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2009 Pacific Division Abstracts
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Abstracts of Colloquium Papers
"‘Stepping Back’ Revisited: Hegel on Critical Distance”
Kate Padgett Walsh, Iowa State University
 In this essay I argue that Hegel provides resources for an interesting and distinctive account of how we step back from desires. Hegel argues that any account of how we achieve critical distance must take account of the extent to which we are fundamentally social beings. More specifically, the Hegelian claim is that there is no pre-social identity or self that can be separated out from a socially-constructed context of thought and value. Instead, I argue, what is distinctive about a Hegelian approach is the idea that what when we reflect on desires we make use of shared self-conceptions that are neither universal nor particular to individuals.

"‘The Ravens Paradox’ Is a Misnomer”
Roger Clarke, University of British Columbia
 I argue that the standard Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox—generally accepted as the most successful solution to the paradox—is insufficiently general. I give an instance of the paradox which is not solved by the standard Bayesian solution. I defend a new, more general solution, which is compatible with the Bayesian account of confirmation. As a solution to the paradox, I argue that the ravens hypothesis ought not to be held equivalent to its contrapositive; more interestingly, I argue that how we formally represent hypotheses ought to vary with the context of inquiry. This explains why the paradox is compelling, while dealing with standard objections to holding hypotheses inequivalent to their contrapositives.

"A New Paradox of Happiness”
Joe R. Salerno, St. Louis University
 The paper examines the prospects for resolving a broad range of structurally identical paradoxes—including a new paradox of happiness. The structure in question is most familiar in discussions of the knowability paradox (also known as Fitch’s paradox or the Church-Fitch paradox of knowability). For this reason we’ll look to a typical bullet-biting response to the knowability paradox in search of an adequate reply to the happiness paradox. I’ll argue that the bullet is too hard to bite, and conclude that the paradoxes remain.

"A New Paradox of Hedonism?”
H. E. Baber, University of San Diego
 Hedonists hold that pleasure is good. Jens Timmermann however argues that hedonism, thus understood, is inconsistent with our ordinary non-moral value judgments about pleasure insofar as, allegedly, sometimes "we decide that pleasure is bad, or not worth having, not because of any extrinsic factor…but because one is experiencing enough pleasure to the point that more would in itself be undesirable.” Intense food, he notes, being tickled and sexual stimulation can cause this reaction. Such cases, he argues, pose insurmountable difficulties for the hedonist: "If human beings inevitably seek to maximize their own pleasure, why do they on occasion, when offered more, say that they have enough?” I argue that no experience, however pleasurable, is essentially pleasurable hence that while we may reject erstwhile pleasures when they cease to be pleasurable, we cannot have too much pleasure as such.

"A New Solution to the Grounding Problem for Coincident Objects”
Daniel Z. Korman, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign
 I attempt to solve the grounding problem for the view that statues and the clay of which they are made have differ with respect to their modal properties. Here is the grounding problem: the modal differences between the statue and the clay seem to stand in need of explanation, and yet there seem to be no further differences between the statue and the clay that can explain this modal difference. I propose a novel way of solving the grounding problem, which involves distinguishing between the mereological relation that holds between the statue and its parts and the one that holds between the clay and its parts. I attempt to show that the indicated difference is poised to explain modal and sortal differences between the statue and clay, and I discuss the extent to which the solution generalizes to handle grounding problems involving other kinds of entities.

"A Problem for Motivational Externalism”
Danielle Bromwich, National Institutes of Health
 Motivational internalism is roughly speaking the thesis that, if I judge that ‘It is right that I ’, I will be motivated to . This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is purportedly in tension with our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis—motivational externalism—cite everyday examples of amoralism and apathy to demonstrate that it is possible to sincerely judge that ‘It is right that I ’ and yet not be motivated to . I offer a simple defence of motivational internalism. I argue that the motivational externalist’s purported counterexamples are all predicated on the assumption that reliably determining the extension of a moral concept is sufficient for fully understanding that concept. I argue that, since we have no good reason to accept this assumption, these challenges fail to have force against motivational internalism.

"Actuality and Triply-Indexed Semantics”
Brendan Murday, Ithaca College
 The indexical notion of actuality suggests that a world is only actual in a relativized sense. This does not sit well with the notion of actuality employed by anti-possibilist metaphysicians. I argue that we can appease the actualist while preserving many of the attractive features of the indexical notion by introducing a triply-indexed semantics: in addition to a circumstance of evaluation and a context of utterance, we should add a third index tracking the metaphysically privileged world. By differentiating between the privileged world and the world of utterance, we make room for a world that is actual in an unrelativized sense, while still leaving us with a parameter whose value can shift when we want to consider some other world as actual (as we may in evaluating statements concerning conceptual possibility).

"Aesthetic Supervenience and Coincident Objects”
Michael Watkins, Auburn University
 The aesthetic supervenes on the non-aesthetic, or at least it is commonly thought. What is not commonly recognized is that two very different motivations lie behind this common thought. I pry apart these two motivations, show that different (though compatible) supervenience theses naturally arise from these different motivations, and argue that only one of these theses is, as it is commonly construed, true. I then develop, following a suggestion of Sydney Shoemaker’s, a different approach for thinking about how aesthetic properties depend upon the non-aesthetic.

"Against Sonicism”
Ben Caplan, Ohio State University
Carl Matheson, University of Manitoba
 We argue against Dodd’s (2007) sonicism. After presenting Dodd’s sonicism, Levinson’s (1980) objection that sonicism fails to capture the awesomeness of Beethoven’s Hammerklavier Sonata, and Dodd’s reply, we argue that, even if Dodd can satisfactorily reply to that objection, he can’t satisfactorily reply to a related objection. Along the way, we discuss aesthetic properties like being awesome.

"Against the Paradoxicality of Moore’s Paradox”
Joseph Shieber, Lafayette College
 There is overwhelming consensus within the philosophical community that Moore—paradoxical utterances, or indeed the beliefs that such utterances express, are somehow absurd; arguments arise merely over the favored explanation for that absurdity. Against the consensus, however, I argue here that there is no absurdity involved in Moore- paradoxical utterances or beliefs. Indeed, I suggest that ameliorative epistemological projects in fact require us to recognize such utterances and the beliefs that they express as completely legitimate.

"Against the Property Dualist Argument”
Benedicte Veillet, Lafayette College
 Anti-physicalists have forcefully attacked the phenomenal concept strategy, arguing that if there are phenomenal concepts of the kind the physicalist believes there are, then there must be non-physical properties (Smart 1959, White 2007). The critique of the property dualist argument has for the most part focused on its most notorious premise, the Semantic Premise (see Loar 1997 and Block 2007). My goal, in this paper, is to argue that the property dualist argument is weaker even than most have often supposed. Even if we grant the property dualist the Semantic Premise, her argument will fail. Indeed, the Semantic Premise states merely that if a phenomenal concept and a physical concept co-refer, their referent must have two properties. The property dualist, to make her case against physicalism, must further argue that one of these properties is non-physical. I argue that the property dualist provides no adequate support for this additional claim.

"Against Zero-dimensional Material Objects”
Daniel Giberman, Stanford University
 I present an argument against (spatially) zero-dimensional material objects from the premises (i) that if there are zero-dimensional material objects then they are bare particulars, and (ii) that there are no bare particulars. The argument for the first premise involves the spatiotemporal nature of material objects, the metaphysics of property exemplification, and the claim that zero-dimensional property instances are best understood as non-spatiotemporal items. The argument for the second premise involves the intuitive claim that exemplification of at least one sparse property is a prerequisite for existence. I defend this claim against Ted Sider’s (2006) recent attempt to refute it.

"Agency as the Exercise of Practical Knowledge”
Kevin Falvey, University of California–Santa Barbara
 A skeptic about agency maintains that everything that happens can be explained in terms of causal sequences of events none of which need to be regarded as the action of an agent. We say I raised my arm, but all that really happened is that my arm rose, which was caused by my muscle contracting, etc. An answer to the skeptic must make clear how the agent is an ineliminable element in the explanation of what occurred, in a way that warrants us in saying he did this, and not merely that it occurred. It is argued that to vindicate agency, we must regard our actions, at least in core cases, as exercises of practical knowledge. This view of agency also vindicates Elizabeth Anscombe’s view that an agent knows without observation what she does intentionally. Donald Davidson’s well-known putative example of an intentional action known to the agent only by observation is criticized and rejected.

"All Political Justification Is Instrumental”
Alexander Guerrero, New York University
 This paper argues for the following conclusion: all plausible normative justifications for political systems and political actions are, at bottom, instrumental. The basic idea is that all political systems and actions require departures from the normative ideal of autonomous choice and action—departures that are in all cases instrumentally justified. This conclusion has important implications. One implication is that non-instrumental political values (such as the value of egalitarian political processes) cannot be ‘trumps’ that rule out political systems and political actions that do not exemplify these values, regardless of the consequences of ruling them out. A second implication is that we should be open to considering all kinds of departures from the ideal of autonomous action—not just those familiar from representative democracies. In particular, we should be more open to non-democratic procedures if those procedures will better serve the instrumental purposes that, at bottom, justify political systems and political action.

"An Argument Against Animalism”
Tuomas Manninen, Arizona State University
 In "An argument for Animalism,” Eric Olson explicates what he means by ‘animalism,’ presents the ‘thinking-animal argument’ for animalism, and argues that those who try to refute the argument face a choice between three awkward alternatives. According to Olson, the opponents would have to deny either that there are any human animals, that animals can think, or that there are thinking beings located where your human animal is. In my paper, I argue that Olson’s formulation of animalism is susceptible to Peter Unger’s "sorites of decomposition” argument, which forces one to accept that there are no animals. I will show how this consequence can be avoided on a constitutionalist model that denies the other two claims. As an upshot, I argue that the alternative is far less awkward than Olson paints it to be.

"Appearance Matches and Color Constancy”
Wayne Wright, University of California–Irvine
 Color constancy and its scientific study have received much attention from philosophers. However, insufficient consideration has been given to the foundations of empirical research on color constancy. Of particular concern is the index widely used to characterize the degree of color constancy achieved in particular settings. There are basic difficulties pertaining to both the nature of the target phenomenon and the experimental and analytical methods employed to generate the quantities from which the index is calculated. This paper examines some of these difficulties, with an eye toward tempering philosophers’ appeals to extant theoretical frameworks and experimental results from scientific research on color constancy.

"Appetimus sub Ratione Boni: The Leibnizian Roots of Kant’s Account of Free Choice”
David Forman, University of Nevada–Las Vegas
 Kant arrives at his account of maxims as the freely chosen subjective principles of our willing through an appropriation and transformation of the Leibnizian view that we are free in choosing the apparent good. Wolff and Baumgarten call such representations of the good "maxims” and take them to be a product of the understanding (such that moral improvement consists in a refinement of the understanding). But Kant claims that if we are to preserve human freedom, then we must consider maxims, paradoxically, to be the product of willing or choice (Willkür) itself. Accounting for this possibility—that that we choose the conception of good on which we act rather than simply choosing whatever the understanding represents as good—requires a new metaphysics of freedom. But this innovation occurs within the context of a conception of moral psychology that remains deeply indebted to Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten.

"Are Aristotle’s Universals Sortals?”
Philip Corkum, University of Alberta
 Sortals are kinds which provide criteria of identity for individuals falling under that kind. Many contemporary sortal theorists and some Aristotle scholars have looked to Aristotle for a historical precedent, claiming that Aristotle’s secondary substances are sortals. In this paper, I’ll argue that Aristotelian universals do not play any of the roles played by sortals in contemporary metaphysics. The paper comes in three parts. In the first part, I’ll argue that none of the prima facie evidence unequivocally supports the interpretation. In the second part of the paper, I’ll give positive reasons for denying that universals are sortals. And in the third and final part of the paper, I’ll sketch an alternative picture of the relation holding between individuals and universals for Aristotle.

