regulate it, and in so doing, to reduce or deny the responsibility of agents for actions performed due to illicit private coercion. It also argues that such principles of responsibility can have a practical function, which helps explain why agents bear responsibility for actions taken in the light of such principles, and how such principles can constrain what agents are to be held responsible for.

Conflict in the Aristotelian City: Desire for Equality and Competition for Power
Candice Delmas, Boston University
 Essential to the art of statesmanship, according to Aristotle, is the knowledge of the causes of political disorder (stasis). These causes are complex and abounding; yet Aristotle identifies one unique source of stasis: the human desire for equality. Against the standard emphasis on citizens’ shared sense of justice, I offer a new reading of this desire for equality, based on the distinction between concept and conception. Thus for Aristotle, I argue, people share a concept of justice insofar as they agree that justice is proportionate equality; but they advance competing—and mistaken—conceptions of justice to determine each person’s due. These disagreements, and the desire for equality which generates them, crystallize around the question of the allocation of political power. Crucially, Aristotle takes these conflicting conceptions of justice as a given of political reality, and as the basic premise of his investigation into the best practicable regime.

Contextualism about Intrinsic Value
Justin Jeffrey, University of Idaho
 Intrinsic value has a central but problematic place in moral theory. The skepticism surrounding intrinsic value is understandable, and exists in part because of Moore’s famous redescription of the concept near the beginning of the 20th century. Moore attempted to clarify the concept, but in so doing seems to me to have changed it considerably. Some of these changes were regrettable but they have been hard to shake. I offer in this paper a way to rescue intrinsic value by invoking a strategy most famously used to ward off global skepticism in the field of epistemology. More specifically, I take a contextualist approach to the semantics of intrinsic value ascriptions. This contextualist approach shows promise for those who would like to preserve much of the functionality of intrinsic value but shed its problematic Moorean aspects.

Contingency and Relative Significance Debates in Biology
Andrew Margenot, Connecticut College
Derek Turner, Connecticut College
 In a series of papers, John Beatty has argued that the contingency of evolutionary history explains why relative significance debates are more prevalent in biology than in other areas of science. This paper develops an objection to Beatty’s project. We observe that one of the many relative significance debates in biology concerns the relative significance of contingency vs. convergence in evolutionary history. To attempt to explain that debate by appeal to the contingency of evolutionary history would be circular. After developing this objection and examining one reply that Beatty could make, we offer our own alternative explanation for the prevalence of relative significance debates in biology, one that avoids this circularity problem.

Curiosity and the Response-Dependent Value of Understanding
Jonathan Kvanvig, Baylor University
 Curiosity is sometimes thought of in terms of a desire to know, but I argue that it is best understood differently. Given a proper understanding of curiosity, I then argue for a generality claim about it, and use these two features to show how curiosity can form the basis for a response-dependent value of understanding. This account provides an answer to a central value question in epistemology, the question of the relationship between the value of knowledge and the value of understanding.

Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?
Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri–St. Louis
 I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience.

Does Disagreement Lead to Skepticism?
Michael G. Thune, Joliet Junior College
 Elsewhere, I offer my own positive view about the epistemological significance of disagreement. In this paper, I argue that Richard Feldman’s view (which holds that disagreement between ‘epistemic peers’ very often requires that both sides suspend judgment about the proposition or propositions in dispute) is committed to the soundness of an argument which, I argue, contains a false premise. Other salient versions of the skeptical view have their critics; for space considerations, I focus only on Feldman’s version. To a signifcant extent, these other versions are like Feldman’s in their assumption that disagreements between epistemic peers typically involve epistemic symmetry between the relevant beliefs. Thus, showing that in a significant range of cases, such an assumption is or is likely to be false gives us a reason to think that the skeptical view about disagreement is generally mistaken.

Double Effect, Single Explanation
Sarah Paul, Bowdoin College
 Intentional agency seems to bring with it a special kind of knowledge: we generally know what we are doing intentionally without needing to appeal to observation of ourselves in action. But how far does this non-observational knowledge of agency extend? This paper contends that it is not limited to knowledge of what we intend to be doing, as it is generally supposed; in addition, we often know without observation that we are bringing about the foreseen but unintended ‘double effects’ of our intended actions. It is argued that one candidate explanation of non-observational knowledge of agency, Strong Cognitivism about intention, faces a serious challenge in accounting for this fact, whereas the Inferential Theory offers a straightforward explanation. Focusing on knowledge of double effects thus provides a helpful datum in our theory choice.

Emanation (or Lack Thereof?) in Plato and Plotinus
David J. Yount, Mesa Community College
 Emanation is used by some commentators as a differentiator between the philosophies of Plato and Plotinus. However, I will show that the following claim is false: Plotinus has the view that lower entities or hypostases—Soul and Intellect—emanate from or, as Plotinus states, are "outflows” of higher principles or hypostases (that is, Soul emanates from Intellect, and Intellect emanates from the One), but Plato does not. I dispute this claim in two different ways: (1) Plotinus himself states that emanation is only a metaphor and not literal; and (2) even if we grant that Plotinus is an emanationist, Plato is committed at least to the spirit if not the letter or doctrine of emanation as well. If my argument succeeds, one will have to look away from emanation for a differentia between these thinkers. Objections against my view are considered as well.

Emergent Consciousness and Ontological Fundamentality
Daniel Giberman, Stanford University
 On what I call the ‘builder conception’ of ontological fundamentality, the fundamental properties are those whose localized, mereologically basic exemplifications fix the facts of the whole world. This view is attractive because it fits well with the ontologically economical view that microphysics grounds all macro facts. However, the view is threatened by the possibility of emergent properties, that is, properties that fail to supervene on the properties of the mereologically basic parts of the objects that exemplify them; for if emergence is possible then there are cases in which property distributions across micro objects fail to fix macro facts. I consider a popular kind of putative example of emergence, involving conscious organisms, and argue that such examples are suspect. If I am right then the threat to the builder conception from the possibility of emergence is lessened.

Emotion and the Value of Understanding
Adam Pelser, Baylor University
 Understanding essentially involves grasping or appreciating significant explanatory relations in complex bodies of information. Appreciating the relative value of some explanatory relations over others is an inherently emotional process, as is evaluative perception generally. Understanding thus essentially involves emotionally perceiving some explanatory relations in complex bodies of information as better than others, according to the concerns and desires motivating inquiry. Moreover, the positive emotional feeling that accompanies awareness of one’s own understanding, in contrast to the emotional frustration and disappointment that accompany failure to understand important matters, reveals that we have a deep and widely shared desire to understand. That we naturally perceive understanding as valuable is the primary ground and justification—absent defeaters—for our belief that understanding is (objectively) valuable. Emotions are thus importantly constitutive of the nature of understanding and integral to our understanding and appreciation of its value.

Epistemic Desert and the Value of Knowledge
Jerry Joseph Steinhofer, Brown University
 Whenever a subject knows a proposition, they have a true belief but are also worthy of that true belief. In this way, knowledge entails epistemic desert. The concept of epistemic desert allows for a simple and elegant solution to the value problem in epistemology. Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because (i) it is good to deserve a true belief and (ii) it is good to have a true belief and deserve to have that true belief. There are several significant advantages of this proposal. (1) It allows us to explain the value of knowledge by classifying knowledge as particular kind of valuable phenomena: deserved success. (2) It identifies a distinctive non-derivative epistemic final value that is associated with justification: the desert of true belief. (3) It identifies a consolidating epistemic value. (4) It is consistent with the view that true belief is the fundamental epistemic value.

Escaping Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism
Ali Hasan, University of Iowa
 In Justification Without Awareness (2006), Michael Bergmann presents a dilemma for internalism from which he claims there is "no escape”: The awareness allegedly required for justification is either strong awareness, which involves conceiving of some justification-contributor as relevant to the truth of a belief, or weak awareness, which does not. Bergmann argues that the former leads to an infinite regress of justifiers, while the latter conflicts with the "clearest and most compelling” motivation for endorsing internalism, namely, that for a belief to be justified its truth must not be an accident from the subject’s perspective. Bergmann’s dilemma might initially seem to have the force of a knock-down argument against the classical internalist accounts he considers, if not against all forms of internalism. I argue, however, that neither horn of Bergmann’s dilemma is successful. Classical internalists can hold on to the main motivation for internalism and avoid an infinite regress.

Ethical Naturalism as Transcendental Anthropology
John Hacker-Wright, University of Guelph
 In this paper, I argue that one important strain of Aristotelian ethical naturalism employs what Jonathan Lear has called transcendental anthropology. Lear’s Wittgenstein holds that successful language use requires shared, reflective understanding of a form of life by the language’s users; this understanding is partially constitutive of the meaning of our expressions, and it cannot be derived from observation of our activities, hence it is transcendental. I argue that Aristotelian ethical naturalism should be understood as having a similar transcendental component. Grasping the goodness or badness of human action requires an understanding of action as intentional. As Anscombe has argued, this understanding depends on the agent’s non-observational knowledge of what she is doing and this understanding in turn requires non-observational insight into the agent’s form of life. Appreciating the transcendental aspect of Aristotelian naturalism is, I argue, crucial for fending off some common objections to Aristotelian naturalism.

Ethics with Young People
Susan Gardner, Capilano University
 Ethics, insofar as it informs action, cannot be taught through a process of information transfer. To behave ethically, one needs to learn how to yank one’s actions out from under the controlling influence of desires and circumstance through the self-empowering force of objective reasoning. Such ‘process learning’ is anathema to educators under pressure to live up to accountability standards that are easily graded. However, refusing the opportunity to foster responsible effective practical reasoning in our youngsters dooms them to slavery by appetite, sense, and situational forces. The antidote is Philosophy for Children, a program that has been knocking at the doors of schools around the world for the last 40 years. With a more precise theoretical message of what good thinking looks like, its payoff, and what ‘truth’ has to do with it, we may yet see a better day when philosophy is in every classroom worldwide.

Experimental Philosophy in Introduction to Philosophy: Opportunities and Challenges
Emily Esch, College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University
Chris Weigel, Utah Valley University
 To the extent that experimental philosophy involves an internal dispute about methodology, it will not be seen as having immediate significance to a typical undergraduate. Hence, including it involves careful thought about what it will bring to the classroom as a whole, to the majority of students. In this session we will discuss possible answers to the following questions: What unique discussions can experimental philosophy bring to a class? How can we best integrate experimental philosophy with traditional texts? What challenges does teaching experimental philosophy face? Through case studies, we explore two different approaches to integrating experimental philosophy into Introduction to Philosophy courses. The first case study will explore using polling in a way similar to that advocated by Nadelhoffer and Nahmias ("Polling as Pedagogy” 2008). The second case study will explore teaching Nichols and Knobe’s "Moral Responsibility and Determinism” (2007) in a unit on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.

Explaining Absences
Michael Dean Hartsock, Missouri, University of, at Columbia
 It is standardly argued that if causation is a relation, absences cannot be causes or effects. Relations need relata, and absences are nothing at all. Helen Beebee and Achille Varzi have addressed this problem by arguing that commonsense negative causal judgments are false, but have causal explanations as counterparts. I argue that this approach fails. In prevention cases—causation of an absence—the Beebee-Varzi view entails that no explanation is possible. Instead, I argue that intuitively plausible negative causal statements pick out, by negative description, causal relata. Thus we preserve the view that causation is a relation and vindicate commonsense.

