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2006 Pacific Division Abstracts
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"Francios Lamy, Occasionalism, and the Mind-Body Problem"
Fred Ablondi, Hendrix College
The standard historical narrative in undergraduate philosophy courses holds that Malebranche and his fellow occasionalists were drawn to occasionalism to solve the problem of explaining interaction between immaterial souls and extended bodies. Such an understanding, however, is inaccurate; Malebranche et. al. adopted occasionalism for a variety of reasons, but none did so because of a need to provide an ad hoc solution to a perceived mind-body problem. Yet there is one Cartesian for whom the 'traditional' reading is on the mark. Francois Lamy (1636-1711) argues exactly as the standard story has it: occasionalism is adopted explicitly on the grounds that interaction between the mind and the body can only be accounted for by invoking an omnipotent deity. I discuss and analyze Lamy's argument, but not as an attempt to revive the 'traditional story'. Rather the case of Lamy reminds us to be wary of making blanket claims about the 'occasionalists.'

"Understanding the Embodiment of Perception"
Kenneth Aizawa, Centenary College of Louisiana
Where it is commonly thought that (CAH) Perceptual experience is caused, in part, by sensorimotor skills, Noë (2004) proposes the more radical hypothesis that (COH) Perceptual experience is constituted, in part, by sensorimotor skills. Clearly these two hypotheses offer distinct conceptions of what the embodiment of perception amounts to. This paper will argue that the two principal lines of argumentation in Noë (2004) fail to support (COH) over (CAH).

"Aspirational Forgiveness"
Lucy Allais, University of Sussex
The logical coherence of the notion of forgiveness has been thought to be threatened by a combination of two factors: (1) forgiveness centrally involves the idea of somehow ceasing to hold a wrong against the perpetrator, but (2) forgiveness must be granted with awareness of the wrong and the perpetrator's culpability for the wrong in full view, and without changing the belief in this. The common view that forgiveness consists of overcoming retributive emotions does not explain the idea of ceasing to hold a wrong against someone, and the problem is exaccerbated by the cognitive account of emotion usually appealed to – if emotions centrally involve beliefs, then we cannot overcome the emotion while maintaining the belief. Using a different account of emotion, I suggest that forgiveness consists of two factors: overcoming negative emotions towards the perpetrator, and ceasing to regard the wrongdoing as centrally attaching to their character.

"Can You Coerce Someone with a Death Wish?"
Scott A. Anderson, University of British Columbia
Coercion, it is generally thought, works psychologically, by putting pressure on the will, to alter the coercee's choice of action. Force and other direct interventions work physically, against a body, and do not necessarily affect what their target wills to do. Upon these considerations, much recent philosophy of coercion has sharply distinguished coercion from the use of force. By considering what it takes to check someone with a death wish, I argue that the use of force or other direct intervention is much more closely connect to coercion that goes through the will than is commonly understood. In fact, coercion is best understood as a use of the kinds of power that make direct intervention an effective technique against nihilists and ot hers harboring non-standard or anti-social desires. The willingness and ability to use force is primary, and coercion by means of threats is simply a special case of it.

"Fools for Moderation"
Barbara S. Andrew, William Paterson University
Literature about the benefits of marriage often takes one of two tacks: either it argues that there is an ideal form of marriage and that helps to create moral virtues in the spouses, or it argues that marriage plays a foundational role in the state by helping to mold citizens and providing a basic unit with which the state interacts. The first kind of argument about moral virtue usually argues for an ideal of Acompanionate marriage, the second kind of argument relies on a certain notion of the state. In this essay, I argue that marriage requires virtue and may help us in developing virtue. I contend that this development and expression of virtue is an ethical right and benefit that, if due to some, is due to all citizens. However, I also contend that the connection between virtue and marriage differs from the common view.

"Virtue and Reliability"
Jason Baehr, Loyola Marymount University
This paper examines whether reliability is an essential or defining feature of a (moral or intellectual) virtue. I defend three main theses in connection with this issue. I argue (1) that reliability is not a defining feature of a virtue where virtues are conceived (as they oft en are) as "personal excellences," but (2) that there is another (also intuitive and familiar) conception of a virtue according to which reliability is a defining feature. I also argue (3) that even on the former conception a certain rational belief pertaining to reliability is essential. The discussion sheds important light on the nature of moral and intellectual virtues and on certain debates in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.

"Is Virtue Priceless?"
Anne Margaret Baxley, Washington University in St. Louis
This paper concerns the relationship between virtue and competing options. Does the brave person recognize that bravery has a cost, since bravery at times requires tremendous sacrifice? Or does the brave person feel no pain at the prospect of death when standing firm in the face of danger for a good cause? Favoring the latter account of the virtuous person's moral outlook, John McDowell has argued that the truly virtuous person never experiences any conflict between the demands of virtue and other options, because the requirements of virtue 'silence' other reasons for action. McDowell maintains that this silencing interpretation can be found in Aristotle's texts and that it represents a plausible and appealing picture of virtue. In this paper I argue that the silencing interpretation is not compelling. As Aristotle rightly saw, virtue can have a cost, and a mark of the wise person is that she recognize it.

"Representing Personal Identity"
Donald L.M. Baxter, University of Connecticut
Famously Hume finds himself in a labyrinth concerning personal identity. I will give a simple argument that stays very close to Hume's own words in the Appendix passage, and that adds only an assumption he endorses elsewhere. I focus on Hume's account of consciousness. No competing interpretation has had this focus despite the fact that the "promising aspect" of Hume's account is that "personal identity arises from consciousness" and that his "hopes vanish" when he comes "to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness" (App.20 /635636). The key assumption for Hume, I argue, is that consciousness's ideas are unerring. The Appendix labyrinth is how to make sense of an identity between the distinct past perceptions, in order to explain how consciousness's unerring ideas can represent them as identical.

"Thomson, First- and Second-order Ways of Being Good, and the Mysterious Relation Puzzle"
Michael Beaty, Baylor University
Judith Jarvis Thomson claims that G. E. Moore's story aboutthe right and the good is incoherent, because there is no such property as intrinsic goodness. She offers a new story about the right and the good which she finds "very attractive." Central to her story is a distinction between first-order and second-order ways of being good. Though she admits that "there are gaps" in her account, she thinks "its structure must be correct." One such gap is the absence of an account of the relation between first- and second-order ways of being good. I call this the "gap puzzle." I argue that this puzzle is a symptom of her failure to distinguish adequately between first- and second-order ways of being good. I offer an account of the distinction which solves the "gap puzzle" while preserving her distinction between first-order and second-order ways of being good.

"Developmental Process Reliabilism and a Theory of Evidence"
Matthew Bedke, University of Arizona
Justified beliefs are connected to truth. But justification also concerns one's evidence. These two platitudes have generated very divergent theories of justification – externalist theories focus on the former, while internalist theories focus on the latter. The aim of this paper is to reconcile the platitudes and form a unified theory that integrates the epistemic concepts involved. To get the appropriate truth connection we must modify standard process reliabilism and focus on the developmental reliability of processes rather than their actual or suitably restricted counterfactual reliabilities. According to the resulting theory, developmental process reliabilism, processes confer justification just in case they enjoy the right developmental history. This account of justification can evade some traditional objections to standard reliabilism, which are thought to weigh in favor of internalist theories. But most importantly, developmental process reliabilism offers an externalist analysis of evidence, achieving some reconciliation between internalism and externalism in the process.

"Has BonJour Solved the Problem of Induction?"
James R. Beebe, State University of New York - Buffalo
According to Laurence BonJour's (1998) recent solution to the problem of induction, our inductive beliefs are justified because we can apprehend a priori the necessary truth that inductive conclusions are generally the best explanations of inductive premises. After explicating the nature of the probability claims at the heart of BonJour's solution, I argue that, even if we can have the a priori knowledge BonJour thinks we can, this knowledge is not sufficient for possessing a solution to the problem of induction.

"How to Perceive the Past with Your Eyes Shut"
John T. Bengson, University of Texas - Austin
It is widely assumed that, first, perception is always of the present and, second, sensory organs always operate at the time of perceiving. I contend that both of these assumptions are mistaken. After arguing that ordinary star-gazing is perception of the past, I develop Kendall Walton's thesis that to look at a photograph is to genuinely see whatever it is a photograph of, namely, a past scene. I then provide reasons to think that we may also perceive past scenes in virtue of remembering. My argument appeals to (1) the possibility of the phenomenon of "snapshot perception", (2) the way we sometimes talk about our remembrances, and (3) the fact that episodic memory is in all ontologically relevant ways on par with "ordinary" perception, including and especially in the respect that instances of the former, like instances of the latter, regularly satisfy (non-question-begging versions of) the causal theory of perception.

"The Implications of Social Psychology for Corporate Responsibility"
Lorraine Besser-Jones, University of Waterloo
A long-standing debate in the field of business ethics arises over the nature of corporate responsibility. A central issue emerging within this debate concerns whether or not corporations have social responsibilities, or whether their responsibilities lie solely to members of the corporation itself (i.e., its shareholders). While the view that corporations have social responsibilities is a morally attractive one, it is subject to serious objections. My goal here is to rescue this view by providing a new argument, grounded in social psychology, which avoids these objections. My argument, in short, is that leaders of corporations should endorse socially responsible action in order to attain their own goals of profit-maximization. Given the documented situational influences on individuals' behavior, a corporation that fails to do so is liable to self-destruct.

"The Errant Feminine in Plato's Timaeus"
Emanuela Bianchi, University of California - Berkeley
This paper gives a critical feminist reading of the receptacle/chora in Plato's Timaeus, and illuminates how the source of motion in this version of the Platonic cosmos is irreducibly marked as feminine. The Awandering, errant, motion famously associated with the womb at the end of the dialogue in fact infuses the cosmos from its very beginnings. The receptacle/chora is a restless and labile notion, and reading it alongside the Irigarayan figure of the two lips offers a destabilization that allows for an immanent critique of ancient metaphysics against itself, at the same time as remaining answerable to contemporary critical concerns.

"A Paradox for Theories of Welfare"
Ben Bradley, Syracuse University
Sometimes people desire that their lives go badly. Recently it has been pointed out that such desires seem to create a paradox, akin to the liar, for desire satisfactionism. What has not been pointed out is that the paradox also arises for other theories of welfare. Given the importance of welfare theory for ethical theory and political philosophy, the paradox deserves more attention. In what follows I explain the paradox for desire satisfactionism, I show how the paradox arises for some other welfare theories, and I discuss some attempts to defend those theories from the paradox. I claim that no defense fully succeeds.

"On Behalf of Moral Principles"
Jason Brennan, University of Arizona
Particularism is the thesis that there are no moral principles. Two of the main arguments for particularism are the Argument by Counterexample and the Switching Valence Argument. The Argument by Counterexample purports to show that there is a counterexample to any proffered set of moral principles, thus morality is not captured byprinciples. In response, I argue that what particularists have really shown is that anomalies to principles always exist. I explain how such anomalies occur in other fields and are not, by themselves, a mark against principles.The Switching Valence Argument is meant to show that reasons atomism is false. Reasons atomism is the view that the moral force (positive, negative, or indifferent) of reasons can be characterized prior to context. However, I argue that Switching Valence Argument, rather than countingagainst reason atomism, actually counts on behalf of it, because it makes moral reasons strongly analogous to actual chemical atoms.