"Armstrong and the Difference Between Particulars and Universals: A Reply to MacBride”
Jacob Berger, City University of New York Graduate Center
 D. M. Armstrong defends a metaphysical system which includes among its ontological constituents particulars and universals. While a difference between particulars and universals is intuitive, there are philosophers, notably Frank Ramsey, who remain skeptical of a distinction. In his Ramsey-inspired paper, "The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?” Fraser MacBride surveys several ways to characterize the distinction, including Armstrong’s own formulation, and finds them wanting. I review many attempts to differentiate particulars from universals and conclude that, even if we accept MacBride’s assertion that Armstrong’s own effort to characterize the distinction is unsatisfactory, there are nevertheless ways to explicate the distinction that are compatible with Armstrong’s metaphysical project.

"Authority Incompatibilism”
Neal A. Tognazzini, University of California–Riverside
 In this paper, I introduce and argue for a new brand of incompatibilism, what I call authority incompatibilism. Authority incompatibilists argue for their thesis by employing a principle according to which moral responsibility requires that some member in the agent’s moral community possess authority to hold the wrongdoer responsible. Add to this principle the claim that determinism is incompatible with any agent’s ever possessing the relevant sort of authority, and authority incompatibilism follows. This position represents a new direction for discussions of determinism and moral responsibility because it is focused on an accountability-based worry instead of the more typical attributability-based worries about control.

"Body-chauvinism or Mind-chauvinism? Questioning the Autonomy of Psychology”
Saray Ayala, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and University of British Columbia
 The autonomy of some special sciences, like psychology, seems to be guaranteed by the multiply realizable nature of its entities, properties and events. Research on Embodied Cognition, however, seems to point towards a limitation of this multiply realizable nature, thereby paving the way to a reductionist appraisal. According to Embodied Cognition, mind is essentially embodied. In this paper, I consider two ways in which embodiment can be understood. According to a reductionist interpretation, (physical) details of body are critical to mind (Shapiro 2004, 2006). A functionalist interpretation, however, claims that physical details of the realizer have nothing to do with mind, what matters for mind is the computational role that body plays (Clark 2006, 2007). I shall argue in favor of the former reading, and then I shall conclude that Embodied Cognition directly tells against the autonomy of psychology.

"Concept Grounding and Knowledge of Set Theory: On Jenkins’s ‘Knowledge of Arithmetic’”
Jeffrey Roland, Louisiana State University
 Jenkins proposes an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, in the sense that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way, and to accommodate the time-honored judgment that arithmetical knowledge is a priori. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic. In particular, I’m interested in the possible extension of Jenkins’s account to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins’s account and entertaining challenges to extending her account to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension seems unlikely.

"Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-order Evidence”
Jonathan Matheson, University of Rochester
 This paper examines a series of objections made against conciliatory views of disagreement by Thomas Kelly (2005) concerning higher-order evidence. A natural an intuitive view in the epistemology of disagreement is a conciliatory view of disagreement. A conciliatory view of disagreement maintains that discovering that an epistemic peer who shares your evidence disagrees with you, epistemically requires you to doxastically move towards your opponent. Kelly levels three objections against such a view regarding whether higher-order evidence is evidence for the disputed first-order proposition, and whether it being so would support a conciliatory view of disagreement. I argue, contra Kelly, that higher-order evidence is evidence for the disputed first-order proposition and that his counterexamples to conciliatory views all fail in one or more respects.

"Content and Counterpossibles”
Barak Krakauer, University of Massachusetts–Amherst
 According to Lewis, Stalnaker, and others, counterpossibles, or counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents, are vacuously true. Such accounts of counterfactuals are unable to provide truth conditions to counterpossibles, even though we use them in everyday speech as well as philosophical discourse. In this paper, I argue that the truth conditions of such counterpossibles can be given in virtue of the truth conditions of some nearby counterfactual with unproblematic truth conditions. These nearby counterfactuals are claims about a structure that might be instantiated by the antecedent. If such an approach can be successfully developed, it will provide us with non-trivial truth conditions for counterpossibles without resorting to impossible worlds or non-classical logic.

"Conventional Implicature and Strong Speaker Orientation”
Claire Horisk, University of Missouri
 Christopher Potts has argued that supplemental expressions generate conventional implicatures. A central piece of his evidence is that a supplemental expression is strongly speaker-oriented—that is, only its utterer is heard as endorsing what the expression expresses, unless it is uttered as part of a direct quotation. Strong speaker-orientation becomes apparent where an expression occurs in the complement clauses of propositional attitude or indirect speech reports. In this paper, I argue that supplemental expressions are not strongly speaker-oriented, on the grounds that they exhibit opacity in propositional attitude reports.

"Coordinated Behavior, Emergence, and the Explanatory Salience of Collective Representations”
Whit Schonbein, College of Charleston
 We sometimes attribute intentional states to groups to explain their behavior. For instance, we say that Ford cut jobs because the company expects low earnings. Rupert (2005) argues that such attributions are explanatorily superfluous—they can be replaced with explanations invoking a more conservative ontology of individual mental states and causal interactions. Huebner (2008) objects that Rupert’s argument is too strong: It implies that person-level representations are also superfluous. Furthermore, Huebner offers an example—ship navigation—intended to show that appeals to collective representations are not superfluous. I argue that (i) an alternative interpretation of Rupert’s argument avoids Huebner’s objection, and (ii) that the navigation example is also susceptible to Rupert’s objection so interpreted. Furthermore, the objection holds even when the navigation example is supplemented with a prominent account of emergence designed to address just such cases.

"Crisp on the Buck-Passing Account of Value”
S. Matthew Liao, Oxford University
 T. M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the explanatory priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good.

"Damming the Swamping Problem, Reliably”
Jared Bates, Hanover College
 The swamping problem maintains that if reliabilism is right that knowledge just is reliably formed true belief, then nothing could explain why knowledge has more value than mere true belief (Kvanvig 2003 and others). My objective here is to divert this stream of criticism by building two bulwarks against it. The first follows a strategy of reliabilism’s critics and involves shifting focus away from the level of particular beliefs to explain the value of knowledge, while the second identifies (epistemically) valuable properties of reliably formed beliefs themselves that are not swamped by truth.

"David Charles and Aristotle’s Builders”
Errol Katayama, Ohio Northern University
 In Aristotle on Meaning and Essence and in "Wittgenstein’s Builders and Aristotle’s Craftsmen,” David Charles ascribes to Aristotle the view that master craftsmen’s grasp of the meaning of natural-kind terms takes place without their possessing any scientific theory about them. Such a grasp of the signification of the kind terms will not involve any knowledge of not only their essence but also their existence as well. In this paper, I shall argue that there is at least one kind of master craftsmen—builders—that fail to perform the distinctive epistemological role assigned by Charles. Consequently, I shall raise a serious doubt on the reliability of builder master craftsmen’s ability to latch on to the objective kinds and thereby weaken the overall confidence that Charles has on them to ‘construct a realist representation of the kinds around him’ so as to pave us ‘the road to realism’.

"Defending Trust as a Two-part Relationship”
Christopher Hudspeth, University of South Florida–Tampa
 This paper is devoted to showing that trust is a two-part rather than a three-part relation; it involves a subject and an object, A trusts B, but does not require the object of a prepositional clause, A trusts B with C. I argue that the costs and benefits of any act of entrusting are not relevant to trust. Doing so allows us to see that trust relationships are not defined by the set of actions that would constitute a breach of that relationship but rather by the motivations the other has for acting. The economic perspective therefore fails to capture the nature of trust and our relationship to others. A two-part conception of trust, meanwhile, allows us to move beyond an economic account and to engage in truly personal interpersonal relationships.

"Descartes on the Causes of Motion: Reevaluating the Evidence for an Occasionalist Reading of Descartes’ Physics”
Andrew R. Platt, St. Cloud State University
 Prominent contemporary scholars, including Janet Broughton, Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber, have argued that Descartes holds at least a partial form of Occasionalism. In its most unrestricted form, Occasionalism says that God is the immediate cause of every event, and no created substance (such as a finite mind or body) causes any event. Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber have argued independently that Descartes’ views about physics entail Occasionalism about natural motion, or the motions not directly caused by human volitions. This paper offers a critical examination of their case for reading Descartes as a partial Occasionalist. I argue that Descartes thinks God causes every motion, but that he does not take this to imply that bodies are not genuine causes of motion. According to Descartes, God concurs with bodies to cause natural motion in such a way that both God and bodies are genuine, efficient causes of motion.

"Developing a Phylogenetic Species Concept”
Joel Velasco, Stanford University
 This paper starts from the position that we need a phylogenetic species concept which will form groups of organisms that can serve as basic units in a phylogenetic taxonomy. A natural starting place is to extend the concept of monophyly to cover groups of organisms. Some phylogeneticists deny that species even could be monophyletic while others demand they must be. I argue that while species could be monophyletic groups, they should not be. Instead, species must be genealogically exclusive groups where each member is more closely related to everything in the group than to anything outside it. I then carefully spell out how we should understand this and conclude by giving a working definition of exclusivity that forms groups that can function within phylogenetic theory. Exclusivity, but not monophyly, can thus serve as a necessary condition for species.

"Disjunctivism and Primitive Knowledge”
Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri–St. Louis
 Inspired by Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument, I offer a new objection to classical disjunctivism. I then give arguments in favor of a new kind of disjunctivism, which I will call ‘common-factor disjunctivism,’ and show that common-factor disjunctivism avoids the charges pressed against classical disjunctivism.

"Do We Perceive Apples as Edible?”
Bence Nanay, Syracuse University and University of British Columbia
 Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out that an influential argument in favor of the claim that we represent sortal properties perceptually does not work. Second, I argue that we can fix this argument if we replace the property in question with the property of being edible, climbable or Q-able in general.

"Does Luck Exclude Control?”
E. J. Coffman, University of Tennessee
 Many philosophers think that "luck excludes control”—roughly, that an event is lucky for you only if it lies significantly beyond your control. Jennifer Lackey (2008) has recently argued that there’s no such requirement on luck. In this paper, I show that Lackey’s argument fails. I also consider a new argument against such requirements on luck that differs importantly from—but ultimately fares no better than—Lackey’s argument.

"Doing Without Moral Status”
Benjamin A. Sachs, National Institutes of Health
 Nearly everyone who writes on the ethics of marginal cases—the question of how we morally ought to treat living things that are significantly less psychologically sophisticated than normal adult humans—makes use of the term moral status or one of its cognates (moral standing, moral considerability, moral personhood and membership in the moral community). Here I attempt to bring metaphysical rigor to discussions of moral status. I inquire, first, whether moral status might refer to a property that helps explain the truth about how we ought to treat less sophisticated individuals. I then consider whether moral status might refer to a property without independent explanatory power. Finally, I offer two interpretations of moral status on which it refers to nothing at all, yet ascriptions of it have meaning. In each case, I conclude that ascriptions of moral status convey nothing that cannot be conveyed more clearly in other words.

"Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation”
Juan Comesaña, University of Wisconsin–Madison
 According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism (MEP), how much justification we need in favor of a proposition in order to know that it is true depends on our preferences. According to extreme epistemic pragmatism (EEP), on the other hand, our preferences influence our epistemic position at a more basic level, because they help determine how much justification we actually have in favor of the proposition in question. Simplifying brutally, MEP has it that the more worried we are about a proposition’s being false, the more justification we need in order to know it, whereas EEP has it that the more worried we are about a proposition’s being false, the less justification we have for it. I will argue that, given a very plausible principle of second-order evidence, MEP entails EEP. This is important because although MEP can be motivated by plausible arguments, EEP has extremely implausible consequences.