Exploitation and Neglect
Matt Zwolinski, University of San Diego
 Most of us think that those who exploit the vulnerable—who take unfair advantage of them—are committing a serious moral wrong. This judgment persists even when the exploitation is mutually beneficial—that is, even when it leaves both parties better off than they were prior to the transaction. We might also think that those who neglect the vulnerable—who simply ignore their needs—are doing something wrong. But we generally think that neglect is not as bad as exploitation. This is puzzling, since mutually beneficial exploitation does something to make the vulnerable better off, while neglect does not. This paper explores the comparative moral wrongness of exploitation and neglect, setting out the conditions under which the former is worse than the latter, and discussing the implications of this difference for practical moral problems such as those involved in sweatshops and price gouging.

Faith and Knowledge Fight and Make Up: Jacques Derrida’s Philosophical Proposal for the ‘Sources’ of Religion
Matthew S. Haar Farris, Graduate Theological Union
 This paper critically examines Derrida’s theory that religion, both conceptually and in practice, is a response to the other. For Derrida, ‘religion’ is defined by the fact that it is divided at its source by the mutually hostile and hospitable relationship between faith and knowledge. Like inoculating oneself in order to develop resistance to a virus, religion is continually stabilizing and sacralizing itself by temporarily destabilizing and de-sacralizing itself, appropriating the other that threatens it, especially technoscience. Derrida calls this general economy of religion auto-immunization. The purpose of this presentation is twofold: 1) to explain how the radical demand to respond to the other is an essential characteristic of Derrida’s texts on religion; and 2) to elucidate Derrida’s theory of auto-immunization as the general economy of ‘religion.’

Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions
Clayton Littlejohn, University of Texas–San Antonio
 Lewis thought that the fallibilist view was hopeless. If you want to avoid skepticism, Lewis thought you ought to be an infallibilist and a contextualist. He thought that concessive knowledge attributions (e.g., ‘I know that Harry is a zebra, but it might be that he’s a cleverly disguised mule’) were contradictory and that they were overt statements of the fallibilist’s view. Dougherty and Rysiew have argued that CKAs are pragmatically defective rather than semantically defective. Stanley thinks that these three are wrong about the fallibilist’s commitments and that the pragmatic response to Lewis fails. I shall argue that there are problems with Dougherty and Rysiew’s response to Stanley’s criticisms having to do with their account of epistemic modals and that there are problems with Stanley’s response to Lewis. I’ll offer my own defense of fallibilism and try to show that CKAs are not something fallibilists should be worried about.

Flexible Contextualism about ‘Ought’ and Attitude-attributions
Janice Dowell, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
 In the philosophy of language and linguistics literature, contextualism about modals used normatively, such as ‘must,’ ‘ought,’ and ‘may,’ is the canonical view. Its great advantage is its ability, if correct, to provide a simple and highly unified explanation for a great variety of language use. Recently, Gunnar Bjornsson, Stephen Finlay and Brian Weatherson have raised puzzles that seem to show that contextualists are unable to provide a fully satisfying explanation of the interaction of modals and attitude-ascriptions in the context of normative disagreement. Here I lay out and defend a version of flexible contextualism that, I argue, avoids the puzzles posed by those authors. A further advantage of my account is that it provides a non-ad hoc, prediction-generating, explanatory, and general story about how contexts selects intuitively plausible values for a modal expression’s parameters. That account, in relying upon publicly manifestable, referential intentions, fits perfectly with well-worked out, Gricean accounts of language use. The ability of the account to generate predictions and explanations rests on its well-developed procedure for identifying the contents of such intentions, through an identification of the nature of the disposition to use and evaluate utterances that having such an intention confers. Finally, the account also fits with a plausible, Kaplanian account of how contexts determines domain restrictions in the case of quantification over individuals. In the literature on quantification over individuals, it is agreed on all sides that such quantifiers are context-sensitive. So, it is an important advantage of my account that modals, as quantifier expressions, receive a precisely parallel treatment.

Freedom, Backtrackers, and the Fixity of the Past
Paul R. Audi, University of Nebraska–Omaha
 How should the intuition that the past is ‘fixed’ be cashed out? In particular, does the fixity of the past entail that there are no true backtracking counterfactuals? These issues bear importantly on the question of whether freedom and determinism are compatible. If the fixity of the past can be reconciled with the truth of certain backtracking counterfactuals, then there is a way to resist some of the strongest arguments for incompatibilism, notably van Inwagen’s consequence argument. Here I argue that the most plausible construals of the fixity of the past are compatible with the truth of the relevant backtrackers. Compatibilism, for that reason, has a promising line of response to particularly troublesome incompatibilist objections.

G.E. Moore’s Epistemological Legacy
Jeremy Kirby, Albion College
 I advance an interpretation of Moore’s response to Idealism and Skepticism that acknowledges both an appreciation of the philosophical and meta-philosophical position wherein he is located, while avoiding some of the pitfalls into which other recent interpretations have fallen.

Grounding Ethics in Philosophical Psychology
Paul Katsafanas, University of New Mexico
 How might Nietzsche be relevant for contemporary ethical theory? I argue that the bulk of Nietzsche’s writing is concerned with the question of how normative claims can be justified. Nietzsche develops an original and compelling answer to this foundational question. He seeks to show that facts about the nature of human motivation and willing generate a non-optional standard of success for human action. In this talk, I reconstruct Nietzsche’s central argument for this conclusion. I contend that Nietzsche’s argument is structurally analogous to constitutivist theories of practical reason, which seek to ground normative claims in facts about action’s constitutive features. I show that Nietzsche’s argument can be understood as an empirically grounded version of constitutivism. Nietzsche’s work therefore engages with concerns that are currently at the forefront of ethical theory.

Hegel’s Project of Reconciliation and Radical Political Criticism
Jeff Gauthier, University of Portland
 I explore what might be meant by a politics of reconciliation and consider whether or not radical social criticism is compatible with it. I begin by placing the concept of reconciliation in Hegel’s broader system, attending to how it answers the ‘contradictions’ of other ways of establishing moral and political obligation. I then take up reconciliation as it is developed in the Philosophy of Right, with special attention to Michael Hardimon’s discussion of the project. I conclude that even if Hegel is right about the need to rely upon existing institutions and practices in developing moral and political critique, this is insufficient to justify the conclusion that fundamental changes in existing social and political orders might not be called for.

Hoping Against Hope
Adrienne Martin, University of Pennsylvania
 The orthodox view of hope is that hoping for an outcome is desiring it under conditions of uncertainty. But two people who equally desire an outcome they both believe is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless hope to different degrees—one may "hope against hope,” while the other entertains only a mild hope. I propose that hope involves an evaluative stance toward the subjective probability of the hoped-for outcome obtaining: it is or is not good enough to justify specific choices, feelings, and moods. I relate this proposal to Kahneman’s and Tversky’s prospect theory of risky decisions and argue that, if this theory is true, we should see this evaluative stance as part of the orthodox view. I then show how my proposal is different from and preferable to Philip Pettit’s view that hope involves the ‘cognitive resolve’ to treat the hoped-for outcome as likely to obtain.

Images for the Sake of the Truth in Plato’s Symposium
Yancy Hughes Dominick, Seattle University
 Alcibiades, in Plato’s Symposium, says that he will praise Socrates through images (215a4-5). He assures his companions, however, that this "is no joke: the image will be for the sake of the truth” (215a6). Alcibiades then describes Socrates as full of images, and as speaking in words that are "bursting with images of virtue” (222a3-4). This focus on Socrates’ images seems in tension with the view that Socrates exemplifies the proper lover earlier described. The successful lover gives birth "not to images of virtue,” but to "true virtue” (212a). How can Socrates burst with images yet exemplify the lover who generates not images, but true virtue? This question urges us toward a firmer grasp of this unique Socrates (221c-d) and his exemplary character. Despite the apparent tension in the text, Socrates does indeed model the successful lover: Socrates is filled with images, but those images engender true virtue in others.

In Defense of Nonsocratic Skepticism
Philip Swenson, University of California–Riverside
 Gary Watson has defended a version of nonsocratic skepticism about weakness of will. Nonsocratic skepticism holds that, although it is possible for a person to act against his better judgement, no one ever does so while processing the ability to act in accordance with his better judgement. Bonnie Kent has offered three arguments for the conclusion that Watson’s version of nonsocractic skepticism does not provide an adequate account of weakness of will. My goal is to respond to each of these arguments. I maintain that Watson’s version of nonsocratic skepticism (or at least a version quite similiar to his) can be developed in such a way that it avoids the force of Kent’s criticisms.

In Search of a Non-Counterfactual Foundation for Mechanistic Explanation
Jonathan A. Waskan, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
 Resurgent interest in both mechanistic and counterfactual theories of explanation has led to a fair amount of discussion regarding the relative merits of these two approaches. James Woodward is currently the pre-eminent counterfactual theorist, and he criticizes the mechanists on the following grounds: Unless mechanists about explanation invoke counterfactuals, they can not make sense of claims about interactions between mechanism parts or of explanations that put forward absent knowledge of productive mechanisms. He claims that these shortfalls can be offset if mechanists will just borrow key tenets of his counterfactual theory, but this is something of a Trojan horse. Here I argue that Woodward’s critique is based upon the mistaken assumption that actualist-mechanists about causal claims are committed to the idea that causal claims always make assertions about specific productive mechanisms. His critique fails, however, if there is a viable topic-neutral actualist-mechanist alternative.

Individuating the Senses
Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow
 What makes the senses, such as vision, touch, taste, smell and hearing, different from each other, and what features of a sense determine that it is the type of sense that it is? There is disagreement among both philosophers and scientists about what criteria should be used to individuate the senses. I consider these in the light of new facts and research. For example, we now know that humans and animals seem to have senses that are in some ways different from the five just mentioned. For example, balance in humans, and electric and infra-red senses in some animals. In addition, scientists are creating devices that promise to extend or replace human senses. I will argue that, contrary to previous thought, we don’t have to choose between the existing criteria. Rather, the new facts invite us to use all of the criteria to form a fine-grained taxonomy of the senses.

Inherence-Causation-Conceivability in Spinoza or On Spinoza’s Well-Grounded Bifurcations
Yitzhak Melamed, Johns Hopkins University
 In the current paper I examine and criticize one of the boldest and most fascinating readings of Spinoza of the past few years. In his outstanding new book, Michael Della Rocca suggests a strict identification of the relations of inherence, causation, and conceivability in Spinoza. Against Della Rocca’s claim that the bifurcation of efficient causation (into causation which is, and is not, accompanied by inherence) constitutes an illegitimate brute fact, I will argue that the bifurcation of causation in Spinoza is paralleled by a bifurcation of conceivability and that the two relations are grounded in the foundational bifurcation of existence into substance and modes. If we are to recognize the reality of modes in Spinoza, we must also acknowledge the bifurcations that result from the bifurcation of existence into substance and modes.

Integrating Yoga into an Introduction to Philosophy Class: Experiments in Experiential Pedagogy
Ken Burak, Northampton Community College
 Here I present a unit useful for any Introduction to Philosophy course that wishes to address dualism. To begin: is any non-dualistic initiative doomed to failure because it must dualistically oppose dualism to non-dualism? Yoga answers in two ways: first: dualism is not wrong, but a possibility: the mind can take its leave of the body, but it can also, through yoga, contact and engage the body deeply. Secondly, mind-body dualism can only be overcome through such an engagement. The answer to dualism lies not in the chatter of the philosopher’s mind, but in the silence and equanimity of the yogi’s pose. But to approach the problem honestly, students will have to do what they are seldom asked to do in a philosophy class: actually rise out of their chairs, and engage their bodies.

Is Government Supererogation Possible?
Justin Weinberg, University of South Carolina
 Governments often perform acts that seem morally good, but which are not required by any plausible theory of justice. Acts which no one is required to perform, but would be morally good if performed, are supererogatory. Thus, it appears governments perform supererogatory acts. But is that what’s really happening? In this paper, I argue that because of the kind of agent government is, actual government supererogation is virtually impossible. If we wish to preserve the possibility of government supererogation, common views about the relationship between justice and morality, and the relationship between coercion and justice, must be revised.