"How Structuralism Can Solve the 'Access' Problem"
Otávio Bueno, University of South Carolina
According to mathematical structuralism, the subject matter of mathematics is not the study of mathematical objects, but of mathematical structures. By moving away from objects, the structuralist claims to be in a position to solve the 'access' problem: structuralism explains the possibility of mathematical knowledge without requiring any access to mathematical objects. In a recent paper, Fraser MacBride challenged the structuralist response, and argued that the structuralist faces a dilemma in the attempt to solve that problem (MacBride [2004]). In the present paper, I argue that MacBride's dilemma can be resisted, and that, particularly in the version articulated by Michael Resnik (Resnik [1997]), structuralism can solve the 'access' problem. I show exactly how MacBride's dilemma fails, and argue that this failure provides an opportunity to highlight a significant feature of structuralism: the way in which it articulates a fund amentally different picture of mathematical epistemology than traditional epistemology would suggest.

"Safety and the End of Liberalism"
Derrick R. Calandrella, Independent Scholar
Liberalism begins in the conviction that the will is an unlimited power to control the body. Because the individual exercise of this power poses a potential threat to other individuals, liberty goes hand in hand with the problem of security. These two concepts (liberty and security) jointly determine the history of liberalism up to the present. Today, however, liberty has been subordinated to security, reversing their relationship through most of the liberal tradition. We see this in the manic concern for safety that characterizes the daily life and foreign policy of our nation. If the future of politics is not to succumb to the nihilism of pointless solutions, we must find another way to think of freedom. There are strands of contemporary philosophy that suggest this alternative. By starting with vulnerability ratherthan safety, they propose a new way of considering ourpolitical experience.

"Why Isn't Sarcasm Semantic, Anyway?"
Elisabeth Camp, Harvard University
Nearly everyone assumes that sarcasm is a pragmatic phenomenon. But we can also construct a prima facie plausible semantic model of sarcasm. Further, sarcasm behaves semantically according to three classic tests that purport to distinguish the semantic from the pragmatic: cancelability, conjunction reduction, and embedding. Nonetheless, I argue, we should trust our pre-theoretical intuition; sarcasm is indeed pragmatic, and the tests are unreliable.

"Happiness, Eudaimonia, and Descriptive Adequacy"
Matthew Carter Cashen, Washington University in St. Louis
Notoriously, much of what Aristotle says about eudaimonia sounds dubious if we take him to be talking about happiness as we know it, and so there is an old question as to whether we should take him that way. Recent strategies for theorizing about happiness suggest that we should not. According to L. W. Sumner's test of descriptive adequacy, theories of happiness should be assessed in terms of how well they describe our ordinary intuitions. Thus, if Aristotle's claims are as dubious as they sound when taken as claims about happiness, either his theory is badly flawed, or he is not talking about happiness at all, but about something else, like well-being or flourishing. My aim is to challenge this view, first by challenging the complaint that Aristotle's theory is obviously descriptively inadequate, and second, by challenging descriptive adequacy itself as an ideal to strive for in theorizing about happiness.

"Belief Attribution and the Falsification of Motive Internalism"
Michael Cholbi, California State Polytechnic University - Pomona
Belief attribution and the falsification of motive internalism Motive internalism (MI) holds that moral beliefs are necessarily motivating. Adina Roskies has recently argued against this position on the grounds that patients with injuries to the ventromedial (VM ) cortex are counterexamples to MI. These patients appear to have moral beliefs that they regularly fail to act upon while also exhibiting no physiological or affective evidence of being motivated by these beliefs. I argue that Roskies' attempt to falsify MI is unpersuasive because the evidence used to attribute the relevant moral beliefs to VM patients is insufficient: Contra Roskies, that VM patients are proficient moral reasoners does not establish the presence of these moral beliefs. In addition, the linguistic evidence Roskies cites (a) is vulnerable to methodological worries about its reliability or authenticity, (b) does not override counterevidence derived from the patients' non-linguistic behavior, and (c) is undermined by VM patients' inability to correctly attribute moral beliefs to others.

"Malebranche's Soft Dualism"
Monte Cook, University of Oklahoma
Usually Malebranche seems to follow Descartes in holding that there are only two kinds of substances. But in a little-discussed section of the Search After Truth, he argues against judging that minds and bodies are the only kinds of (created) substances, to which both Simon Foucher and Robert Desgabets respond that it is crucial that there be only minds and bodies. Foucher says that denying this opens the door to Pyrrhonism, and Desgabets adds that Malebranche's talk about beings that are neither minds nor bodies is empty of content. I argue that despite denying that we should judge that minds and bodies are the only kinds of substances, Malebranche still advocates a kind of dualism that I call 'soft dualism.' And I briefly suggest that he has within his system the resources to answer Foucher and Desgabets.

"A Defense of Phenomenal Conservatism"
Andrew Cullison, West Virginia University
Phenomenal conservatism is the view that if it seems to you that some proposition is true, and you have no defeaters, then you're justified in believing that proposition. I defend phenomenal conservatism from four very recent objections.

"A Teleological Account of Cartesian Sensations?"
Raffaella De Rosa, Rutgers University - Newark
Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes held a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes' view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e. their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e. their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her interpretation has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons' teleological account cannot be sustained for both theoretical and textual reasons and that it does not have the advantages it is advertised as having.

"How to Be a Scientific Realist"
Gerald D. Doppelt, University of California - San Diego
This paper seeks to develop a more defensible case for scientific realism. I argue against two standard assumptions of realists: (1) that realism is confirmed if it provides the best explanation of theories' predictive success and (2) that the realist claim that successful theories are true, by itself, provide the best explanation of their success. On the positive side, I argue that the confirmation of realism requires that it provides an explanation of theories' explanatory success, not just predictive success. I then show how realism can explain theories' explanatory success. I propose a richer realist model for explaining theories' success which includes an account of their epistemic virtues (e.g. simplicity and unification) and standards of success, as well as the realist hypotheses that they are true. This realist model is further confirmed because it can explain the success of theories in gaining adherents.

"Contextualism and the Problem of Knowing What One Says"
Mylan Engel, Northern Illinois University
Contextualists maintain that the semantic standards governing knowledge ascriptions of the form 'S knows that p' are a function of the salience of p-falsifying error possibilities. They contend that when p-falsifying error possibilities become salient in a given conversation, the semantic standards governing 'knows that p' rise in response, often to the point where S ceases to satisfy those standards. I show that contextualism has the implausible result that knowledge ascribers frequently fail to know what they are saying when they are saying it. In particular, I demonstrate (i) that Cohen's version of contextualism entails that knowledge acsribers often don't know the semantic content of their knowledge ascriptions, until after they have uttered them, and (ii) that on DeRose's version of contextualism, knowledge ascribers don't know whether their knowledge-attributing utterances even have any semantic content, until after they have uttered them.

"Knowing that One Knows Revisited"
Ian Evans, Lewis and Clark College
The following principle is commonly assumed by contemporary epistemologists: DKK. If S knows that S knows that p, then S knows that p, S knows that S believes that p, and S knows that S is warranted in believing that p (and S knows that S satisfies all the conditions of warrant). DKK is typically invoked in discussions of the KK-thesis (roughly, that whatever S knows, S knows that S knows it), but also makes appearances in discussions of meta-knowledge quite generally. After examining how DKK istypically used to argue against the KK-thesis, I will present four arguments for holding that DKK is false and runs counter to standard epistemological methodology. I will then present my own analysis of knowing that one knows.

"Observer-Dependence in Ethics and Epistemology"
Jeremy Fantl, Haverford College
According to observer-dependent views (ODVs), all normative statements are true in virtue of mental states of appropriately placed observers. It is generally thought that such views enjoy significantly more prima facie plausibility in ethics than in epistemology. I argue that there is a fundamental kind of critique of ODVs in ethics that is not as compelling in epistemology. Our first-order moral intuitions tell against ODVs in ethics in a way that our first-order epistemic intuitions do not tell against ODVs in epistemology. Therefore, ODVs require 'reform of the face value' of our ethics in a way that they do not require reform of the face value of our epistemology. This is at least one reason to find ODVs in ethics less plausible than ODVs in epistemology.

"Explicitating Habermas: Expressive Rationality as Corrective to Communicative Action"
Stephen Farrelly, Emory University
Habermas' account of post-metaphysical justification rests on the assertion that he has identified the necessary structures of argumentation. This assertion vitiates his project by treating a normative distinction we draw as an assertion about the natural structure of the world. As such, it violates his own definition of a 'post-metaphysical' theory. The project can be rescued and improved by replacing the quasi-trasncendental turn with an expressivist theory of rationality a la Robert Brandom. This substitution allows us to understand Habermas' conditions of argumentation as norms implicit in how we argue. As norms, they themselves stand in need of reasons. Likewise, they are open to revision. Treating the norms of argumentation in this manner provides a more fruitful approach to Habermas' general project, which treats rationalization as good insofar as it opens our own traditions to criticism. Expressive rationality should be understood as a necessary ingredient for a critical theory.

"The Metaphysics of Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism"
Juan Ferret, University of Texas - El Paso
In the preface of Pragmatism, William James emphatically declares "that there is no logical connexion between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.' The latter stands on its own two feet. One may entirely reject it and still be a pragmatist." He adds, "[o]ne of pragmatism's merits is that it is so purely epistemological. It must assume realities; but it prejudges nothing as to their constitution, and the most diverse metaphysics can use it as their foundation." In contrast, this paper shows that James's pragmatism leans towards the pluralistic metaphysics that he eventually develops in radical empiricism. Hence, the pluralism of radical empiricism is more fully developed than the pluralism in pragmatism.

"Representational Content and the Keys to Success"
Justin C. Fisher, University of Arizona
I consider the question of whether success-linked theories of content theories like those of Ramsey (1927), Millikan (1984) and Blackburn (2005) which take there to be a definitional link between representational content and behavioral success are consistent with the plausible claim that we can use content-attributions to explain behavioral success. Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) argues that success-linked theories of content are too closely linked to success to be able to explain it. Against this, I present a plausible account of how content-attributions make available good explanations of behavioral success, and argue that if we want our content-attributions to be able to do this explanatory work, then we actually need to embrace a success-linked theory of content.

"Substitutivity, Simple Sentences, and Belief Reports"
Heimir Geirsson, Iowa State University
Naïve Russellianism entails that substitution of coreferential names in a sentences preserves the proposition expressed and, hence, truth value. Still, we have strong anti-substitution intuitions. The paper discusses the source of our anti-substitution intuitions and presents an account that explains these anti-substitution intuitions in both simple sentences andbelief reports. The explanation relies neither on implicated propositions nor mistaken evaluations.

"Same-Sex Marriage in a Free Society: Between Toleration and Recognition"
David Gilboa, University of Wisconsin - Oshkosh
A free society would protect the freedom of same-sex marriage either as a religious freedom or as a municipal freedom. At the same time, the public may fail to recognize same-sex marriage by withholding from same-sex couples the legal rights of married, opposite-sex couples. If this situation gives rise to unjust discrimination, a free society may go a long way towards restoring justice to same-sex couples by either classifying same-sex couples as civil unions or incrementally, through court decisions addressing particular cases.