"Epistemopolis: Anti-utopia, Anarchy, and the Architecture of Postmodern Epistemology”
Bryan Norwood, Mississippi State University
 Epistemology, while largely an attempt to deal with the incorporeal, has not escaped the grasps of material, architectural terminology and analogy. This paper will explore the city as a model for knowledge, the epistemopolis, by looking at two postmodern, relativistic epistemological options and their accompanying architectures: anti-utopian epistemology and anarchic epistemology. Does the abandonment of absolutes in the epistemopolis necessitate a full blown eclecticism where judgments can no longer be made about the built environment? Is our only choice suburban sprawl and cheap, poorly stylized strip malls? In answering these questions, the conflict between the east and west coasts of America, Los Angeles and New York, emerges at the heart of the debate. These two cities represent the extremes of the epistemopolis, one sprawling and without epistemic garbage and one bound to a small island and full of conflict, complication, and epistemic waste.

"Equality of Resources and the Equally Talented Society”
Kristi A. Olson, Harvard University
 According to Ronald Dworkin, individuals should be entitled to what is attributable to their choices, but not to what is attributable to differential talents. If we accept these two requirements, it seems as though we would want to distinguish the component of an individual’s income which is attributable to differential talents from the component which is attributable to individual choice. Yet, according to Dworkin, it is impossible—even in theory—to make this distinction. Thus, Dworkin proposes a compromise based on the insurance individuals would purchase against low earning capacities, prior to knowing the economic value of their talents. In this paper, I show that Dworkin’s compromise is unnecessary. Contrary to what Dworkin says, we can, in fact, distinguish what is attributable to differential talents from what is attributable to choice. And, by doing so, we can solve some of the problems which have traditionally plagued egalitarians.

"Ethos as Abode: The Heideggerian Ground of Ethics”
Tara Kennedy, University of New Mexico
 In this paper, I explore what basis might be found for ethics in Heidegger’s writings, specifically in his "Letter on ‘Humanism.’” I do so via the trope of dwelling as it appears in this text and others. Understanding in what way human beings "dwell” allows us insight into how Heidegger conceives of the essence of the human being, in what way language constitutes a home in which these beings dwell, and how and for what those who use language stand as guardians, according to him. Ultimately, I argue that the ground for ethics on Heidegger’s account can only be Being itself and that being ethical therefore involves having the proper comportment in the world. Finally, acknowledging the untraditional nature of such an ethical theory, I investigate what possibilities exist within such a system for bringing about changes in the behavior of those we believe to be acting immorally.

"Facts and Principles of Justice”
Jeppe von Platz, University of Pennsylvania
 In this essay I critically discuss Cohen’s argument for the conclusion that principles of justice must be fact-independent. I find two flaws with Cohen’s argument: that one of its premises is false and that it commits a fallacy of ambiguity. Behind both flaws is Cohen’s inadequate understanding of the complex ways in which conceptions of justice can reflect facts. My critique of Cohen thus has the constructive aim of shedding a bit of light on some hard questions about how theories of justice can and should be informed by facts.

"Forgiveness as an Alternative Response to Wrongdoing”
Kristen Bell, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
 Most philosophers have understood forgiveness as forswearing resentment for some morally good reason. This account makes forgiveness look like something one does just in case the alternative course of action would be unjustifiable. Forgiveness begins to look suspiciously perfunctory and obligatory, hardly capturing the common thought that forgiveness can be heroic. I will articulate and defend an alternative account of forgiveness which avoids this problem. On my view, one forgives when one thinks the offender should be held accountable, but one trusts the offender to hold himself to account and one forswears the attempt to hold him to account oneself. The question to consider in deciding whether to resent or forgive is not "should the offender be accountable?” but rather should I insist on holding the offender to account, or should I trust him to hold himself to account?”

"Fundamental Laws and Counterfactual Stability”
Patrick McGivern, University of Alberta
 I examine Mark Lange’s recent account of the distinction between the ‘fundamental’ laws of physics and the ‘non-fundamental’ laws of the special sciences, based on counterfactual stability. Very roughly, a true generalization is counterfactually stable if it would remain true across a range of counterfactual situations. Lange uses this concept not only to describe the distinctive counterfactual behavior of the fundamental laws of physics but also to explain how laws from other sciences can be autonomous from the fundamental laws of physics and of independent explanatory value. I criticize this account of the laws of physics and argue that they are not stable in the sense Lange describes. I then assess the sense of autonomy Lange’s account gives the laws of the special sciences, and argue that it is of dubious explanatory value.

"Gigerenzer’s Evolutionary Argument Against Rational Choice Theory: An Assessment”
Armin Schulz, University of Wisconsin–Madison
 Despite the fact that Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is one of the most important theories of the social sciences, its plausibility has been vigorously debated over many years. A recent innovation in this debate has been to appeal to evolutionary theory. In particular, Gerd Gigerenzer argues that an evolutionary perspective reveals RCT to be fundamentally mistaken: instead of using an optimising, domain-general reasoning faculty, he claims it is more likely that we have evolved decision-making mechanisms that are based on ‘satisficing’, domain-specific simple heuristics. In this paper, I assess how compelling the evolutionary element of Gigerenzer’s argument against RCT is. I conclude rather negatively: evidentially, his reasoning is unconvincing; and heuristically, it is at best highly limited. Overall, I thus hope to make clear that the evolutionary perspective, at least as it has been applied by Gigerenzer, has contributed little to the debate surrounding the plausibility of RCT

"Giving Eudaimonism Its Due”
Jonathan Sands Wise, Georgetown College
 In his recent Justice, Nicholas Wolterstorff denies that an inherent rights theory of justice is compatible with eudaimonism, because it treats external goods as only instrumentally good and denies that a person’s claim-right against me can be a sufficient reason for me to act. But eudaimonism as a justification of a way of life has neither of these implications: external goods may be genuine goods, and it is compatible with eudaimonism that someone’s having a right against me be a sufficient reason for my acting justly. The consideration of the place of practices and virtues in a well-lived human life need not motivate; for eudaimonism it is necessary only that this consideration occur in reflection. What Wolterstorff offers, then, is not a reason why an inherent rights theory of justice cannot be compatible with eudaimonism, but reason to deliberate about the place of justice in eudaimonism.

"Good Objections to Dogmatism”
Christopher Stephens, University of British Columbia
 Pryor (2000, 2004) and Silins (2007) have defended a view about epistemic justification for perceptually based beliefs known as Dogmatism. Roughly, Dogmatism is the view that if it perceptually seems that p then the agent has at least some immediate justification that p. In this paper I provide a new objection to Dogmatism by developing a connection between the debate about Dogmatism and the Hempel-Good debate in philosophy of science about the nature of confirmation. I argue that there are reasons to think that Good was the winner of the debate about confirmation, and that this work provides the resources for an objection to dogmatism about perception.

"Gupta on the Given”
James John, University of Toronto
 In his Empiricism and Experience, Anil Gupta argues for a surprising claim: that if the given in experience is propositional—if there is a set of propositions the subject of an experience is justified in believing solely on the basis of undergoing the experience—then the "Cartesian conception of experience”—the sense-datum theory—is true. Gupta’s "Argument from the Propositional Given” comes in two versions. This paper examines both, showing that each fails. It also makes the following claims: that "Reliability,” the claim that experience never justifies any false propositions, is implausible; that experience’s passivity doesn’t argue for Reliability; that what one is justified in believing on the basis of an experience is what one may take into rational consideration upon having the experience, not what one must take into consideration; and that the rational adjustment of one’s view in light of experience is a process that may be non-conceptual.

"How Dirt Works: Natural Motion of the Elements in Aristotle’s Physics VIII.4”
Aimee L. Koeplin, Loyola Marymount University
 The natural motions of the elements pose an apparent problem for Aristotle’s thesis: everything that moves is moved by something. I argue that we can make better sense of Aristotle’s view if we abandon the idea that the goal, or telos, of the elements is to be in a certain place in favor of the idea that the goal, or telos, of the elements is to go in a certain direction.

"How Not to Build a Hybrid”
William M. Ramsey, University of Nevada–Las Vegas
 In discussions about how we explain and predict the behavior of others, two major theoretical positions are the theory-theory and the simulation theory. Recently, some authors, in particular Nichols and Stich, have advocated what they call a ‘hybrid’ position, where elements of both theory and simiulation are claimed to underlie our mindreading capacity. In this talk, I claim that the position that they (and others) endorse is not really a hybrid at all. My main claim is that there is a conflation of a simulation process with the normal sort of processing involved in the application of theory. I argue that once this is realized, we can see that there is nothing in their account that shouldn’t be expected and/or embraced by a pure theory-theorist.

"How to Use a Concept You Reject”
Mark McCullagh, University of Guelph
 Some philosophers maintain that possessing a concept requires endorsing certain characteristic inferences. They adduce cases in which people reject some inferences and seem thereby to reject a concept. Against this, Williamson argues that even these people can understand those who use the concept, and to do this is to possess it. I offer a reconciliatory proposal that respects the intuitions on both sides of this debate. The central idea is that you can satisfy the conditions for using a concept indirectly (say in a belief ascription) while failing to satisfy the conditions for using it directly.

"Hume and the Value of the Beautiful”
James Shelley, Auburn University
 Hume is apparently committed to the view that an artwork work is beautiful if and only if it gives pleasure to ideal critics. Jerrold Levinson has urged that such a commitment raises a problem that Hume never addresses—that of explaining why you should care what gives pleasure to ideal critics if you are not critically ideal yourself. I argue that Levinson’s own solution to this problem comes up short, that it does so because his commitment to the biconditional is a commitment to a theory of value, that Hume’s commitment is instead a commitment to a theory of evaluation, and that this fact explains why the problem that Levinson raises never arises for Hume.

"In Defense of Extended, Embodied Cognition: Some Lessons for Philosophy from Cognitive Neuroscience”
Anne Jacobson, University of Houston
 The thesis of Extended, Embodied Cognition (EEC), as we will understand it, maintains that cognition ain’t just in the head, to paraphrase Putnam (Putnam 1975). Adhering at least in part to Putnam’s model, it holds that cognition in general supervenes on the environment external to the brain and, indeed, to the body. The defense of EEC presented here has two major parts. This first develops as a response to a well-known argument against defenders of EEC. This part is particularly critical of a methodology increasingly common in philosophy since Davidson, and it develops a new paradigm for giving an account of mental functioning. The second part puts in question a well known dogma in recent philosophy. In each part, the arguments draw heavily on general features of recent cognitive neuroscience.

"In Defense of the Hedonistic Account of Happiness”
Stephen G. Morris, Missouri Western State University
 Although the concept of happiness plays a central role in ethics, contemporary philosophers have generally given little attention to providing a robust account of what this concept entails. In a recent paper, Dan Haybron sets out to accomplish two main tasks: the first is to underscore the importance of conducting philosophical inquiry into the concept of happiness; the second is to defend a particular account of happiness—which he calls the ‘emotional state conception of happiness’—while pointing out weaknesses in the primary competing accounts of happiness, including the hedonistic account. I argue against his claim that the emotional state conception of happiness is superior to the hedonistic conception of happiness. In the course of defending the hedonistic theory of happiness against Haybron’s attacks, I provide my own explanation for why the study of happiness is important to ethics.