Is the Capacity to Understand Moral Norms a Precondition of Blameworthiness?
Arash Farzam-Kia, Queen’s University
 Traditionally, the capacity to understand moral norms has been taken to be a necessary condition of blameworthiness. According to one such account, implicit in moral criticism is a demand that the agent comply with moral norms, a demand which is unintelligible if the agent lacks the capacity to understand what the applicable norms are. In this essay I argue that the content of moral address, and therefore the conditions of its intelligibility, have been largely misunderstood. Arriving at a correct account of the content of moral address suggests that moral address is not undermined by the agent’s incapacity to understand the nature of moral norms. It follows that the inability of the agent to understand moral norms does not render moral criticism inappropriate. This provides the basis for a ‘strict liability’ account of moral criticism.

Joint Attention and Moral Charisma
Andrew Terjesen, Rhodes College
 It has long been thought that moral character can transform people you interact with, but it is less commonly held that the moral character of a leader can transform a community through the mere possession of good character (and not the exercise of it). In the Confucian tradition, the de of a leader can change the people and even the natural world. De has often been translated as ‘virtue,’ but this translation loses the sense of moral charisma that can change a world. I suspect this is because it seems a bit too mystical for most normative ethicists. I will argue that studies of joint attention suggest a way in which to reclaim the moral charisma of virtue (in the East and West) as we may jointly attend to the world with a leader and have his attitude reshape how we view the world through joint attention.

Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge
Steven Reynolds, Arizona State University
 Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed.

Kant on Moral Dilemmas
Michael Cholbi, California State Polytechnic University–Pomona
 Every philosopher grants there are apparent moral dilemmas but are there genuine dilemmas, situations in which, no matter what an agent does, she acts wrongly? In debates about the existence of genuine dilemmas, Kant is typically identified as a clear and uncompromising denier of such dilemmas. Here I argue that Kant’s view is not in fact a metaphysical stance on moral dilemmas at all. Instead Kant defends a more subtle, methodological view according to which the denial of moral dilemmas is a regulative ideal for moral deliberation. On this view, practical reason both assumes the non-existence of moral dilemmas and aspires to their resolution. Kant’s denial of moral dilemmas is thus a regulative principle of practical reason whose authority rests on its being a consequence of our acceptance of the Categorical Imperative as practical reason’s supreme principle.

Kant on Supererogation: Four Views
Ernesto V. Garcia, University of Massachusetts–Amherst
 There are three standard views about Kant on supererogation: either that Kant’s moral theory does not have room for supererogatory actions, and (1) so much the worse [Urmson/Eisenberg/Guevara] or (2) so much the better [Baron/Timmerman] for his views, or that Kant’s moral theory does have room for supererogatory acts (3) in the qualified sense that they fulfill wide imperfect duties of beneficence [Hill/Heyd]. In this paper, I defend a fourth approach, arguing that (4) while Kant has no distinctive place for supererogatory actions in his moral theory, he does in his overall value theory or axiology. What is crucial to recognize here is that for Kant, not all value is moral value. I show how Kant can acknowledge that some supererogatory actions do have moral worth in one important sense, but that their special value derives from the fact that they are notable expressions of the non-moral value of love.

Kantian Ethics and Nonideal Theory
Robert Hanna, University of Colorado–Boulder
 The purpose of this paper is to apply a Sartrean existential insight to an investigation of the logic of Kantian moral principles in a nonideal world, by developing a new interpretation and conservative extension of Kant’s highly influential and equally notorious ethical theory. I call this new interpretation and conservative extension ‘the Hierarchical Paraconsistent Logic Interpretation,’ and if I am correct, it provides a unified solution to three classical problems in Kantian ethics: (1) the problem of universalizability, or the apparent epistemic indeterminacy of tests for the generalizability and consistency of moral principles, (2) the problem of rigorism, or the apparent over-strictness, apparent overgeneralization, and apparent overly-extended strictly universal scope, of moral principles, and and above all, (3) the problem of moral dilemmas, or the apparent inconsistency between equally legitimate absolutely universal moral principles.

Knowledge and the Action-Guiding Role of Assertions
Giovanni Mion, Southern Methodist University
 The paper argues that the traditional understanding of the role played by linguistic communication obscures the connection, recently emphasized by Jason Stanley in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), between knowledge and action. More precisely, the paper argues that if we assume that the primary function of language is not to share thoughts, but to achieve practical goals, and, accordingly, that assertions play primarily an action-guiding role (as opposed to a mind-revealing role), then we are in a better position to explain the semantic import of practical factors upon knowledge.

Libertarian Autonomy and Intrinsic Motives
Carlo Filice, State University of New York–Geneseo
 This paper suggests that libertarians should avail themselves of a system of natural and autonomy-friendly motivational foundations—intrinsic motives. A psyche equipped with intrinsic motives could allow for some degree of character-formation that is genuinely and robustly autonomous. Such autonomy would rest on motives that are one’s own in the most direct way: they are part of one’s natural make-up. A model with intrinsic motives helps libertarians to explain how a robust type of autonomy is possible. Without intrinsic motives libertarian agents are only guaranteed a thin degree of absolute free will.

Linguistic Contextualism and Figurative Language
Mark Phelan, Yale University
 In ordinary instances of communication propositional contents are intuitively grasped as the meanings of utterances. Linguistic Contextualists contend such utterance meanings are partially determined by context-sensitive processes that operate on pronounced expressions, but are not linguistically mandated. I discuss some such processes commonly posited by contextualists, and some principles to which they appeal to constrain utterance interpretation. I then use examples to suggest that the intuitive meanings of figures of speech (i.e. metaphors, metonymies, etc.) are calculable and suitably constrained according to the relevant processes and principles. Thus, contextualism identifies figurative meanings (like literal meanings) with utterance meanings. This presents a problem about how to differentiate literal and figurative utterances. I suggest an account of figurative language that is available to contextualists and respects the distinction language users draw between figurative and literal utterances.

Locke’s Internal Externalism
Shelley Weinberg, University of Illinois
 Most scholarship sees Locke as endorsing a representational theory of perception, in which the direct object of thinking is an idea. Locke’s treatment of the inverted spectrum, however, seems to suggest the contrary: thinking isn’t about privately experienced mental objects, but about publicly available external causes. I argue that, for Locke, thinking is directed toward subjectively experienced mental items that at the same time succeed in acting as pure indicators of their causes. My account is different from other recent interpretations in that I do not think Locke gives up internalism with respect to simple ideas of sensation, for the ‘truth’ of an idea is dependent on the conformity of elements internal to the perception of the idea. Key is the complexity involved in the perception of an idea, which helps to explain why the incorporation of externalist elements does not mean that Locke has or must give up internalism.

Love of Living or Being-Towards-Death? Heidegger Contra Frankfurt
B. Scot Rousse, Northwestern University
 Harry Frankfurt has recently argued that the biological instinct for self-preservation, or "love of living,” plays "a comprehensively foundational” role in the constitution of our practical identities. He argues in general that most basic commitments and cares which guide an agent’s personal practical reflection are best conceived on the model of naturalistic facts, foundational for and located completely without the normative space of reasons. The claim is that in questions of practical identity there is a definite priority of the factual over the normative. Martin Heidegger on the other hand argues that human identity cannot ultimately bottom out in any natural facts except, perhaps, the fact of human mortality. I show that, on the Heideggerian view, the existential and normative significance that Frankfurt finds in the naturalized "love of living” is better captured by the idea that a human identity is fundamentally a lived out in the manner of "being-toward-death.”

Mirroring Is Not Always Simulation
Mitchell Herschbach, University of California–San Diego
 Mirror neurons and systems are commonly appealed to as mechanisms enabling mindreading, i.e., understanding other people’s mental states. Such neural mirroring is usually treated as evidence of mental simulation rather than folk psychological theorizing. I will call into question this assumed connection between mirroring and simulation theory, arguing that mirroring does not necessarily constitute mental simulation. A resemblance relation between a neural process in an observer and a neural process of the same type in a target agent, as found in mirroring processes, is not sufficient for mental simulation. I argue that mental simulation further requires that the mental process in the attributor serve as a model of the target mental process in the other person. To show that this requirement is not always met by mirroring processes, I describe a model of intention attribution using a motor mirroring process that should not be characterized as interpersonal mental simulation.

Modal Supervenience and Modal Mereology
Sean Drysdale Walsh, University of Minnesota–Duluth
 In this paper, I argue that (a) a wide variety of mereological views, including three and four-dimensionalism as well as universalism and restrictivism, falls prey to this inconsistent triad, and that (b) the solution to avoid this triad (and to avoid Cambridge Changes creating substantial changes) is to hold a modified modal form of mereological supervenience, and that (c) this solution points to the plausibility of a modal mereology as well, in which one is a universalist about possible composition and a restrictivist about actual composition.

Moral Coherence, Value Fragmentation, and Epistemic Justification
Patricia Marino, University of Waterloo
 In this paper, I address, and challenge, a particular—and common—way of understanding moral coherence on which it is understood ‘richly,’ as involving norms of systematicity and unity, and in which the good of coherence is epistemic, grounded in the connection between coherence and truth. I argue first that the most common way of supporting such views—an appeal to the idea that beliefs that ‘support and explain’ one another—does not get us very far in the absence of question-begging assumptions about the unified nature of value. One response to this difficulty is what I call the ‘piggy-backing’ strategy: to say that analogies between scientific reasoning and moral reasoning allow us to explain the epistemic value of moral coherence. Working with some contemporary views of scientific coherence, I argue that this strategy fails, partly because the fragmented way we value makes such analogies useless.

Moral Constructivism and Evolutionary Psychology
Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, George Washington University
 Some philosophers (Joshua Greene, Peter Singer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) argue that research on the empirical underpinnings of our moral beliefs supports either skepticism or error theory concerning some of our moral intuitions, such as the widespread intuition that it’s wrong to push the big man off the footbridge in a variation of the trolley problem. I review some of these "debunking arguments” and examine the most prominent rebuttal in the literature: moral constructivism (Neil Levy, Sharon Street, Hallvard Lillehammer, Guy Kahane). Taking T.M. Scanlon as a paradigm constructivist, I agree that constructivism blocks empirical challenges, but I argue that constructivism actually facilitates a different way of empirically debunking some of our moral intuitions, including ones that support deontology. Empirical research can provide clues to what rules would be rejected by reasonable people with evolutionary histories different from ours. Constructivists should recognize that such empirical evidence bears on the moral facts.

Moving on for Community’s Sake: A (Self-Respecting) Kantian Account of Forgiveness
Kate Moran, Brandeis University
 This paper sketches a Kantian account of forgiveness and argues that it is distinguished by three features. First, Kantian forgiveness is best understood as the revision of the actions one takes toward an offender, rather than a change of feeling toward an offender. Second, Kant’s claim that forgiveness is a duty of virtue tells us that we have two reasons to sometimes be forgiving: forgiveness promotes both our own moral perfection and the happiness of our moral community. Third, we have a duty to withhold forgiveness if we think forgiveness will cause or encourage our offender to wrong us again. This duty to sometimes withhold forgiveness stems from our duty of self-respect, which Kant repeatedly describes as a duty to ourselves to ensure that we are not harmed again.