"Is There an Overdetermination Problem for Lewisian-Style Counterfactual Analysis of Causation?"
Dana Lynne Goswick, University of California - Davis
David Lewis' counterfactual analysis of causation is often criticized on the grounds that it cannot adequately account for causal overdetermination. I concede this is true if we follow Lewis' account of events. I argue, however, that, while maintaining Lewis' general view of events as transworld sets, causal overdetermination can be accounted for by giving up either Lewis' requirement that events' members be minimal spacetime regions or his requirement that events have at most one member from each spacetime world. In particular, I advocate replacing the criteria that events' members must be minimal spacetime regions with the criteria that events' members must be almost minimal spacetime regions. So doing allows one to claim that disjunctive events exist. I then show how such events allow Lewisian-style counterfactual analyses to explain causal overdetermination.

"Reid's Direct Realism About Vision"
Giovanni B. Grandi, Auburn University
Thomas Reid presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764). The axioms of this geometry are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. The "geometry of visibles" is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface it self. In a recent article, J. Van Cleve has argued that Reid can secure a non-Euclidean geometry of visibles only at the cost of abandoning his direct realist theory of perception, and reintroducing sense-data. The question will be reexamined by considering two aspects of Reid's theory of vision: the claim that we do not directly perceive distance by sight and Reid's characterization of visible figure as a partial notion of an external object.

"Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility"
Hilary Greaves, Rutgers University
David Wallace, Oxford University
According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalization. This claim that conditionalization is recommended by rationality can be challenged – whence the normative force of the injunction to conditionalize? There are several existing justifications for conditionalization, but none directly addresses the idea that conditionalization will be epistemically rational if and only if it can reasonably be expected to lead to epistemically good outcomes. We apply the approach of cognitive decision theory to provide a justification for conditionalization using precisely that idea. We assign epistemic utility functions to epistemically rational agents; an agent's epistemic utility is to depend both upon the actual state of the world and on the agent's credence distribution over possible states. We prove that, under independently motivated conditions, conditionalization is the unique updating rule that maximizes expected epistemic utility.

"Testimony and Memory as Generative Epistemic Sources"
Christopher R. Green, University of Notre Dame
This paper is part of a project defending a strong analogy among the epistemologies of testimony, memory, and perception. Probably the most frequently mentioned purported disanalogy among those epistemic sources is the suggestion that perception is a generative epistemic source, while testimony is merely transmissive, and memory merely preservative. I will argue that both testimony and memory can be generative epistemic sources, because they can be generative doxastic sources: sources of new beliefs. True, testimony and memory are merely preservative of positional justification, but perception is also merely preservative of that property, because perception likewise depends on environmental information.

"On Judging the Moral Value of Narrative Artworks"
James Harold, Mount Holyoke College
In this paper, I argue that in at least some interesting cases, the moral value of a narrative work depends on the aesthetic properties of that artwork. It does not follow that a work that is aesthetically bad will be morally bad (or that it will be morally good). The argument comprises four stages. First I describe several different features of imaginative engagement with narrative artworks. Then I show that these features depend on some of the aesthetic properties of those works. Third, I argue that these same features of imaginative engagement are morally salient, by virtue of inviting more or less sophisticated and reflective moral responses. Finally, I show that the overall moral value of an artwork depends in part on whether or not the prescribed response is simple or complex, passive or reflective.

"World Poverty and Individual Freedom"
Nicole Hassoun, University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
This paper argues that we are obligated to structure the global institutional system such that it is enabling all people to meet their basic needs. After considering the nature of the global institutional system, it suggests that the system must at least meet some minimal requirements for legitimacy. It contends that as many of those subject to the system as possible must, while living under the system, be able to autonomously agree to live under the system. For most individuals to develop and exercise their autonomy, they must be able to preserve the integrity of their bodies and minds which requires that they are able to meet their basic needs. However, it is not possible to tell which individuals will gain autonomy without the ability to preserve the integrity of their bodies and minds. So, the paper concludes the global institutional system must enable everyone to meet their basic needs.

"Well-Being and Aristotelian Perfection"
Daniel Haybron, St. Louis University
Aristotelian accounts of well-being or flourishing have gained considerable prominence in the recent literature, and for good reason. They can account for a variety of intuitions about well-being that alternative views seem unable to handle. This paper examines their most distinctive feature, welfare perfectionism: the view that well-being consists at least partly in perfection, excellence, or virtue. I argue that perfectionism is probably false despite the replies that have been made to previous critiques. The argument has two parts. First I present several examples that perfectionists seem unable to accommodate. I then argue that perfectionist and prudential values play different roles in human life. They answer to distinct concerns, such that we should not expect perfection to be a fundamental constituent of well-being.

"Grice's Razor"
Allan J. Hazlett, Brown University
Grice's Razor says that, given some linguistic behavior to be explained, we should prefer, ceteris paribus, simpler pragmatic explanations in terms of general features of language (like appeals to conversational implicature) to more complicated semantic explanations. The principle applies to theories of knowledge attributions, as Jonathan Schaffer has recently pointed out; contextualism comes out looking bad compared to Gricean accounts. But while Schaffer's rejection of contextualism is right, his defense of a skeptical Gricean account of our knowledge attributions in terms of hyperbole is wrong. Other principles govern our selection of linguistic explanations, among them a principle of charity and what I call a 'principle of believability'. I defend these principles, rejecting both contextualism and Schaffer's proposal, and propose an anti-skeptical Gricean account of knowledge attributions and denials.

"Extended Memories and the Functional Roles Objection"
Sean Hermanson, Florida International University
The Extended Mind thesis says that some mental processes are literally implemented by states that extend beyond the body. Recent criticism of such 'transcranial cognition' offered by Rupert exemplifies a version of what I call the 'functional roles' objection. His objection contends that since extended realizers fail to exhibit certain ubiquitous effects of vertebrate memory, they do not implement the functional roles characteristic of genuine mental processes. I offer three criticisms of this view. First, the objection seems persuasive since it presumes a version of Functionalism which denies the Extended Mind hypothesis. Second, the specific differences Rupert cites as essential marks of genuine memory are not essential since human subjects who failed to exhibit them would nevertheless continue to have beliefs and memories. Third, there are real world examples of extended information-storage systems which exhibit the supposed characteristic features of real memory.

"Foundational Belief and the Structure of Justification"
Kenneth E. Hobson, University of Iowa
Richard Feldman argues that traditional foundationalism holds that our justification for beliefs about the external world requires justified beliefs about sensations. Problems encountered by this requirement makes traditional foundationalism untenable, a result which supposedly gives dialectical support to a version of non-traditional foundationalism that we might call noninferentialism: perceptual experience alone gives us justification for external world beliefs. I argue that the problems faced by traditional foundationalism do not directly support noninferentialism. This is because there are two other intermediate inferentialist foundational theories – call them restrictivism and permissivism – that, while not requiring justified sensory beliefs, still capture the intuition motivating traditional foundationalism. These hold that justification for external world beliefs can be constituted by our merely having justification for sensory beliefs. Permissivism holds further that we can justifiably base external world beliefs on such justification. An argument for permissivism is sketched that utilizes a non-causal conception of epistemic basing.

"Emergentism and Supervenience Physicalism"
Robert Howell, Southern Methodist University
It is attractive to define physicalism in terms of a supervenience thesis: physicalism is true iff all properties supervene on physical properties. In a recent article, Jessica Wilson has argued that such a definition is inadequate because it does not exclude dualistic emergentism. Given necessitarianism about laws, emergent properties metaphysically supervene on their physical bases, thus supervenience cannot properly characterize physicalism. In this paper, I argue that even assuming necessitarianism, emergent properties do not supervene on their bases. The reason is that necessitarianism is only plausible if it requires laws to be explanatory, while it is of the essence of emergence laws that they are "brute." The result is that a necessitarian should either deny that emergence laws are really laws, maintaining instead that they are contingent generalizations, or emergentism should not really be considered dualistic. Supervenience is still the best way to define physicalism.

"Vagueness Does Not Entail Unrestricted Composition"
Casey Karbowski, Western Washington University
Arguments from David Lewis and Theodore Sider are convincing a number of philosophers to accept a principle of unrestricted composition, the view that for any plurality of objects, there is a further object that has those as its parts. They argue that there can neither be a sharp nor vague cut-off between objects and non-objects, and so every plurality must compose an object. Their argument fails, because there can be sharp cut-offs in analogous situations, such as between persons and non-persons.

"On Complacency"
Jason Kawall, Colgate University
Like many moral vices, complacency has received very little recent philosophical attention. In this paper I attempt to address this neglect, at least to some extent. I first draw attention to inadequacies in common dictionary definitions of complacency and provide an alternative that avoids these problems. I then contrast complacency with such 'nearby' vices as apathy, resignation, akrasia, and hypocrisy. Finally , I briefly argue for the importance of exemplary agents in efforts to end complacency.

"Compatibilism and Retributivism"
Erin I. Kelly, Tufts University
This paper distinguishes between a relational notion of blame and a metaphysical notion of blame. The relational notion is compatible with causal determinism while the metaphysical notion is not. I argue that compatibilist accounts of responsibility are unsatisfactory when it comes to retributive justice. A relational notion of blame cannot adequately justify the reactive attitudes upon which some retributivists attempt to build a case for criminal punishment. The stronger, metaphysical notion of blame, however, is open to skeptical doubt. While an agent's deliberative perspective and some of our moral relationships may be unavoidably bound up with an unstable metaphysical notion of responsibility, a system of criminal justice can avoid it. We could instead view punishment as a regrettable cost of a society's crime prevention program, one that presupposes on a weaker, relational notion of blame.

"Definition by Abstraction"
Joongol Kim, Western Illinois University
Neo-Fregeans like Crispin Wright and Bob Hale have defended the status of abstraction principles as definitions. In this paper I argue that taken as a definition, an abstraction principle can be satisfied by more than one concept, and this raises the possibility that one of the interpretations it allows of fails to serve its purposes as a definition. I show that in some cases of abstraction principles this possibility is actual. Then I argue that even the mere possibility of a rogue interpretation, from which no abstraction principles can be immune, suffices to show that they can never attain the status of a self-justifying definition.

"Conditional Desires"
Shieva J. Kleinschmidt, Rutgers University
There's an intuitive distinction between two types of desires: conditional (desires for things such that we want to get them only as long as we'll still want them when we get them) and unconditional (desires for things that we want to get regardless of how we'll feel about them later). Derek Parfit has suggested that we interpret conditional desires as desires involving certain conditionals – that is, that we interpret them as being implicitly conditional upon their own persistence. While this account seems intuitive, I argue that it is incorrect. In this paper, I examine several ways of cashing out conditional desires in terms of conditionals, and show problems with each. Then I set those problems aside and present a trilemma against this way of interpreting conditional desires, based on problems independent of those already mentioned. Finally, I conclude by noting that the problems I raise apply to a wide variety of accounts, not just those involving conditionals, which leaves us with an interesting puzzle: we have an intuitive, easily graspable distinction, and a difficulty in accounting for it.

"Incars, Outcars, Klables, and Trables: What the Commonsense Ontologist Should Say About Strange Kinds"
Daniel Z. Korman, University of Texas - Austin
According to the naive conception of material objects, there are tables, mountains, cats and their tails, but nothing composed entirely of my nose and the Eiffel Tower. The naive conception has fallen out of favor among metaphysicians for a number of reasons. One such reason – often alluded to, but rarely spelled out with any precision – concerns the possibility of having acquired certain strange kind concepts in place of our own. The mere possibility of a community with a conceptual repertoire consisting of such strange kind concepts puts pressure on the proponent of the naive conception to expand his ontology to include all of these strange kinds. I provide an explicit statement of this argument from strange concepts and then, drawing upon the Merrill-Lewis theory of eligible referents and concepts, offer a novel solution to the problem that does not require one to abandon the naive conception.