"In Sickness and in Health: Can the Marriage Between Health Care and the Market Live Ethically Ever After?”
Thomas D. Harter, University of Tennessee
 Some argue that health care goods and services should never be treated as market commodities. However such arguments are seemingly incompatible with the current realities of health care markets in the United States. This paper argues that it is possible to ethically treat some health care goods and services as market commodities when they are regulated in such a way as to uphold three principles seemingly common in both health care and market transactions: honesty, respect for autonomy, and the desire to increase access to goods and services. I begin by discussing the philosophical and ethical, the practical, and the market problems with treating health care goods and services as market commodities. I then address how each of these problems is surmountable. Lastly I discuss how the principles of honesty, respect for autonomy, and the desire to increase access to goods and services help demarcate the ethical limits of heath care markets.

"Indexicalism and Default Saturation”
Michael Humiston, University of Wisconsin–Madison
 In this paper I propose a revision of indexicalism, of one of the main views on context-dependency, to defend it against the criticisms of contextualists. Indexicalists hold that all context-dependency can be modeled on well-understood notions like the saturation of predicates or the fixing of values for parameters provided by the lexical meanings of terms. Contextualists challenge indexicalism by generating examples of optional contextual effects (effects of context on the meaning of utterances that are not required for the utterance to express a unique proposition). The solution I propose to this problem is to posit that for some of the parameters of a term, the lexical meaning of the term fixes their values in the absence of a context sufficiently rich to do so itself. Some terms, which can be saturated by context, need not be because of ‘default saturation’ already provided by the meaning of the term.

"Individual Mandates and the Massachusetts Universal Coverage Health Plan”
Dale Murray, University of Wisconsin–Baraboo/Sauk County and University of Wisconsin–Richland
 Recently, Massachusetts instituted a universal coverage health plan which requires all citizens to purchase insurance. I argue that while the goal of universal coverage may be desirable, the use of an individual mandate to force citizens to secure insurance is not. While it may be permissible to tax citizens in order to secure a substantive social good, it is a violation of state neutrality (thought of as neutrality of intent) to force citizens to join associations with the primary purpose of securing the normative good of health. Additionally, even though the Massachusetts plan may provide increased access to health care for many, would likely disproportionately place financial burdens on the working poor, making it even more difficult for them to obtain a range of social goods.

"Informative Rejections of Why Questions”
Joshua Rust, Stetson University
 For Bas van Fraassen, causal explanations are answers to why-questions. But if explanations in general (whether causal or otherwise) increase a questioner’s understanding about the explanandum, I argue that some rejections of a why-question are also explanatory. Moreover, such informative rejections of a why-question have not been adequately distinguished from standard, straight answers to why-questions. In order to both illustrate the distinction, and help motivate possible critical applications of the distinction, I will consider the case of rationalizing action, as found in Davidson’s "Actions, Reasons, and Causes”.

"Introspection and Absent Qualia”
Paul Audi, University of Nebraska–Omaha
 Shoemaker has argued that absent qualia are impossible because of the special relation between qualia and introspectibility. I distinguish two kinds of introspectibility and show that his argument conflates them and thereby fails. The possibility of absent qualia remains open. I then offer a dualist account of both kinds of introspection. The contingent causal relation between qualia and introspective belief requires a dualist to be an interactionist. The constitutive relation between qualia and justification for introspective belief requires everyone to recognize a non-causal role that qualia play with respect to justification. I close by answering the causal exclusion problem on behalf of the dualist.

"Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics”
Elizabeth Tropman, Colorado State University
 Sensibility theorists such as John McDowell have argued that once we appreciate certain similarities between moral values and secondary qualities, a new metaethical position might emerge, one that avoids the alleged difficulties with moral intuitionism and non-cognitivism. The aim of this paper is to examine the metaethical prospects of this secondary-quality analogy. In particular, I shall be concerned with the extent to which McDowell’s comparison of values to secondary qualities supports a viewpoint unique from that of the moral intuitionist. Once we disentangle the various metaphysical and epistemological strands of McDowell’s analogy, I suggest that McDowell’s position may be closer to moral intuitionism than initially supposed. This discussion will also help clarify the intended meaning of the secondary-quality analogy, as well as its significance for metaethics more generally.

"Intuitions as Invitations”
Patrick Fleming, James Madison University
 Many philosophers express intuitions by saying that ‘we’ believe that P. Recently, this claim has come under empirical attack by philosophers showing that the folk often do not believe what some philosophers take to be intuitive. In this paper I outline a different way to understand appeals to intuition. Following a suggestion by Bernard Williams, I argue that many intuitions are invitations to make a judgment. After outlining the proposal I argue for three claims. The first is that if we accept this account of what philosophers mean by saying that P is intuitive, the skeptical argument does not get off the ground. The second is that there are some very good reasons to read appeals to intuition in this way. And finally there appears to be nothing epistemically suspect about such appeals.

"Is Good Tragedy Possible? The Argument of Gorgias 502b-503b”
Franco V. Trivigno, Marquette University
 In the Gorgias, Socrates articulates an apparently unqualified criticism of tragedy as a kind of flattery (502c3-4). Most have taken his claim there to be equivalent to "all tragedy is flattery” [TF]. In this paper, I contest this view. I first examine the evidence for the standard view. Then I show that Socrates’ analysis of political rhetoric reveals it to have two parts, one that is shameful flattery and another that seeks to improve its audience. Since tragedy is treated as a kind of rhetoric (502c-d), the possibility of good and bad rhetoric implies that ‘bad tragedy is self-serving flattery and is indifferent to audience improvement’ [BT] and ‘good tragedy strives to say what is best and to improve its audience’ [GT]. Finally, I argue that the class opened up by [GT] is nonempty and that Plato’s attitude toward actual tragedy is less severe than has been otherwise thought.

"Kant on Public Reason and Free Speech”
Helga Varden, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign
 The ultimate aim behind the system of law as a whole, Kant argues, is not only the establishment of a minimally rightful state, but the continuous reform of the institutional framework so that it becomes a true liberal, representative republic. The aim is to make sure that all public offices are ultimately run by the people who govern themselves through public reason and through enlightened public discussion of the institutions’ operations. The upshot of this is that the state, in terms of public right, can and must provide for freedom of speech and education, since these are the means though which citizens can govern themselves rightfully. By exploring these reasons, I argue that Kant can justify both why the public authority should posit laws to protect the freedom to critically engage in public reason, outlaw certain forms of speech, regulate the media and provide, regulate, and require universal education.

"Kant’s Problem Regarding Others”
Marcy Latta, University of Pennsylvania
 Kant offers an explicit criterion regarding how we ought to treat humanity (or free beings) in his formulation of the moral law known as the Formula of Humanity, yet seemingly gives us little in the way of an account as to why we are compelled to view others in such a way that qualifies them as members of humanity. Unless Kant can force us to adopt a particular conception of others, he cannot show that we are bound to treat them in any particular manner, and, thus, that we are obligated to respect the moral law in any practically meaningful sense. I draw attention to the asymmetry between Kant’s arguments concerning our knowledge of our own humanity (or freedom) and those concerning our knowledge of the humanity of others, to show that considerations of practical reason alone do not compel us to view others as appropriate objects of moral consideration.

"Keeping Reference in Mind”
Kevan Edwards, Syracuse University
 The main claim defended in this paper is that familiar motivations for a reference-based approach to semantics can be converted into motivations for a reference-based approach to the content/identity of the basic conceptual constituents of thought. Insofar as reference-based approaches are rarely given serious consideration in philosophy of mind (or cognitive psychology) the argument in this paper suggests the need for a rethinking of some foundational assumptions.

"Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”
Jennifer Nagel, University of Toronto
 Whether the subject of an epistemological scenario is intuitively seen as having knowledge or mere belief in a proposition depends on a wide array of factors. One tricky factor is the mention of possibilities of error to which the subject might have been prone: it seems we become more stringent when such possibilities are mentioned, even when it is stipulated that they do not obtain in the case at hand. Non-skeptical invariantists have suggested that there might be some psychological explanation of this increase in stringency. After a brief discussion of problems with existing proposals, I present a novel psychological explanation of the phenomenon. A tenacious psychological bias known as epistemic egocentrism—a natural tendency to underestimate the naïveté of other subjects—explains the increases in stringency that occur when possibilities of error are mentioned. More economical than existing alternatives, this explanation also does more to support non-skeptical invariantism.

"Knowledge, Harmony, and Beauty in the Theaetetus
Matthew Holtzman, Johns Hopkins University
 In the Theaetetus, Plato suggests that the central question of the dialogue, "What is knowledge,” can not be answered without simultaneously investigating the nature of Theaetetus’ soul. This paper proposes a reading of the first half of the dialogue which explains the relationship between these investigations. The influence of Protagoreanism on Theodorus rendered him unable to teach mathematics as a propaideutic to philosophy. In order for Theaetetus to complete the curriculum outlined in the Republic, Socrates, as midwife, must help Theaetetus to understand the nature of mathematical practice, to see the contradictions inherent in the Protagorean account of mathematics and education which he unwittingly imbibed from Theodorus. As a reflective mathematician, the state of Theaetetus’ soul will be such that he will be capable of delivering a definition of knowledge in harmony with his nature; one that is beautiful, self-expressive, and true.

"Love and Entitlement: Sartre and Beauvoir on the Nature of Jealousy”
Irene McMullin, University of Arkansas
 Contrary to contemporary accounts, this paper argues that a defining feature of jealousy is its sense of entitlement to the beloved’s affirmation. Because jealousy involves locating one’s center of value in being-valued by the other person, the uncertain character of this ‘outsourcing’ of value provokes anxiety and the attempt to get control of the other’s free affirmation. Examining Sartre’s analyses of love and its distortions will allow us to better understand the role of evaluation in this emotion. Turning to Simone de Beauvoir’s account of traditional gender values will clarify how jealousy is profoundly shaped by the sense of entitlement.

"Meaningfulness as a Secondary Quality”
Nathaniel J. Goldberg, Washington and Lee University
 ‘Dog’ in English means dog, and ‘cat’ means cat. Though they mean different things, each possesses the property of being meaningful. ‘La nieve es blanca’ in Spanish and ‘L’herbe est verte’ in French possess that property also. But what exactly is that property? What is the nature of meaningfulness? Here I articulate the novel thesis that meaningfulness is a secondary quality analogous to color. I then offer reasons to prefer this understanding of meaningfulness to several rivals.

"Minimal Enactivism”
Michael Bruno, University of Arizona
 This essay defends what I call the minimal enactive theory of conscious vision. The minimal enactive theory holds that the phenomenal character of a subject’s conscious visual states constitutively depends on states of that subjects’ motor system. I defend the view in the following way. I first present four kinds of empirical evidence taken to support some kind of close dependence of conscious vision on motor system activity. After surveying this evidence, I explicate a novel account of constitutive dependence. Constitutive dependence is cashed out as a kind of counterfactual dependence between non-distinct entities. I explain what this amounts to, why it has metaphysical significance, and why the empirical evidence surveyed supports this kind of dependence.

"Moore’s Open Question Maneuvering”
Jean-Paul Vessel, New Mexico State University
 Within §13 of Principia Ethica is contained Moore’s most famous Open Question Arguments (OQAs). Several of Moore’s contemporaries defended metaethical nonnaturalism by appeal to OQAs. Some contemporary cognitivists embrace Moore’s OQAs against metaethical naturalism. And noncognitivists—as well as various "hybrid” theorists—have utilized OQAs to fuel their own emotivist, prescriptivist, and expressivist metaethical programs. Despite Moore’s influence upon contemporary metaethics, his OQAs have been ridiculed in recent years. Their deployment has been labeled "accident prone,” "simple to dismiss,” and just plain invalid. These recent allegations are completely unfounded. In fact, they seem to stem from failures to provide acceptable interpretations of the Moorean texts. Thus, I commit myself here to criticizing a popular and influential interpretation of Moore’s OQAs before providing what I consider to be the most plausible and charitable version of Moore’s strongest OQA. Then we’ll be in position to provide some evaluative commentary upon Moore’s Open Question Strategies.