Music, Mood, and Misattribution
Jenefer Robinson, University of Cincinnati
 There is good empirical evidence that music can arouse at least some of the ‘garden-variety’ emotions, such as fear, sadness, and joy, that it is capable of expressing. But it’s unclear how this can happen. Cognitive appraisal theorists claim that emotions appraise a situation in terms of its significance to survival and/or well-being: in sadness, for example, a situation is appraised as an occurrence of loss. But there is no relevant loss involved in listening to sad music. According to Jesse Prinz’s ‘embodied appraisal’ theory, emotions are a species of perception and the emotions apparently aroused by music are a kind of perceptual illusion, but the feelings aroused seem genuine. Some philosophers of music have argued that music can arouse only moods or emotional feelings, but it’s still unclear what the mechanism of arousal can be in that case. I argue that misattribution theory can perhaps explain this puzzling phenomenon.

New York Is Just New York: An Account of Genuine Proper Names in Fiction
Joe Hedger, Arizona State University
 The problem of genuine names occurring in fictions has garnered much less attention than its more glamorous cousin—viz. the problem of vacuous or empty names—but perhaps a careful examination of the former may shed some light on the latter, as well as on aesthetics more generally. In this paper I argue that proper names occurring in fiction directly refer to actual persons, places and things. I offer a theory for consideration which handles Kroon’s Real-Fictional Problem. I also present some reasons why this theory is preferable to the highly influential account of Lewis’s "Truth in Fiction” which is initially endorsed by Kroon and French. I present an objectio to the modal realist solution involving anaphora and argue that my suggestion better accords with our intuitions about fiction, and also it is more applicable to other areas of aesthetics.

Nietzsche and Moral Obligation
Simon Robertson, University of Southampton
 There is a growing appreciation that many of Nietzsche’s central concerns arise from, and engage with, the same traditions that shape contemporary ethical thought. Nonetheless, there may also be a common suspicion that what Nietzsche himself gestured towards has by now been articulated, and articulated more cogently, by other writers. Drawing upon the structure of an argument I have sketched elsewhere, in this paper I fill in some of its details in order to reconstruct a Nietzschean critique of obligation-centered moral theory. In doing so, I show that Nietzsche’s critique, although not dissimilar from that offered by some more recent morality critics, not only pushes in slightly different directions but may have more bite.

No (New) Troubles with Ockhamism
Garrett Pendergraft, University of California–Riverside
 David Widerker rejects Ockhamism on the basis of a scenario in which an agent’s ability to alter the fact that God knows that a future action will be performed apparently implies an impossible ability to alter a hard fact about the past. This is an indirect argument insofar as it de-emphasizes the question of whether God’s beliefs are soft. But this strategy succeeds only if the fact under consideration is truly (and clearly) a hard fact about the past. Moreover, the fact has to be such that refraining from the relevant future action will require altering that clearly hard fact. Unfortunately, in the scenario Widerker presents, the posited fact is not what it needs to be. It either entails the occurrence of the action in question or it does not—but, as I will demonstrate, in neither case should the Ockhamist conclude that our freedom to do otherwise is in danger.

No Time Like the Present
David McElhoes, University of Maryland–College Park
 Michael Fara and Timothy Williamson (2005) present a compelling argument against David Lewis’ counterpart theory. They argue that Lewis’ theory fails to capture vital aspects regarding the logic of actuality. In this paper, I extend their argument from the modal case to the temporal: I use it to argue against Theodore Sider’s (2001) stagist theory of time and persistence. I argue that the results of Fara and Williamson’s investigation show that quantification over temporal counterparts leads one to deny certain claims regarding the present moment that are undeniable.

Nonideal Theory
Christopher Freiman, University of Arizona
 Much of political philosophy occurs within ideal theory, which models individuals and institutions as strictly compliant with the principles of justice. Yet problems in political philosophy tend to be exclusive to nonideal theory—they arise only when compliance with justice is not strict. I argue that this tension gives rise to a tendency among theorists to invoke nonideal assumptions to generate social problems and then to illicitly revoke those assumptions when generating institutional solutions. The lesson here, I argue, is to undertake institutional analysis entirely from the perspective of nonideal theory. Our aim should be to devise political institutions that function well when compliance is not assured, as these are the conditions that necessitate political institutions in the first place. To do this, we’ll need to rethink the solutions to many of the standard problems in political philosophy.

Nozickean Sensitivity, Inductive Evidence and Cornea
Tim Perrine, Calvin College
Stephen Wykstra, Calvin College
 Arguments from evil are now ‘evidential,’ not ‘logical.’ Many non-theists adduce various empirical features of evil as strong inductive evidence against theism. Many theists argue that given the gap between us and the theistic God, these features aren’t strong evidence at all. This standoff connects to a debate in epistemology: does good evidence needs to be epistemically ‘sensitive’? We explore the connection by rebutting recent arguments of Justin McBrayer. McBrayer attacks Steve Wykstra’s critique of Rowe’s well-known ‘noseeum’ arguments baed on CORNEA. McBrayer notes that CORNEA resembles ‘sensitivity constraints’ found, paradigmatically, on Nozick’s truth-tracking account of knowledge. But ‘Nozickean sensitivity’ is widely seen as unable to handle inductive knowledge; CORNEA, argues McBrayer, similarly fails. For CORNEA "is a sensitivity constraint on evidence, and inductive evidence is often insensitive.” If right, this is bad news for CORNEA, since CORNEA purports to test precisely inductive evidence. But if wrong, it’s an opportunity. If CORNEA can vindicate itself against McBrayer’s counterexamples, it may also help resuscitate Nozickean sensitivity. McBrayer’s counterexamples involve subjunctives, which he treats using standard Lewis smantics for counterfactuals. We argue that a proper use of Lewis semantics requires a distinction between two evidential contexts. We clarify the distinction using Bayes’ theorem, taking the subjunctives as conditional probabilities. This spotlights fatal ambiguities in McBrayer’s counterexamples, and vindicates CORNEA by a more sensitive use of standard Lewis semantics.

Object Theory and AR
Daniel Rabinoff, Manitoba, University of
 This paper examines certain paradoxes as they pertain to possible worlds construed as maximal entities of some sort of other. I present two common views of possible worlds, one which construes them as maximal properties, the other construing them as maximal states of affairs. I examine a couple well known paradoxes that arise from these theories. I’ll then present a third view of possible worlds given by Otávio Bueno and Edward Zalta. According to this view possible worlds are abstract objects that represent maximal possibilities in a particular way. This theory is supposed to have the virtue of easily avoiding the forementioned paradoxes. I’ll argue that this view does not avoid the paradoxes any better than the two stated orthodox views.

On a Humanitarian Duty of Intervention
David Lefkowitz, University of Richmond
 Theorists typically reject a duty of humanitarian intervention on the grounds that it violates the reasonable cost proviso on the general moral duty to provide assistance to those at great risk of serious harm. Here I offer a critical response to Cecile Fabre’s recent defense of this claim. In contrast to Fabre, I contend that conscription for the purpose of ensuring a number of suitably trained military professionals sufficient to carry out low-risk humanitarian interventions does not undermine the autonomy or prospects for a flourishing life of those compelled to complete this service. Furthermore, I argue that the pool of those with a duty to participate in humanitarian interventions is quite large. Since only a relatively small number of those will actually need to do so, and an even smaller number will actually suffer harm as a result, the expected cost to each agent with the duty is not unreasonable.

On Confucian Golden Rule, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and Beauvoir’s Reciprocal Claim
Lijun Yuan, Texas State University–San Marcos
 This paper will compare three meanings of the same notion of reciprocity, tracing their implications and influences in Chinese women’s status and inferiority. It will analyze why the reciprocal claim can help women to improve and promote their equality and empowerment under the Confucian idea of social harmony, which is compatible with feminist ethics of care.

On the Debt of Gadamerian Hermeneutics to Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education
Nathan Ross, Oklahoma City University
 This paper examines the relation of Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, particularly by examining the concepts of ‘play’ and ‘appearance’ in Schiller’s thought. The paper points out parallels between the two thinkers which remain unacknowledged in Gadamer’s critique of Schiller. The first main section of the paper examines the notion of play in Schiller, pointing out that Schiller conceives of play in a medial voice, much as Gadamer does. This means that Schiller’s conception of art is not one-sidedly subjective in the way that Gadamer believes. The second section directly takes on Gadamer’s claim that Schiller’s notion of aesthetic appearance sunders art from truth, by arguing that Schiller conceives of appearance as a mode of truth.

On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality
Erik J. Wielenberg, DePauw University
 Evolutionary debunkers of morality maintain that the availability of evolutionary explanations for human moral beliefs threatens the view that humans possess moral knowledge. A crucial premise of the arguments of such debunkers is the claim that if S’s moral belief that P can be explained without appealing to the truth of P, then S’s moral belief that P lacks warrant. I sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. I draw on this explanation to show that, given a reliabilist approach to warrant, the arguments of evolutionary debunkers can be resisted. On my account, some human moral beliefs are produced by reliable processes and hence may constitute knowledge even if such beliefs can be explained without appealing to their truth.

Overcoming Opposites: Nietzsche’s Minimal Method of Revaluation
Joseph Swenson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
 In this paper I argue the best overall entry point into Nietzsche’s attempt at a ‘revaluation of all values’ is found neither through appeals to his most well-known doctrines (the Will-to-Power, Eternal Return, Ubermensch, etc.) nor through his critique of particular traditional values (selflessness, compassion, truth, etc.). Rather, I argue that prior to these much discussed features of Nietzsche’s project one finds a minimal methodological starting point for revaluation in his critical engagement with deeply rooted prejudices or ‘foreground estimates’ that constitute the implicit evaluative background against which explicit traditional values and moral commitments show up as intelligible, binding, and purposive. In particular, I will focus on what Nietzsche considers to be the most pervasive background prejudice of the Western tradition: the metaphysical belief in the ‘opposition of values.’ Through a consideration of this prejudice, I propose that Nietzsche’s most basic method of revaluation is best understood as an attempt to overcome traditional values and their background prejudices through a novel appropriation of their own traditional authority.

Parts of Singletons
Ben Caplan, Ohio State University
Pat Reeder, Ohio State University
Chris Tillman, University of Manitoba
 Here’s a view that we like: Cary is a part—not just a member, but a part—of his singleton, the set whose sole member is Cary. Here’s another view that we like: the mereological difference between Cary and his singleton—what you get when you subtract Cary from his singleton, so to speak—is the empty set. Putting these views together, we get the view that Cary’s singleton is composed of Cary and the empty set: or, more suggestively, that Cary is composed of Cary and . We like this view, too. In this paper, we develop a view on which Cary’s singleton is composed of Cary and the empty set.

Performative Constructivism
Dylan W. Murray, Georgia State University
 Constructivist ethical theories (e.g., contractualist theories), which claim that certain ethical truths are constituted by the results of constructivist procedures (e.g., social contracts), face a frequent objection. If constructivist procedures are grounded on prior normative considerations, which many constructivists admit, and if the ethical truths that result from the procedures are completely determined by these prior considerations, then many worry that the procedures themselves are redundant, and so eliminable. Here, I present a general strategy to avoid this worry that evokes a recurrent, but often implicit, feature of constructivist procedures—namely, that most (e.g., social contracts and hypothetical choice procedures) are a species of performative. Recognizing constructivist procedures as performatives can assure their ineliminability, as performatives are necessary to make some things the case.

Phenomenal Concepts and the Mode of Presentation Problem
Emmett L. Holman, George Mason University
 The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is a popular strategy for defending physicalist theories of mind against criticisms. According to PCS, there are special, first person perspective ‘phenomenal concepts’ that can explain away the intuitions that consciousness cannot be physical which underlie such criticisms. But PCS must give an account of the mode of presentation of phenomenal concepts that is consistent with physicalism and otherwise satisfactory in its own right. Taking an argument by Horgan and Tienson (2001) as my point of departure, I argue that this is an as yet unresolved problem for PCS. Construing phenomenal concepts as pure self directed type demonstratives, as proposed by Levin (2007) and (perhaps) Loar (1990, 1997) can be shown not to succeed in this regard, and there are prima facie reasons to think that recent ‘quotational’ construals of phenomenal concepts cannot either.