"The Limits of Predictability: Two Case Studies in (Physical) Demonology"
Alexandre V. Korolev, University of British Columbia
While the current view is that quantum algorithms lead to re-describing of the complexity space of computational problems, recently it has been argued that they may even require reconsidering the whole notion of computability itself, by being able to "compute the noncomputable". The possibility of hypercomputation, or supertasks performing infinite number of computational steps in a finite time compatible with modern physical theories, raises a number of important philosophical issues, pushing one to look at the age-old philosophical debates anew. The first episode of the paper is concerned with the computational predictive limitations of a classical Laplace's demon. The second episode is a recent debate in the field of quantum computation with its recently proposed quantum adiabatic algorithms capable of performing supertasks. If realized, these would serve as an Oracle needed for a Laplacian demon to be able to predict the future successfully. I critically address this latter proposal.

"Similarity Is a Bad Guide to Counterfactual Truth"
Douglas N. Kutach, Brown University
The most popular theory of how to evaluate counterfactuals is to use the Lewis-Stalnaker logic together with some reasonably tractable refinement of our ordinary notions of similarity. This approach is misguided because for some ordinary counterfactuals, irrelevant possible worlds end up determining the counterfactuals' truth values . This undermines some of the support for the Lewis-Stalnaker logic, e.g. the failure of antecedent-strengthening.

"Norms of Assertion"
Jennifer Lackey, Northern Illinois University
A view growing in popularity in the recent philosophical literature is that only knowledge warrants assertion. More precisely, the following is frequently taken to be the central norm of assertion (hereafter, the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, or the KNA): KNA: One should assert that p only if one knows that p. In this paper, I argue that the KNA is false. In particular, I show that there are cases in which a speaker asserts that p in the absence of knowing that p without being subject to criticism in any relevant sense, thereby showing that knowledge cannot be what is required for proper assertion. I then develop and defend an alternate norm of assertion that not only avoids the problems afflicting the KNA, but also more fully and coherently accommodates our general intuitions about both asserters and their assertions.

"Convergences in the Public Square"
Edward A. Langerak, St. Olaf College
A general version of the restraint principle is that conscientious citizens ought to restrain themselves from using non-public reasons to advocate for coercive legislation unless they also are willing and able to provide public reasons for it. In two recent publications, Paul Weithman and Christopher Eberle object to the restraint principle. They argue on behalf of integrated believers (who feel religiously and morally obliged to shape their politics with their theological commitments) for a much looser restriction on public square arguments, but do so in ways that can construed as proposals for some convergence between integrated believers and political liberals on this issue. I analyze these as two routes toward convergence and I suggest a third, one that I develop from themes in these and other recent publications.

"(Dis)solving the Chronological Paradox in Customary International Law"
David Lefkowitz, University of North Carolina - Greensboro
As traditionally conceived, the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires that states believe the law to already require the conduct specified in the rule. Distinguishing the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist from the process whereby that customary rule becomes law dissolves this chronological paradox. Creation of a customary rule requires only that states come to believe there exists a normative standard to which they ought to adhere, not that this standard is law. What makes the customary rule law is adherence by officials in the international legal system to a rule of recognition that treats custom as a source of valid law. Confusion over this distinction arises because in the international legal system, the same agents whose beliefs give rise to a customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid.

"Assertional Practice and the False Belief Task"
Ronald W. Loeffler, Grand Valley State University
A number of prominent positions in the philosophy of language imply that, necessarily, participants in assertional practice have the concept of belief. Employing the results of a well-known developmental psychological experiment, which highlights the difficulties of ordinary three-and-a-half year old children to attribute false beliefs that p to others, I argue that this modal statement is false. My argument, and the ensuing discussion of it, if sound, show that, possibly, participants in linguistic communication track each other's doxastic states and obligations without forming any higher order mental representations involving doxastic concepts. If so, these prominent positions in the philosophy of language are, as they stand, false and in need of modification.

"Criteria and Defeasibility: When Good Evidence Is Not Good Enough"
Eric J. Loomis, University of South Alabama
With his notion of a criterion, Wittgenstein proposed a form of non-inductive evidence which would partially constitute the meaning of those statements for which it serves as evidence. Providing a cogent explication of the notion of a criterion has proven a long-standing challenge. I argue that our best hope for making sense of the notion remains the simple one of treating criterial evidence as logically entailing the truth of certain statements in the absence of a defeater. I show how more contemporary developments in fallibilist epistemology can help us to clarify this idea. I further demonstrate that a common alternative account of criteria, one which treats criterial evidence as "necessarily good" but not logically entailing, exhibits a coherence problem.

"Wordless Thoughts and Their Supposed Limits"
Robert W. Lurz, City University of New York - Brooklyn College
Bermúdez puts forward a novel theory of nonlinguistic thought that holds that (T1) nonlinguistic creatures cannot think thoughts about propositional attitudes (PAs). Bermúdez theory is significant in at least one important respect. There is a fairly established theory-of-mind (ToM) research program in primatology that is premised on the possibility of there being higher-order PAs in chimpanzees and other higher primate. If Bermúdez's theory is correct, this research program is pointless and misconceived and, what is more, can be seen to be so a priori. I argue that Bermúdez's justification for T1 rests upon two empirically implausible assumptions and, therefore, fails to undermine the underlying assumption of the ToM program in primatology.

"Kant on Morality and Temporality"
Mary C. MacLeod, Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Kant's doctrine of autonomy, like his theory of sensibility, enables the justification of synthetic a priori judgments. The pure intuitions needed for mathematics are possible only because intuition has spatio-temporal form, and moral interest in action depends on the autonomy of the will. Moreover, both moral and mathematical principles constrain the empirical application of another kind of principle. Application of the hypothetical imperative is constrained by the requirement that desired ends be pursued only through morally permissible means, and the categorial principles that underwrite physics must be temporally schematized to be legitimately employed. Given the tenets of Kant's Critical philosophy, moral principles cannot differ from mathematical principles in transcendental location while also resembling them deeply in functional role. So I argue that either Kant abandoned his Critical scruples on turning to moral philosophy or else the Categorical Imperative is the form of a passive, receptive practical faculty.

"Two Arguments Against the Particular Content Reading of Nicolas Malebranche's 'General Volitions'"
Colin R. Marshall, New York University
This paper presents two arguments against a certain interpretation, defended by Steven Nadler and Andrew Pessin, of what Malebranche calls 'general volitions.' On that interpretation, a 'general volition' for Malebranche is a volition with particular content (i.e. that makes reference to particular objects) which is in accord with some general law. The first argument challenges a motivating assumption of the interpretation: that for every particular volitional action there must be a corresponding volition with particular content. The second argument aims to show that the interpretation needlessly weakens Malebranche's solution to the problem of evil.

"The Berkeley Triangle and the Occasionalism That Lurks Beneath"
Genevieve Migely, Claremont Graduate University
Berkeley defines spirit as an active being. However, his philosophy is accused of being incapable of actually supporting this ontological claim. Numerous scholars argue that Berkeley's immaterialism outright bans any possibility of finite causation in the natural world. His immaterialism is the thesis that God, and only God, creates ideas of sense. If God alone creates ideas of sense, then finite minds are precluded from this creative ability. The upshot of this inability to produce ideas of sense is that humans would be incapable of moving their own bodies. I will attempt to show that there is no real conflict between Berkeley's philosophical triad: his immaterialism, his commonsense realism, and his spiritual ontology. I will argue that contrary to these critics, there are no occasionalist presuppositions lurking within Berkeley's overall philosophy.

"Pro-attitudes, Propositionalism, and Psychological Disharmony"
Michelle I. Montague, University of California - Irvine
Many present-day philosophers and semanticists use the expressions 'intentional attitude' and 'propositional attitude' interchangeably, thereby implicitly endorsing propositionalism, the view that every intentional attitude is a propositional attitude, and closing out an alternative view, objectualism, according to which at least some intentional attitudes are irreducibly nonpropositional attitudes, objectual attitudes, attitudes to objects, like people, that are not propositions at all. My purpose here is not to launch a general attack on propositionalism. I want rather to consider the central case of desire. I argue that propositionalist analyses of desire depend on there being a fundamental pro-attitude that cannot itself be given a propositionalist analysis. If this is right , then there can be no completely general propositionalist account of pro-attitudes, and propositionalism as a whole is also refuted. Finally, I show how this fundamental objectual proattitude can be used to characterize several kinds of psychological phenomena.

"Something's Rotten in Denmark: Inference to the Best Explanation"
Deborah Sue Mower, University of Wisconsin - Madison
There is presently an impasse on whether moral facts have an explanatory role, and if they do, whether that licenses realism about moral facts. I argue that this impasse is a result of confusion about and inconsistent usage of the concept of inference to the best explanation (IBE). Within the literature, there is 1) disagreement about necessary conditions for the "best" explanation, 2) confusion about comparative and eliminative conceptions of IBE, and 3) misapprehension about the inferences that IBE warrants. I use a probability framework from philosophy of science to analyze these various claims about moral explanations, realism, and IBE. Moving forward requires a commitment to analyzing assumptions and stating clear positions on conditions and conceptions of inference to the best explanation, as well as being aware of the limitations of IBE in supporting claims of moral realism.

"The Individuation of Trait Types and the Aetiological Theory of Function"
Bence Nanay, University of California - Berkeley
According to the aetiological theory, the function of a trait is F if this trait's performing F has (recently) contributed to the survival of the ancestors of this organism (in other words, if this trait has been selected for doing F). This definition of function relies on an unproblematic notion of trait types. The trait whose function is to be defined and the traits that have been selected for in the past must be of the same type. But how can we individuate trait types? What makes hearts different from non-hearts? I will argue that there is no coherent non-circular way of individuating trait types that is available to the aetiological theory of function.

"Two Views on Time Reversal"
Jill E. North, New York University
In a recent paper, Malament employs a time-reversal transformation that's different from the standard one. Aside from noting its naturalness and general applicability, however, he doesn't offer explicit reasons for rejecting the standard view. This is because his focus is to argue against Albert's (2000) view that electromagnetism is non-time-reversal invariant. I think Malament has been too modest. He has proposed a new and important understanding of time reversal that deserves arguing for in its own right. I present arguments that his time-reversal transformation improves on the standard one. The recent literature on time reversal has focused on whether velocities should undergo a time-reversal operation. I address a prior question: What is the proper notion of time reversal? The answer to this question is important, for it will allow us to determine whether our best theories are time-reversal invariant and, consequently, whether spacetime is temporally oriented.

"Unification and Partition-Variance"
Greg Novack, University of Wisconsin - Madison
Myrvold (2003) develops a Bayesian understanding of the virtue of unification without 'building the advantage in' to the distribution of prior probabilities. To this end he proposes a probabilistic measure of the degree to which a hypothesis unifies the evidence. I show in this essay that Myrvold's measure of degree of unification is partition-variant – it has the property that the ordering of hypotheses in terms of their degree of unification can be reversed by changing the description of the evidence. This shows that the proposal in question does not identify a suitably objective advantage that unification provides.