"Moral Particularism and the Aesthetics Analogy”
James Harold, Mount Holyoke College
 Most accounts of ethics and aesthetics either tend to emphasize the differences between the two kinds of valuing, or, occasionally, to use moral valuing as a model for aesthetics. Moral particularists, however, are more apt to see aesthetics as the template according to which ethics should be understood. The aim of this paper is to critique the particularists’ analogy. There is a class of aesthetic judgments that has no moral counterpart. The paper is not a critique of moral particularism as such; the failure of the analogy is not a serious problem for the particularists’ view. However, if the analogy fails, then a widely held assumption comes to light for which moral particularism—and indeed any metaethical view—will need an account. Most metaethical approaches assume that aesthetics and ethics can be treated uniformly, but this assumption should be challenged.

"Moral Perception and the Causal Objection”
Justin P. McBrayer, Fort Lewis College
 One of the primary attractions to moral anti-realism is the current lack of a plausible moral epistemology. Recently, some moral realists have responded with a radical proposal—we know moral facts in much the same way as we know everyday facts about the external world: by perception. According to this proposal, we can know that an action is, say, morally wrong by literally seeing it. The most plausible objection to such moral perception is the causal objection: in order for an agent to perceive X, she must be in appropriate causal contact with X. But we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This objection is a bad one, and I argue that the causal constraint can be met regardless of whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non-secondary, natural properties; or non-natural properties.

"Natural Kinds, Laws, and the Problem of Complex Essences”
Travis Dumsday, University of Calgary
 Scientific essentialism faces an important but neglected difficulty. The essences of many, if not all, natural kinds seem to be complex, consisting of multiple essential properties that appear to have no necessary connection between them. Ductility and solubility are both essential to gold, but they have no intrinsic link between them; hence objects can be ductile without being soluble and vice versa. How then are these diverse properties unified into a single essence? I refer to this as the problem of complex essences, and show that unless it is solved, scientific essentialism’s ontology of laws loses some of its explanatory force over and against the rival Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong (DTA) account. I then attempt to address it by reference on the one hand to a certain necessity arising from objects’ materiality, and on the other to historical contingency in the origin of kinds.

"Newtonian Forces and Evolutionary Biology: A Problem and Solution for Extending the Force Interpretation”
Joshua Filler, University of Wisconsin–Madison
 There has recently been a renewed interest in the "force” interpretation of evolutionary biology. In this paper, I present the general structure of the arguments for the force interpretation and identify a problem in its overly permissive conditions for being a Newtonian force. I then attempt a solution that (1) helps to illuminate the difference between forces and other types of causes and (2) makes room for random genetic drift as a force (contra Brandon (2006)). In particular, I argue that forces are not different in kind from other types of causes but rather forces are situated on a continuum of causes distinguished by their unifying power.

"Non-Essential Necessary Connections”
Roberta Ballarin, University of British Columbia
 Naming and Necessity is the classical text of contemporary essentialism. Yet it does not present one unified interpretation of necessity. I argue that Kripke’s argument in footnote 56 for the necessity of origin embodies an anti-essentialist, combinatorial interpretation of necessity. The most plausible reconstruction of Kripke’s argument implicitly assumes a Compossibility premise, according to which distinct possibilities must be compossible. I connect the basic idea behind such Principle of Compossibility to two anti-essentialist views: (i) a generalized Humean framework, and (ii) maximal model theoretic constructions. When conflicts arise between the Humean denial of necessary connections between things and the maximalist principle of recombination of distinct possibilities, the preferred combinatorial strategy eliminates possibilities, because Compossibility embodies the spirit of the combinatorial interpretation of necessity at a deeper level than Hume’s recombination of distinct existences, insofar as it defines possibilities themselves, rather than objects, as fundamentally independent from one another.

"Normalizing Prostitution vs. Normalizing the Alienability of Sexual Rights”
Hallie Rose Liberto, University of Wisconsin–Madison
 Recent philosophical assessment of prostitution is divided into two camps. Some liberal philosophers have argued that legalizing prostitution would allow us to clean up the institution, and normalizing it would take away the stigma attached to sex work that accounts for many of its problems. However, radical feminists claim that prostitution is degrading, is borne of social injustice, and spurs social injustice. Scott Anderson argues (Ethics, 2002) that while the radical feminists’ concerns with prostitution could be considered extrinsic to the institution (as liberals think), there is another problem with prostitution. The legalization and normalization of prostitution, while providing a new legal option to individuals, will actually reduce everyone’s sexual autonomy. In my paper I distinguish between two types of prostitution: sexual rights alienating prostitution and sexual rights preserving prostitution. I argue that Anderson’s concerns only apply to the former.

"Not ‘Who?’ but ‘Why?’: Information and Consent in the Ethics of Contemporary Health Care Decision-making”
Anton R. Tupa, Saginaw Valley State University
 Abstract to "Not ‘Who?’ but ‘Why?’: Information and Consent in the Ethics of Contemporary Health Care Decision-Making” In this essay, I discuss a way of justifying health care decision-making ideals in many contemporary societies. First, I explore some of the background literature on the ethics of medical decision-making. I argue that much of the literature in this area begins with the wrong question. Second, I sketch a new way of justifying a model of health care decision-making. In this second part, I rely heavily on some works in philosophical ethical theory in developing my new justification. Third, I explain why this new line of justification is superior to previous lines of argument. Much of this article is controversial, but my conclusion—that current health care decision-making ideals in many contemporary societies are justified—is entirely conventional.

"On a Rational Reconstruction of Intentionalism Debates”
Derek Brown, Brandon University
 I provide a framework within which to discuss intentionalism issues. The framework distinguishes between two different intentionalism debates, that between indirect and realist conceptions of perception, and that between qualia realist and antirealist views. Additionally, the framework contains the conceptual space for projectivism and thereby recognizes in experience the possibility of ‘internal’ yet ‘intentional’ aspects of experience, something not countenanced by familiar versions qualia realism or intentionalism. The resulting conception of spectrum inversion is preferred to the one familiar from intentionalism debates, and marks just one of many possible applications of this framework.

"On Threatening Human Dignity by Creating New Types of Beings”
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin, Cornell University
 Discussions about whether new biomedical technologies threaten or violate human dignity are now common. Indeed appeals to human dignity have played a central role in national and international debates about whether to allow particular kinds of biomedical investigations. The focus of this paper is on chimera research. I argue here that both, those who claim that particular types of human-nonhuman chimera research threaten human dignity and those who argue that such threat does not exist, fail to make their case. I will first introduce some of the arguments that have been offered supporting the claim that the creation of certain sorts of chimeras threatens or violates human dignity. I will next present opponents’ assessments of such arguments. Finally I critically analyze both the critics’ and the supporters’ claims about whether chimera research threatens human dignity.

"Opposing Powers”
Randolph Clarke, Florida State University
 A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.

"Perspectival Cognition in Aristotle’s De Memoria
Tony Roark, Boise State University
 In the Protagoras, Socrates lauds the ‘art of measurement’ as something that would enable us to distinguish larger from smaller things, no matter how near or remote, and would thereby ‘save our life’. As he so often does, Aristotle takes his inspiration from Plato and formulates a theoretically-sophisticated account of the phenomenon of common interest—in this case, of perspectival cognition. In this paper, I offer novel interpretation of a challenging passage within the De Memoria in which Aristotle sketches his account.

"Plato’s Receptacle: A Notion of Space?”
Barbara M. Sattler, Yale University
 Reacting to the discussion whether Plato’s receptacle in the Timaeus is indeed a notion of space or rather of matter or a mixture of both, I argue that this dispute can only be decided by first clarifying what we mean by space. I suggest working with a loose version of topology and metric which I expand so as to account also for physical space; and in order to avoid anachronism, I first try to figure out the problem Plato is reacting to before employing these notions. The problem the receptacle solves for Plato can be shown to be the mediation of intelligible structures to the material bodies in the empirical realm. And it shall be demonstrated that while Plato doesn’t develop the receptacle as a full blown notion of space for this mediation, he nevertheless establishes it as a basis for conceptualising geometrical as well as physical space.

"Pluto and the Platypus: Tale of an Odd Ball and an Odd Duck”
Matthew Slater, University of Idaho
 Many astronomers seem to believe that we have discovered that Pluto is not a planet. But this is not so. Recent discoveries of trans-Neptunian Pluto-sized objects do not militate for Pluto’s expulsion from the planets unless we have prior reason for not simply counting these newly-discovered objects among the planets. I argue that the official IAU-sanctioned definition of ‘planet’—which provides prima facie reason for excluding these objects—runs afoul of a plausible norm of classification. I conclude with a discussion of this and related norms and their role in the Pluto dispute, drawing upon analogous features of another case of taxonomic perplexity: the platypus.

"Promises, Trust, and Warrant”
Allen N. Habib, University of Calgary
 When we promise to do something, we thereby gain a moral obligation to do it. But why is this so? One type of explanation for why we have a duty to keep our promises is that our promisees come to trust that we will keep them, and betrayal of that trust is a moral wrong. This approach suffers from a difficulty in explaining what reasons promisees have to come to trust promisers in the first place. I examine a solution to the problem proposed by TM Scanlon, that promisees can trust promisers because promisers are forbidden to attempt to mislead them. I conclude that the solution is inadequate.

"Race as an Institutional Fact”
Kay Mathiesen, University of Arizona
 According to Ron Mallon (2004), any adequate account of race must meet three constraints: passing, no-traveling, and reality. "Passing” describes the fact that persons who are treated by others as belonging to one race, may "actually” belong to a different race. "No traveling” refers to the fact that racial concepts such as "white” may pick out different sets of persons in different cultures. "Reality” refers to the fact that racial designations enter into explanations of how people’s lives go. However, Mallon argues that no account can simultaneously satisfy all three constraints. I argue that an account of race as an institutional fact, based on Searle’s theory of constitutive rules, can satisfy all three constraints. Furthermore, the institutional account provides an enlightening explanation of these three features of race.

"Re-imagining Normativity: Meaning, Rules, and the Imagination”
Barbara Fultner, University of Connecticut and Denison University
 The thesis that meanings are normative, that they function as rules determining correct use, seems to run counter to the view that language is creative and imaginative. Some hold that for subjects to follow a rule exemplified by a set of examples may "reflect a lack of imagination” on their part (Pettit 2002). What makes rule-following unimaginative is that it is ultimately based on a disposition to respond in a certain way. Divergence from norms in dominant accounts or normativity is usually discussed in terms of error rather than innovation. When we think of innovation, we often appeal to the imagination, associated with non-discursive thought and with emotion. In this paper, I argue that the imagination works at multiple levels relative to normativity. It plays a role in rule-following itself as well as in semantic innovation. The tension between imagination and normativity is hence a dialectical one.

"Reasons and Evidence One Ought”
John Brunero, University of Missouri–St. Louis
 Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have recently argued that we can helpfully explain the concept of a reason in terms of the concept of evidence and the concept of ought. They defend the thesis (R): Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to Φ if and only if F is evidence that A ought to Φ (where Φ is either a belief or an action). In this paper, I argue that (R) is false in both directions: some fact could be a reason for A to Φ without being evidence that A ought to Φ, and some fact could be evidence that A ought to Φ without being a reason for A to Φ.