Phenomenal Concepts and the Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness
Vincent Picciuto, University of Maryland, College Park
 This paper adapts an account of phenomenal concepts to form a novel version of a dual-content, higher-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness: the higher-order quotational thought theory. Contrary to the received view of phenomenal concepts, which merely employs phenomenal concepts in response to various anti-physicalist arguments, it is argued that such concepts partly constitute phenomenally conscious states. Thus, in addition to providing a response to anti-physicalist arguments, it is argued that phenomenal concepts can play an important explanatory role in an account of the nature of phenomenally conscious states. After discussing three potentially insurmountable problems for standard higher-order theories, it is shown that the novel version introduced avoids such problems and has additional explanatory advantages over similar, competing dual-content theories.

Philosophy 101 and Experimental Philosophy
Joshua May, University of California–Santa Barbara
 During a recent stint teaching Introduction to Philosophy, I seized the opportunity to mix in some experimental philosophy. I did this in two ways: (a) I put a few articles on experimental philosophy on the syllabus, and (b) I ran a survey at the end of the course to gain information on students’ impressions of philosophy having taken the course. The results were quite interesting given that things turned out almost exactly opposite from what I expected, at least for the hypotheses I was most interested in testing. First, I expected students to largely dislike the course. (After all, most students seem to loath philosophy!) Second, I expected to find most students drawn to the topic of experimental philosophy. Third, I expected students to find the material on experimental philosophy rather interesting. But, for the most part, the results don’t support any of these predictions.

Plato on Words, Parts of Words and Meaning
Deborah Modrak, University of Rochester
 If thought is internalized speech (Phlb. 38c-39b), then intelligibility is dependent upon the adequacy of our linguistic representations. Knowledge is dependent upon the mind’s ability to grasp and manipulate intelligible objects. These topics involve a cluster of interrelated questions that Plato addresses in the Cratylus and Theaetetus. The Cratylus grapples with them as part of an analysis of meaning and linguistic practices. What makes a word a correct linguistic representation of what it signifies? In the Theaetetus, Plato seeks to find a satisfactory definition of knowledge. What makes a particular case of grasping a specific idea an instance of knowing? Semantic questions and epistemological ones are all of apiece for Plato since the underlying issues concern intelligibility and representational adequacy. Nevertheless, because the issues are framed differently, commentators have tended to look at each dialogue separately. This paper examines Plato’s conception of the shared foundations of language and knowledge.

Plato’s Cicadas
Dan Werner, SUNY at New Paltz
 Plato’s myth of the cicadas occurs at a crucial moment in the Phaedrus, since it marks the transition between the two halves of the dialogue. But just what is the purpose of this myth? I believe that Socrates is using it to offer a warning to Phaedrus. The message is that Phaedrus—and we as readers—should avoid an uncritical, sleeplike reaction to the just-completed palinode, and should not treat the speech as if it were the final word. Instead we must recognize the limitations of the palinode, and engage in a higher-order investigation of its claims via philosophical dialectic. The myth of the cicadas thus plays a metanarrative role, and dramatically exemplifies the notion of psychagogia (‘leading of the soul’) which is central to the discussion of rhetoric in the second half of the Phaedrus. In this way, the myth helps to unify the dialogue as a whole.

Plato’s Kinetic Theory
Brian Prince, Rice University
 In his later dialogues, Plato uses kinesis as a category to cover all forms of change. If he had successfully explained all forms of change as kineseis, then his definition of soul would have allowed him to claim that souls are the source of all change. Readers of the later dialogues are aware, of course, that Plato does not make these claims straightforwardly. But he does seem to be collecting the pieces of such a theory in his late dialogues. I will argue here that the Timaeus contains three theories that make all non-psychic changes kineseis. These are 1) the elemental theory, which accounts for qualitative change, 2) the section on time, accounting for temporal change, and 3) the hypodoche, explaining the existence of the space in which all changes occur. I then consider whether we should read ‘kinesis’ as ‘change in general’ or as ‘locomotion,’ preferring the latter.

Plato’s Methodology in Republic I-IV
Chad E. Wiener, Portland State University
 Vlastos argues that Plato discards elenchus for the method of hypothesis. Benson challenges this view but also claims that the method of hypothesis is Plato’s preferred method. I argue on behalf of Benson’s first claim but show the second claim cannot be maintained by appealing to the methodology employed in Republic I-IV. Book I employs the elenchus. Elenchus reduces its interlocutors to silence so they can no longer say anything concerning the inquiry of justice. The method of hypothesis can continue in such circumstances (Meno 87b2-4). Books II-IV shift to answering a problem—whether justice is better than injustice or not. I argue that the city-soul analogy is really an example of problem reduction and employs the method of hypothesis to solve this problem. Such a method continues the inquiry but is inaccurate according to Plato (435c9-d5).

Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy in a Metaphysics Course
Kevin L. Timpe, Northwest Nazarene University
 In "Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy,” Thomas Nadelhoffer and Eddy Nahmias argue that experimental philosophy is a pedagogically useful tool to bring into the classroom. Among the benefits they suggest are increasing student engage with the material, encouraging classroom discussion, increased distribution of class participation, and increased knowledge of what students find counterintuitive. In this presentation, I describe my own use of experimental philosophy in a metaphysics course. I describe the preparation and implementation of surveys, as well as the results of those surveys. I also consider what are some of the difficulties I encountered.

Practical Dialectic in Plato’s Philebus
Brian Keady, University of Denver
 It is not uncommon for readers of Plato to think that he views systematic question-and-answer as the only appropriate method for pursuing, and ultimately attaining, truth and genuine knowledge. It is also easy to assume that the question-and-answer procedure spans the full compass of Platonic dialectic given its pervasiveness in the philosophical methods that are developed and practiced in the dialogues. Drawing primarily from the Philebus, in this paper I argue that, contrary to popular critical opinion, (1) Plato indicates that we can also seriously pursue knowledge while engaged in everyday affairs, and (2) in several places he makes clear that dialectic is not limited to the question-and-answer method.

Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism
Eric Thompson, University of Tennessee
 My primary objective in this paper is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical scenarios generated by SK are actually false. We’ll then see that by combining PI and SK, the effect will be to place extremely high demands upon evidence for ∼SK. It will finally be observed that, while we may have good evidence for ∼SK, we do not have extremely strong evidence sufficient for establishing ∼SK. This supports my conclusion that any standard version of PI ultimately entails external world skepticism. If successful, my conclusion will critically undermine the current view that PI is actually a skeptically resistant position.

Presentism, Eternalism, and Existence Simpliciter
Alex Baia, University of Texas–Austin
 Presentism—the view that only the present is real—is at odds with eternalism—the view that past, present, and future are ontologically on a par. Some are skeptical that there is any substantive disagreement between presentists and eternalists. Both sides claim to disagree, for example, over whether dinosaurs exist simpliciter. But what exactly is this notion of existence simpliciter, and why think that we need it? I answer the skeptic by demonstrating the need for existence simpliciter and showing how it fits into our scheme of existence concepts.

Protagoras Was Not a Relativist to Me
Jerry Green, Texas Tech University
 In the Theaetetus Plato portrayed Protagoras as a proponent of epistemological relativism, the view that all beliefs are true for their believers. I believe this view of Protagoras is mistaken, despite its nearly unanimous acceptance. The evidence suggests that Protagoras was not a relativist at all. A close reading of the Theaetetus reveals that Plato never ascribes relativism to Protagoras directly, but instead exerts considerable effort to continually distance his claims from Protagoras himself. Moreover, what few details of Protagoras’ purported theory Plato does give are incompatible with relativism. Finally, the few extant Protagorean fragments and the dialogue Protagoras both either fail to support or directly contradict a relativist theory. The virtually ubiquitous acceptance to Protagorean relativism is, if not simply incorrect, at least lacking in textual support. Though we cannot say with certainty what Protagoras did think, we can be fairly certain that Protagoras was not a relativist.

Quotation and Compositionality
Paul Saka, University of Texas–Pan American
 Belief reports command scholarly attention because they appear to violate the principle of compositionality. This is an illusion, however; the real problem lies with quotation. To preserve compositionality a number of semantic theories of quotation have emerged, but aside from their individual shortcomings I argue that they all fail for one grand empirical reason: semantic theories treat quotations as singular terms, yet many quotations function as predicates, prepositions, and other parts of speech. Instead of saying that quotations denote linguistic expressions, I propose that speakers refer to expressions by means of quotations. By shifting theoretical duties from semantic denotation to speaker reference, I am able to save the principle of compositionality. It comes at a price, though: while compositionality is preserved, it loses much of its traditional interest.

Rawls’ Problem with Assumptions
Douglas Paletta, University of Pennsylvania
 Rawlsians face a problem in how to understand the moral assumptions like freedom and equality that structure the contractarian account of justification. On the Kantian interpretation, the assumptions are substantive moral claims and explain the significance of choosing principles in the original position. However, nothing within the contractarian account can justify these assumptions. Retreating to purely political interpretations of freedom and equality deflates the concepts so that using them is less controversial. However, the deflated political interpretation of the ideals precludes them from explaining the significance of choosing principles in an appropriate bargaining position. So, Rawls either fails to justify central moral assumptions or sacrifices the significance of the social contract.

Reasons, Causes, and Neuropsychology: An Essay on Geometrical Gerrymandering
Andreas Elpidorou, Boston University
 In this essay, the dichotomy between the space of reasons and the space of causes—one commonly employed in philosophy of mind, perception, and action—is criticized. An examination of this dichotomy in light of findings from neuropsychology (especially, visual agnosia) leads to a dilemma: either the dichotomy fails to fulfill its function (namely, to dichotomize), since there are phenomena which cannot be characterized by either pair of the dichotomy; or, it does succeed, but in doing so, obscures the phenomena which it set out to explain. A choice between a false or a procrustean dichotomy is not much of a choice.

Reflection and Social Metacognition
Christopher Lepock, University of Toronto
 Alston and Sosa hold that epistemic value is determined by truth-conduciveness and that having reflective access to the grounds of one’s beliefs is epistemically valuable. They derive the latter claim from the former via what I call the ‘metacognition lemma,’ the idea that the capacity to monitor and regulate belief-formation is truth-conducive. I argue that their derivation won’t work for believers in isolation. Rather, reflective access is truth-conducive because it enables us to communicate the grounds of our beliefs to others, and thus permits them to monitor our reliability.

Resistance and Ressentiment: Max Scheler and Jorge Portilla on values and their fragility
Carlos Sanchez, San Jose State University
 The Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla’s Fenomenología del relajo is perhaps the best example of the existential phenomenological tradition in 20th century Latin America. Borrowing from the canonical sources (Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler), Portilla produces a unique analysis of Mexican culture, one that, while grounded in a particular time and place, nonetheless achieves universal appeal, as it contributes and complements Max Scheler’s analysis of ressentiment through a concept Portilla calls "relajo.” Relajo is not identical to ressentiment; it turns out to be temporally prior to it but it is nevertheless, like Scheler’s notion, a non-reflective, yet conscious, act of suspending value and undermining its cultural, historical, and social force. This paper explores Portilla’s phenomenology of relajo and its relation to Scheler’s Ressentiment. It is safe to say that Portilla’s work represents the ultimate encroachment of the existential phenomenological tradition in Latin America—my aim is to show how this is the case.