"Richard Posner on Democracy and Judicial Intervention"
Richard Nunan, College of Charleston
Posner's defense of Bush's judicial appointment as winner of the 2000 presidential election, is based on an argument from democratic theory involving a rejection of the concept of a collective will of the electorate, and of the concept of civic virtue. Elections do nonetheless serve a valuable purpose in Posner's view: providing a more effective solution to the problem of orderly succession of government than hereditary monarchy. I argue that Posner is committed to an attenuated conception of the general will at work in democratic electoral process, mistaken in denigrating the concept of civic virtue, and in his alternate hypothesis, that our voting behavior is driven ultimately by our perceptions of our self interest, narrowly construed. Consequently, Posner is ultimately mistaken in advocating a pragmatic approach to judicial adjudication, where only the outcome ultimately matters, not the means by which we arrive there.

"What a Law of Nature Is"
William Russell Payne, Bellevue Community College
A view of causal laws as analyses of dispositions is developed and defended. The epistemic status of laws as necessarily true property analyses is addressed along with the alleged intuition that laws are contingent and concerns about the explanatory value of dispositions.

"Can National-Defense Be Morally Grounded in Personal Self-Defense?"
Thomas W. Peard, Baker University
In his influential work War and Self-Defense, David Rodin ably challenges the view that the moral right of national-defense can be grounded in the right of self-defense. He considers and rejects the "reductive strategy" on which national-defense is viewed as a "collective form" of self-defense. He also believes that the "analogical strategy" fails, on which the right of national-defense is not reduced to self-defense but rather is claimed to be analogous to that right. I argue that Rodin has not fully refuted the reductive strategy and that there is a promising analogical strategy, which Rodin overlooks, for grounding national-defense in self-defense.

"The Red Herring of Compositionality and Beyond"
Mark Timothy Phelan, University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
I offer a critique of a general argument put to several uses by Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. I show the argument to rest on an unclear premise: the compositionality premise, which holds that the meaning of complex representations is derived from the simple representations that compose them. The premise admits of a weak and a strong interpretation. I offer evidence that Fodor and Lepore require the strong interpretation. I demonstrate that we only have reason to accept the weak interpretation. Thus the general argument fails. I then examine one particular use of the argument, to refute prototype theories of mental content. Free of the requirement of strong compositionality, we are able to appeal to additional routes to meaning for complex representations in order to explain problem cases for prototype theories. I offer some such routes.

"Glancing at the Invisible (On Inference in Aristotle's Science)"
Tiberiu M. Popa, Butler University
The central purpose of this paper is to show that a study of Aristotle's scientific method in Meteorology IV can contribute significantly to settling important problems such as whether, in his 'applied' scientific treatises, Aristotle is mindful of the prescriptions offered by his own philosophy of science (especially but not exclusively in the Posterior Analytics). In this context, I have paid special attention to Aristotle's quasi-syllogistic formulations, used in his appeal to material dispositions and implicitly in his attempt to gain insight into what is inaccessible to sense perception (e.g. the microstructure of uniform bodies). While this paper focuses on the convergence of Aristotle's philosophy of science with his theory of matter, it is also relevant to contemporary philosophy of science, especially to studies that deal with the significance of dispositions in relation to causality and scientific explanation.

"Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?"
Douglas Portmore, Arizona State University
In this paper, I present an argument that poses the following dilemma for moral theorists: either (a) reject at least one of three of our most firmly held moral convictions or (b) reject the view that moral reasons are morally overriding, that is, reject the view that moral reasons always defeat non-moral reasons in the determination of an act's deontic status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible). I then argue that we should opt for the second horn. If I'm right, if non-moral reasons are relevant to determining what is and isn't morally permissible, then moral theorists have their work cut out for them. Moral theorists will need to account for how two very different sorts of reasons, moral and non-moral reasons, "come together" to determine an act's deontic status. I will not attempt to do this work here, but rather only to argue that the work needs to be done. The view that moral reasons are morally overriding is to be distinguished from the view that moral reasons are rationally overriding, that is, the view that moral reasons always defeat non-moral reasons in the determination of an act's rational status. With regards to an act's rational status, what's most relevant here is not whether the act is rational, but whether it is in accordance with what the agent has most reason to do, for whereas the former depends on the agent's subjective beliefs, the latter depends on the facts, the facts that provide the agent with reasons to act in various ways.

"Stability and Biology: The Case of Like-Begets-Like"
Kenneth A. Presting, University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
A recent paper by Marc Lange, "Laws and Their Stability," presents an interesting thesis: that certain sets, such as the logical or physical necessities, may be identified as stable by testing the logical relations between the sentences in the set, as compared to the sentences excluded from the set, using certain counterfactual conditionals. I will argue that Lange's definition of stability is circular, despite some strenuous work on his part to avoid that problem. Along the way, I will show that the acceptance and correctness of counterfactuals in several fields has more to do with our human need to discuss possibilities we need not (or cannot) fully describe, than with the laws that necessarily govern our practical lives.

"The Medium Is Not The Message"
Matthew Rellihan, Georgetown University
I argue that the idea that perception is theory-laden does not necessarily lend support to the incommensurability thesis. Perception is epistemically significant only to the extent that it is the vehicle by which information is transmitted from the world to the mind, and there are any number of ways of perceptually encoding the same bit of theory-relevant information. Indeed, t here are as many percepts carrying the information that x is F as there are perceptible events nomically dependent upon x's being F. Theory-ladenness entails, at most, that some of these paths to theory confirmation and the establishment of scientific consensus will be closed off, but it gives us no reason to expect that all of them will be. Thus, different observers may experience the world differently without thereby being led to adopt different theories of the world, and science can be objective and unbiased even if perception sometimes is not.

"Predication and Cartographic Representation"
Michael A. Rescorla, University of California - Santa Barbara
I argue that maps do not involve predication. In particular, they do not contain representational components displaying the function-argument character discerned by Frege and clarified by Tarski. Thus, the compositional mechanisms of cartographic representation are fundamentally different than those of propositional attitudes and natural language sentences. I take as my foil the recent account of Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi, which attributes predicational compositional mechanisms to cartographic representation. I argue that the details of Casati and Varzi's own formal theory militate against attributing predicational structure to maps.

"An Empirical Defense of Recognitional Concepts"
Bradley Rives, Union College
Recognitional concepts are typically defended on epistemological grounds. In this paper, I consider whether such concepts can be defended on psychological, explanatory grounds. In particular, I consider whether a certain strategy for defending the existence of analytic connections among concepts can be co-opted to defend the existence of constitutive connections between concepts and perceptual judgments. I offer some reasons for thinking that it can't. I then consider a different kind of empirical evidence for the existence of recognitional concepts, which appeals to certain psychological laws. This latter strategy, I argue, provides a promising way of defending recognitional concepts on empirical grounds.

"The Gift of Forgiveness"
Rodney C. Roberts, East Carolina University
International interest in the need to acknowledge and rectify past injustices includes a concern for these and other related matters by philosophers. Claudia Card’s recent book, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford, 2002), is illustrative of the rigorous philosophical analysis being brought to bear on questions concerning injustice and our response to it. Included in Card's theory of evil is a conception of forgiveness. Forgiveness is important on her view because (inter alia) it fosters goodwill, and it can aid in the resolution of atrocities, what Card thinks of as the paradigms of evil. However, there is a tension in Card's theory arising from her conception of forgiveness as a gift. I shall endeavor to articulate this tension, and show that, while it can be successfully dealt with, doing so requires an emendation to her theory.

"Conflicts of Obligation: A Dispositionalist Account"
Luke Robinson, University of California - San Diego
W.D. Ross appears to hold that conflicts of obligation are something else entirely and that genuine conflicts of obligation are impossible. According to him, conflicts of obligation are conflicts between "prima facie obligations" rather than conflicts between "obligations", and conflicts between the latter are impossible. But appearances notwithstanding, Ross offers us the resources to construct a plausible, dispositionalist account of conflicts between genuine obligations. On this account, prima facie obligations are obligations under a different, overtly dispositional description. Hence, conflicts between prima facie obligations are conflicts between genuine obligations.

"Kantian Moral Feeling as a Singular Referring Representation"
Timothy Rosenkoetter, Dartmouth College
The problem I address is how Kant could make sense of an agent's having an a priori moral feeling with cognitive content. My claim is that moral feeling is a conscious representation that refers to a single object and does so immediately. Those are precisely the criteria that distinguish an intuition from other representations. Accordingly, I propose that moral feeling is this moral cognition in the same sense in which an intuition is the cognition of an object. In both cases the sensible representations qualify as cognitions because they refer to objects. Yet in both cases the sensible representations are not actualized as cognitions unless they are brought into relation with concepts. This hypothesis is empty if the object to which moral feeling refers cannot be precisely specified. I sketch a model of Kantian practical reason which allows the absolutely good will to play that role.

"The Many Places of Knowledge in Nature: Reflections on Hilary Kornblith's Knowledge and Its Place in Nature"
William A. Rottschaefer, Lewis and Clark College
In his recent Knowledge and its Place in Nature, Hilary Kornblith argues that animal knowledge, including human knowledge, has a place in nature because it constitutes a natural kind. Knowledge is a natural kind because it forms a homeostatic property cluster that plays an important explanatory/causal role in the behavior of many animals. Kornblith maintains as a consequence that there is no significant difference between human and non-human cognition. On this basis he argues that analytic accounts of knowledge that maintain such a difference all fail. In this paper, I argue that knowledge constitutes notmerely a single functional biological kind but multiple kinds. Some of these kinds constitute human and non-human epistemic agents as significantly different while at the same time supporting the naturalistic account of knowledge that Kornblith urges. In contrast with Kornblith, I find that knowledge has not just one, but many places in nature.

"Can There Be Reasons that Don't Require?"
Benjamin A. Sachs, University of Wisconsin - Madison
In this essay I defend the following platitude against two recent challenges. The Platitude of Practical Reason: all reasons can ground requirements of rationality. The first challenge is found in Joshua Gert's recent book, Brute Rationality. In it he argues that reasons play two logically distinct roles – requiring action and justifying action. He argues, further, that some reasons – 'purely justificatory' reasons – play only the latter role. Jonathan Dancy offers the second challenge in his Ethics Without Principles, where he distinguishes between the 'favoring' and 'ought-making' roles of reasons. While all reasons play the former role, some do not play the latter, and are therefore irrelevant to what one rationally ought to do. My contention is that both Gert and Dancy are going to have trouble accounting for our intuitions in a number of cases.

"Ambiguity and the Representation Problem"
Paul Saka, University of Houston
I canvass eight possible approaches to representing ambiguity within truth-conditional semantics, and I argue that all are unsatisfactory. For example, it would be a mistake to hold that "x is a bank" is true iff x is a financial institution while "x is a bank" is true iff x is a slope, for then x would be a financial institution iff x is a slope. It would also be a mistake to hold that some tokens of "x is a bank" are true iff x is a financial institution while other tokens are true iff x is a slope, given the existence of punning and equivocation. My work may be taken either as a call for research on a neglected topic in truth-conditional semantics, or as a call for abandoning truth-conditional semantics.

"Who Discovered Fitch's Paradox, and Why Won't It Go Away?"
Joe R. Salerno, St. Louis University
The knowability paradox draws a semantic equivalence between the credible claim that a proposition is true only if it is knowable and the purile claim that a proposition is true only if it is known. A prominent reaction to the paradox is to restrict the quantifier 'all truths'. I argue that the restriction strategy does not make the paradox go away, since Fitch's result may be formulated without violating the natural restriction on the quantifier. The knowability paradox was first published by Fitch in 1963, but is credited to an anonymous referee from 1945. Along the way I share recently archived material that discloses the identity of the anonymous referee.