"Recollection and the Method of Hypothesis in Plato’s Meno
Chad E. Wiener, Portland State University
 It is often assumed that recollection and the method of hypothesis inquire into different things and the methodology in each case is distinct. I argue that the slave boy’s act of recollection employs the method of hypothesis by showing how this inquiry is parallel to Socrates’ example at 86e-87b. I also argue that the method of hypothesis is appropriate for an of recollection in respect to the belief disposition of such an inquirer, i.e., the person who knows neither the what is of a thing nor what sort it is. I conclude by suggesting how both mathematical and philosophical method can employ the same methodology yet still are distinct in a way.

"Reconciling Anomalous Monism and Scheme Content Dualism”
Dwayne Moore, Wilfrid Laurier University
 Anomalous monism and the repudiation of scheme-content dualism are two of Donald Davidson’s more important philosophical contributions. It would be surprising to discover these doctrines are in conflict with one other. Manuel De Pinedo (2006) has recently argued that there is in fact some tension. He thinks anomalous monism requires token events to be extensional and hence beyond any conceptual framework, whereas the rejection of scheme-content dualism does not permit any such schemeless events. In this paper I argue that Pinedo’s worries are misplaced. Davidson’s anomalous monism does require extensional token events, but these can be invoked without adopting a dualism of scheme and content. This is done by carefully considering the implications of radical interpretation and triangulation.

"Reconsidering Spinoza’s Free Man”
Matthew J. Kisner, University of South Carolina
 While Spinoza’s remarks on exemplars or models in the preface of the Ethics are few and brief, they have far-reaching consequences. For he argues that we ought to judge our good and perfection with respect to what he calls a "model of human nature.” While commentators have offered a variety of interpretations of the model, there has been near unanimous agreement that the model is Spinoza’s free man, described from 4p66s to 4p73. Since the free man is a perfectly active being, this reading indicates that Spinoza’s ethics sets exceptionally high goals, aiming to make us purely active beings. This paper argues, against the standard view, that the free man should not be read as describing the model on the basis that such a reading is inconsistent with Spinoza’s philosophy, particularly his claims about the nature of passivity, whether ought implies can and models generally.

"Reflective Self-Appraisal, Autonomy, and the Motive of Care”
Dwight Furrow, San Diego Mesa College
Mark Wheeler, San Diego State University
 Despite receiving considerable philosophical attention, the concept of autonomy remains contested. In this paper, we diagnose one source of the continuing problem—an excessive emphasis on reflective self-appraisal in the dominant procedural models of autonomy—and suggest a solution. We argue that minimalist conceptions of rational self-appraisal are subject to fatal counterexamples. Yet, attempts to provide a more robust account of rational self-appraisal are too demanding to capture our intuitions about who counts as an autonomous agent. We argue that no procedure of rational reflection will confer autonomy; rather autonomy is a matter of an agent’s actions flowing from her substantive commitments. Instead of rational self-reflection, autonomous actions are the product of the motive of care, which anchors an agent’s occurent desires to her system of value.

"Rigidity or Actuality-dependence?”
Jussi Haukioja, University of Turku
 It is generally assumed that rigidity plays a key role in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of identity statements, both between proper names and between natural kind terms. However, there is no generally accepted definition of what it is for a kind term to be rigid. In this paper I argue that the most popular view, according to which rigid kind terms are the ones which designate the same kind in all possible worlds, fails to deliver a posteriori necessities. I also present an alternative view, on which the work of explaining a posteriori necessities is not really done by rigidity, but by a related metasemantic notion, which I call actuality-dependence.

"Rule-following as Coordination”
Giacomo Sillari, University of Pennsylvania
 I argue that the notion of rule-following can be explained through the notion of equilibrium in a coordination game. The communitarian solution to the Kripkean skeptical paradox hinges on the ideas of convention and normativity. Lewis’s account of convention as a solution to recurrent coordination games contains the game-theoretic, strategic element that—I claim—is crucial for the skeptical solution. Moreover, the game-theoretic analysis indicates a possible origin for the normativity of rule-following. Can the reduction proceed any further? Lewis’s account of convention relies on the idea that players coordinate by identifying successful precedent as the salient action. I argue that reliance on precedent is to be understood in terms of Wittgenstein’s notions of bedrock and form of life.

"Same-Sex Marriage and the Charge of Illiberality”
Peter Brian Barry, Saginaw Valley State University
 Precisely how liberalism should be understood is a familiar problem, but certainly liberalism involves a commitment to protect a significant range of liberty. So it would be surprising if legally permitting and recognizing same-sex marriage (henceforth: SSM) turned out to be antithetical to liberalism. But some philosophers and political scientists have argued exactly that—that legal recognition of SSM is positively illiberal. I contend that the charge of illiberality is misguided and depends upon assumptions that liberals eschew and yield conclusions that opponents of SSM find intolerable. I also briefly propose an argument derived from constitutional law that legally prohibiting SSM is illiberal.

"Scientific Explanation, Understanding, and Knowledge”
Kevin McCain, University of Rochester
 It is widely held by philosophers of science that an essential feature of scientific explanations is that they provide understanding. It is also widely held among philosophers of science that understanding is a kind of knowledge. Although the former view is quite plausible, the latter view leads to problems for accounts of scientific explanation. In this paper I argue that the recent epistemological literature provides independent reasons for thinking that understanding is not a kind of knowledge. I also argue that by conceiving of understanding not as a kind of knowledge, but instead as a non-factive cognitive state that involves awareness of various relations (coherence, part/whole, relations between parts, etc.) that exist within a body of information one can provide an understanding constraint on explanations that matches our intuitions while avoiding two serious problems facing the understanding constraint construed as requiring knowledge.

"Self-Awareness, Self-Understanding, and Self-Interpretation”
B. Scot Rousse, Northwestern University
 In Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that an individual’s narrative self-interpretation (his personal identity) is distinct from and ontologically dependent upon a formal-phenomenological minimal selfhood. The latter is the basic first-personal, pre-reflective givenness of our experiences. I argue that Zahavi’s use of the narrative conception of selfhood to account for an individual’s personal identity is problematic because, by conceiving of personal selfhood strictly from the perspective of reflective self-interpretation, he passes over an important phenomenon, namely pre-reflective self-understanding. An individual’s personal identity is first of all manifest and operative in the habits and style of his pre-reflective absorption in the world, not in the story he reflectively constructs about himself. Thus Zahavi’s twofold distinction between minimal self-awareness and self-interpretation needs to be amended. Drawing on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Frankfurt I will argue that the phenomena demand a threefold distinction in our conception of the self: self-awareness, self-understanding, and self-interpretation.

"Simple Persistence”
Bradley Rettler, University of Notre Dame
 In this paper, I discuss how theories of persistence are affected by the possibility of persisting mereological simples. My goal is twofold: first, to offer a reason for rejecting perdurantism—its inability to account for persisting simples, and second, to encourage philosophers to investigate the implications of theories of persistence for debates in mereological metaphysics, and vice versa. In §1, I define some terms and then argue that, necessarily, mereological simples lack temporal parts. I then consider popular answers to the Simple Question. Only MaxCon allows for simples to have temporal parts. On most views, if simples persist, they must endure or exdure. In §2, I offer three implications of this conclusion. In 3, I discuss what conclusion(s) ought to be drawn.

"Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies”
Erik J. Wielenberg, DePauw University
 I argue that skeptical theism undermines our confidence that God would never lie. Skeptical theists maintain that the fact that we cannot think of a justification for a given evil does not imply that the evil in question has no justification. I argue that skeptical theists are similarly committed to the claim that the fact that we cannot think of a justification for God lying to us does not imply that no such justification exists. This leaves us with no good basis for ruling out the possibility of divine lies. The argument implies that skeptical theism is at odds with any religious tradition according to which there are certain claims that we can know to be true solely in virtue of the fact that God has told us that they are true.

"Standard Compatibilism and the Problem of Causal Exclusion”
Kevin W. Sharpe, St. Cloud State University
 Recently, a nonreductive physicalist strategy for avoiding the infamous problem of causal exclusion has been gaining popularity. Causal compatibilism denies the principle of causal exclusion: every effect has a single sufficient cause, unless it is overdetermined. Thus, the compatibilist allows that, in some cases, an effect can have multiple sufficient causes without being overdetermined. In this paper, I show how an anti-dualist argument from causal coincidence, originally due to Andrew Melnyk, also threatens nonreductive physicalism. The argument shows that while the nonreductive physicalist can avoid the standard kinds of overdetermination, any allowance of multiple causation generates a new form of causal coincidence that standard compatibilism is powerless to avoid. As far as the standard compatibilist strategy goes, nonreductive physicalism is still saddled with unacceptable coincidences, albeit different ones than those she set out to avoid originally. Accordingly, standard compatibilism fails to distinguish benign multiple causation from overdetermination.

"Substance Concepts and Personal Identity”
Peter Nichols, University of Wisconsin–Madison
 One of Eric Olson’s central claims in arguing for Animalism is that ‘animal’, but not ‘person’, is a Wigginsian substance concept—a concept that provides the most fundamental answer to the question "what are we?” ‘Person’ supposedly fails to be a substance concept because it answers the question "what do we do?” without specifying what we are. That makes ‘person’ a functional kind, and functional kinds, Olson claims, cannot be substances. I argue that the appeal to the Wigginsian substance test does not favor Animalism over the Psychological Approach, because (1) ‘animal’ is a functional kind, and thus, if being a functional kind prevents persons from being substances, it also prevents animals from being substances, and (2) the "what it is/what it does” distinction is illegitimate on the reading which Olson needs, and thus cannot ground a distinction between substances and non-substances.

"Supervenience and Structure-specific Indiscernibility”
Ralf Bader, University of St Andrews
 In this paper I argue that there is an important distinction between individual-specific and structure-specific understandings of indiscernibility. These two notions pertain to different ways of individuating property distributions. They give different accounts of the members of the domains that are mapped when assessing for property-preserving isomorphisms. While the individual-specific account treats objects as the unit of analysis, the structure-specific account is concerned with space-time points. An isomorphism is B-preserving on the individual-specific understanding iff for any individual x in D, x has B-property F if and only if the image of x in D* also has F. By contrast, according to the structure-specific account of indiscernibility, an isomorphism is B-preserving iff for any collection of space-time points p in D, B-property F is instantiated in p if and only if F is also instantiated in the image of p in D*.

"Taking Brains Seriously: A Response to Eric Olson’s Sparse Ontology”
Joungbin Lim, University of Virginia
 According to Eric Olson’s sparse ontology, there is no brain but there are atoms arranged brainwise in my skull. He argues that his ontology can solve ‘the problem of too many thinkers’, according to which if my brain exists, there must be two thinkers in my region (my brain and I). In this paper, I argue that Olson’s argument is wrong because (1) it generates a new problem of too many thinkers and (2) it is based on a flawed assumption regarding the relation between the brain and the thinker. I conclude that even though my brain exists, there is no problem of too many thinkers.

"Taking Employment Seriously”
I. Larry Udell, West Chester University
 This paper proposes a full employment conception of justice according to which full employment is a necessary condition of a just society. Although John Rawls articulated this thesis, he did not argue for it, and subsequent discussions of justice that followed up the publication of A Theory of Justice have entirely neglected it. Section 1 develops such a response to the alternative metrics of Sen and Nussbaum and shows that a primary social goods metric suitably expanded is for the most part satisfactory, and goes on to show the necessity of adding employment to the list of primary social goods. Section 2 shows that the inclusion of employment as a primary social good in Rawls’s original position results in the adoption of a full employment principle.