Revising Revisionism
Kevin L. Timpe, Northwest Nazarene University
 In a series of recent papers, Manuel Vargas has elaborated and defended a revisionist approach to free will and moral responsibility. In the present paper, I shall argue that for all its virtues, revisionism is not an alternative to the triad of compatibilism, hard determinism, and libertarianism; it is instead a kind of compatibilism. I begin by presenting revisionism in general and then discuss the particular form of revisionism that Vargas advocates. I then develop two interrelated arguments for the claim that Vargas’ revisionism is a particular species of compatibilism, and thereby ought to be labeled as such. Along the way, I point out reasons why this terminological precision is important, while also agreeing with Vargas that the focus on the compatibility issue may not track all important aspects of the free will and moral responsibility literatures.

Rights and Political Authority in Hobbes
Michael Green, Pomona College
 Hobbes held that political authority is derived from a social contract in which subjects both authorize a sovereign to act on their rights and surrender their rights of governing themselves. The two parts of the social contract appear to conflict with one another: how can subjects authorize someone to act on their rights if they also surrender those rights? I will offer an interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of rights that shows how the two parts are consistent. Authorization gives the sovereign a kind of power while surrendering rights limits the subjects’ liberties.

Safety and Lotteries
Mark Makin, Yale Divinity School
 Fans of a safety condition on knowledge often informally remark that if you know something, you couldn’t easily have been wrong about it. In reply to a familiar problem with safety involving lottery cases, Duncan Pritchard has reformulated safety such that, roughly, if you know something, you could somewhat easily have been wrong about it, but you couldn’t very easily have been wrong about it. In this paper, I argue that fans of safety à la Pritchard—those who believe safe true belief is both necessary and sufficient for knowledge—are committed to the view that in many cases we know that our lottery ticket will lose. In many cases we couldn’t very easily have been wrong about losing the lottery; that is to say, in many cases the nearest possible worlds are worlds in which we still lose the lottery.

Safety Drills
Matthew J. Kennedy, University of Nottingham
 Recently several philosophers have argued that a kind of epistemic safety is necessary for knowledge. In reaction several philosophers have proposed counterexamples to this idea, arguing that there are examples of ‘unsafe knowledge.’ In this paper I describe a basic principle for ordering cases or possible worlds in terms of their similarity to cases or worlds of interest. ‘Close’ cases should preserve the epistemically relevant features of the cases of interest. This principle allows us to disarm the proposed counterexamples, and defend the idea that safety is necessary for knowledge.

Saving the Few
Tyler Doggett, University of Vermont
 In forced choices between saving a larger group and a smaller, non-overlapping group, it is permissible to save the smaller group. Consider a different case: you have a forced choice between saving an extremely happy person and a quite sad one. You can save the sad one. Consider a different case: you have a forced choice between saving the happy person or the sad one. If you save the happy person, you can spare someone else a quite minor loss. Still, you can save the sad one. I argue there are no important differences between this last case and the first. Since you can save the few in the last, you can save them in the first.

Saving the Neutrality Intuition from Broome
S. Matthew Liao, Oxford University
 The neutrality intuition, according to which adding a person to a world is ethically neutral in itself, is particularly important in the field of population ethics. While John Broome finds this intuition strongly attractive, he argues that this intuition has counterintuitive implications and that therefore we must give it up. In this paper, I argue that these counterintuitive implications may be more apparent than real, and that Broome’s arguments do not by themselves show that we must give up the neutrality intuition.

Second-Order Properties Can ‘Bring New Powers into the World’
Eric Hiddleston, Wayne State University
 Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Inheritance argument aims to show that second-order properties "bring no new causal powers into the world,” and thus do not exist (or at least are not "causal kinds”). I consider different senses in which second-order properties could fail to "bring causal powers into the world”. I present cases in which second-order properties do appear to "bring new causal powers” in the sense the argument requires. I argue in addition that the cases I describe are problematic for reductionist views more generally.

Semantic Normativity and Naturalism
Claudine Verheggen, York University in Toronto
 I distinguish among three senses in which meaning may be said to be normative, one trivial, the other two more robust. According to the trivial sense, meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application. According to the first robust sense, these conditions are determined by norms. According to the second robust sense, statements about meaning have normative implications. Normativity in one or the other of the robust senses, but not in the trivial sense, is commonly thought to pose a threat to naturalism. I argue that, given its trivial normativity, meaning cannot be normative in the first robust sense but it is normative in the sense that statements about the meaning of terms have hypothetical normative implications that are essential to meaning. I further argue that this normativity itself poses no threat to naturalism. Rather, this normativity follows from the fact that the trivial normativity of meaning precludes its naturalization.

Sensations and Mind-Body Union in Descartes’s Philosophy of Mind
Joseph W. Hwang, California, University of, at Chico
 After having argued for the real distinction between mind and body in his Meditations, Descartes argues that the mind and the body, though distinct substances, are united. He argues for their union with the premise that if I have sensations, such as the sensations of pain and hunger, then my mind and my body must be united. Why does Descartes think this premise is true? What is it about sensations that Descartes believes implies that there is such a union? I argue for a new account of this premise on the basis of observing two key characteristics of the qualitative nature of sensations, namely, the way sensations present things, and the subject of such sensations. These two key characteristics of sensations (coupled with one other premise) explain why Descartes believed that sensations (e.g. the sensation of pain) require the union of mind and body.

Slips and Revealed Preference
Santiago Amaya, Washington University in St. Louis
 Slips of action are interesting exceptions to the principle that intentional action reveals preference. Yet their philosophical value has been underestimated. Several stereotypes promote a view of slips similar to pre-Darwinean views of fossils: curiosities with mundane explanations. Once these stereotypes are exposed, however, slips turn out to be like fossils in yet another respect: traces of normal processes not visible to everyday observation. The paper argues that slips of action are not mistakes due to absent-mindedness, lack of attention, temporary forgetfulness, or some abnormality. It also distinguishes slips from some common forms of irrationality. In the end, it is argued that slips are side-effects of reasonable routines of intention formation, in concrete, side-effects of a system of default reasoning.

Slots in Universals
Cody Gilmore, University of California–Davis
 Slot theory, as I use the term, is the view that (i) there exist such entities as argument places, or ‘slots’, in universals, and that (ii) a universal u is n-adic if and only if there are n slots in u. I argue that those who take properties and relations to be abundant, fine-grained, non-set-theoretical entities face pressure to be slot theorists. Given such a theory of properties and relations, the most natural strategies for paraphrasing away ‘slot-talk’ have significant drawbacks.

Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument
Torin Alter, University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa
 You might possess the concept of arthritis even if your conception of that disease is inaccurate or impoverished (Burge 1979, Putnam 1975). The concept is yours but, if you’re like most people, you’ll defer to experts regarding its extension. Arguably, similar claims apply to many of our concepts. This view is sometimes called social externalism. Derek Ball (forthcoming) and Michael Tye (2009) argue that social externalism is true of our phenomenal concepts. They also argue that this fact undermines a popular response to Frank Jackson’s (1982) knowledge argument known as the phenomenal concept strategy (Stoljar 2005). And Ball argues that the same fact undermines the knowledge argument itself. I will argue that Ball and Tye fail to undermine the knowledge argument or the phenomenal concept strategy. Those lines of reasoning might have to be modified to make them consistent with social externalism, but not in ways that make them weaker.

Spatial Content and Motoric Significance
Robert Briscoe, Ohio University
 This paper presents an interpretation of three claims central to Gareth Evans’s theory of egocentric spatial representation. It also answers objections to Evans’s theory that arise from a failure to distinguish between the objective, egocentric spatial content of a perceptual experience and what I call its ‘motoric significance.’

Species, Genes, and the Tree of Life
Joel Velasco, Stanford University
 The Tree of Life represents the genealogical history of life. But there are multiple levels of biological organization. Here I argue that while species-based genealogies are not helpful, there are two ways of understanding genealogy for phylogenetics—organism centric and gene centric. The organismal view reduces the history of species to the history of organisms. This naturally connects with viewing the Tree as representing the full network of organismal connections. The gene-centric view defines an exclusive group as a group of organisms that forms a clade for more of the genome than any conflicting clade. On this view, taxa occupy a unique position on the "primary concordance tree”. But each gene has its own historical "tree of life”. I conclude by arguing that both organismal and gene-centric view and their corresponding trees of life are objectively real and play important, but different, roles in biological practice.

Statistical Learning in Language Acquisition: Implications for Moral Psychology and the ‘Linguistic Analogy’
Theresa Lopez, University of Arizona
 A powerful argument for moral nativism appeals to features common to linguistic cognition and moral cognition. This ‘linguistic analogy’ argument is situated in the framework of Chomskian linguistics. As those in the Chomskian tradition take there to be an innate faculty of the mind that guides language learning, those who advance the ‘linguistic analogy’ defend the existence of an innate moral faculty that guides and constrains the child’s acquisition of a moral competence. Defenders of each nativist position appeal to poverty of stimulus (POS) arguments, which cite the early emergence of specialized cognitive capacities. An emerging body of research in psycholinguistics, suggesting that young children are endowed with efficient, domain-general statistical learning mechanisms, introduces a serious challenge to the POS argument for linguistic nativism. In this paper, I consider how such findings bear on the parallel argument for moral nativism.

Territory, Authority, and the People: Rethinking Modern Sovereignty Today
Matt Whitt, Vanderbilt University
 In this paper, I examine modern theories of sovereignty in order to clarify the stakes of contemporary reconfigurations of political authority and territory. I first argue that modern sovereignty is characterized by a tension between theological understandings of dominion and secular notions of authority. Together, these conflicting visions of sovereign command imagine the collective subject of sovereignty—‘the people’—as both the creation of, and precondition for, sovereign rule. This tension appears throughout modern and contemporary political philosophy in the form of familiar problems and paradoxes. However, the tension has historically been occluded—but never resolved—by an appeal to territory as a criterion of collective subjection. By defining ‘the people’ over whom a sovereign rules, territoriality renders modern ideals of sovereignty both theoretically coherent and practically realizable. As territorial sovereignty gives way to globalization, new criteria of subjection, such as ‘all-affected principles,’ stand to inherit this very modern function.

Testimony, Epistemic Egoism, and Epistemic Credit
Jason Kawall, Colgate University
 It is generally acknowledged that testifiers play creditable roles in the production of knowledge in others. But is such credit epistemically relevant, and is an agent more successful qua epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I argue that, ceteris paribus, agents deserve equal epistemic credit for their role in producing knowledge in others to that which they would receive for a similarly salient role in acquiring similar knowledge for themselves. The core of the paper consists in a sustained defence of this proposal against a series of objections. I further develop the proposal by drawing upon a distinction between constitutive and auxiliary forms of credit that allows us to avoid attributing epistemic credit to agents in problematic cases. If the current proposal is correct, our understanding of successful epistemic agents needs to be expanded to take into account their role in producing epistemically valuable states in others.

The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Graciela Kuechle, Universität Witten/Herdecke
Diego Rios, Universität Witten/Herdecke
 The Baldwin effect is a process by which learnt traits become integrated into the genome through a non-Lamarckian mechanism. From its inception, the Baldwin effect has been regarded with skepticism. The objective of this paper is to relativize this assessment. Our contribution is twofold. To begin with, we provide taxonomy of the different arguments that have been advocated in its defense, and distinguish between three justificatory dimensions—feasibility, plausibility and likelihood—that have been unduly conflated. Second, we sharpen the debate by providing an evolutionary game theoretic perspective that is able to generalize previous results. The upshot of this paper is that the mechanism envisaged by Baldwin is less puzzling than commonly thought.