"Rorty's Hope for Philosophy"
Mark M. Sanders, St. John's University
In this paper I examine Richard Rorty's recent re-evaluation of his notion of the liberal ironist and his public/private distinction. I maintain that Rorty has not undergone a radical change in his thinking, but rather he has come to see the importance and relevance of hope to his philosophy, which begins to break down the public/private distinction of the liberal ironist. After describing the basic tenets of Rorty's liberal ironist and some criticisms of it, I turn to some of the recent developments in Rorty's thinking that he has exhibited in Philosophy and Social Hope and Achieving Our Country, as well as some recent articles about Rorty that discuss the role of hope in his philosophy. I conclude that hope re-connects Rorty to his pragmatic roots and provides him with a powerful new vocabulary with which to discuss the future of philosophy.

"Sense-Impressions, Things-in-Themselves, and the Totality of Facts"
Aaron Allen Schiller, University of California - San Diego
In Having the World in View John McDowell criticizes Wilfrid Sellars' views concerning what the latter called "the sense-impression inference." The disagreement between them is that while Sellars finds there to be sufficient grounds for admitting the existence, as well as for determining the nature, of sense-impressions, McDowell does not. While many have considered this debate recently, none have made sufficient headway in discussing what I take to be the sticking point between them. I argue that while there can be little doubt that causal connections between mind and world are necessary for empirical content, how we conceive of those connect ions makes all the difference. Sellars, in finding necessary a distinction between things-in-themselves and appearances, is thereby committed to bridging that gulf with sense impressions whereas McDowell, who holds a world of facts view, feels no such compulsion.

"Are Civil Rights Protests Self-Respecting?"
H. Benjamin Shaeffer, Humboldt State University
This paper addresses the question whether civil rights protest constitutes self-respecting behavior, and if so, how. I argue against Bernard Boxill's account of protest as the demand that one's rights be respected. For protest must be understood as a form of active self-defense of one's rights if it is to be self-respecting activity, and merely demanding that one's rights be respected cannot constitute an active defense. Since a defense of one's rights will necessarily involve coercing the oppressor to treat one with respect, my view conflicts with Gandhi'sclaim that protest should not seek to coerce the oppressor.

"Prisoner's Dilemma: The Hard Problem"
Lee Shepski, University of Arizona
Many treatments of the Prisoner's Dilemma evade (or attempt to evade) the conclusion that "defecting" is rational by relaxing one or more constraints on the problem. I argue that an ultimately satisfying solution must respect all of the following constraints: (1) the game is singleplay; (2) agreements, if any, cannot be enforced; (3) preference orderings are not altered so that it is no longer the case that each player's dominant strategy is to defect; (4) the prisoners' choices are causally and probabilistically independent; and (5) the participants possess merely ordinary (rather than ideal) rationality. I argue that when these constraints are kept in place it will be difficult and perhaps impossible to evade the conclusion that defecting is rational. I conclude by arguing that this should not, in the end, be a surprising result.

"Identification, Responsibility, and The Whim Problem"
David Shoemaker, Bowling Green State University
The Real Self View (RSV) of autonomy and moral responsibility maintains that X is morally responsible for some action only if her real self identifies with the will producing it, i.e., only if her action is genuinely self-determined. In a recent paper, however, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has presented an important new objection to the RSV, what he calls The Whim Problem. Contrary to RSV, he argues, we often hold people morally responsible for the actions they do on a whim, actions with which they do not, by definition, identify. I attempt to show how RSV may be defended against this objection, in part through an analogy with lax parents.

"A Defense Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs"
Tomoji Shogenji, Rhode Island College
This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. (1) The empirical argument purports to show that the reductionist justification of testimony is either circular since it relies on some testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of testimony. (2) The semantic argument purports to show that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presupposition of people's truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. I point out that the semantic argument owes its apparent strength to the ambiguity of the term "assumption" between a presupposition and a hypothesis. To interpret utterances, the epistemic subject only needs the hypothesis that the testimony is credible, which is to be confirmed or disconfirmed by non-testimonial evidence. It is shown that this response to the semantic argument also undercuts the empirical argument.

"On the Value of Happiness: Herder Contra Kant"
Sonia Sikka, University of Ottawa
This paper examines the debate between Kant and his former student, Johann Gottfried Herder, on the subject of happiness. It argues that Herder's position is more sophisticated than is often assumed, and that the opposition between him and Kant on this issue is, accordingly, also more complex than some scholars have suggested, touching upon a host of fundamental questions in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Kant and Herder hold sharply contrasting views of the relation between mind and body, between reason and perception, and between means and ends within various spheres of teleological understanding. They also differ on the nature and role of the emotions, and on the status of the 'natural' as a category applying both to an aspect of human subjectivity and to the objective world. As I demonstrate, these differences are implicated in the dispute between them on the value of happiness.

"Epistemicism Can't Save the Individuality of Species"
Matthew H. Slater, Columbia University
Many deny that species are natural kinds. For some, this denial is merely the flip side of a rather counterintuitive assertion: that species are individuals – literally, no kidding. Not paradigmatic individuals, mind you – like mountains, trees, people, tables, and such (if such there be) – but spatially scattered, spatiotemporally connected "hunks of the genealogical nexus." Such species-individuals will likely have indeterminate parts (particularly in the course of speciations); and as is well known mereological indeterminacy raises a host of worries. Perhaps it is incoherent. What is a definitist supporter of species individuality to do? A natural response: go epistemicist regarding species boundaries and speciations. But species epistemicism, I argue, does not stave off mereological indeterminacy unless one goes epistemicist about future events as well.

"Liberal Pluralism and the Case for Freedom as Non-Domination"
Andrew F. Smith, State University of New York - Stony Brook
William Galston argues in Liberal Pluralism that a specified version of Isaiah Berlin's idea of negative liberty, which he calls 'expressive liberty,' provides the best means to minimize the inevitable loss of personal integrity experienced by some citizens in any duly circumscribed social world. This is so insofar as it strongly supports the development of approaches to governance that can accommodate the widest possible range of choiceworthy values and an institutional schema that operates according to a basic principle of non-interference in the lives of citizens. I suggest, however, that expressive liberty, backed by the principle of non-interference, does not provide adequate support for the minimization of loss. Drawing on the work of Philip Pettit, I offer an alternative to Galston's version of negative liberty that may prove better suited to achieving his practical aim and helpful in revealing how his argument for liberal pluralism could be strengthened theoretically.

"Isness: A Philosophy for Avant-Gardes (2000/2005)"
Susan E. Spaid, Independent Scholar
For Arthur Danto, aboutness, for which an embodied meaning 'shows' what the work is 'about,' serves as the rhetorical device that distinguishes art (Warhol's Brillo Box) from non art (a cardboard Brillo box). However, avant-garde works first endure 'isness,' the discomfort accompanying one's experiencing unfamiliar, sensorial events. Works of art that sustain isness resist 'aboutness,' thus artworks that thwart 'pat' interpretive schemes survive longer as art in their refusal to enter art history. And works that gain or lose specific meanings prove more influential as they adapt to changing values and beliefs. Irrespective of era, isness dramatizes unfamiliar forms emerging against the grain, whaile aboutness captures tradition-bound cultures. Works that exhibit isness engender particularized events, startle viewers and plant memories that facilitate future awareness, thus casting dooubt on art's representationality. The creators of works that introduce new standards are rarely conscious of the rules or ideas that their works supposedly articulate.

"On Avoiding Performative Contradiction in Moral Criticism"
Elise Springer, Wesleyan University
A moral critic risks performative contradiction if she invokes a systematic moral theory to justify critical judgment, yet fails in the activities of criticism to conform to the moral demands she recognizes. The puzzle leads some, such as Henry Sidgwick, to embrace its awkward implications for the consequentialist moral critic, while it provides others, such as Rae Langton, with a reductio argument against any consequentialist criterion in moral philosophy. Though such puzzles have apparently been articulated only in consequentialist manifestations, my reflections here indicate that the problem is not specific to consequentialism, nor does it face all consequentialists: deontological theories on which any action can be assigned moral status likewise place actual moral critics in awkward dilemmas, such that accurate representation and moral activity stand in tension. Constructivist approaches to moral judgment avoid the performative contradiction, but at the cost of expecting good critics to diverge in their critical stances.

"Probability in Fine-tuning Design Arguments"
Kent W. Staley, St. Louis University
A fine-tuning argument for design (FTA) begins with the observation that certain physical parameters or initial conditions have values which could not differ very much without rendering human life impossible. FTAs infer from this observation that the universe is a product of a designing intelligence whose purpose it was in creating the universe to bring about or allow for human life. Contemporary FTAs often take the form of probabilistic arguments. This paper considers such arguments in light of possible interpretations of the probability statements in their premisses. Whether probabilities are regarded in physical, epistemic, or logical terms, probability statements about fine-tuning of fundamental physical parameters or cosmological initial conditions turn out to be unfounded, incoherent, or irrelevant.

"Particularism and Thick Ethical Properties"
Rebecca Lynn Stangl, University of Virginia
According to radical moral particularists such as Jonathan Dancy and Christine Swanton, not only can we not codify any natural features of a situation that will always count in favor of an action being the right or wrong thing to do, the so-called thick ethical properties also lack invariant deontic valence. Not only does pleasure not always count in favor of the rightness of a particular action, the fact that an action is just may also fail to count in favor of its rightness. The most compelling argument offered in defense of this thesis, it seems to me, is contained in Christine Swanton's article entitled, "A Virtue Ethical Criterion of Right Action." In this paper, I show that this argument is not successful. Following this, I offer one diagnosis of why this kind of argument, while ultimately unsuccessful, nevertheless possesses some initial plausibility.

"Do All Valuable Artworks Possess Aesthetic Value?"
Robert A. Stecker, Central Michigan University
This paper evaluates the claim that nothing is valuable as an artwork unless it possesses aesthetic value. This idea, that aesthetic value pervades artworks that are valuable at all, was put into doubt by a number of artistic movements that arose in the twentieth century such a Dada and its descendants including conceptual art, because works within these movements appear to be counter-examples to the claim. Recently, a number of philosophers have tried to resurrect aesthetic essentialism with regard to artistic value. They try to do this arguing either that the purported counter-examples actually possess aesthetic value or that they possess a value parasitic on the aesthetic value of other works. The purpose of this paper is to argue that this project hasn't and won't succeed.

"On the Ontological Priority of Thought Over Language: The Sellars-Chisholm Correspondence"
Benjamin J. Stenberg, University of Washington
In one of his letters to Chisholm on intentionality, Sellars seems to contradict himself by saying both that it's possible for there to exist a being that thinks but has no language to express itself and saying that one only gains the ability to think subsequent to having learned a language. The former claim seems buttressed by Sellars' talk in a number of other places of the `priority in being' of thought over language. In this paper I (1) exam closely just what the supposed `ontological priority' of thought comes to and conclude that it does not, in fact, add support to the idea that there could be thinking but language-less being, and (2) argue that the apparent contradiction in Sellars' letter to Chisholm can be alleviated by a deeper understanding of both the `ontological priority' of thought and the initially troubling claim itself.