"Techne and the Unity of the Good in Plato and Aristotle”
George Harvey, Indiana University Southeast
 In Nicomachean Ethics I.6, Aristotle claims that knowledge of the form of the Good would be of ance to experts in various fields of expertise. Specifically, he appeals to the fact that experts produce particular goods without such knowledge, and further, that it is unclear how it would make anyone a better expert (1096b35-1097a14). My view is that we find evidence in Plato’s dialogues that serves to answer this objection. Drawing from the Phaedrus and Philebus, I will examine the relationship that Plato establishes between the various forms of expertise constituting the technai and knowledge of the forms through dialectical method. This examination will establish that all expertise in the technai requires theoretical knowledge that is obtainable only through dialectical means, and that knowledge of the Good plays an indirect but indispensible role in the production of particular goods.

"Temporal Dimensions of Reductionism in Biology”
Alan C. Love, University of Minnesota
 Although reduction clearly concerns spatial dimensions, such as relations between macroscale and microscale properties, at least three relevant temporal dimensions can be distinguished: historical, iterated compositional, and emergent process. The first two are prevalent in prior philosophical discussions but the third has not been previously analyzed. This neglected dimension is shown to be more appropriate for reductive explanations in experimental biology.

"The Alleged Impotence of Reflection: Owens on Belief and Control”
Josh Bright, University of California–Riverside
 Certain uses of normative language regarding belief seem to imply both control over and responsibility for belief. Nevertheless, most current philosophers deny the possibility of direct control over belief. I examine one such argument offered by David Owens. Owens’ argument is distinctive in that, as an intellectualist, he attempts to ground the relevant difference between belief and action not in the activity of the will, but rather in the structure of our rationality. Actions can be guided by reflective judgment, but beliefs cannot. I contend that Owens is mistaken, and that his mistake can be traced to a misunderstanding over the relevant conception of rationality. I employ John Broome’s work on the logic of normativity to diagnose Owens’ error, and to sketch a more satisfactory intellectualist conception of direct control over belief.

"The Case for a New Contractualism”
Travis N. Rieder, University of South Carolina–Columbia
 T.M. Scanlon, in What We Owe to Each Other, argues that an act is wrong if it would be disallowed by any set of principles which others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject. I find this account plausible. However, he also argues that reasons are ‘primitive’ notions, which cannot be non-circularly defined—that is, a reason is merely ‘that which counts in favor of something.’ I find this less plausible. However, in this paper, I argue for neither of these plausibility claims; instead, I assume them, in order to ask whether Scanlon’s unique brand of contractualism can be retained if one is motivated, as I am, to jettison his foundational theory of reasons. I argue that it can, and that the modified theory which results—a contractualism resting on a thoroughly Humean account of practical reasons—does not fall to its most obvious criticism.

"The Case of the Divergent Descriptions: An Experimental Investigation of Semantics, Cross-cultural Style”
Jonathan Livengood, Independent Scholar
Justin M. Sytsma, University of Pittsburgh
 In two fascinating articles, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich use experimental methods to raise doubt about reliance on intuitions in developing theories of reference which are then deployed in philosophical arguments. They ran a cross-cultural survey asking Western and Asian subjects about a famous case from the philosophical literature (Kripke’s Gödel example). They found significant variation in subjects’ intuitions about that case. While there have been a number of theoretical responses to this work, there have not yet been any experimental responses. This paper fills that gap. We noticed an ambiguity in the question Machery et al. posed in their original experiment; we then ran four studies to test the impact of this ambiguity on subjects’ responses. We found that the ambiguity accounts for much of the variation found in their original experiment. We argue that in the light of our data, Machery et al.’s argument is no longer convincing.

"The Dialectic of Physics II.8”
Margaret Scharle, Reed College
 Almost every interpretation of the dialectic in Physics II.8 shows Aristotle to beg the question against his opponent, but I suggest that this is because commentators have not properly appreciated the fact that Aristotle uses the winter rain example—the common ground shared between him and his opponent—as the fulcrum of the argument.

"The Dilemma of Underlying Matter in Aristotle’s De Generatione et Corruptione II.1, 328b31-329a23”
Mary Katrina Krizan, University of Colorado–Boulder
 Aristotle’s positive account of matter, the contrarieties, and the so-called elements in De Generatione et Corruptione II.1, 329a24-b3 has been of much interest to scholars trying to understand Aristotle’s commitment (or lack thereof) to prime matter. Commentators have paid significantly less attention to the sections of GC II.1 immediately leading up to Aristotle’s positive account, particularly his criticisms of Anaximander and Plato’s Timaeus. In this paper, I suggest that a new way to frame the prime matter debate can be found by analyzing Aristotle’s criticisms of his predecessors in GC II.1. In particular, various attempts to answer questions regarding the number, separability, and identity of the matter that underlies the perceptible bodies lead to a dilemma for the status of underlying matter. By understanding this dilemma and how it might be avoided, we can better frame our account of why Aristotle may or may not be committed to prime matter.

"The Fringe of Consciousness and the Introspectible Difference Between Vision and Thought”
Robert Schroer, Arkansas State University
 There is an enormous introspectible difference between visual experience and conscious thought; in particular, visual experience seems to give us access to (and present) objects in a way that conscious thought does not. In this paper, I develop a Representationalist account of this difference. My account features the idea that visual experience and conscious thought are temporally extended, continuous affairs that contain interacting high detail and low detail representations. (The former representations constitute the focal point of consciousness, while the latter constitute its "fringe”). I will argue that differences in how these representations interact with each other explain why visual experience seems to give us access to (and present) objects in a way that conscious thought does not.

"The Goodness of Worlds, World-Creating Acts, and World-Creators”
Luke Gelinas, University of Toronto
 I assess a recent reply to William Rowe’s ‘No Best World’ argument for atheism, due to Michael Almeida, and propose a novel approach. Whereas Almeida’s strategy focuses on the connection between the goodness of world-creating acts and the goodness of world-creators, the defense I propose attempts to undermine the tight connection, implicit in Rowe’s argument, between the goodness of worlds and the goodness of world-creating acts. I argue that attempts to rebut the argument this way are more promising, since (unlike Almeida’s strategy) they allow theists to preserve the intuition that a morally perfect being would not knowingly perform an act less good than others in its power to perform.

"The Metaphysician’s Gambit: Appeals to Discriminatory Power”
Patrick S. Dieveney, California State University–Long Beach
 It is not uncommon for metaphysicians to argue that we ought to accept their theories on the grounds that, unlike their competitors, their theories can distinguish apparently different possible scenarios. To the extent that these scenarios ought to be distinguished, it would appear to be a virtue of a theory that it distinguishes them. In this paper, I consider this virtue, what I call ‘discriminatory power’. I argue that for discriminatory power claims to carry any weight, they must first satisfy what I call ‘the independence condition’. This creates problems for metaphysicians who want to appeal to discriminatory power as a reason to accept their theories. In particular, satisfying the independence condition restricts the kinds of arguments that can be offered for discriminatory power claims. But, more importantly, satisfying the independence condition frequently undermines the metaphysician’s original discriminatory power claim.

"The Mysterious Mu: An Argument for Small-number Nihilism”
Dave McElhoes, University of Maryland–College Park
 Of the existing theories of vagueness, Timothy Williamson’s epistemicism is rather unpopular. In this paper I defend popular opinion. I attack Timothy Williamson’s epistemicism on the grounds that it can be used to derive contradictions. To derive the contradiction I present a sorites-inspired argument that the epistemicist is compelled to accept: its soundness relies mostly on one’s adherence to classical reasoning, the sort of reasoning that is embraced by the epistemicist. However, when combined with Williamson’s central epistemicist principles, the conclusion of this argument can be used to derive contradictions. Ultimately, I suggest that Fregean Nihilism might be our best option given Williamson’s powerful arguments against his competitors.

"The Perception Requirement in Plato’s Philebus
Kelly Arenson, Emory University
 Early in his evaluation of hedonism in the Philebus, Plato defines pleasure as the restoration of the natural harmony of a living animal. Later, Plato modifies this definition, identifying pleasure only with perceived restorations. This paper discusses the significance of this perception requirement by examining two ways in which Plato employs it in the dialogue. First, I show how Plato’s denial that a neutral state of freedom from pain is pleasant rests on his contention that neither restorations nor disturbances are perceived in the neutral state. Second, I argue that Plato differentiates pure from impure pleasures based on whether the deficiency being restored is perceived or not. Pure pleasures are not mixed with pain, and are therefore superior, because their deficiencies go unperceived. I conclude that ultimately these two applications of the perception requirement enable Plato to exclude practically all pleasures from his conception of the best human life.

"The Phenomenal Contents of the Global Workspace”
Elizabeth Schechter, University of Maryland–College Park
 Among the many contemporary debates about consciousness, one concerns whether and to what extent phenomenally conscious experience is rich. A second debate concerns the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness; some believe that there can be phenomenally conscious experiences that are not access conscious, while others insist that all phenomenally conscious experiences are also access conscious, and hope that a theory of access consciousness will in fact play an important role in explaining phenomenal consciousness. The outcome of this second, "accessibility/phenomenality” debate is often taken to determine the outcome of the first, "richness/sparseness” debate. In particular, those who believe that access consciousness is essential for phenomenal consciousness tend to accept that phenomenal consciousness is sparse. This paper defends the richness of phenomenal consciousness, while maintaining that access consciousness is essential to phenomenal consciousness, thus arguing that the richness/sparseness and the accessibility/phenomenality debates come apart.

"The Problem of Proprioception in Aristotle”
Anastasia K. Anderson, University of the Fraser Valley
 Aristotle is commonly portrayed as holding that the objects of sense perception must be external to the perceiver’s body. If this is correct, it renders awareness of one’s own body mysterious in Aristotle. One might argue that he simply remained silent on the subject of bodily awareness, but I show that hints of at least three different forms of bodily awareness are found in Aristotle’s writings. In light of Aristotle’s recognition of the existence of proprioception and the questionable textual support for the claim that sense objects must be external to the body, it is suggested that we more actively consider where proprioception fits in when developing interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of perception.

"The Pursuit of the Natural”
Scott D. Tanona, Kansas State University
 Responses to critics of science who charge that science is atheistic have argued that science is committed only to methodological but not ontological naturalism. However, the distinction between the methodological and ontological positions is not always clear, especially when it seems the primary motivation for adopting methodological naturalism may be metaphysical. Furthermore, we still lack an account of the natural sufficient for supporting precisely why science must adopt methodological naturalism. I offer a conception of the natural based on minimal epistemological desiderata of intersubjectivity and predictability (of a range of sorts) and suggest that these alone are sufficient to motivate, although not internally justify, methodological naturalism. I argue that understanding methodological naturalism in terms of these epistemological criteria shows that the adoption of methodological naturalism does not depend on prior ontological naturalistic assumptions. It is, however, associated with values that may fit some metaphysical views better than others.

"The Rationality of the Youths of Kallipolis”
Michelle Jenkins, University of Arizona
 In this paper, I address the question of the rationality of the youths of Kallipolis. The moral education as presented in the Republic appears to be arational—youths are not given reasons for why the beliefs they are taught are true and Socrates says that the youths will "welcome the reason when it comes”. Some scholars have taken this to indicate that the youths themselves are prerational. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that we can see good evidence that the youths not only have the capacity for reason but are encouraged to develop that capacity throughout their childhood. This becomes apparent when we reflect on the theoretically sophisticated mathematical education that they are expected to engage in alongside their moral education. The final section of this paper considers how to reconcile the hyper-rational nature of the theoretical education with the arational nature of the moral education.

"The Reverse-Zombie Argument Against Dualism”
Richard Brown, City University of New York–LaGuardia
 The zombie argument currently advanced by dualists is question begging. It cannot show that physicalism is false because the first premise of the argument assumes that physicalism is false. One cannot even conceive of zombies if physicalism is true. I invoke a type-B-ish Kripkean strategy. The usual type-B defense admits that zombies are conceivable and then denies that they are really possible. I argue, instead, that what Kripke shows is that it may seem to us as though we are conceiving something when we are not. To illustrate this I give two reverse-zombie arguments against dualism. The first invokes zoombies, creatures identical to me in every non-physical way but which lack qualitative consciousness; the second invokes shombies, creatures physically and qualitatively identical to me which are solely physical. These are conceivable and so the dualist is in a dilemma. Either the original-zombie argument was question begging or dualism is false.