The Body as Instrument and as ‘Person’ in Kant’s Moral Philosophy
Aaron Bunch, Washington State University
 I argue that an account of the human body as a mere instrument of moral agency (see Gregor 1963 and Denis 2001) cannot explain Kant’s duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. To properly account for Kant’s view on suicide, self-mutilation, and sexual self-defilement, the human body must be regarded not merely as the instrument of a moral agent, but as an aspect of the moral agent herself, as a constituent of the indissoluble or ‘absolute’ unity of a human person. The body thereby shares in the dignity of moral personhood, which constrains our treatment of it. The bio-medical ethics literature recognizes Kant’s non-instrumental view in its discussion of the donation and sale of body parts (Chadwick 1989, Gerrand 1999, Munzer 1993), but does not consider its relevance to Kant’s account of suicide or sexual self-defilement. In closing, I consider briefly whether Kant provides a sufficiently specific criterion for ‘instrinsically degrading’ treatment.

The Expansion of "Other than Being:” A Perspective of Political Philosophy on Levinas’s Ethics
Jiang Yi, Beijing Academy of Social Sciences
 The concept of the Other has a central role in Levinas’ thought, by which we could comprehend all issues developed by the problem of being. No doubt, Levinas emphasizes the religious implication of the concept in his ontology. However, from the worldly perspective, the concept of the Other has more significance for us in society. In this paper I discuss three questions as follows: How does Otherwise than Being go to the Other? What does the existence of the Other mean for us? How does Otherwise than Being become a topic in the political philosophy? The purpose of the paper is to show that the Other means not only alternative individuals different from us, but the society itself which has different features from every individuals in it, and the social relation among individuals.

The Impossibility of Distributive Justice
Paul Gomberg, Chicago State University
 This paper argues from sociological assumptions that distributive justice—conceived as just distribution of income and wealth—is impossible. Income and wealth are central to many distributive conceptions of justice. Contemporary theorists, following John Rawls, believe that theories of justice should not rely on controversial ideas of what makes life good. Thus, given their silence about what substantively constitutes a good life, these philosophers propose using income and wealth as neutral measures of each person’s resources. This approach has unintended consequences. Any proposed distribution either allows or forbids income and wealth inequalities. If it allows inequalities it unjustly deprives those who have less of social esteem; a society where income and wealth are equal is impossible. Because it either leads to injustice or proposes the impossible, distributive justice is impossible. The arguments should encourage us to think about justice in contribution rather than distribution.

The Indispensability of Intersubjective Probability
Darrell P. Rowbottom, University of Oxford
 This paper argues that an intersubjective interpretation of probability is indispensable in understanding the rationality of science from the point of view of confirmation. It shows how intersubjective probabilities are superior to their subjective counterparts in a number of key respects, in a peculiar class of circumstances relevant to scientific practice. It also shows how group probabilities can be superior to individual probabilities even if rationality constraints other than coherence, e.g. as advocated by Objective Bayesians, are required of degrees of belief. Key considerations are the improved error correction that can occur, and the increased background knowledge that becomes available, through interaction and group decision-making.

The Largest Proper Parts of a Whole: A Mereological Reason Why the Thesis of Composition as Identity Is False
Patrick Monaghan, University of Iowa
 According to the thesis of composition as identity, a mereological whole is nothing over and above the parts that compose it. In recent years, this thesis has generated quite a lot of controversy. However, while several arguments have been introduced to refute the thesis, since they have all been based on various assumptions concerning general metaphysics that the proponents of the thesis will simply reject out of hand, these arguments are all inadequate. Consequently, if the thesis is to be refuted, what is needed is an argument that is based on an assumption pertaining to the metaphysics of mereology that the proponents of the thesis cannot reject in such a way. In this paper, I defend one such argument, which is couched in terms of the notion of the largest proper parts of a mereological whole.

The Lockean ‘Enough-and-as-Good’ Proviso: An Internal Critique
Helga Varden, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign
 An account of private property is central to a liberal theory of justice. Much of the appeal of the Lockean theory stems from its account of the so-called ‘enough-and-as-good’ proviso, a principle which aims to specify each employable person’s fair share of the earth’s material resources. I argue that Lockeans fail to show how the proviso can be applied without thereby undermining a guiding intuition in Lockean theory. This guiding intuition is that by interacting in accordance with the proviso, employable persons interact as subject to the ‘laws of nature’ rather than as subject to one another’s arbitrary will. Because Locke’s own and contemporary Lockean conceptions of the proviso subject some persons to some other persons’s arbitrary will, the proviso so conceived cannot function as it should, namely as a principle that restricts interacting persons’s actions reciprocally.

The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs
Holly M. Smith, Rutgers University
 It is often held that an action is subjectively right for an agent to do just in case that action is best for her to do in light of her ideal beliefs—the beliefs that it would be reasonable for her to have in the circumstances. This paper examines the arguments that might be offered for this view, finds them unpersuasive, and argues that compelling reasons can be found for holding that what is subjectively right for an agent to do is what it is best for her to do in light of her actual beliefs, however flawed, rather than the beliefs that it would be reasonable for her to have.

The Plane of Republic 587d
Matthew King, York University
 Many readers object to the way Socrates arrives at the conclusion in Book 9 of the Republic that the philosopher-ruler lives 729 times as pleasantly as the tyrant. I argue that Socrates’s calculation is not merely contrived to reach the number 729. I will demonstrate that Socrates’s initial move of multiplying the distance between the tyrant and the oligarch by the distance between the oligarch and the philosopher-ruler implies something that could profoundly enhance our understanding of the Republic: the Republic’s scheme of character-types should be filled out by applying the necessary/lawful/unlawful distinction to reason and thumos and not just to appetite, thereby bringing into view four more types in addition to the five explicitly identified in Book 8. This is particularly important in that it allows us to better understand the non-ruling philosopher and the sophist in relation to the philosopher-ruler.

The Pleasures of Psychic Harmony in Plato’s Republic
Kelly Arenson, University of Memphis
 After Plato establishes in Book 9 of the Republic that each of the three parts of the soul has its own particular pleasure, he declares the rational part’s pleasure to be greatest, and then concludes that "the one in whom that part [viz., the rational] rules has the most pleasant life” (583a). This paper contends that Plato has at least two argumentative strategies for proving reason’s hedonic superiority in Book 9: on the one hand, he attempts to show, rather unsuccessfully, that rational pleasures are metaphysically superior to other psychic pleasures; on the other, he contends that the parts of the philosopher’s soul coexist harmoniously such that the soul as a whole experiences the most pleasures. I argue that the latter claim reveals the psychic holism inherent in the most pleasant life and is more in line with Plato’s thinking about psychic harmony and pleasure elsewhere in the Republic.

The Problem of Classification: Kant’s Reply to Locke
Ludmila Guenova, Harvard University
 Kant was much influenced by Locke’s view that our classification of objects into natural kinds is ultimately haphazard, since our general ideas represent merely the objects’ nominal rather than real essences. In responding to Locke, Kant struggles to devise a rigorous method by which to demonstrate that our empirical concepts do capture the fundamental causal properties of objects. I argue that this method is provided by Kant’s theory of systematicity. On Kant’s view, we can exhibit the validity of an empirical concept if we locate it within a total system of concepts and laws. Kant thus turns Locke’s argument on its head: Whereas for Locke the construction of a hierarchy of genera and species only exemplifies the inherent arbitrariness of our classification, for Kant this hierarchy serves as the sole means by which can absolve our empirical concepts of such arbitrariness.

The Problem of Enhanced Control
Christopher Evan Franklin, University of California–Riverside
 Event-causal libertarians have a distinct advantage over agent-causal libertarians in constructing a coherent and empirically plausibly theory of agency since their theories seem to differ from compatibilists theories only in requiring that some of our actions are undetermined. The problem facing event-causal libertarianism is to explain how such accounts, with so little difference, can secure more control than compatibilism. This is the problem of enhanced control: how can indeterminism, the mere absence of determinism, enhance control? I argue that event-causal libertarians can meet this objection by rejecting the usual analysis of free will as solely consisting in powers. Freedom, in contrast to will, concerns not what powers an agent has, but what opportunities he has to exercise these powers. On the basis of this distinction, I argue that indeterminism is relevant to increasing our control not because it gives us new powers, but rather new opportunities.

The Problem of Negative Existentials Inadvertently Solved
Greg Ray, University of Florida
 The problem of negative existentials is one of the classic problems in philosophy of language, but in this talk, I mean to argue that latter-day developments in truth-theoretic semantics solved this problem without any help from us, and due to accidents of history, no one noticed. Some have worked hard to develop a solution to the problem using the tools of truth-theoretic semantics—Tyler Burge (1974), Larson and Segal (1995), and, at book-length, Mark Sainsbury (2005), have developed such treatments. In each of these cases, the core idea is to drive the semantic theory on offer with a non-standard logic. But I will argue that straight-up, classical-if-you-like truth-theoretic semantics already solves the problem of negative existentials without special work.

The Proto-Morality of Life: Primary Recognition in Axel Honneth’s Reading of Phenomenology of Spirit
J. C. Berendzen, Loyola University New Orleans
 Axel Honneth has recently argued that there is a basic level of affective interpersonal relations that must be in place before one can take up a cognitive relation to the world of objects. This form of relation, which could be called ‘primary recognition,’ is also taken to be a necessary precursor of developed forms of human sociality. Primary recognition might then have a critical import, insofar as those forms of social interaction that do not properly develop this initial form of recognition can be seen as distorted or pathological. Honneth further, in a recent essay, finds a similar kind of view in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, and he argues that the initial description of ‘recognition’ in that text amounts to a kind of ‘proto-morality.’ This paper will examine Honneth’s arguments regarding the proto-morality in Hegel’s Phenomenology, and consider how this concept might be put to further use.

The Rate of Time’s Passage in the Moving Spotlight Theory
Bradford Skow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
 Objective becoming is notoriously difficult to make sense of, and asking "How fast does time pass?” is supposed to bring out one way in which it is obscure. In this paper I look at what the moving spotlight theory (which incorporates objective becoming) says about the rate at which time passes. There are many versions of this theory, and (I will argue) all of them have acceptable responses to a request for the rate of time’s passage. But looking at those responses points to problems with the primitive tense operators employed by the best version of the theory. I tentatively suggest a new version of the theory that avoids those problems.

The Sovereign in the Political Thought of Hanfeizi and Thomas Hobbes
Al Martinich, University of Texas–Austin
 Both Hanfeizi and Hobbes believe in absolute sovereignty, that is, that the sovereign should have a monopoly on political power and may regulate almost any aspect of life. Both also explain the characteristics of the sovereigns in terms of some ultimate entity. For Hanfeizi, the sovereign is like dao, the Way, and for Hobbes the sovereign is a mortal god. It is often held, as a consequence of these views, that each supports arbitrary rule. I will argue that that is not true because both prescribe principles of justice and fairness for a good state. For Hanfeizi, the good state is a stable one; for Hobbes, it is a stable one that preserves a comfortable life for the subjects.

The Structure of a Quantum World
Jill North, Yale University
 I argue that the fundamental space of a (non-relativistic) quantum mechanical world is configuration space, even though this is a very high-dimensional space. For this is the space needed to define the dynamics of the theory. I argue from general considerations governing how we infer the fundamental space of any physical theory, to the conclusion that we should be realists about configuration space: we should think that this space exists, that it is fundamental, and that it has a definite, particular structure. Ordinary three-dimensional space exists, but it is non-fundamental. Instead, it emerges from fundamental configuration space. I argue for this view and compare it with some recent alternatives.