"Sensory Qualities and Concept Empiricism"
Par Sundstrom, Umeå Universitet
According to Limited Concept Empiricism (LCE), there are certain ('phenomenal') thoughts about sensory qualities that one can think only if one has experienced the qualities they are about. Unlike the classical, unlimited concept empiricism of philosophers like Locke and Hume, (LCE) enjoys a lot of contemporary support. However, I think we don't have good reasons to believe in (LCE). In this paper, I discuss two motivations for the view: the motivation from Imagism, and the motivation from The What-Else Question. I argue that neither motivation provides us with reason to believe (LCE), and suggest that mastery of public language terms may enable one to think phenomenal thoughts about sensory qualities.

"Motives, Maxims, and Deontic Relevance"
Steven Sverdlik, Southern Methodist University
Does the motive from which an action is performed ever affect its deontic status? Any particular action falls into one and only of three deontic categories: obligatory, p rohibit ed or `merely permissible'. The question might then be formulated as whether MT is true. MT : There is an action X such that if X were performed from one motive it would fall into one deontic category, and if X were performed from another motive it would fall into a second deontic category. There are examples of actions whose motives are deontically relevant. I use them and MT as a way to explore the merits of Kantianism. I consider the procedure of testing `maxims' with the Categorical Imperative. Christine Korsgaard developed the most plausible version of this test. I will show that it fails to establish that MT is true when it operates on a promising example.

"Getting Clear on Group Autonomy"
Brian Thomas, University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
Laurence Thomas argues that contemporary African-Americans lack group autonomy, or in the least, possess it in lesser degrees than other groups, most notably, Jews. Angelo Cortlett disagrees claiming that Thomas's criteria pre-judge the case and that Thomas insufficiently app reciat es the barriers that blacks have faced since coming to the United States. I want to weave a path between both of these two views. I challenge Thomas's claim that blacks do not have group autonomy by arguing that the criteria he invokes are mis guided. But contra Cortlett, t hey do not beg the question. I argue that contra Corlett, Thomas has not in fact underappreciated the barriers blacks have faced, Thomas overstates such features. Both Thomas and Cortlett fail to sufficiently appreciate the fact that group autonomy is an interpretative project and recognizing this fact mitigates against the problems we see in specifying criteria to judge the instantiations of group autonomy.

"Modal Conceptualism: A Clarification and Defense"
Amie L. Thomasson, University of Miami
The view that modal truths are either analytic truths or based in combining an analytic truth with an empirical truth--a view I will call `modal conceptualism'--is appealing, since it promises to mitigate metaphysical and epistemological perplexities about modality. It is widely associated with two other theses: the denial that modality is a real or intrinsic feature of the world, and the claim that modal properties or facts are mind-dependent . Since the latter is widely thought to lead to anti-realism about objects, the conceptualist view is often rejected on those grounds. I will argue, however, that properly understood modal conceptualism does not entail either of the associated theses (though it makes accepting the former more plausible) and so cannot be rejected on grounds of leading to objectual anti-realism. The upshot will be that conceptualist approach to modality remains a viable option worthy of serious consideration, not quick dismissal.

"If It Were the Case that Counterfactuals Behaved Differently in Attitude Reports, It Might Be the Case that They Are Contex-Sensitive"
Christopher Tillman, University of Rochester
In this paper I argue that the widely held presumption that counterfactuals are context-sensitive is incorrect. I proceed by making some preliminary remarks about context-sensitivity. I then present and explain two arguments for the conclusion that counterfactuals are context-sensitive. According to the first, our intuitions about the truth of counterfactuals are to some extent variable. This variability is best explained by supposing that counterfactuals are context-sensitive. According to the second, the context-sensitivity of a counterfactual is inherited from the context-sensitivity of (e.g.) 'x is more similar to y than z'. I argue that neither of these arguments should be persuasive. Finally , I present and explain two arguments for the conclusion that counterfactuals are not context-sensitive. If the foregoing arguments are correct, the reasons for accepting that counterfactuals are context-sensitive are undermined and, in addition, we have positive reasons for rejecting the theses. I (tentatively) conclude that counterfactuals are not context-sensitive.

"On Being a Morally Responsible Stage"
Neal A. Tognazzini, University of California - Riverside
Certain metaphysical theses about the nature of persons may have consequences for our views about moral responsibility, and vice versa. Indeed, some philosophers have thought that persons cannot properly be held morally responsible for their actions unless they endure through time. According to these philosophers, if perdurance is true, then no one is ever morally responsible. In this essay, I examine this claim specifically as it applies to stage theory – a theory about persistence according to which continuants are identified with instantaneous stages. I articulate and critically assess what I take to be three of the strongest argument s for the conclusion that stage theory is incompatible with moral responsibility. I show how the arguments fail, and thus conclude that morally responsible agency can exist even if stage theory is true.

"The Passions That Rule"
Teemu Toppinen, University of Helsinki and University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
In this paper I examine a phenomenon that I call the 'subjective normative authority' of normative judgments, and implications of this phenomenon to the debate between cognitivists, who hold – roughly – that normative judgments are beliefs, and conativists who hold – roughly – that they are desires of sorts. Normative judgments guide action with authority: agents, in being guided by normative judgment, take there to be reasons both for their judgments and for the desires rationalized in the process. I first defend conativism from an argument of Michael Smith's, in his Which Passions Rule? and elsewhere, to the effect that conativism can only account for this phenomenon on pain of collapse to cognitivism. Secondly, I argue that cognitivism is bound to misrepresent this authority of normative judgment. Conativism, but not cognitivism, can explain how it is possible to be guided by authoritative normative judgment, and for the right reasons.

"Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility"
Hilary Greaves, Rutgers University
David Wallace, Oxford University
According to Bayesian epistemology, the epistemically rational agent updates her beliefs by conditionalization. This claim that conditionalization is recommended by rationality can be challenged – whence the normative force of the injunction to conditionalize? There are several existing justifications for conditionalization, but none directly addresses the idea that conditionalization will be epistemically rational if and only if it can reasonably be expected to lead to epistemically good outcomes. We apply the approach of cognitive decision theory to provide a justification for conditionalization using precisely that idea. We assign epistemic utility functions to epistemically rational agents; an agent's epistemic utility is to depend both upon the actual state of the world and on the agent's credence distribution over possible states. We prove that, under independently motivated conditions, conditionalization is the unique updating rule that maximizes expected epistemic utility.

"Consciousness and Reflection in Locke's Essay: Solving the Problem of Incoherence"
Shelley Weinberg, University of Toronto
Locke states succinctly in II.i.19 of the Essay, "Consciousness is the Perception of what passes in a Man's own Mind" and in II.i.4 that reflection is "the Perception of the Operations of our own Minds." The question is how consciousness of mental operations differs from reflection. According to the received view, Locke cannot coherently distinguish or identify consciousness and reflection without jettisoning either his commitment to the empiricist principle that all ideas originate in sensation and reflection or his commitment to the reflective abilities of children. I argue that this dilemma rests the mistaken assumption that consciousness bears the same productive relation to ideas as sensation and reflection. I show that on a different assumption, that consciousness is not an additional mental act, but an aspect internal to perception, the conflict between consciousness and Locke's other significant commitments is resolved.

"Factivity Without Safety"
Dennis Whitcomb, Rutgers University
I summarize Timothy Williamson's theory of knowledge, construct some counterexamples to it, and try to diagnose the problem in virtue of which those counterexamples arise. Then I consider possible responses. It turns out that only one of those responses is tenable, and that that response renders Williamson's theory a continuous piece of, rather than a radical paradigmatic break from, recent mainstream work in the theory of knowledge.

"Immigrant Admissions and Globalized Relations of Harm"
Shelley Wilcox, Temple University
This paper rejects the open borders position on immigration on the grounds that it fails to provide adequate normative guidance concerning immigration in the world today. Many more immigrants presently seek admission to affluent states than those societies are willing to accept, and a principled means for determining which immigrants have the strongest moral claims to admission is urgently needed. The open borders position cannot provide such a means because it construes the right to immigrate strictly as universal right. In contrast, I defend an admissions-guiding principle that assigns strong moral claims to admission to certain immigrants. According to this principle, a state must admit immigrants if admission is necessary to prevent the state from harming those immigrants or if admission is an appropriate means for compensating immigrants whom the state has already harmed. States must fulfill these obligations before legitimately using immigration policy to meet other national goals.

"Explaining the Success and Failures of Science"
K. Brad Wray, State University of New York - Oswego
Like the realist, van Fraassen is impressed by the fact that in mature fields our current theories routinely enable us to make accurate predictions. Unlike the realist, he does not believe that the best explanation for the predictive success of our current theories is that our theories accurately reflect the structure of the world. He attributes the success of our current theories to the fact that unsuccessful theories have been eliminated in a process of selection comparable to the selection process operative in the biological world. I argue that van Fraassen's explanation is superior to the realists' explanation because it can explain why it is that we come to reject once widely-accepted theories that were regarded as successful in the past. Unlike the realist's explanation, van Fraassen's selectionist explanation provides us with the resources to explain both the success and failures of science.

"The Tracking Theory of Epistemic Justification"
Mark E. Wunderlich, Iowa State University
I propose a tracking theory of epistemic justification: belief A is at least as justified as belief B if and only if A tracks the truth at least as well as B. Following Nozick's (1981) development of the tracking theory of knowledge, I discuss tracking in terms of nearby possible worlds; following Sosa (1999, 2004), I focus on error-avoidance rather than truth acquisition. This theory could accompany a tracking theory of knowledge, but it is also has independent interest. The chief benefit of the tracking approach is that it yields an account of a family of closely related concepts of epistemic justification. It therefore offers new possibilities for interpreting traditional disputes in epistemology, including the internalism/externalism controversy.

"Modal Realism and Modal Tense"
Takashi Yagisawa, California State University - Northridge
Modal realism is any theory that postulates possible worlds as real entities in such a way that merely possible individuals existing at merely possible worlds are as real as actual individuals existing at our actual world. I advise modal realists to follow the methodology of fashioning a modal realist theory of possible worlds and possible individuals after a certain temporal metaphysical theory, namely, presentism. This is surprising; presentism is chauvinist, whereas modal realism is egalitarian. I advise modal realists to mimic presentists and postulate the modal equivalent of tense, or modal tense. This should be done while ignoring the chauvinist aspect of presentism and following the egalitarian spirit of four-dimensionalism instead. This will give modal realists a uniform way to respond to various objections to modal realism. It will also open a promising path to a non-Lewisian variety of modal realism.

"Should I Not Kill? Could I Not Kill?: Murder, Shame, and the Death Penalty"
Benjamin S. Yost, University of California - Berkeley
This presentation has two aims: to unpack Levinas' provocative claim that the AI [is] not innocent spontaneity but usurper and murderer, and to turn this claim into an argument against the death penalty. Our murderousness, I will argue, is the fact that we can never fulfill our obligation to prevent the other's death. To achieve the second aim, I will examine Levinas' assertion that this incapacity gives rise to the affect of shame. I will then argue that for all the difficulty inherent in extracting concrete prescriptions from Levinas' philosophy, this account of the shameful relation to the other's death can support the argument that capital punishment violates human dignity.