"The Role and Value of Epistemic Confidence”
William J. Melanson, University of Nebraska–Omaha
 Assessments of epistemic confidence tend to play a larger role in our lives than do direct assessments of evidence, justifiedness, or even knowledge. In this paper, I shall examine the role and value of epistemic confidence. The basic idea is that we continually adjust the level of epistemic confidence in our beliefs as we recognize new evidence either supporting or undermining them. Hence, at every point, our level of epistemic confidence provides an indication of the overall strength of the evidence that we have encountered thus far. In this way, our epistemic confidence provides a guide to the subjective justifiedness of our beliefs. As such, our epistemic confidence provides an immediately accessible estimate of the likely truth of our beliefs. Though fallible, such an estimate is indispensible when determining whether to act upon a belief or whether to take the precaution of seeking additional evidence.

"The Structure of Classical Mechanics”
Jill North, Yale University
 How do we learn about the nature of the world from the mathematical formulation of a physical theory? One rule we follow, familiar from spacetime theorizing: posit the least amount of spacetime structure required by the fundamental dynamics. I think we should extend this rule beyond spacetime structure. We should extend the rule to statespace structure. Using this rule, I argue that a classical world has a surprisingly spare amount of structure.

"The Subjective Intuition”
Jennifer Hawkins, University of Toronto
 Theories of well-being are typically divided into subjective and objective. Subjective theories are those which make facts about a person’s welfare depend on facts about her actual or hypothetical mental states. I am interested in what motivates this approach to the theory of welfare. The contemporary view is that subjectivism is devoted to honoring the evaluative perspective of the individual, but this is both a misleading account of the motivations behind subjectivism, and a vision that dooms subjective theories to failure. I suggest that we need to revisit and reinstate certain features of traditional hedonism, in particular the idea that felt experience plays a role that no theory of welfare can afford to ignore. I then offer a sketch of a theory that is subjective in my preferred sense and avoids the worst sins of hedonism as well as the problems generated by the contemporary constraints of subjective theorists.

"The World Thinking Itself: Heideggarian Themes from Categorial Intuition to the Origin of the Work of Art”
William H. Koch, University of South Florida
 This paper is an attempt to present concisely several of the key elements of my successfully defended master’s thesis and my yet to be completed dissertation. It seeks to discuss the early influence of categorial intuition in the work of Martin Heidegger and to briefly trace its transformation in his work to his opus on art The Origin of the Work of Art. In the course of this task the foundational importance of categorial intuition for phenomenological methodology and a new perspective on the centrality of the problem of historical world change for Heidegger’s overall project comes to light.

"Truthmakers as Difference-Makers”
Avram Hiller, Portland State University
 A number of philosophers have defended one form or another of Truthmaker, the view that every truth is necessitated by some existing thing or state of affairs. However, Trenton Merricks’ recent book Truth and Ontology leaves little doubt that Truthmaker is false. Two of Merricks’ strongest arguments show that negative existentials do not have truthmakers, and that Truthmaker does not properly account for necessary truths. Since Merricks believes that a restricted account of Truthmaker which excludes these two classes of truths would involve unprincipled gerrymandering, he believes that nothing like Truthmaker can be true. In this paper, however, I explicate a restricted Truthmaker principle, which I call (with a nod to David Lewis) the Difference-Maker principle, and I show how this principle does not involve unprincipled gerrymandering. In conclusion, I reject Merricks’s claim that because of the failure of Truthmaker, the correspondence theory of truth is false.

"Two Arguments from ‘Human Rights Violation’ to ‘Univesal Jurisdiction’”
Clair Morrissey, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
 Given the importance of the human rights discourse to the international political arena, it is not surprising to find theorists appealing to human rights in other domains of international legal theory. This piece focuses on the way in which appeals to human rights violations have been utilized in arguments concerning the legitimacy of international criminal prosecutions of crimes against humanity. I begin by laying out an example of one such argument, that of Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman. I then sketch a new Mill-Feinberg inspired argument that also makes use of human rights violations to ground universal jurisdiction. I end with a discussion of three substantive differences between the two approaches: (1) the role of sovereignty in the arguments, (2) which prosecuting bodies they deem legitimate, (3) how they accommodate the emergence of individuals as subjects of international law.

"Two Standpoints on Knowledge”
Anthony D. Coleman, Willamette University
 Many philosophers believe that there are two standpoints that we can adopt toward our beliefs and actions: a standpoint of rational deliberation and a standpoint of empirical description. In this paper, I argue that we can adopt these two standpoints toward our knowledge of propositions. I then argue that this fact helps to answer the question as to whether propositional knowledge should be understood along internalist or externalist lines.

"Ultra-sociality and Language: Is Extensive Human Cooperation the Result of Gene/Culture Co-evolution?”
William A. Rottschaefer, Lewis and Clark College
 In a series of papers and books, evolutionary theorists Richard Boyd and Peter J. Richardson argue that the ultra-sociality of humans—their ability to cooperate in groups larger than family, kin groups and bands—is similar to the capacity of humans to learn and use a language. They maintain that both ultra-sociality and linguistic capacity are culturally acquired adaptations that become genetically based. In this paper, I reconstruct and examine a central argument for this claim. I then propose an alternative hybrid social learning account of ultra-sociality. Though not resolving the issue in favor of one or another approach, I focus on some developmental consequences of each hypothesis that may allow for empirical discriminations between the two.

"Virtue, Not Jealousy: Hume’s View of Social Dependency”
Lorraine L. Besser-Jones, Middlebury College
 Hume believes that the affirmations of others play an essential role in the judgments we make of our own merit: we seek out the approval of others, and fulfill our need for pride or self-esteem only upon obtaining it. While others have argued that this sort of social dependency leads us in the negative direction characteristic of jealousy, Hume believes it operates as a positive force, functioning, among other things, as a powerful motive to virtue. In this paper, I explore how it is that Hume sustains this view in the face of the very plausible idea that our social dependency leads us to jealousy rather than virtue. In so doing, I hope to reach a greater understanding of Hume’s account of self-esteem (which, for Hume, is a version of pride), and, in particular, the principle of comparison.

"What Is the Four Principles Approach to Biomedical Ethics?”
Kristen A. Hine, Towson University
 According to Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, the four principles approach to biomedical ethics is supposed to provide a "framework” for reasoning through moral issues in medicine. But what exactly is this framework meant to provide? In this paper I present and evaluate two possible interpretations of principilism: principilism as a criterion of moral rightness, and principilism as an account of justified moral beliefs. I argue that the view, as it is presented and defended by the authors, is best understood as an account of the conditions under which one’s ethical beliefs are justified. Having defended my favored interpretation, I next take up the objection that principilism cannot be put into practice because the principles lack the requisite determinacy to be action guiding. I contend that this objection is successful only if principilism is characterized (incorrectly) as a criterion of morally right action.

"What’s Formal about Formal Indication?”
Matthew Shockey, Indiana University–South Bend
 Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger’s method of "formal indication” is at the heart of his attempt to answer "the ontological question of the being of the ‘sum’” (SZ 46). It works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one’s first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation, on the basis of which various further a priori, ontological structures that constitute one as the kind of entity one is become accessible. Formal indication is thus formal in two senses: it "officially” designates or signals certain first-person (singular) phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological "form” of the entity in question.

"Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Wolf? Naturalizing Empty Concepts”
Dan Ryder, University of British Columbia–Okanagan
 Externalist theories of representation (including most naturalistic psychosemantic theories) typically require some relation to obtain between a representation and what it represents. As a result, empty concepts cause problems for such theories. I offer a naturalistic and externalist account of empty concepts that shows how they can be shared across individuals. On this account, the brain is a general-purpose model-building machine, where items in the world serve as templates for model construction. Shareable empty concepts arise when there is a common template for different individuals’ concepts, but where this template is not what the concept denotes.

"Why Do We Need Tense?”
David Ian Spencer, University of California–Davis
 Almost everyone agrees that tensed representation is required for timely action, but there is little in the way of explanation as to why this should be so. Taking an argument of Mellor’s as my starting point, I will develop an answer to this question in terms of the sorts of tracking systems required for creatures like us to act in a reliably successful manner. Along the way, I will give an account of what it is to be tensed in terms of temporal tracking and show that the sorts of tracking systems required for timely action end up vindicating the idea that tense is indeed a requirement for reliable timely action.

Abstracts of Symposium Papers
"A Better Best System Account of Lawhood”
Jonathan Cohen, University of California–San Diego
 Perhaps the most significant contemporary theory of lawhood is the Best System (MRL) view on which laws are true generalizations that best systematize knowledge. Our question in this paper will be how best to formulate a theory of this kind. We’ll argue that an accetable MRL should (i) avoid inter-system comparisons of simplicity, strength, and balance, (ii) make lawhood epistemically accessible, and (iii) allow for laws in the special sciences. Attention to these problems will bring into focus a useful menu of novel MRL theories, some of which solve problems the original MRL theory could not. Hence we conceive of the paper as moving toward a better Better Systems theory of laws

"Agent-Relativity and Second-personality”
Mark LeBar, Ohio University
 Second-personal reasons are (if Stephen Darwall is correct) an important and distinctive class of practical reasons. The "second-personal standpoint,” a perspective that "you and I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one another’s conduct and will,” underwrites our ordinary understanding of moral obligation and our practices of making claims on others and holding them accountable as members of a moral community. However, to do this work, such reasons must also be agent-relative, rather than agent-neutral, and I believe Darwall’s account of them makes their agent-relativity problematic. At the very least, we cannot rely on the contents of agent-relative reasons to explain how they differ from agent-neutral ones. I explain what I take the problem to be and suggest what I take to be promising ways to remedy it.

"Character Traits, Social Psychology, and Impediments to Helping Behavior”
Christian Miller, Wake Forest University
 One of the liveliest areas of work in experimental philosophy in the past ten years has examined the implications of empirical results in social psychology for the existence and nature of character traits. In a number of recent papers, I have drawn on the social psychology literature to develop a new theory of character which is conceptually distinct both from traditional Aristotelian accounts as well as from the positive view of local traits outlined by Gilbert Harman and John Doris. On my view, many human beings do have robust traits of character which play an important explanatory and predictive role, but which are triggered by certain situational variables which preclude them from counting as genuine Aristotelian virtues. The goal of this paper is to develop this positive view in a new direction by examining in detail several important impediments to helping behavior which can inhibit the activation of helping-relevant traits.

"Is Logic in the Mind or in the World?”
Gila Sher, University California–San Diego
 In this paper I present an outline of a unified answer to the following questions: 1. Is logic in the mind or in the world? 2. Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be over come? 3. How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? 4. Is there a criterion of logicality? 5. What is the relation between logic and mathematics? Due to limitations on space I focus primarily on the first two questions and briefly describe my answers to the last three.

"Rationalism Within Reason”
Michael Nelson, University of California–Riverside
 I discuss Kieran Setiya’s argument for the Virtue Theory of practical reason and against rationalist views. Setiya’s argument targets the doctrine of the guise of the good, according to which there is a constitutive connection between intentional action and evaluative judgments of the good. I agree that there is no such connection and that it is implausible to draw standards of practical reasoning from the concept of intentional action. But I argue that there is a constitutive connection between autonomous agency and evaluative judgments and that the rationalist can appeal to this connection in identifying the standards of practical reason.

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