The Thoughts of Unity of Universe and Human in Chinese Confucianism and the Catholic Human Person and the Right to Life: A Comparative Study
Zhang Weiwei, Tsinghua University
 The paper elucidates human dignity and life theory of contemporary theologian and philosopher Max Scheler and Jacques Maritain. Its purpose is to view the premise of dignity and human life as the concept of Human Person related to God, the reason theory in scholastic philosophy, and possibility of universal theory of soul or ego instead of contextual historical ethics. From context of the Other, the paper compares to a different human existent context in Chinese coherent tradition, which is the harmony of universe and human, the authority of Human person originating from natural life and realistic existence similar to all natural creatures; this ethos cannot produce the view of the dignity of life in the West. All cultures should face the questions of modernity for searching of self or a new self; I think Chinese culture should integrate another Truth theory or develop a new perspective on traditional Ren.

The Unity of Plato’s Timaeus-Critias
Mason Marshall, Pepperdine University
 Why in the Timaeus-Critias is Timaeus’s cosmology juxtaposed with Critias’s story of Atlantis? And why is the Timaeus-Critias presented as a sequel to the sort of statecraft carried out in the Republic? Offering an explanation, I argue that (1) the cosmology belongs with the Atlantis tale insofar as they both are part of an attempt to discern what the phenomenal world allows for and what it disallows, and (2) this sort of attempt is integral to the brand of statecraft carried out in the Republic. In a word, the Timaeus-Critias is a sustained effort to extend a kind of investigation which consumes a great deal of the Republic.

Tolstoy and Nussbaum on Innocence
Svetlana Beggs, University of California–Riverside
 In many of her works Martha Nussbaum argues that a life lived in the spirit of innocence and simplicity is antithetical to moral maturation and flourishing. In sharp contrast, Leo Tolstoy frequently praises simple, meek persons (often peasants) who live in the spirit of innocence and writes of them that they are the ones who live full, meaningful, morally rich lives. Far from naive, Tolstoy’s moral ideal makes good sense and, in the end, Nussbaum and Tolstoy agree more than disagree. Where they do greatly differ is in their conceptions of what impedes moral maturation. Their points of views and recommendations regarding the road to maturation, therefore, greatly differ as well. But both largely converge on what counts as a mature moral life: a life lived with our eyes fully open, ready to deal with complex particularity of other people.

Toward a Less Confident Cognitivism
Lewis Powell, University of Southern California
 Cognitivism about intention is the view that intentions involve beliefs. The principle motivation for the view is to explain norms on intention by appeal to norms on belief. The dominant versions of Cognitivism achieves these explanations at the cost of the very controversial assumption that no agent can intend to do something without believing that they will do it. If this fairly counterintuitive commitment is necessary to achieve the cognitivist’s explanatory aims, the view is that much less appealing. In this paper, I develop versions of cognitivism that achieve the same explanatory success without having to embrace this counterintuitive requirement. The views developed invoke and explore considerations about semantic differences arising from slight shifts in tense or aspect, such as "S will ϕ”, "S is ϕ-ing”, and "S is going to ϕ”.

Two Conceptions of Personal Responsibility
William Glod, Institute for Humane Studies
 Neutral paternalism claims that if some action A goes against person P’s beliefs and values, then it might be appropriate to interfere with A in order to bring P’s actions back into alignment with her beliefs and values. By contrast, what I call the Responsibility Principle (RP) holds that even in cases where an agent is committed to acknowledging the irrationality of her action A, it follows that she should take responsibility and refrain from performing A, rather than deferring to a paternalist for correction of her irrationality. This essay sketches two ways of cashing out the conception of self-responsibility one might use to support RP. The first, or ‘maximand,’ conception does not rule out neutral paternalism. The second conception holds that self-responsibility is a moral demand on others to refrain from paternalistic interferences. This latter conception gives more convincing grounds for RP to defeat neutral paternalism.

Universalism, Vagueness, and the Argument from Borderline Hammers
Daniel Z. Korman, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign
 The most influential argument for mereological universalism is the Lewis-Sider argument from vagueness. Universalism is widely accepted and—despite its counterintuitive implications—widely held to be innocuous. I will argue that those who endorse the argument from vagueness must accept either (i) eliminativism about familiar kinds, (ii) a revisionary view about attributions of modal properties, or (iii) the doctrine of plenitude. No horn of this trilemma is innocuous; no one escapes the argument from vagueness unscathed.

Using Wikis in Philosophy
Mark Alfino, Gonzaga University
 A wiki is a type of internet-based collaboration software that allows groups of people to easily co-author content. It’s most famous application is the world-wide Wikipedia. This session explores ways of using wiki software in teaching philosophy. Wikis are generally valuable to faculty because they allow easy management and updating of content (primarily text, images, and links). Students may be asked to post model work to the wiki, engage in collaborative research using the wiki as a medium for sharing findings, contribute notes, additional detail, or questions to lectures, collaborate with other students on test preparation, or host student projects. We will also discuss technical features of wikis and limitations of their usefulness.

Vague Entailment
David B. Barnett, University of Colorado, Boulder
 On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. This view entails the following proposition: that clear vagueness as to whether Harry is bald clearly does not entail that Harry is bald. I argue against the proposition, and thus against the dominant view.

Van Inwagen’s Two Failed Arguments for the Belief in Freedom
Zachary J. Goldberg, Arizona State University
 In chapter 6 of An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen presents an influential argument that we are justified in believing we are free. He does so by claiming that the determinist’s objection to the argument for the belief in freedom fails in the exact same way that the skeptic’s argument fails to prove that none of our empirical beliefs are justified. I show that this strategy to defend the belief in freedom fails due to a disanalogy. In a different (but related) argument, van Inwagen concludes that deliberating while holding the belief that you are free is inconsistent. He suggests that (1) inconsistency is an epistemic defect and (2) it is implausible that some truth is such that your simply believing it would make epistemically defective your engaging in so basic an activity as deliberation. Finally, I show that this argument fares no better than the former.

Virtue Epistemology Naturalized
Victor Kumar, University of Arizona
 On a certain naturalized conception of epistemology we have reason to believe in knowledge because it is ineliminable from our best empirical theories of cognition and behavior; we can better understand what knowledge is by thinking about what it must be in order to play the causal-explanatory roles assigned to it in empirical theories. My primary interest in the essay is the causal-explanatory relationship between epistemic virtue and knowledge. Epistemic virtues explain, from a design stance, how we, as environmentally-embedded, computational systems, receive and process information in order to generate accurate representations. But they also explain, from an intentional stance, how we, as epistemic agents, attend to and control evidence, and reason about what we should believe. The one causal-explanatory relationship is machine-like; the other agentive. The upshot is a vindication of a certain sort of hybrid internalist-externalist theory of knowledge.

Virtues as Robust Traits—An Analysis of Doris’s Situationist Challenge
Ellie Hua Wang, Indiana University, Bloomington
 Doris has recently challenged Aristotelian moral psychology on the basis that its commitment to widespread robust traits is not empirically supported. However, Doris does not specify a clear standard for possession of robust traits, and he does not use the experimental results in the way often presumed by his critics. As a result, critics have often read Doris in a way that is not only incompatible with his relevant remarks, but does not locate what Doris is really after. This paper aims to engage Doris’s challenge by giving the best interpretation of it. I first clarify the problems with a popular criticism of Doris by referencing his remarks, and identify his potential target by addressing the Aristotle conception of virtue development. I then show that Doris’s challenge best interpreted nonetheless neglects the complexity involved in virtue development and trait manifestation. Last, I point to empirical evidence supporting Aristotelian moral psychology.

What Can We Know about What it Is Like to Be a Dolphin, and Why it Matters: Dolphin Consciousness and the Ethical Implications
Thomas White, Loyola Marymount University
 In the last twenty years, scientists studying a variety of large-brained mammals have discovered that cognitive abilities traditionally thought to be unique to humans are present in other mammals. Research on dolphins has provided the most dramatic picture of sophisticated intellectual and emotional abilities in nonhumans. This raises important questions about the character of dolphin consciousness and the ethics of human/dolphin contact. Any inquiry of such matters, however, must begin with Thomas Nagel’s "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” This paper follows Nagel’s lead by asking what we can know in answer to the question, what is it like to be a dolphin? I argue that a close study of recent scientific research on dolphins allows us both to heed Nagel’s cautions and to make preliminary inferences about dolphin subjective states. Accordingly, I conclude that at least one controversial practice—the Japanese ‘drive hunts’—is ethically indefensible.

What Constructivism Cannot Accomplish
Lee Shepski, University of Tennessee
 Many philosophers defend the view that morality is in some sense objective—roughly, that the most fundamental moral facts are the same for everyone. Many also defend the view that morality has normative authority—that rational agents normally have some reason to be moral. These theses are not uncontroversial, but prominent versions of expressivism, realism, and constructivism all attempt to accommodate both. I argue that constructivism cannot succeed in this attempt: constructivism can purchase objectivity only at the expense of normative authority and vice-versa. As I understand constructivism, both Kantian views and Ideal Observer theories count as constructivist. I examine an example of each of these types of theory (as developed by Christine Korsgaard and Michael Smith, respectively), explain why neither can accommodate both objectivity and normative authority, and conclude by drawing a general moral about constructivism.

What in the World Is Weakness of Will?
Joshua May, University of California–Santa Barbara
 Ever since Davidson’s seminal paper "How Is Weakness of Will Possible?” philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia (i.e. acting contrary to one’s judgments about what is best for one to do). However, there has been some recent debate about whether this at all captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will if there is one at all. Richard Holton argues that it doesn’t while Al Mele claims that to a certain extent it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about the ordinary notion (if it exists) is one apt for empirical investigation. My plan is to evaluate Mele’s studies and report an experiment of my own in order to help figure out what in the world weakness of will is. I tentatively conclude that neither Mele nor Holton is quite right. There either is no ordinary notion here or it is at best a cluster concept.

What Is the Will?
Laura W. Ekstrom, College of William and Mary
 This paper concerns the notion of will in contemporary analytic debates over the nature of free agency. It addresses the following questions: Is there a sensible, legitimate issue concerning freedom of the will, distinct from the question of freedom of action? If so, what is that issue? What purposes are served by use of the term ‘will’ in free will theory? I distinguish two broad senses of the term ‘will’ and point out that, on one of these senses, there are no interesting, special issues concerning freedom of the will. However, on the other sense, there are such issues, and they are complex and worthy of further attention. Finally, I sketch the outlines of a theory of will in the second sense, one that emphasizes what I see as an appropriate direction for progress in continued work on free agency.

Willing Universal Law vs. Universally Lawful Willing: What Kant’s Supreme Principle of Ethics Should Have Been
Scott E. Forschler, Independent Scholar
 Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) attempts to derive morality from a universalizability test, which considers whether an agent could will or endorse all other agents following some maxim. But this standard is inadequate because it gives counter-intuitive results in cases where other agents are not following principles which are so universalizable. It also fails to capture Kant’s original insight that the good (justified) will must conform to law as it wills. An alternative principle does capture this intuition, and furthermore it allows us to distinguish between principles that produce different results when all agents are also following the principle versus cases where only some or no other agents are doing so. Modal logic can be used to symbolize the distinction between the two principles and highlight Kant’s error, which has unfortunately been followed by many Kantians through the present day.

Wisdom, Courage, and Natural Virtue at Protagoras 349d-351a
J. Clerk Shaw, University of Tennessee
 In this paper, I examine some neglected difficulties in Socrates’s first attempt to show that courage is wisdom in the Protagoras. I then tentatively argue (with help from his second attempt and the Laches) that the most plausible resolutions of these difficulties reveal a complicated Socratic view of the relationships among boldness, courage, and wisdom. In particular, the difficulties are most easily resolved if Socrates accepts three grades of courage (natural courage, technical courage, and philosophical courage) and not just the last of these, as standard interpretations have it.

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