"The Meaning and Meaningfulness of Terrorism"
Mohammed Abed, University of Wisconsin - Madison
This paper sets out criteria of adequacy for a definition of terrorism. I argue that accounts of the meaning of terrorism that smuggle intrinsic wrongness into the concept itself and definitions that rule out the intentions and motives behind 'paradigm acts' of terrorism do not meet these criteria and are therefore conceptually inadequate. The former obstructs further philosophical enquiry into the ethical status of terrorism while the latter fails to distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence. I then present a definition of terrorism that meets this set of criteria. On my view, the concept of terrorism can be defined in terms of the means employed by terrorists, the 'logic' of the act, its meaningfulness, and the ultimate objectives that terrorists have in mind. In particular, I show that as well as subsuming 'paradigm' instances, the definition encompasses cases of terrorism not widely recognized as such and therefore undercuts the claim that the concept of terrorism is not amenable to definition.

"Quasi-Independence, Fitness, and Advantageousness"
Kevin Brosnan, Independent Scholar
I argue that the idea of "quasi-independence" (Lewontin 1978) cannot be understood without attending to the distinction between fitness and advantageousness (Sober 1993). Natural selection increases the frequency of fitter traits, not necessarily of advantageous ones. A positive correlation between an advantageous trait and a disadvantageous one may, or may not, prevent the advantageous trait from evolving. The quasi-independence criterion is aimed at specifying the conditions under which advantageous traits will evolve under natural selection. Contrary to what others have argued (Sterelny (1992) and Sterelny and Griffiths (1999)), these conditions must involve a precise quantitative measure of, a) the extent to which advantageous traits are beneficial, and b) the degree to which they are correlated. Driscoll (2004) recognizes the need for such a measure, but I argue that she does not provide the correct formulation. The account of quasi-independence that I offer clarifies this point, and in addition, illuminates the ways this concept has been misused; e.g., in arguments seeking to replace sociobiology with evolutionary psychology (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999), and in arguments advanced by many evolutionary psychologists supporting a modular view of the mind (Tooby and Cosmides 1992).

"Aristotle on Consciousness"
Philip Corkum, University of Alberta
Aristotle holds that there is a passive intellect, by which the mind can become any intelligible object, and an active intellect, by which the mind can make any intelligible object. What is the activity of the activeintellect? In this paper, I'll consider an argument that the role of the active intellect in thought is analogous to the role of perceiving that we see and hear in perception. The paper comes in two parts. In the first part, I'll argue that perceiving that we see and hear isn't a special case of perception but is rather a necessary condition for any perception whatsoever. In particular, perceiving that we see and hear is a turning of one's attention to the affection of the sense organs. In the second part of the essay, I'll consider an argument that the activity of the active intellect is analogous to perceiving that we see and hear. If this is correct, then the activity of the active intellect is not a special case of intellection but rather a necessary condition of any intellection whatsoever. In particular, the activity of the active intellect is a turning of one's attention to the intelligible objects contained in the passive intellect.

"Respect for Persons and the Doctrine of Religious Restraint"
Chris Eberle, Independent Scholar
The Doctrine of Religious Restraint is the claim that a citizen in a liberal democracy should not support a policy for which she has only a religious rationale even if she properly regards that rationale as probative and, indeed, even if that rationale is probative. The most prominent argument for the Doctrine of Religious Restraint appeals to the claim that we ought to treat each person as having equal moral standing: citizens ought to obey the Doctrine of Religious Restraint because doing so is required in order for citizens to respect one another as persons who have equal moral standing. But I argue that that argument is not sound: there is no sense in which a citizen who supports a public policy solely on religious grounds thereby disrespects her compatriots.

"Sacred Mountains and Beloved Fetuses: Can Loving or Worshipping Something Give It Moral Status?"
Elizabeth Harman, New York University
Suppose an indigenous tribe worships a mountain and believes that hiking harms the mountain. Some hikers want to hike on the mountain, but they could have a somewhat less enjoyable hike elsewhere. The tribe's worship provides some reason against hiking on the mountain, even if the tribe will never find out about the hiking. We might explain the reason by saying that the mountain actually comes to have moral status by being worshipped by the tribe. (Mary Anne Warren has such a view.) I argue that this initially attractive claim has unacceptable implications. In particular, it implies that anti-abortion protesters can endow moral status upon the fetus of a pregnant woman who is planning to abort.

"The Reductivist's Troubles with Mental Causation"
Eric Hiddleston, Wayne State University
I present a "problem of mental causation", and argue that the " Reductive Materialism" of Jaegwon Kim and David Lewis has no good solution to it. Kim and Lewis must either deny special science explanations generally, or deny a plausible premise I call "Explanatory Realism" (roughly, that good explanations cite causes). I argue that the "Nonreductive" Materialist has an adequate solution.

"Emergence: A Response to Kim"
Brannon McDaniel, University of Virginia
In his recent book, Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough (Princeton, 2005), Jaegwon Kim sets out a strengthened version of his "supervenience" argument, in which he claims that several varieties of nonreductive physicalism are committed to mental properties "downwardly" causing physical properties. Causation of this sort is thought to be problematic, since no framework yet supplied has succeeded in explaining how mental properties can maintain their causal efficacy; the work claimed for mental properties can seemingly be assigned to physical properties. I provide an account centered on the famil iar notion of emergence, and the position that is developed fits squarely within Kim's family of nonreductive physicalist views. I specifically argue for the following conclusions: emergence occurs only at a given level of ontological complexity; mentality should be construed as the exemplification of a causally-efficacious universal by a particular entity. An unproblematic account of downward causation is motivated, explained, and shown to be compatible with Kim's requirements, while avoiding the supp osed difficulties inherent in such a position.

"The Chickenhawk Argument"
Cheyney Ryan, University of Oregon
The chickenhawk charge is a recurring feature of the political landscape but it is far from clear what the argument is. Some say that there is no argument, that the charge is only an illogical ad hominem invective. This essay argues that, properly construed, the issues raised by the chickenhawk charge are perfectly valid ones that raise fundamental concerns about the place of personal responsibilty with respect to war in a democracy.

"From Nihilism to Monism"
Jonathan M. Schaffer, University of Massachusetts - Amherst
Mereological nihilism is the view that everything is simple. Extant discussions of nihilism assume that such simples will be many and small – some plurality of point particles or other wee bits of matter. Existence monism is the view that only the world exists. Such monism is a version of nihilism, since it entails that all that exists is one big simple – a partless, seamless One. I will argue that nihilism culminates in monism. The main argument for nihilism is that it provides the simplest sufficient ontology, and monism provides the simplest of sufficient ontologies. What will emerge is a story about how commonsense is divided. On the one hand, commonsense ontology embraces mereological composites. On the other hand, commonsense methodology demands the simplest sufficient ontology. This is the story about what commonsense is divided between – on the one hand folk mereology, and on the other, not the Democritean idea of atoms in the void, but rather the Parmenidean vision of a seamless One.

"The Fundamental Limits of Reason in Descartes's Moral Thought"
Gary Steiner, Bucknell University
The importance of morality in Descartes's thought has been all but overlooked in contemporary English-language scholarship on Descartes. The central importance of morality in Descartes's thought is reflected by the influence of Christian thinkers such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas on Descartes's conception of the human being. The foundations of morality in Descartes's thought are Christian commitments that Descartes shares with these thinkers. This foundational dimension of Descartes's thought is often overlooked because Descartes's strong emphasis on technological thinking and his program to use physics to render human beings "the masters and possessors of nature" have led many commentators to see him as a purely secular thinker. But even Descartes's ideal for the mastery of nature is ultimately grounded in Christian thought, although it comes into conflict with traditional Christian ideals. Descartes's commitment to Christian piety and his commitment to the autonomy of human reason stand in a irreconcilable tension with one another. This tension is between an "angelic" Christian commitment to live in accordance with God's dictates, and an 'earthly' or technological ideal reflected in Descartes's endeavor to use autonomous human reason to ground scientific practice. Descartes's 'angelic' commitments are reflected in his acknowledgment that articles of faith like the Trinity cannot be demonstrated by rational insight, and in his ideal of generosity, which he describes in unmistakably Christian terms. Descartes's technological orientation is evident in his repeated attempts to argue for the self-sufficiency of reason and his reduction of nature to an object of maniupulation and domination in the service of human material welfare. Descartes never resolves the tension in his thought between angelic and earthly aspirations. Rethinking Descartes's own ambivalence about morality promises to shed light on the respective roles that reason and faith can play in contemporary moral reflection.

"Evolution and the Schizophrenia of Quasi-realism About Normativity"
Sharon Street, New York University
When quasi-realists put on their hats as metaethical theorists, they say that to make a normative claim is to express a certain state of mind (such as planning). Yet when they put on their hats as participants in normative discourse, they say that normative truths hold independently of these same states of mind. While holding both positions simultaneously might seem to embody an unacceptable schizophrenia, quasi-realists have forcefully argued that there is no inconsistency whatsoever involved in holding both positions. For many of us, however, the impression of an untenable schizophrenia is hard to shake. In this paper, I argue that this lingering impression is right, and that it is Darwinian considerations which enable us to see this. I argue that we cannot prevent our naturalistic understanding of the Darwin ian origins of our normative capacities from interacting and ultimately conflicting with the view that there are independent normative truths – even if we understand this latter claim in the exact manner directed by quasi-realists. For expository purposes, I focus mostly on Allan Gibbard's quasi-realist position as presented in Thinking How to Live, but I believe the conclusions I reach are of broader significance, applying across the board to quasi-realist views on normativity.

"Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives"
Kevin L. Timpe, University of California - San Diego
In current debates about moral responsibility, it is commonplace to differentiate two fundamentally different incompatibilist positions: Leeway Incompatibilism and Source Incompatibilism. In the present paper, I arguethat this is a bad dichotomy. Those forms of Leeway Incompatibilism that have no appeal to 'origination' or 'ultimacy' are problematic, which suggests that incompatibilists should prefer Source Incompatibilism. I then differentiate two sub-classifications of Source Incompatibilism. Narrow Source Incompatibilism holds that alternative possibilities are outside the scope of what is required for moral responsibility. Wide Source Incompatibilism maintains that while ultimacy is most fundamental to moral responsibility, an agent meeting the ultimacy condition will also have alternative possibilities, thereby also satisfying an alternativepossibilities condition. I give reasons to think that a version of Wide Source Incompatibilism is the most promising incompatibilist position.

"Defending a Possibilist Insight in Consequentialist Thought"
Jean-Paul Vessel, New Mexico State University
There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following deontic principle: DC: O(a & b) O(a) & O(b) The principle states that for any acts a and b, if it is obligatory for a specific agent to do the compound act a & b, then that agent is obligated to do a and is also obligated to do b – the deontic operators distribute over conjunction. Possibilists – those who believe that we should always pursue a "best" possible course of action available to us – accept the principle as true. Actualists – those who believe that certain future facts about the actual world can generate obligations incompatible with the best possible course of action available to us – reject the principle as false. I'm out to defend DC from the actualist attack. In this essay, I briefly present the central actualist argument against DC. I then show that possibilism has all of the resources to explain the phenomena with which actualists are so concerned. Next, I try to diagnose the actualists' malcontent. Finally, I attempt to shed some light on the nature of consequentialist conditionals by incorporating possibilist insights into a semantics for subjunctive conditionals appropriate for consequentialist theorizing.

"New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives"
Peter B.M. Vranas, Iowa State University
Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied – what more is there to say? Much more, I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three-valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic.

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